

achievements—though impressive—are simply not on a par.

Every active judge had significant professional and nonpartisan experience to help persuade us that they merited confirmation.

I remind my colleagues that in recent months, I voted for two Republican nominees who were deeply involved in the impeachment of President Clinton—Tom Griffith for the very court to which Mr. Kavanaugh has been nominated and Paul McNulty to the second highest position in the Justice Department.

Now let me come to the ABA report released recently. Some of my friends across the aisle have fallen over themselves to dismiss, dilute, and denigrate that report. This, of course, despite the fact that last time around, Mr. Kavanaugh and several Senators frequently repeatedly boasted about his original, higher ABA rating.

Here is why the observations noted in that report are important. When he and I met recently, I asked Mr. Kavanaugh how we are to judge someone with his scant record. He has very few writings. He is younger than almost everyone who has been nominated to the D.C. Circuit. He has never been a judge.

Mr. Kavanaugh told me that one way to make a judgment about him would be to talk to the people who know him, to talk to colleagues and judges and others who are familiar with him and his work.

Well, that is one of the things the American Bar Association actually did in preparing its evaluation. They talked—as Mr. Kavanaugh himself suggested—with people who are familiar with his work.

What is more, they do it under a promise of confidentiality, so that they will be likely to obtain the most honest and candid appraisals—rather than the expected plaudits from peers and previous employers.

Many of those interviewed echoed precisely the concerns that I and others have raised—his lack of relevant experience and the effect the insularity of his political experience might have on his ability to be a neutral judge.

Now, I understand that none of the 14 committee members found Mr. Kavanaugh flatly “not qualified.”

But I ask my colleagues, shouldn't we give substantial weight to these statements from people who are familiar with his work—not isolated remarks, but a multitude of them, from different quarters, commenting about different court appearances and interactions with him?

Given the importance of the D.C. Circuit, we have a duty to closely scrutinize the nominees who come before us seeking lifetime appointment to this court.

And it is no insult to Mr. Kavanaugh, to say that there can't be a single person in this room, if they were being honest, who doesn't recognize that there are scores of lawyers in Wash-

ington and around the country who are of equally high intellectual ability, but who have much more significant judicial, legal, and academic experience to recommend them for this post.

So I would say that many of my colleagues and I have a sincere and good-faith concern that this nominee is not apolitical enough, not seasoned enough, not independent enough, and has not been forthcoming enough. The hearing did not alleviate those concerns.

Indeed, Mr. Kavanaugh was evasive when he should have been forthright; he sidestepped questions when he should have met them head on.

During an extended exchange with me, he repeatedly refused to answer a simple question—whether he had ever expressed opposition to a potential judicial nominee within the White House, even though there is no conceivable earthly privilege that should have prevented him from answering.

On another occasion, it took Senator LEAHY four tries before Mr. Kavanaugh would answer the simple question: Why did you take 7 months to respond to the Judiciary Committee's written questions in 2004?

On yet another occasion, he continued to refuse to tell us whether he is in the mold of Scalia and Thomas, even though he has spent several years selecting and vetting highly ideological judges for the President who has repeatedly promised to nominate judges in “the mold of Scalia and Thomas.”

If the President can say repeatedly at campaign stops and speeches that he wants judges in the mold of Scalia and Thomas, and if those statements are not just meaningless, empty rhetoric, why can't we Senators find out in some meaningful way whether there is any truth in advertising?

In short, if the nominee had spent the last several years on a lower court or in a nonpolitical position proving his independence from politics, I could view his nomination in a different light.

But he has not. Instead, his résumé is almost unambiguously political. Perhaps with more time, and different experience, we would have greater comfort imagining Mr. Kavanaugh on this court. But that day is not yet here.

Therefore, I vote nay on the nomination and urge my colleagues to do the same.

With that, I yield the floor and, once again, thank my colleague from Michigan.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

#### NOMINATION OF GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, General Hayden's nomination for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency comes at a critical time. The Agency is in disarray. Its current Director has apparently been forced out, and the previous Director, George Tenet, departed under

a cloud after having compromised his own objectivity and independence and that of his Agency by misusing Iraq intelligence to support the administration's policy agenda. The next Director must right this ship and restore the CIA to its critically important mission.

I will vote to confirm General Hayden because his actions have demonstrated on a number of important occasions the independence and strength of character needed to fulfill the most important role of the CIA Director— independence and a willingness to speak truth to power about the intelligence assessments of professionals in the intelligence community.

This nomination has been considered by me on two key issues: One, whether or not General Hayden will be independent—and I believe he will—and two, what judgment should be rendered about him based on what is known about the National Security Agency's surveillance program which he administered during his tenure as Director of the NSA. Again, the highest priority of the new Director must be to ensure that intelligence provided to the President and the Congress is objective and independent of political considerations. It was only a few years ago that then-CIA Director George Tenet shaped intelligence to support the policy position of the administration. There are many examples.

On February 11, 2003, just before the war, Director Tenet publicly stated, as though it were fact, that Iraq has “provided training in poison and gases to two Al-Qaeda associates.” However, we now know that the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, had assessed a year earlier that the primary source of that report was more likely intentionally misleading his debriefers, and the CIA itself had concluded in January 2003, before the Tenet public declaration that I have quoted, that the source of the claim that Iraq had provided training in poisons was not in a position to know if any training had in fact taken place.

On September 28, 2002, President Bush said that “each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group.” A week later, on October 7, 2002, a letter declassifying CIA intelligence indicated that Iraq was unlikely to provide WMD to terrorists or al-Qaida and called such a move an “extreme step,” a very different perspective from that which had been stated by the President. But the very next day after that declassification was obtained, Director Tenet told the press that there was “no inconsistency” between the views in the letter and the President's views on the subject.

His statement was flatly wrong. His effort to minimize the inconsistency or eliminate it not only revealed his lack of independence, but it damaged the credibility of the Central Intelligence Agency.

At a hearing in 2004, I asked Director Tenet about the alleged meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001. He told us that the CIA had “not gathered enough evidence to conclude that it had happened” and that “I don’t know that it took place. I can’t say that I did.” What he neglected to say was that the CIA did not believe that the meeting had happened, a fact that he finally acknowledged publicly in July of 2004, after the war began, when he wrote that the CIA was “increasingly skeptical that such a meeting occurred” and that there was an “absence of any credible information that the April 2001 meeting occurred.” We determined later that that CIA skepticism dated back at least to June 2002, before the war.

Director Tenet also looked the other way when the administration publicly alleged that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. As a matter of fact, he had personally called the Deputy National Security Adviser to urge that the allegation be removed from the President’s October 2002 Cincinnati speech. Director Tenet was silent after the President included the allegation in his January 2003 State of the Union speech. It was not until July of 2003, long after the war began, 2 months after President Bush declared major combat operations were over in Iraq, that Director Tenet finally acknowledged publicly that the allegations should not have been included in the State of the Union speech.

According to Bob Woodward’s book “Plan of Attack,” when the President asked Director Tenet, following the CIA’s presentation to him in December of 2002, about its intelligence relative to Iraq’s suspected WMD programs, How confident are you in the intelligence about that, Director Tenet replied, “Don’t worry; it’s a slam dunk,” which it surely was not. But that is what the President wanted to hear. That is the message which Director Tenet presented to him, and that is the message that the President then presented to the American public.

It is essential that the new Director of the CIA stand up to the administration in power, no matter what administration it is, when the intelligence does not support the direction that the administration wants to go. We cannot afford another Iraq intelligence fiasco.

General Hayden has said that he will be an independent CIA Director. Based on his record, I believe him.

One piece of evidence in that Hayden record relates to a strategy that the administration used to bolster its case for war. The decision was made by the administration to put a set of what was called “fresh eyes” to look over the intelligence relative to the alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaida. The Secretary of Defense created a separate operation in a DOD policy office led by Douglas Feith. While the intelligence community was consistently dubious of

the links between al-Qaida and Iraq, the Feith office scraped and scratched and cherry-picked the intelligence to produce assessments that said that there was a strong relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida. And then Mr. Feith bypassed the CIA, bypassed the intelligence community, and briefed that analysis to senior policymakers at the National Security Council and the Vice President’s office.

George Tenet told us that he was not aware of that prewar briefing by Mr. Feith, until I brought it to his attention in February of 2004. In making its case for war with Iraq, the administration used Mr. Feith’s misleading intelligence to convince the country that Saddam and bin Laden were allies. There were few in the administration who had been willing to speak up against this bypass of the intelligence community process, a process whose very purpose is to provide balanced, objective assessments for the intelligence community. One of the few who has spoken up is General Hayden.

At his nomination hearing, I asked General Hayden whether, when he was NSA Director before the Iraq war, he was comfortable with what Douglas Feith was up to. My question to General Hayden was not just about Doug Feith. It was about whether the General was willing to speak the truth as he saw it, even if it went against the administration’s case for war. General Hayden told the committee, relative to the Feith operation:

No, sir. I wasn’t comfortable.

Has anyone else in the administration said that, spoken up and said that which is so obvious about the Feith operation?

There may be others, but General Hayden is the only one that comes to mind. This is what he then said to the committee at our hearing on his nomination:

It is possible, Senator, if you want to drill down on an issue and just get laser beam focused, and exhaust every possible—every ounce of evidence, you can build up a pretty strong body of data, right? But you have to know what you’re doing, all right.

I got three great kids, but if you tell me go out and find all the bad things they’ve done, Hayden, I can build you a pretty good dossier, and you’d think they were pretty bad people, because that was what I was looking for and that’s what I’d build up.

General Hayden said this:

That would be very wrong. That would be inaccurate. That would be misleading.

Wrong, inaccurate, and misleading. That is a pretty good description of the Feith shop’s prewar intelligence analysis. It is an indictment of the administration’s use of that intelligence to make the case for war.

But what is interesting, in particular, is not just what General Hayden said at his confirmation hearing; it is what he did at the time that the Feith office was actually out looking for intelligence to try to prove their premise that there was a connection between Saddam and al-Qaida. General

Hayden actually placed a disclaimer on NSA reporting relative to any links between al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein, stating that SIGINT—or signals intelligence—“neither confirms nor denies” such a link.

So while you had the administration claiming the link and Doug Feith scrapping around, scratching for any little bit of evidence that could prove his preordained conclusion that there was such a link, you had General Hayden saying SIGINT, signals intelligence, neither confirms nor denies that such a link exists.

In other words, we have in General Hayden more than just promises of independence and objectivity and a willingness to speak truth to power. We have somebody who has actually done so.

There is another significant way in which General Hayden has spoken truth to power. When we were considering reforming the intelligence community to fill the gaps and the cracks that existed prior to 9/11 and the Iraq War, there was a major effort to derail the proposal, in part because the legislation sought to shift some authority from Department of Defense components to the new office of the Director of National Intelligence. Although General Hayden is a four star general, he stood up to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on this issue. It took some backbone and strength of character for him to do so.

As to General Hayden remaining in active duty if he is confirmed, I would only make three points. One, he is not the first person to do so. Since the Central Intelligence Agency was established by law in 1947, three commissioned officers have held the title of Director of Central Intelligence, RADM Roscoe Hillenkoetter, GEN Walter Bedell Smith, and ADM Stansfield Turner. I would also remind my colleagues that the Senate confirmed then LTG Colin Powell to be President Reagan’s National Security Adviser even though there is no law that removes that position from the supervision or control of the Secretary of Defense.

Secondly, General Hayden has sent a letter to Senator WARNER which states “I do not intend to remain in active military status beyond my assignment as Director, Central Intelligence Agency (if confirmed).” This is an added assurance of independence and that he will not be shaping intelligence to please the Defense Department in order to put himself in a better position for some future appointment in the military establishment.

Third, General Hayden’s supervisor in his line of work as Director of the CIA will be by law Ambassador Negroponte, not Secretary Rumsfeld. So General Hayden would not be in the military chain of command but in the intelligence chain of command.

To eliminate any doubt of that, we are including a provision in the Defense authorization bill, which is awaiting Senate floor action, to make

that absolutely clear in law. Senator WARNER and I think it is already clear, but we are going to make it doubly clear by putting that into the pending DOD authorization bill.

As I mentioned, the key issue relative to General Hayden's nomination is the President's domestic surveillance program. Over the past 6 months, we have been engaged in a national debate about the appropriate limits on the Government's authority to conduct electronic eavesdropping on American citizens.

General Hayden was Director of the National Security Agency when the President authorized the program, and many of our colleagues have raised concerns about that.

The administration has repeatedly characterized the electronic surveillance program as applying only to international calls and not involving any domestic surveillance. In February, for instance, the Vice President said:

Some of our critics call this a domestic surveillance program. Wrong, that is inaccurate; it is not domestic surveillance.

Ambassador Negroponte said:

This is a program that was ordered by the President with respect to international phone calls to or from suspected al-Qaida operatives and their affiliates . . . This was not about domestic surveillance.

General Hayden found a way to signal that the administration has not described the entire program. When asked at his confirmation hearing whether the program the administration described is the entire program, General Hayden said he could not answer in open session. Presumably, if it were the entire program, he could have easily answered, "yes."

In addition, while Stephen Hadley, the President's National Security Adviser, has said relative to the reports that phone records had been provided to the Government under the NSA program, that it is hard to find a privacy issue here, General Hayden did not make that claim and instead acknowledged that, indeed, privacy was an issue, and surely whatever one thinks they believe about this program, privacy is an issue.

There may be some who, when they understand the program, believe the privacy concerns are overridden by the security advantage. There may be others who reach the other conclusion that whatever security advantages are achieved do not overcome the privacy intrusions that are reported to exist by those phone records being in the possession or being available to the Government, according to those press reports. But whatever one's conclusion is, there are clearly privacy concerns involved. And when the general was in front of us—he was honest enough—and said: I cannot say there are no privacy concerns here, he was telling us something which should be obvious to each one of us.

There are remaining for me a lot of unanswered questions about the NSA

program, and I have been one who has been at least partially briefed. I am one of that subcommittee of seven for whom the briefing has begun. But the fact is, the legal opinions about this program are not General Hayden's, they are the Attorney General's. I am aware of no allegation that General Hayden took any action that went beyond what the President authorized or what the Attorney General advised was legal. There are legitimate grounds for criticism regarding this program, but such criticism should be aimed at the White House and the Attorney General.

The Intelligence Committee is in the middle of an inquiry into the program. Now that the full committee has been authorized to be briefed on the program, all of the members of the Intelligence Committee need to catch up to where seven of us are, which is about halfway through the briefings. We are still waiting for the administration to answer many questions that we have asked about the program.

I want to turn for a few moments to the issue of detainee treatment. I would have liked General Hayden to be more forthcoming on this issue at his hearing. In his testimony, General Hayden affirmed that the CIA is bound by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In particular, General Hayden stated that this legislation's prohibition on the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment of detainees applies to all Government agencies, including the CIA. The Detainee Treatment Act also requires that no individual under the effective control of the Defense Department or in a DOD facility will be subjected to any interrogation technique that is not listed in the Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogations. In response to my questioning, General Hayden agreed that the Army field manual would apply to CIA interrogations of detainees under DOD's effective control or in a DOD facility.

I was disappointed, however, that General Hayden repeatedly chose not to respond in public to many other questions on detainee treatment, deferring his answers to the hearing's closed session. I believe that he could have answered these questions and related his professional opinion in the public hearing.

In response to Senator FEINSTEIN's questions, General Hayden would not say publicly whether individuals held at secret sites may be detained for decades. He would not say publicly whether waterboarding is an acceptable interrogation technique whether the Agency has received new legal guidance from the Department of Justice since passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in December of last year. General Hayden would not answer my question whether the Justice Department memo on the legality of specific interrogation techniques, referred to as the second Bybee memo, remains operative, saying only that "additional legal opinions" have been offered. The

problem is exacerbated because the administration continues to deny our requests for the second Bybee memo and other Justice Department legal memos which set out the legal boundaries for what constitutes permissible treatment of detainees.

Under the Detainee Treatment Act, we have established a single standard—no cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of detainees. This standard applies without regard to what agency holds a detainee, whether the Defense Department or the CIA, or where the detainee is being held. Yet the administration will not say publicly whether this standard has the same meaning for the intelligence community that it has for our military. The Government's views on the standard for how we treat detainees remains cloaked in secrecy.

The Armed Services Committee has heard from the judge advocates general of our military services on what they believe the standard for detainee treatment is. The judge advocates general were asked about the use of dogs in interrogations; forcing a detainee to wear women's underwear during interrogation to humiliate him; leading a detainee around the room on all fours and forcing him to perform dog tricks; subjecting a detainee to provocative touching to humiliate or demean him; subjecting a detainee to strip searches and forcing him to stand naked in front of females as an interrogation method; and waterboarding. In each case, the judge advocates general said that such treatment is not consistent with the spirit or intent of the Army field manual. As I mentioned earlier, with the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act, the Army field manual applies to all interrogations of detainees under the effective control of the Defense Department and all interrogations conducted in DOD facilities.

General Hayden, in contrast, would not say in open session whether even waterboarding is even permitted. When the Senate Armed Services Committee's markup of the national defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2007 comes to the floor later this year, the Senate will have the chance to demand some answers on the standard for the treatment of detainees. The new bill includes a requirement that the President provide Congress a definitive legal opinion, coordinated across government agencies, on whether certain specific interrogation techniques—including waterboarding, sleep deprivation, stress positions, the use of dogs in interrogations and nudity or sexual humiliation—constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. This provision would also require the President to certify to Congress that this legal opinion is binding on all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, including the CIA, their personnel, and their contractors.

While I disagree with General Hayden's decision not to publicly state his

personal view, the general did affirm that the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the Detainee Treatment Act applies to all Government agencies, including the CIA.

We have asked the administration to clarify this matter. I would hope that the administration would, one, state clearly that waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and stress positions are unacceptable; two, state clearly that the standard in law prohibits the use of dogs in interrogations; and three, state clearly that acts like stripping a detainee for interrogation purposes or subjecting a detainee to sexual humiliation are prohibited. I also hope that the administration will state clearly that the International Committee of the Red Cross will be informed about all detainees held by the United States Government and adopt a policy of not rendering individuals in our custody where there is a reasonable possibility that the person will be tortured.

As I said at the time the Senate approved the Detainee Treatment Act, enactment of this legislation means the United States has rejected any claim that this standard—cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment—has one meaning for the Department of Defense and another for the CIA—one meaning as applied to Americans and another applied to our enemies, or one meaning as applied on U.S. territory and another applied elsewhere in the world.

I conclude by saying, in my view, General Hayden will be the independent Director of the Central Intelligence Agency that we so desperately need and that the country deserves. The record demonstrates his willingness to speak truth to power, and I will vote to confirm General Hayden.

I yield the floor.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 8:45 A.M.  
TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands adjourned until 8:45 a.m. tomorrow morning.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 10:06 p.m., adjourned until Friday, May 26, 2006, at 8:45 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate May 25, 2006:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ROBERT O. BLAKE, JR., OF MARYLAND, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA, AND TO SERVE CONCURRENTLY AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AS AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES.

THE JUDICIARY

ANNA BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TERM OF FIFTEEN YEARS, VICE FRANK ERNEST SCHWELB, RETIRING.  
PHYLLIS D. THOMPSON, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TERM OF FIFTEEN YEARS, VICE JOHN A. TERRY, RETIRED.

NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD

ELIZABETH DOUGHERTY, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD FOR A TERM EXPIRING JULY 1, 2009, VICE READ VAN DE WATER, TERM EXPIRING.

IN THE AIR FORCE

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be brigadier general

COL. THERESA M. CASEY, 0000  
COL. GARBETH S. GRAHAM, 0000  
COL. BYRON C. HEPBURN, 0000

IN THE ARMY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY TO THE GRADE INDICATED WHILE ASSIGNED TO A POSITION OF IMPORTANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 601:

To be lieutenant general

MAJ. GEN. N. ROSS THOMPSON III, 0000

THE FOLLOWING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE RE-

SERVE OF THE ARMY TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 12203:

To be major general

BRIG. GEN. RAYMOND C. BYRNE, JR., 0000

THE FOLLOWING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE RESERVE OF THE ARMY TO THE GRADES INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 12203:

To be major general

BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWARD H. BALLARD, 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL W. BEAMAN, 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL FLOYD E. BELL, JR., 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL NELSON J. CANNON, 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL CRAIG N. CHRISTENSEN, 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN T. FURLOW, 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANK J. GRASS, 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL LARRY W. HALTOM, 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL VERN T. MIYAGI, 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL HERBERT L. NEWTON, 0000  
BRIGADIER GENERAL LAWRENCE H. ROSS, 0000

To be brigadier general

COLONEL TIMOTHY E. ALBERTSON, 0000  
COLONEL MARK E. ANDERSON, 0000  
COLONEL STEPHEN M. BLOOMER, 0000  
COLONEL MARIA L. BRITT, 0000  
COLONEL JAMES K. BROWN, JR., 0000  
COLONEL PAUL E. CASINELLI, 0000  
COLONEL KEITH W. CORBETT, 0000  
COLONEL BRET D. DAUGHERTY, 0000  
COLONEL DAVID M. DEARMOND, 0000  
COLONEL LAWRENCE E. DUDNEY, JR., 0000  
COLONEL GREGORY B. EDWARDS, 0000  
COLONEL DAVID J. ELICERIO, 0000  
COLONEL PHILIP R. FISHER, 0000  
COLONEL GARY M. HARA, 0000  
COLONEL RUSSELL S. HARGIS, 0000  
COLONEL CHARLES A. HARVEY, JR., 0000  
COLONEL CAROL A. JOHNSON, 0000  
COLONEL JOSEPH P. KELLY, 0000  
COLONEL CHRIS F. MAASDAM, 0000  
COLONEL MICHAEL C.H. MCDANIEL, 0000  
COLONEL PATRICK A. MURPHY, 0000  
COLONEL MANDI A. MURRAY, 0000  
COLONEL MICHAEL R. NEVIN, 0000  
COLONEL MANUEL ORTIZ, JR., 0000  
COLONEL TERRY L. QUARLES, 0000  
COLONEL MICHAEL G. TEMME, 0000  
COLONEL STEVEN N. WICKSTROM, 0000

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be colonel

ROY D. STEED, 0000

IN THE NAVY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED INDIVIDUALS FOR REGULAR APPOINTMENT IN THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 531:

To be lieutenant commander

LUZ V. ALICEA, 0000  
PETER B. DOBSON, 0000