

HENRY J. HYDE UNITED NATIONS
REFORM ACT OF 2005

SPEECH OF

HON. JOSEPH CROWLEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, June 17, 2005

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2745) to reform the United Nations, and for other purposes:

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to speak in support of the Lantos Shays substitute and in opposition to the United Nations Reform Bill sponsored by Chairman HYDE.

While I am concerned about the withholding of funding from the United Nations, I believe that reforms are needed within this world body while enhancing not diminishing the U.S.'s moral authority in this august body.

While I agree with many of my colleagues who have spoken on this bill that reform is needed, I am troubled by the way Chairman HYDE has drafted this bill.

I have great respect for the Chairman but I think the bill could have been drafted in a less draconian manner.

This bill makes it almost impossible for the United Nations to complete all the reforms within the time frame that has been set.

I do not believe that the United States should be withholding contributions if reforms are not made at the pace this bill sets them at.

Withholding our contributions from the United Nations until certain programs are shifted to voluntary is something that all of the member states would have to approve and I do not believe that this bill gives a reasonable enough time frame.

The Lantos Shays substitute will arm the United States to promote serious reforms and not just forcing to cut off funds to the United Nations that would be counterproductive to our national interests.

The substitute keeps the reform of the Chairman HYDE's bill as a goal, but does not link it to a mandatory \$100 million deduction in U.S. contributions.

Another important difference between the Chairman's bill and the substitute is the inflexibility on the issue of peacekeeping.

The substitute retains the much needed reforms on peace keeping instead of just cutting aid to these missions. The substitute will provide the Secretary of State with a waiver in the event that a new mission is essential to America's national interest.

We all know that the United States has problems and we see one of the most evident ones in its treatment of the state of Israel.

The General Assembly has turned itself into a forum to bash Israel and until recently it had a policy equating Zionism as racism.

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights also routinely castigates Israel and the General Assembly has gone out of its way to pass a one-sided resolution condemning Israel for protecting its citizens from terrorism.

The General Assembly created two committees which focus negatively on Israeli actions and protectively on the Palestinians: the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, and the Committee on the Exercise of

the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

The United Nation needs to be reformed so it is a body of creating diplomacy and understanding not a forum for hate.

I do believe the United Nations needs to be reformed to remain a strong supporter not just because of its close proximity to my Congressional district or the large amounts of my constituents who work at the United Nations but because I strongly believe in the founding principals of the United Nations.

This multilateral organization has helped the world come together since its creation and brought us out of the horrors of World War II. If we truly want to work toward reform we must work with our friends and partners to make this happen—not just threaten the loss of contributions.

This will solve none of the reforms that are needed so badly to get the United Nations back on the right tract.

I do not support this bill in its current form and urge all of my colleagues to support the Lantos Shays substitute so we can start to have a real dialogue on the much needed reform of the United Nations.

THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT ON
U.S. INTERESTS

HON. DAN BURTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 20, 2005

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, the death of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, the emergence of a new Palestinian leadership, and the government of Israel's proposed disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank have created a high degree of optimism in the International Community that we are on the cusp of dramatic new openings in the Middle East peace process.

As a senior Member of the House International Relations Committee, I have watched the often turbulent goings on in the Middle East for a few years to say the least, and my experience tells me that our optimism should be tempered by the lessons of the past. In fact, I believe we should take a very cautious view of the current round of Israeli Palestinian peacemaking, particularly with regard to Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank.

I have met Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and I know that he is a fine man. I am sure he firmly believes that this "strategic retreat" from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the West Bank is the best way to guarantee Israel's long-term security by allowing Israel to conserve and consolidate military and security resources, reducing opportunities for further friction with the Palestinians, and potentially reducing pressure on Israel to negotiate a final peace settlement on unfavorable terms. Personally, I will not second guess the Prime Minister's wisdom; I very much hope that he is right. But again, my experience tells me that if you take steps to appease an enemy you only give him a green light to put more pressure on you. In my opinion, it is imperative and critical to U.S. National Security that we as policymakers understand the consequences should the Israeli disengagement plan fail to live up to expectations.

I was recently presented a copy of an interesting opinion piece by Ambassador Yoram Ettinger—former Minister for Congressional Affairs at Israel's Embassy in Washington, Israeli Consul General in Houston, and Director of Israel's Government Press Office; and currently editor of "Straight from the Jerusalem Cloakroom and Boardroom" newsletters—regarding the potential consequences of ceding Israeli territory to terrorists. I would like to have the text of this Op-Ed placed into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD following my statement.

[May 26, 2005]

JERUSALEM CLOAKROOM #178: THE IMPACT OF
DISENGAGEMENT ON U.S. INTERESTS

(By Yoram Ettinger)

1. Escalated Terrorism. The morally/strategically justifiable demolition of terror regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan is inconsistent with the creation/bolstering of a terror regime in Gaza, Judea and Samaria. The 1994-6 series of disengagement from 85 percent and 40 percent of the territory (and 100 percent and 95 percent of the population) of Gaza and Judea and Samaria have established the largest terrorist base in the world, led/harbored by PLO/PA graduates of terrorist camps in Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Libya and Tunisia. Since 1993 the PA has harbored anti-U.S. terrorists. U.S. GIs in Afghanistan and Iraq were encountered by Palestinian terrorists.

2. Higher U.S. Terror Casualties. The July 2000 disengagement from Southern Lebanon propelled Hizbullah from a local, to a regional, profile, haunting U.S. GIs in Iraq and Afghanistan and threatening U.S. homeland security.

3. Contradicting U.S. War on Terrorism. Disengagement is perceived, by the Mideast, as cut and run, appeasement and cave-in, in sharp contrast to U.S. war on terrorism: No negotiation with—and no concession to—terrorists; no ceasefire with—but destruction of—terrorist regimes; no political—but military—solution to terrorism.

4. Setback to Peace. The only peace attainable in the (inter-Arab) Mideast is deterrence-driven peace. Disengagement undermines deterrence; hence it sets the area farther from peace and closer to exacerbated terrorism and an all out war. Every square inch ceded by Israel to the PA, since the 1994 disengagement, has been transformed into a platform of hate-education and homicide bombing.

5. Tailwind to Anti-U.S. Terrorists. While the 1976 Israeli Entebbe Operation constituted a tailwind to the U.S. war on terrorism, the 1993-2005 retreat by the role-model of countering terrorism (Israel) in face of the role-model of terrorism (PLO/PA) has added more fuel to the fire of terrorism. Disengagement has been heralded by the PLO/PA and other Arabs as a crucial victory, frequently compared to the U.S. flight from Beirut (1983) and Somalia (1993). It would nurture Arab hope that neither the U.S. nor Israel possess a marathon-like steadfastness, required for a long-term victory.

6. PA Feeds Anti-U.S. Terrorism. A correlation has existed between the bolstering of PLO stock since Oslo 1993 on one hand, and the exacerbation of anti-U.S. terrorism on the other hand (since the 1993 Twin Towers I, through the 1995 Khobar Towers, the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassies, the 2000 USS Cole and 2001 Twin Towers II); the wider the maneuverability of the PLO/PA, the deeper the inspiration to regional anti-U.S. terrorism, irrespective of (and probably due to) U.S. and Israeli appeasement of—and unprecedented concessions to—the PLO/PA.

7. Undermining the Stability of Pro-U.S. Regimes (e.g. Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,