

never shied away from firsts. She was the first woman to serve on the advisory board of what is now known as Texas Utilities and was later the first woman from East Texas to be named to the Texas Utilities governing board.

The reason she deserves the honor itself does not lie in the fact that she is a woman, but in the beauty and generosity of her heart and soul. Through all of her many endeavors and accomplishments, she remains a wonderful wife to her husband, Archie, and a magnificent mother to their two sons, Tucker and Christopher.

I am proud to say she is not only a great friend of East Texas, but she is a friend of mine. Madam Speaker, with this one piece of advice to anyone encountering Judy, if she is pushing a project, you have two options: number one, get on board; or, number two, get run over.

SOCIAL SECURITY

(Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, in the President's budget he asks for a few hundred million dollars over the next few years for the cost of privatizing Social Security. When he was here at the State of the Union address, he commented that Congress rejected his proposals to privatize Social Security. All the Democrats to his surprise got up and cheered, because we think it is a terrible idea to privatize Social Security.

To do to Social Security what they are doing to the pension system, eliminating private pensions and making people depend only on 401(k)s, we think is a terrible idea. What the President telegraphed, by putting in his budget the money to pay for the cost of privatizing Social Security, is that if the Republicans retain control of Congress in this election, they are going to try it again.

They will privatize Social Security if the Republicans control Congress again next year. If anybody thinks that privatizing Social Security is a bad idea, that we should not destroy Social Security, you better vote Democratic this year.

□ 1015

RESOLUTION OF CONDEMNATION REGARDING IRAN

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Madam Speaker, pursuant to the previous order of the House, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 341) condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 341

Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty"), under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Article II of the Treaty, "not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices";

Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the "Safeguards Agreement"), which requires Iran to report the importation and use of nuclear material, to declare nuclear facilities, and to accept safeguards on nuclear materials and activities to ensure that such materials and activities are not diverted to any military purpose and are used for peaceful purposes and activities;

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities and activities;

Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director General of the IAEA on November 10, 2003, of its decision to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and stated that the suspension would cover all activities at the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all feed material for enrichment, and the importation of any enrichment-related items;

Whereas in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the Government of Iran specified the scope of suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities, which the IAEA was invited to verify, including the suspension of the operation or testing or any centrifuges, either with or without nuclear material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, the suspension of further introduction of nuclear material into any centrifuges, the suspension of the installation of new centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the installation of centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and, to the extent practicable, the withdrawal of nuclear material from any centrifuge enrichment facility;

Whereas on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran informed the IAEA of its decision to expand the scope and clarify the nature of its decision to suspend to the furthest extent possible the assembly and testing of centrifuges and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components, including those related to existing contracts, informed the IAEA that any components that are manufactured under existing contracts that cannot be suspended will be stored and placed under IAEA seal, invited the IAEA to verify these measures, and confirmed that the suspension of enrichment activities applied to all facilities in Iran;

Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with "serious concern

that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution", and also noted that the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot cells to handle highly radioactive materials;

Whereas the same resolution also noted "with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved";

Whereas in November 2004, the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany entered into an agreement with Iran on Iran's nuclear program (commonly referred to as the "Paris Agreement"), securing a formal commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment operations in exchange for discussions on economic, technological, political, and security issues;

Whereas on August 29, 2005, Iran's Atomic Energy Organization announced it has mastered the technique of using biotechnology to extract purer uranium, adding that this method "substantially decreases the cost . . . in the process that leads to the production of yellowcake", which is a part of the early stages of the nuclear fuel cycle;

Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires the IAEA Board of Governors to report the noncompliance of any member of the IAEA with its IAEA safeguards obligations to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations;

Whereas Article III.B-4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies that "if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security";

Whereas on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution finding that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with the Safeguards Agreement constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and that matters concerning Iran's nuclear program have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, in an October 26, 2005, speech, his hope for "a world without America" and his desire "to wipe Israel off the map" and has subsequently denied the existence of the Holocaust;

Whereas on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran announced that it planned to restart its nuclear research efforts;

Whereas in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence of IAEA inspectors, began to remove IAEA seals from the enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran;

Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, "[i]t is obvious that if Iran cannot be brought to live up to its international obligations, in fact, the IAEA Statute would indicate that Iran would have to be referred to the U.N. Security Council";

Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, "The Iranian government and nation has no