

"From solitary confinement, Dr. Wang is calling on the leaders of America to stand with him and to demand his unconditional release," it is said in a statement.

Wen is due to meet with U.S. President George W. Bush early next week to discuss trade and issues related to Taiwan, which Beijing views as a renegade province, among others.

Wang, a U.S. green card holder in his mid-50s said by family members to have renounced Chinese citizenship, was the first democracy activist charged by China with terrorism and espionage.

[From the South China Morning Post, Dec. 11, 2003]

FEARS GROW FOR HEALTH OF JAILED
DISSIDENT

(By Verna Yu)

Imprisoned dissident Wang Bingzhang is on the brink of a nervous breakdown due to the "mental torture" he has suffered in jail, and is threatening to go on a hunger strike, his brother says. Wang Bingwu, who visited his older brother at a prison in Shaoguan, Guangdong, last Friday, said he found the solitary confinement and mandatory "political education" imposed three times a day increasingly difficult to bear.

"He told me to tell the world that in order to end his solitary confinement and mental torture, he would go on a hunger strike," Mr. Wang said in Hong Kong yesterday.

Critics say the so-called "political education" sessions in mainland prisons typically include several hours of brainwashing, forced self-criticism and confession of alleged crimes.

He was arrested and convicted on espionage and terrorism charges and given a life sentence in February. He was found guilty of providing intelligence to Taiwan between 1982 and 1990. He and his family deny the charges.

Mr. Wang said his brother looked frail and was suffering from stomach ailments and varicose ulcers. He said his brother was given medicine in prison but was banned from taking other medication that his family brought from America.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 4 minutes to my good friend, the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. RYAN).

Mr. RYAN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

I also want to thank the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON) for his leadership on this issue and a lot of other issues. Regardless of party and regardless of what the political pressure is, the gentleman has taken a stand; and being a new Member of Congress, I want to thank the gentleman for an opportunity to be able to witness that up close.

Mr. Speaker, the issue of Dr. Wang is a very interesting one, for a variety of reasons. The one reason that strikes me, and the gentleman from Indiana alluded to this, is that he was meeting with a labor activist. I find that very interesting, and I find this particular situation a symptom of a larger disease that we are trying to deal with.

They are saying there was a violation of three articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There is obviously no longer a Universal Declaration of Human Rights because countries like China do not agree to this kind of standard that we have set.

So this man was trying to help organize labor in China and trying to help bring some dignity and justice to the labor industry in China. It is obvious that China does not want it, but I think it is becoming more and more apparent that the major corporations in the United States who do business in China do not want China to have labor standards either.

If citizens of the regime in China try to unionize, they will be arrested, they will be beaten, they will be tortured. Many of the workers are bonded workers that come from the farms and go in to work in some of the factories. These people in China and the government of China do not enforce the minimum wage standards that they have, nor some of the safety rules that they have.

Why do they not want to do this? Because if they enforce these rules, as the AFL-CIO has indicated to us, there would be a 10 percent to 77 percent increase in the cost of goods coming out of China. We do not want to say that we want to raise prices, but I thought that this would bring about global competition, and I thought we were going to spread democracy. We want to lift the Chinese worker up. We want to lift them up to live, hopefully, one day, with the standards that we have here in the United States of America.

But just think, if this would happen, if there would be a 10 to 77 percent increase in the goods coming out of the Chinese market, the U.S. worker would finally be able to compete, Mr. Speaker, would finally be able to compete; and it would eliminate the problem we are even having dealing with the currency right now, if we would have those kinds of labor and human rights standards put in place.

I want to share a quote from the President of the United States when he was in Cleveland, Ohio, on March 10, 2003. He said to the workers in Ohio, "Ohio workers, if given a level playing field, can outproduce any worker anywhere on Earth," if we had a level playing field.

What we need to do is ask this administration to get tough on China. A level playing field will not just fall out of the sky.

Then when we saw, and the AFL-CIO petitioned for, an opportunity to try to fix the currency manipulation problems and some of the labor rights problems, four Members of this administration's cabinet said that the administration's efforts at diplomatic engagement with Beijing on these two issues, currency and labor rights, would produce more results than threatening punitive tariffs.

Efforts at diplomatic engagement? This is coming from an administration that, when they walk the halls of the United Nations, it is like a bull in a china shop. They have no diplomatic touch. We have alienated all of our allies. Now we want to go and try to deal with China with diplomacy, while they are abusing workers, while they are

abusing people, going to Vietnam to pick people up who are going to help workers organize in China.

Something needs to be done, and something needs to be done now. I appreciate the opportunity that the gentleman from California has given me and the gentleman from California.

I rise in support of this; but, again, I think it is a symptom of a larger problem that needs to be dealt with, and this administration and this Congress need to continue to push China to enforce the human rights that we have been exporting from this country for many, many years and want to continue to export out of this country.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time as well.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. COLE). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, H. Con. Res. 326.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of those present have voted in the affirmative.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

EXPRESSING CONCERN OF CONGRESS OVER IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 398) expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.

The Clerk read as follows:

H. CON. RES. 398

Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);

Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;

Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by an opposition group;

Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;

Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per year;

Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into Iran—specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991—the processing and use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of the material;

Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about its nuclear activities;

Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities;

Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;

Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;

Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such activities;

Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA;

Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns about its nuclear development program;

Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium hexafluoride from China;

Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;

Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;

Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;

Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to import enrichment related items;

Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;

Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;

Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;

Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the international community for full transparency;

Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;

Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated "P2" uranium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to—

(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a "full picture of its nuclear activities" and "full transparency";

(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and

(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to "leave no stone unturned" to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;

Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program;

Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;

Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to sanction Iran to

persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons development program;

Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with "serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution", and also noted that the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;

Whereas the same resolution also noted "with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments";

Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear activities; and

Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international community, its receipt from other countries of the means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress—

(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities;

(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards;

(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;

(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample

evidence of Iran's continuing policy of non-compliance with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;

(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing related equipment;

(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;

(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;

(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities;

(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA;

(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and the international community regarding Iran's military nuclear activities—

(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil field;

(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid natural gas production field;

(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry; and

(D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;

(11) deplors any effort by any country to provide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;

(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, sites, and all information related to the investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs that could support the development of nuclear weapons;

(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest opportunity, to report to the

United Nations Security Council that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the IAEA;

(14) urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities;

(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;

(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and

(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON) and the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H. Con. Res. 398.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Con. Res. 398, a resolution which condemns Iran's continued violations of its obligations and commitments regarding its nuclear program; expresses Congress' grave concern over Iran's efforts to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons, which threaten not only that region, but possibly the world; and calls for a series of steps to be undertaken by various parties to address this threat.

I am proud to be a cosponsor of this measure, and I commend the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman HYDE) and the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), on this bipartisan effort and for their leadership.

Mr. Speaker, after getting caught with its hand in the cookie jar, the Iranian regime was forced to admit in the fall of 2002 that it had nuclear facilities that it had failed to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency. From that time onward, Iran has engaged in a systematic campaign of deception and manipulation to hide its true intentions and to keep its large-scale nuclear efforts a secret.

For at least 18 years, the Iranian regime has been pursuing a covert nuclear program. It has undertaken a number of efforts for the manufacture and testing of centrifuge components, most of which, according to recent IAEA reporting, are owned by military industrial organizations.

It has an enrichment facility designed for the simultaneous operation of large numbers of centrifuges, and a large, partially-underground facility at Natanz, intended to house up to 50,000 centrifuges. Concurrently, Iran is pursuing another approach to uranium enrichment which uses lasers, a complex technology rarely used by even the most advanced countries because it is not cost efficient.

Iran has expressed interest in the purchase of up to six additional nuclear power plants and is pursuing a heavy water research reactor at Arak, a type of reactor that would be well-suited for plutonium production. This represents yet another path to nuclear weapons, which endangers not only the region, but the world.

According to the IAEA report of November of last year, the Iranian regime admitted that it had failed to report a large number of activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium. This same report noted that Iran's deceptions have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear cycle.

Further, the IAEA could not disprove that Iran's nuclear program was not for weapons development and could not conclude that it was solely for "peaceful purposes."

Iran's most recent breaches of its obligations include failing to disclose work on advanced P-2 centrifuges for uranium enrichment and work on Polonium 210, an element which could be used in nuclear explosions.

As a result, Iran has forfeited its right to develop a nuclear fuel cycle and should immediately and unconditionally cease all nuclear enrichment activities.

H. Con. Res. 398 enumerates a series of steps that should be undertaken to, number one, hold the Iranian regime accountable for its nuclear program; and, two, establish a clear precedent that such proliferation efforts, efforts which clearly threaten international peace and security, will not be tolerated. Those who pursue them will have to suffer the consequences.

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The Iranian Government needs to think very, very strongly about that.

Among the demands it places on the International Atomic Energy Agency, it urges the IAEA Board of Governors to quickly report the Iranian case to the U.N. Security Council for further action, which should include steps to prevent Iran from engaging in further clandestine nuclear activities. It also urges the U.N. Security Council to declare that non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT who violate their commitments forfeit their rights under this treaty.

As President Bush said on February 11 of this year, "Proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons."

Mr. Speaker, H. Con. Res. 398 calls upon the international community, through different venues, to use all appropriate means to deter and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear cooperation with Iran until certain conditions are met.

Given the ongoing developments in the political and economic relationship of the European Union countries and Iran, the resolution calls upon the EU countries to suspend bilateral trade agreements with this pariah state until Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development efforts. Also, given the severity of Iran's proliferation activities and heeding the lessons from Libya, H. Con. Res. 398 asks the European Union to go a step further and consider sanctions as a means of compelling Iran to comply with these international obligations and expressed commitments.

It calls on governments whose nationals, businesses, and other entities are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities to, one, fully investigate such a relationship; two, grant full access to the IAEA to conduct its own parallel investigations; and, three, immediately review and rectify export control regulations and practices to prevent further assistance to countries seeking a nuclear weapons capacity.

These are not just in keeping with President Bush's counterproliferation initiatives as outlined in February of this year, but also affirm the tenets of the U.S.-led resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council just last Wednesday.

Mr. Speaker, H. Con. Res. 398 reinforces longstanding congressional efforts to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the funds to pursue and expand their threatening activities, in particular, their proliferation activities. It calls on all countries to take steps to end investment-related efforts that in some way support Iran's energy sector.

This is particularly relevant given plans announced by Iran on Sunday aiming for a six-fold increase in its petrochemical revenues to \$20 billion a year by the year 2015. It is further relevant given, for example, the April 25 announcement that French oil giant Total was awarded a \$1.2 billion contract to develop phase 11 of the massive South Pars gas field in Iran.

H. Con. Res. 398, therefore, also calls for immediate enforcement of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act with respect to Iran.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I would simply like to refer to a recent statement made by Iran's so-called moderate leader, Mohammad Khatami, while Iran was blocking access to IAEA inspectors. He said Iran "has no obliga-

tion toward anybody other than what our interests require."

Placing this in further context, I draw my colleagues' attention to Iran's display last fall of its newly deployed advanced medium-range ballistic missiles which military analysts say could reach Israel or U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf. Television photographs of the display showed one of the missile carriers with a sign that read, "We will stomp on America," and that says it all, as far as I am concerned. We must stop their nuclear proliferation program.

A terrorist state like Iran must not, cannot, be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapons capability, and we need to do whatever is necessary to stop them. Let us send a clear message to Iran, and to all other potential proliferators, that we will not tolerate this behavior, we will not sit idly by as Iran threatens our Nation, our interests, and global security.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to render their strong support to this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this important resolution, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I want to pay tribute to the chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), and to my friend, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON), for their leadership on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, for over a decade, the United States has been trying to alert the entire world to Iran's efforts to covertly develop nuclear weapons. Finally, the rest of the world seems at least ready to listen. Now we must convince them to act.

For many years, Iran has deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency and the entire world about the true purpose of its supposedly peaceful nuclear energy program. The ayatollahs of terrorism have, through the international nuclear black market, acquired equipment and facilities to produce nuclear weapons-grade uranium. As a result of IAEA inspections over the past 15 months, we now know that Iran has acquired designs for sophisticated uranium enrichment equipment and that Iran has been lying about this for years. Iran has even experimented with materials that could be used to initiate a nuclear detonation.

Given that Iran used the same supplier network that provided Libya with the blueprint for a nuclear warhead, we must assume that Iran has an operable nuclear bomb design.

Iran is rightly condemned as a state sponsor of terrorism responsible for funding numerous terrorist groups that murder and maim innocent civilians. Imagine then, Mr. Speaker, this terrorist state armed with nuclear weapons.

This is the threat we face. Iran must not under any circumstances be al-

lowed to acquire nuclear weapons. We must keep the pressure on Iran, as we did on Libya, to step off this most dangerous path. We must keep the pressure on our friends and allies in the European Union and elsewhere who mistakenly believe that continued trade and investment will somehow cause the ayatollahs to give up their multiyear quest for nuclear weapons.

We must also keep the pressure on the IAEA's Board of Governors to again condemn Iran at their June meeting and to formally refer Iran's breaches of its safeguards and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations to the United Nations Security Council.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution also sets a new standard for states to have access to technology for peaceful nuclear purposes. It declares that Iran, through its repeated and flagrant violations of its international obligations, has forfeited the right to be trusted with technology that can be misused to produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution and to send a message to Iran and the entire world that enough is enough. It is past time to isolate Iran economically and diplomatically. A nuclear Iran threatens us all. Driven by its extremist ideology, it might attack and surely could blackmail our friends in the region. Iran's nuclearization would spell the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. We must not let that happen.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. TANCREDO), a member of the committee.

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I just want to add my support to this endeavor and this resolution. Certainly, the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), the author of the resolution, and the committee itself and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON) have been extremely articulate in laying out the points that we should pursue and in encouraging us to bring this resolution and have stated, again articulately, why we should support it. I want to add to those issues that we have laid out some other things that are not specifically identified in the resolution, but I think are important for us to consider.

We must recognize that much of what we know today about Iran and certainly what we know about its nuclear production capabilities, and not just capabilities, but what they have already done, comes to us not as a result of information identified by the international inspection regime. It comes to us as a result of the fact that Iranian dissidents have, at great risk, made this information available to the West.

On more than one occasion, these Iranian dissidents have provided us

with information that we now know to be accurate. It has become invaluable in many ways, and they should be credited for what they have done. It is also important to note that many of these people who have taken refuge in Iraq are under the control and the protection right now of American forces over there. It is also I think important to understand that Iran, the mullahs in Iran are today demanding that these people be returned, forcibly returned to Iran to face certain death. It is inconceivable I think that we would agree to such a situation, especially in light of the information that they have provided and the valuable asset that they in fact are in that part of the world.

We also recognize that much of the difficulty we now face in Iraq is a result of Iran's interference, sending people across that border, inflaming the passions that we now witness in the form of acts of violence against Americans and American troops over there.

So all of these things, as I say, I am glad they have been said, but I just did not want to let this resolution go by without a reference to the people who have worked so hard to bring the information forward and who have struggled for a long time for a free Iran. They are dedicated to that proposition. They are dedicated to a free secular country, a democratic country over there, and I think it would be certainly heartless, it would be a tragedy if we were to abandon them, if we were to actually allow them to be returned to, as I say, certain death in that country.

So I just wanted to add that dimension to this debate. Again, I thank the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON), the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), and the committee for bringing this resolution forward.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to my friend, the gentleman from the State of Washington (Mr. BAIRD).

Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend and colleague, the ranking member of this committee, and the chairman for their initiative. I think it is long past time for this Nation to express grave concern and work with the international community to thwart Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and I applaud them for this resolution.

I do, however, feel compelled to ask an inquiry of the chairman and the ranking member, and it is this: we have seen, I believe, a growing concern about possible usurpation by the administration of congressional authority, particularly in regard to war-making and the use of force. I thoroughly intend to support this sound resolution. I just would like clarification that the resolution does not, in its efforts to rein in the Iranian nuclear program, authorize the President to use force.

I yield to my distinguished ranking member to address this.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding, and I am very pleased to respond to his inquiry.

This resolution is not and cannot be construed to be an authorization for the use of force against Iran. It calls upon all of the state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to take all appropriate measures to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, including economic sanctions and international pressure.

□ 1845

The international sanctions on Libya were ultimately successful in convincing Colonel Qaddafi to give up all of his programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. This is the model that the world community needs to pursue with Iraq.

Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for that clarification. I intend to support this most worthy proposal, and I think it is important that we establish for the record that this Congress is not intending with this legislation to authorize the use of force without approval of the Congress.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN).

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I speak as the ranking Democrat on the subcommittee that deals with terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

I want to clarify of the backgrounds that we face with Iran. First, Iran has a large amount of natural gas. This natural gas is flared. They do not need to generate electricity with nuclear plants. In fact, they can without pollution and at very low costs generate electricity using the natural gas that goes to waste under the present system.

Second, we talk here of the Iranian government. That is very different from the Iranian people who among all the peoples of the Middle East are among those who are most pro-American and, frankly, who are not terribly interested in seeing their country acquire nuclear weapons. We should remember that weapons of mass destruction is a rather vague term that encompasses mustard gas on the one hand and nuclear weapons on the other, and we should not be confused.

Since World War I, I doubt more than a dozen Americans have been killed using chemical or biological weapons. And while Saddam killed many using mustard gas, he did so against highly unsophisticated civilians in a third world situation.

In contrast, nuclear weapons if used in an American city would kill hundreds of thousands of people or millions of people. We can not put these in the same category. And let us not think that a missile defense system will save us. Iran would like to have intercontinental ballistic missiles and the glory of just being able to push a button and see the missile fly off. But the government of Iran sees it is as easy to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States as it is to smuggle into person or a bale of marijuana. A nuclear weap-

on is as detectable, it is as large as a person.

Thus, a nuclear weapon created in Iran could be smuggled into any of our districts. Keep in mind that the government in Iran has sought again and again to kill as many Americans as possible. It is harboring top operatives of al Qaeda, including bin Laden's own son. It is harboring the individual who caused the bombings in Riyadh that killed 7 Americans. It is responsible for the deaths at Khobar Tower and earlier deaths of our people in Saudi Arabia, killing at least 2 dozen Americans.

This is a government in Iran which, if it has nuclear weapons, will marry a desire to kill Americans with a capacity to kill us by the hundreds of thousands.

Now, this is a great resolution. But it is only a resolution. What we need to do is to marry our desire to rein in the nuclear program with a real bill with real teeth. I have introduced to this House, and we have quite a number of co-sponsors for the Iran Freedom and Democracy Support Act. That Act would provide real money to those working for peace and democracy in Iran. That Act would impose real economic sanctions and we need to pass this resolution today or tomorrow and then go on to deploying real money and real economic sanctions in an effort to deal with the Iranian program.

Look at what happened with Libya. They faced multi-lateral economic sanctions and they agreed to abandon their nuclear program. Now, they are getting for an investment, they are getting international air flights, et cetera. This administration promised us an aggressive defense of America. And it has given us only an invasion of Iraq which had apparently no weapons of mass destruction at all. North Korea has 3 years further in developing its nuclear weapons. Iran has proceeded virtually unimpeded, and we have not used the tools available to us, not to invade but to dissuade.

We have the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. We used it against Libya. We failed again and again to use it and waived it again and again when our so-called allies invested billions of dollars in the Iranian oil sector.

Mr. Speaker, just recently we gave a wink and a nod to a \$2.8 billion Japanese investments in the Iranian oil sector. We have given winks and nods as half a billion dollars has gone from the World Bank, 25 percent of it is our money, goes to this government that is developing nuclear weapons to kill our people, and year after year, we allow \$150 million worth of caviar and carpets to come into this country providing a market to industries controlled by some of the most regressive forces in Iran.

It is time for to us bring real economic sanctions starting with our own trade and stopping that \$150 million of imports. Then turning to our allies and saying enough is enough. If you want

to help us, bring the economic pressure. Then the people of Iran will recognize that they can not allow their leaders to proceed down this nuclear road. That it is bad for world stability and bad for their own economy.

And we are not asking for participation in an invasion. Just for strict economic sanctions. We can use our economic power to do it, or we can continue the feckless policy that marked our behavior before September 11.

This is a great resolution. We should pass it. It is only a resolution. It is time to bring real economic sanctions to bear. Otherwise, this resolution will pass. They will laugh at us in Tehran, and they will go forward with their nuclear program.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to compliment my colleague on a very fine statement.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH).

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN). And to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON), I salute your concern about Iraq's nuclear activities. I join you in stating that I do not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. However, I cannot support this resolution.

I believe that if Members read the text carefully, they may agree. This resolution includes an endorsement I believe of the doctrine of preventive war. Preventive war is attacking another country that does not pose an imminent threat but which some might argue could pose a threat. This is not a legitimate or legal reason for going to war. It ends up being an illegal war or war not in self-defense.

To be specific, the doctrine is, I believe, contained in part 2 of the resolution which reads, "Calls upon all state parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons." This clause contains two elements of preventive war. The first is a tacit endorsement of regime change, "all appropriate means to prevent Iran."

All appropriate means is nearly the same language used in Senate Joint Resolution 54, which the Congress passed in 1998. That resolution called upon the President to "take appropriate action to bring Iraq into compliance."

We did not know then that such language would be construed only 5 years later to mean that the Congress endorsed regime change in Iraq, but that is what the administration construed it to mean.

Second, I believe this clause envisions unilateral action by the United States. It "calls upon the United States to use all appropriate means." That means it is a policy of Congress

that the United States, without necessarily receiving any support from the world community, and without the concurrence of the United Nations, could act unilaterally. This combination calling on all state parties to use all appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and calling upon the United States to use all appropriate means, this combination endorses the doctrine of preventive war.

This country was dragged into war with Iraq based on false statements to Congress. Iraq has proved to have been of little threat to the United States, but that did not stop the war's authors from going forward with the arguments that Iraq could one day be a threat.

In this historical context, I believe it is vitally important to call this to the attention of Congress so that Congress can avoid giving its endorsement of what could prove to be an unprovoked attack, unilateral regime change again.

So I oppose this resolution and I ask my colleagues to vote no.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, let me start off by saying you cannot take one section of the bill, and I have great respect for the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH). He and I have been colleagues and have worked together on a number of bills, and I have a very high regard for him. However, let us look at the whole bill and not just one or two phrases in it, because I think it clarifies the whole intent of the bill and I think it illuminates the concern I think that the gentleman has.

If we look on page 8 where the gentleman was just talking about, it says "calls upon all state parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards."

But then we go over to page 10. Understand section 9 there it says it "further calls upon the European Union to consider what further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA."

Then you go to page 11, section C, and it says, "calls on all countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-related activities that support Iran's energy industry."

Go down to line 15 and it says, "calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran."

The thing that I think will really allay some of the gentleman's concerns, on page 12, section 13, it says,

"urges the IAEA Board of Governors at its earliest opportunity to report to the United Nations Security Council that Iran is in non-compliance with its agreements with the IAEA; urges the President of the United States to provide whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities; urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant international entities to declare that non-nuclear weapons states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, who commit violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities."

It further states on page 13, and I hope this will allay some of his concerns, under section 16, "further urges the United Nations Security Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in clandestine nuclear activities; and urges the President to keep the Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this resolution."

I do not think there is anything in there, and the gentleman and I are good friends, that would give the President carte blanche to go ahead and invade Iran or start a war with them. Although, I think it is important that Iran feel a little uncertainty, although I do not think this bill does it, a little uncertainty about what might happen if they continue this program.

□ 1900

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I want to say that I think that the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON) and the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) serve this country well and that there are probably no people stronger in defense of America than both of them. I have total confidence in that, and I just want to express my appreciation for being able to express my misgivings about the language of this bill, but I want to thank the gentlemen for the service that they are giving in expressing the importance of this.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Before closing, Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond to my friend from Ohio by saying that it is not the intention of this author of this resolution to view this resolution as one authorizing unilateral use of force against Iran.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of our time.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Before I yield back the balance of my time, I just hope that the Iranian leaders realize that when they continue down this path, they ultimately not only endanger the entire Middle East and maybe areas beyond, and who knows maybe ultimately the United States, but they endanger their own security as well; and it would be far better for them to start thinking about complying with the U.N. resolutions and stopping their nuclear program before there are problems down the road.

This resolution, as my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), just said, does not give the President unilateral authority.

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, the resolution we are considering today directly confronts what may become a clear and present threat to American security.

For 18 years, the government of Iran has hidden information on its nuclear program from international inspectors. Iran is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a regime which is effective only as long as its signatories are fully committed to full and complete disclosure of any nuclear program for any purpose. The international community has already given Iran the benefit of the doubt. With its rich natural resources, the country does not even need the atomic energy it claims to be producing for peaceful purposes. Why in the world would a country soaked in oil require a nuclear fuel cycle and the enriched uranium that goes along with it? Mr. Speaker, it does not take a detective to smell a rat on this one.

This is very serious business. There is no greater nightmare for this generation of Americans than the idea of a 9/11-style attack involving weapons of mass destruction. Ongoing research into Libya's weapons program, which appears to be a model for compliance and disarmament among all rogue states, demonstrates that the shadowy network of nuclear proliferation is even deeper and more frightening than we had previously suspected. Putting our trust in Iran's undemocratic, fundamentalist leadership to voluntarily safeguard this technology of terror is not an option.

With this resolution, we demand that Iran honor its stated commitments and obligations. The Iranian regime must grant the IAEA inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation of its nuclear activities. And our efforts to secure cooperation must be in concert with our European allies and other responsible members of the international community. As we learned on March 11th of this year, no one in the civilized world is safe from terrorism.

And we must be diligent, earnest, and serious in our message. This means that, in the short term, the IAEA must report that Iran is in noncompliance with its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty; the European Union and other allies in the war on terror must be active partners in sanctioning the Iranian regime economically; and the President should act to enforce the appropriate provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.

Mr. Speaker, American troops have already deposed a regime whose cooperation on

WMD disclosure was not sufficient. No one should doubt our resolve in keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists. We cannot trust the ayatollahs in Tehran to responsibly handle technology that could be used against American civilians. If the Non-proliferation regime is broken, it must be fixed. Quickly.

I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, while all of us rightly focused on the continuing effort to secure and stabilize Iraq, none of us can close our eyes to the ominous and growing danger posed by the government of Iran.

That is why I strongly support this important bipartisan resolution brought to the floor today by the chairman and ranking democrat on the Committee on International Relations (Mr. HYDE and Mr. LANTOS).

This resolution condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international community about its nuclear programs and activities.

For example, Iran failed to properly disclose the existence of a fuel enrichment plant and facility at Natanz, until both were revealed by an opposition group.

It confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion processes, but only after it denied doing so.

According to a February report by the director general of the IAEA, Iran continues to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities.

This resolution also calls on the United States, as well as all state parties to the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to use (and I quote) "All appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons."

The fact is, our national security demands that we do everything in our power to prevent Iran from developing and acquiring nuclear weapons.

The Iranian government is hostile to the interests of the United States. It is a state sponsor of terrorism.

It is a committed enemy of the state of Israel, our staunch ally and the lone democracy in this most volatile region.

It is vital that we speak with one voice on this issue of utmost gravity. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, Iran has repeatedly denied that it is trying to develop nuclear weapons. But it is increasingly difficult to conceive of any other plausible explanation for its efforts to enrich uranium and develop other nuclear-related capabilities. And even harder to understand why else it would try so hard to conceal these activities from the international community. As reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has failed time and time again to comply with its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It has also failed to provide a full disclosure of all nuclear activities to the IAEA, and engaged in a pattern of lies and deception.

Since Iran's covert nuclear program was exposed to the world in February 2003, IAEA inspectors have found traces of highly enriched uranium, discovered that Iran had reprocessed a small amount of plutonium, and forced Iranian officials to reveal critical information about advanced centrifuge designs and components. These and other revelations about

Iran's nuclear program are even more troubling in light of Iran's extensive ties to international terrorist organizations.

According to the just-released State Department report on Patterns of Global Terrorism, "Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003." The report notes that some members of al-Qaeda "have found virtual safehaven" in Iran, while Iranian authorities continue to provide Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other radical terrorist organizations with "funding, safehaven, training, and weapons."

Iran also continues an aggressive program to develop ballistic missiles. According to the Congressional Research Service, Iran has hundreds of short-range missiles, and possibly 10–20 long-range Shahab–3 missiles, which may be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Mr. Speaker, Iran has absolutely no need for a nuclear deterrent. Over the last two and a half years, we have taken care of Iran's only two enemies—the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.

Nor does Iran—with 7 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and the second largest natural gas reserves on the planet—have a demonstrated need for civilian nuclear power.

We must continue to make it clear—to our European allies, who have generally favored a more conciliatory approach to Iran—and to the unelected rulers in Tehran, who continue to lead the Iranian people down this perilous path—that we will not sit idly by and allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons state.

This resolution is an important part of that effort, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. COLE). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, H. Con. Res. 398.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of those present have voted in the affirmative.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will recognize Members for Special Order speeches without prejudice to the possible resumption of legislative business.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.