Upton
Walden (OR)
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Blumenauer
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Clay
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Conyers
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Costello
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Cuellar
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Davis (CA)
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Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
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Doyle
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Inslee
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Jackson (IL)
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Millender-McDonald
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Ruppersberger
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Sánchez, Linda T.
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Schiff
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Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
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Evans
Fattah
Green (WI)
Johnson (CT)
Lewis (GA)
Meehan
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Petri
Strickland
Stupak
Towns
Westmoreland

□ 1300

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote is objected to under clause 6 of rule XX.

Record votes on postponed questions will be taken later today.

IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6198) to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 6198

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Iran Freedom Support Act''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
TITLE I—CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
Sec. 101. Codification of sanctions.
TITLE II—AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN
Sec. 201. Multilateral regime.
Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 203. Termination of sanctions.
Sec. 204. Sunset.
Sec. 205. Technical and conforming amendments.
TITLE III—PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY FOR IRAN
Sec. 301. Declaration of policy.
Sec. 302. Assistance to support democracy for Iran.
TITLE IV—POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO FACILITATE THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION OF IRAN
Sec. 401. Sense of Congress.
TITLE V—PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Sec. 501. Prevention of money laundering for weapons of mass destruction.

TITLE I—CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

SEC. 101. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, United States sanctions with respect to Iran imposed pursuant to sections 1 and 3 of Executive Order No. 12957, sections 1(e), (1)(g), and (3) of Executive Order No. 12959, and sections 2, 3, and 5 of Executive Order No. 13059 (relating to exports and certain other transactions with Iran) as in effect on January 1, 2006, shall remain in effect. The President may terminate such sanctions, in whole or in part, if the President notifies Congress at least 15 days in advance of such termination. In the event of exigent circumstances, the President may exercise the authority set forth in the preceding sentence without regard to the notification requirement stated therein, except that such notification shall be provided as early as practicable, but in no event later than three working days after such exercise of authority.

(b) NO EFFECT ON OTHER SANCTIONS RELATING TO SUPPORT FOR ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.—Nothing in this Act shall affect any United States sanction, control, or regulation as in effect on January 1, 2006, relating to a determination under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)) that the Government of Iran has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

TITLE II—AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT IN IRAN

SEC. 201. MULTILATERAL REGIME.

(a) WAIVER.—Section 4(c) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:

''(c) WAIVER.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may, on a case by case basis, waive for a period of not more than six months the application of section 5(a) with respect to a national of a country, if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees at least 30 days before such waiver is to take effect that such waiver is vital to the national security interests of the United States.

''(2) SUBSEQUENT RENEWAL OF WAIVER.—If the President determines that, in accordance with paragraph (1), such a waiver is appropriate, the President may, at the conclusion of the period of a waiver under paragraph (1), renew such waiver for subsequent periods of not more than six months each.''.

(b) INVESTIGATIONS.—Section 4 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

''(f) INVESTIGATIONS.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The President should initiate an investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) against a person upon receipt by the United States of credible information indicating that such person is engaged in investment activity in Iran as described in such section.

''(2) DETERMINATION AND NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 180 days after an investigation is initiated in accordance with paragraph (1), the President should determine, pursuant to section 5(a), if a person has engaged in investment activity in Iran as described in such section and shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the basis for any such determination.''.

SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES.—Section 5(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended in the heading, by striking ''TO IRAN'' and inserting ''TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN''.

(b) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.—Section 5(b) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:

''(b) MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.—The President shall impose two or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the President determines that a person has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Iran any goods, services, technology, or other items knowing that the provision of such goods, services, technology, or other items would contribute materially to the ability of Iran to—

''(1) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies; or

''(2) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.''.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to actions taken on or after June 6, 2006.

SEC. 203. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.

Section 8(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ''and'' at the end;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting ''; and''; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

''(3) poses no significant threat to United States national security, interests, or allies.''.

SEC. 204. SUNSET.

Section 13 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking ''on September 29, 2006'' and inserting ''on December 31, 2011''.

SEC. 205. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) FINDINGS.—Section 2 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking paragraph (4).

(b) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—Section 3 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking ''(a) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.—''; and

(2) by striking subsection (b).

(c) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—Section 8 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking ''(a) IRAN.—''; and

(2) by striking subsection (b).

(d) DURATION OF SANCTIONS; PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.—Section 9(c)(2)(C) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:

''(C) an estimate of the significance of the provision of the items described in section 5(a) or section 5(b) to Iran's ability to, respectively, develop its petroleum resources or its weapons of mass destruction or other military capabilities; and''.

(e) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Section 10(b)(1) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking ''and Libya'' each place it appears.

(f) DEFINITIONS.—Section 14 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (9)—

(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by—

(i) striking '', or with the Government of Libya or a nongovernmental entity in Libya,''; and

(ii) by striking ''nongovenmental'' and inserting ''nongovernmental''; and

(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ''or Libya (as the case may be)'';

(2) by striking paragraph (12); and

(3) by redesignating paragraphs (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17) as paragraphs (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16), respectively.

(g) SHORT TITLE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking ''and Libya''.

(2) REFERENCES.—Any reference in any other provision of law, regulation, document, or other record of the United States to the ''Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996'' shall be deemed to be a reference to the ''Iran Sanctions Act of 1996''.

TITLE III—PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY FOR IRAN

SEC. 301. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Congress declares that it should be the policy of the United States—

(1) to support efforts by the people of Iran to exercise self-determination over the form of government of their country; and

(2) to support independent human rights and peaceful pro-democracy forces in Iran.

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran.

SEC. 302. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY FOR IRAN.

(a) AUTHORIZATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to provide financial and political assistance (including the award of grants) to foreign and domestic individuals, organizations, and entities working for the purpose of supporting and promoting democracy for Iran. Such assistance may include the award of grants to eligible independent pro-democracy radio and television broadcasting organizations that broadcast into Iran.

(2) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—In accordance with the rule of construction described in subsection (b) of section 301, none of the funds authorized under this section shall be used to support the use of force against Iran.

(b) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.—Financial and political assistance under this section should be provided only to an individual, organization, or entity that—

(1) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) at any time during the preceding four years;

(2) advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materiel;

(3) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran;

(4) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including the fundamental equality of women;

(5) works to establish equality of opportunity for people; and

(6) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of religion.

(c) FUNDING.—The President may provide assistance under this section using—

(1) funds available to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, and the Human Rights and Democracy Fund; and

(2) amounts made available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (g).

(d) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 15 days before each obligation of assistance under this section, and in accordance with the procedures under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1), the President shall notify the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING DIPLOMATIC ASSISTANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) support for a transition to democracy in Iran should be expressed by United States representatives and officials in all appropriate international fora;

(2) officials and representatives of the United States should—

(A) strongly and unequivocally support indigenous efforts in Iran calling for free, transparent, and democratic elections; and

(B) draw international attention to violations by the Government of Iran of human rights, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.

(f) DURATION.—The authority to provide assistance under this section shall expire on December 31, 2011.

(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

TITLE IV—POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO FACILITATE THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION OF IRAN

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It should be the policy of the United States not to bring into force an agreement for cooperation with the government of any country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran unless the President has determined that—

(1) Iran has suspended all enrichment-related and reprocessing-related activity (including uranium conversion and research and development, manufacturing, testing, and assembly relating to enrichment and reprocessing), has committed to verifiably refrain permanently from such activity in the future (except potentially the conversion of uranium exclusively for export to foreign nuclear fuel production facilities pursuant to internationally agreed arrangements and subject to strict international safeguards), and is abiding by that commitment; or

(2) the government of that country—

(A) has, either on its own initiative or pursuant to a binding decision of the United Nations Security Council, suspended all nuclear assistance to Iran and all transfers of advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Iran, pending a decision by Iran to implement measures that would permit the President to make the determination described in paragraph (1); and

(B) is committed to maintaining that suspension until Iran has implemented measures that would permit the President to make such determination.

(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION.—The term ''agreement for cooperation'' has the meaning given that term in section 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(b)).

(2) ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN.—The term ''assisting the nuclear program of Iran'' means the intentional transfer to Iran by a government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a government, with the knowledge and acquiescence of that government, of goods, services, or technology listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) or Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 2 and subsequent revisions).

(3) TRANSFERRING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OR MISSILES TO IRAN.—The term ''transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to Iran'' means the intentional transfer to Iran by a government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a government, with the knowledge and acquiescence of that government, of—

(A) advanced conventional weapons; or

(B) goods, services, or technology listed on the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions.

TITLE V—PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

SEC. 501. PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

Section 5318A(c)(2) of title 31, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ''or both,'' and inserting ''or entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or missiles''; and

(2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by inserting '', including any money laundering activity by organized criminal groups, international terrorists, or entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or missiles'' before the semicolon at the end.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) and the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. BLUMENAUER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.

GENERAL LEAVE

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill now under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

For decades, the Iranian regime, one of the world's most dangerous political entities, has been pursuing a covert nuclear program. According to multiple reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, Iran has been deceiving the world for two decades about its nuclear ambitions and has breached its international obligations dealing with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear cycle.

Iran's violation of the IAEA safeguards, the safe reporting to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the denial of the agency's request for access to individuals and locations, the involvement of its military in parts of it nuclear program, as well as the Iranian regime's continued support of terrorist activities around the globe contradict any assertion of the peaceful intent of the program.

It would be a critical mistake to allow a regime with a track record as bloody and as dangerous as Iran's to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran drives Hezbollah extremist ideology and provides it with weapons and funding, estimated by some at more than $80 million per year. In turn, Hezbollah has helped advance Iranian interests through continued terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies in the region.

This bill before us, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 6198, as amended, will help prevent Iran from acquiring the technical assistance, the financial resources, and the political legitimacy to develop nuclear weapons and to support terrorism. This bill requires the imposition of sanctions on any entity that has exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Iran any goods, services, technology, or other items that would materially contribute to Iran's ability to acquire or develop unconventional weapons. This bill codifies U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran by Executive Order.

The bill also amends the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act by extending the authorities in the bill until December 31, 2011. It also requires the President to certify to Congress that waiving the imposition of sanctions is vital to the national security interests of the United States.

Furthermore, the bill authorizes the provision of democracy assistance to eligible human rights and pro-democracy groups and broadcasting entities. Moreover, this legislation will allow the United States to use the necessary tools against financial institutions which are involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or missiles.

This bill provides a comprehensive approach, providing U.S. officials with strong leverage to secure cooperation from our allies in order to counter the Iranian threat. The sanctions under title II of this bill seek to target the Iranian regime where it is most vulnerable: Its energy sector. Knowledgable experts agree that for Iran, a fuel importer, sanctions could be crippling.

Thus, Mr. Speaker, this bill is not an alternative to diplomacy, but rather complementary to our multilateral efforts. We cannot afford to wait any longer as the potential consequences of further inaction could be catastrophic. I urge my colleagues to lend their support to this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I am attaching an exchange of letters between Chairman HYDE and Chairmen THOMAS and OXLEY concerning the bill H.R. 6198 "The Iran Freedom Support Act" for printing in the RECORD.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
Washington, DC, September 27, 2006.

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN HYDE: I am writing regarding H.R. 6198, the ''Iran Freedom Support Act,'' which is scheduled for floor action on September 28.

As per the agreement between our Committees, the bill would not codify the import sanctions contained in Executive Order 13059. However, Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of the bill would give the President the statutory authority to ban imports against Iran and would terminate that authority with respect to Libya.

Because each of these provisions, as well as provisions related to the waiver, termination, and sunset, have the effect of modifying and altering the application of an import ban, they fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. However, in order to expedite this legislation for floor consideration, the Committee will forgo action on this bill. This is being done with the understanding that it does not in any way prejudice the Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.

I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 6198, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the record.

Best regards,

BILL THOMAS,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, September 27, 2006.

Hon. WILLIAM M. THOMAS,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 6198, the ''Iran Freedom Support Act,'' which is scheduled for floor action this week.

In recognition of the importance of this legislation and based on our two Committees' agreement, the final text of the bill would not codify the import sanctions contained in Executive Order 13059. However, Sections 202(a) and 202(b) of the bill would give the President the statutory authority to ban imports against Iran and would terminate that authority with respect to Libya.

I concur in your assessment that these provisions, as well as provisions related to the waiver, tennination, and sunset, have the effect of modifying and altering the application of an import ban and fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. I appreciate your willingness to forgo action on this bill. I also agree that your forgoing formal committee action does not in any way prejudice the Ways and Means Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.

1As you have requested, I will insert a copy of our exchange of letters on this bill into the Congressional Record.

Sincerely,

HENRY J. HYDE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC, September 28, 2006.

Hon. MICHAEL G. OXLEY,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter concerning H.R. 6198, the Iran Freedom Support Act. As indicated by the referral of the bill to both of our committees, I concur that the bill contains language which falls within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services, This language is contained in portions of title II and in title V of the bill.

I agree that ordinarily the Committee on Financial Services would be entitled to act on the bill. However, I thank you for your support in moving this important legislation forward by agreeing that it is not necessary for your Committee to act further on the bill. Given the importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support Act, I appreciate your willingness to work with us regarding these issues and to permit the legislation to proceed. I understand that by doing so, it should not be construed to prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Financial Services on these provisions or any other similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to your Committee in the future. Furthermore, should these or similar provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I will

request the Speaker to name members of the Committee on Financial Services to the conference committee.

As you requested, I will be pleased to include a copy of this exchange of letters in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill if you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

HENRY J. HYDE,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Washington, DC, September 28, 2006.

Hon. HENRY J. HYDE,
Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding with respect to the consideration of H.R. 6198, the Iran Freedom Support Act. This bill was introduced on September 27, 2006, and was referred to the Committee on International Relations as well as the Committee on Financial Services. I understand that the bill will be considered by the House in the near future.

Ordinarily, the Committee on Financial Services would be entitled to act on those matters within its jurisdiction, Title V and portions of title II. However, given the importance and timeliness of the Iran Freedom Support Act, and your willingness to work with us regarding the issues within this Committee's jurisdiction, further action in this Committee will not be necessary. I do so only with the understanding that this procedural route should not be construed to prejudice the jurisdictional interest of the Committee on Financial Services on these provisions or any other similar legislation and will not be considered as precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional interest to my committee in the future. Furthermore, should these or similar provisions be considered in a conference with the Senate, I would expect members of the Committee on Financial Services be appointed to the conference committee on these provisions.

Finally, I would ask that you include a copy of our exchange of letters in the Committee Report on H.R. 6198 and in the Congressional Record during the consideration of this bill. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me. I thank you for your consideration.

Yours truly,

MICHAEL G. OXLEY,
Chairman.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, in the years since we enacted our attack against Iraq, the threat from Iran has only grown more difficult, and our capacity to meet that threat actually has diminished. It is one of the reasons many of us opposed that action against Iraq.

There is no question Iran's President is a thug, an anti-Semite, and a dangerous man. He exploits Iranian national grievances to consolidate power and has openly expressed his desire to wipe Israel off the map. Well, our troops are bogged down in Iraq, placing them at risk should Iran launch a wave of terrorism. We have done nothing to break our global dependency on oil, the control of which gives Iran its greatest ability to blackmail other countries.

Now, I appreciate the good will and passion of the sponsors of this bill, bringing a critical issue before us. I rise in opposition, however. We have been at this point before. We passed an earlier version of this bill. The Senate rejected it as an amendment to the defense authorization. I appreciate that there have been some positive changes that have been made to this legislation. One is a sunset. The earlier bill would have made it permanent.

And I appreciate that it contains a provision that I authored that would prohibit assistance to groups who had appeared on the State Department's list of terrorist groups in the last 4 years. However, the problem is nothing in this legislation points us in the direction of a solution. It is, if you will, a cruise missile aimed at a difficult diplomatic effort just as they are reaching their most sensitive point. The timing for this legislation could not be worse.

While the United States has largely been missing in action from the diplomatic game, the European Union and Iran have been making progress at developing a formula that would lead to the suspension of Iran's nuclear enrichment program and the start of serious negotiations. This bill specifically targets Russia, which may have some influence with Iran and which is critical to a unified diplomatic front.

This bill has another fundamental flaw besides sanctioning people whose help we need to reach a diplomatic solution. It gives equal weight to overthrowing the Iranian government as it does to nonproliferation. These two goals work against each other.

Yes, the regime's human rights record is atrocious, but preventing them from developing nuclear weapons should be our first priority. By not prioritizing behavior change over regime change, we pull the rug out from anyone in the Iranian leadership who values survival over the nuclear program and eliminates incentives for diplomatic solutions.

Now, in my opinion, Iran holds, if not the key, a key to many of the issues that confound us in the Middle East. Their cooperation ultimately is going to be critical if we are going to be able to deal with the mess that our policies have created in Iraq, the problems that we are facing in Afghanistan with a resurgence of the Taliban, and it is going to play a key role on issues that deal with Israel, Hezbollah, and Hamas. They are like a puzzle. And, sadly, Iran is one of the missing pieces.

After September 11, when the United States took action to overthrow the Taliban, our interests and Iran's aligned, and we were able to coordinate quietly but effectively. They were partners with us at some tough sessions in Bonn when we were having the negotiations that set up the Afghanistan government. And in the midst of this tentative effort at cooperation, President Bush decided to declare Iran part of the axis of evil and most hope for progress disappeared.

Mr. Speaker, the irony is that Iran is one of the few nations in the world where the majority of the people still have a positive view of the United States.

This is difficult. It is not easy. But to simply sanction potential partners and confuse what our priorities are, I am sad to say, is going to be a step backward. We ought to make clear to Iran that they need to stop their support for terrorism, end development of nuclear capacity, and begin the process of free, fair, and open elections. But I am sorry to say that this legislation in front of us ignores the opportunities that we have incorporating the lessons we learned in our success with Libya.

I respectfully suggest that this is legislation that we ought to reject, and that we ought to instead prioritize what our goals are with Iran, and we are going to. By all means, have our sanctions but not be reckless in terms of the pressure we try to exert against the very people who are going to be necessary to help us with a diplomatic solution to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 10 minutes of my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS) and that he may be permitted to control that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BLUNT), our distinguished majority whip, without whom we would not be here today considering a bill with strong bipartisan support as well as administration support. Thank you, Mr. BLUNT.

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Mr. BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN, for yielding. I am pleased to join you and join our friend Mr. LANTOS in support of this bill.

I think that Iran has more potential than any other country to destabilize the world today. President Bush should be given the tools necessary to work toward a diplomatic solution in the crisis that we now face with Iran and that Iran, frankly, presents to the world.

I believe the solution to this problem is in this legislation. I think this does point us in a direction that can work. The mandatory sanctions for any entity that is assisting Iran to have the potential for weapons of mass destruction are important. They don't have to be targeted at a country, but those countries who are helping make that happen need to get the attention of this Congress and this government.

This declares that we also intend as a Congress to avoid implementing agreements with countries that cooperate in this area with Iran. This provides new tools to the President to prevent money laundering that can be used to

provide Iran and other dangerous countries with weapons that endanger our people.

Passage of this bill today sends a powerful message to Iran and to those who would support that country's weapons development, a program that we need to be sure that we punish that behavior.

I hope the President fully utilizes the new authority provided to him in this bill. I also urge not only that we approve this bill, but that our allies and our partners around the world work along with us to implement similar measures and convince Iran to peacefully abandon its efforts to destabilize the world. We encourage the President in this bill to work with those groups that have been mentioned that do support openness and democracy in Iran.

I thank ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN for her great leadership in this effort and TOM LANTOS for his leadership in this effort.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. I first want to thank my good friends ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN and GARY ACKERMAN for their tireless work on this critical legislation.

Mr. Speaker, the Iran Freedom Support Act will dramatically increase the economic pressure on the regime in Tehran to abandon its headlong pursuit of nuclear weapons. If we fail to use the economic and diplomatic tools available to us, the world will face a nightmare that knows no end, a despotic fundamentalist regime, wedded both to terrorism and to the most terrifying weapons known to man.

Iran's desire, Iran's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, is beyond dispute. For years it lied to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and even today it continues to deny access for IAEA inspectors to sensitive nuclear sites.

Mr. Speaker, a short while ago I had an extensive visit to IAEA headquarters in Vienna where I had discussions with some of the leaders of countries that are interested in this issue. They have no doubt that Iran is determined to pursue a military nuclear program.

Tehran has also defied the U.N. Security Council, which has demanded that it cease its enrichment of uranium. And now that Iran has been offered an incredibly generous package of benefits by the United States and our European allies in exchange for suspending uranium enrichment, the regime in Tehran is playing its usual cynical game, stalling for time.

Mr. Speaker, I meet with some frequency with Middle Eastern leaders, and there is not one who isn't deeply worried by the prospect of Iran's going nuclear. A nuclear Iran will touch off a bone-chilling arms race in the Middle East. But long before that happens, before Iran threatens to fire a shot, as it were, virtually every nation within reach of Iranian missiles will recalibrate its foreign policies to make certain that it doesn't offend the region's new nuclear power, Iran, and that, Mr. Speaker, would be a disaster for U.S. foreign policy interests, for the Middle East and for the entire civilized world.

Some argue that our legislation will undermine our relations with European allies who invest in Iran. But that argument, Mr. Speaker, is simply wrongheaded. Our legislation is intended to reinforce diplomacy with economics. We ask our allies to do what the United States did over a decade ago, divest from Iran's energy sector, the cash cow of the ayatollah's nuclear aspirations.

Nor is this legislation, Mr. Speaker, all stick and no carrot. By removing Libya from the list of the sanctioned, this legislation is an implicit invitation to Iran: mend your ways and your support of terrorism and your quest for weapons of mass destruction, and you will be welcomed back into the family of nations. Refuse to do so, and you will suffer accordingly.

The legislation before us will extend the Iran Sanctions Act for 5 years. It will boost congressional oversight over its implementation. The clear message of this legislation is that the administration now has to enforce the law fully.

Mr. Speaker, I would be delighted if our legislation were rendered redundant by serious Security Council action to impose international sanctions on Iran, but the attitudes shown by Russia and China thus far strongly suggest that meaningful U.N.-imposed sanctions are a most unlikely development.

In the meantime, we cannot shirk our responsibility to employ every peaceful means possible to defeat Iran's reckless nuclear military ambitions. That, in essence, is the reason for the urgency of passing H.R. 6198 today.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this bill, and for the sake of foiling a looming, long-term nuclear terrorist threat, I urge my colleagues to do so as well.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. GILCHREST).

Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank the gentlewoman from Florida for allowing us to have this debate today.

The human condition on the planet requires that there be strong military power under certain circumstances, strong intelligence under certain circumstances, strong sanctions under certain circumstances, and strong dialogue.

The President recently spoke to the Iranian people through The Washington Post. Here is what he said: ''I would like to say to the Iranian people, we respect your history. We respect your culture. I recognize the importance of your sovereignty, that you are a proud nation. I understand that you believe it is in your interest, your sovereign interest, to have nuclear power for energy. I would work for a solution to meeting your rightful desires to have civilian nuclear power. I will tell the Iranian people that we have no desire for conflict.''

If we hope to convince our allies and the international community that we are serious about resolving this matter diplomatically, the U.S. must open direct diplomatic channels with Tehran.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH).

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, it is important to go back a little bit in history here. The Iraq Accountability Act of 1998 was about funding a media propaganda machine which was, unfortunately, used to lay the groundwork for a war against Iraq. That act was about encouraging and funding opposition inside Iraq, unfortunately, to destabilize Iraq prior to a war.

You could call this bill the ''Iran Accountability Act.'' This act funds media propaganda machines to lay the groundwork for a war against Iran. It encourages and funds opposition inside Iran for that same purpose.

Notwithstanding what the words are in this bill, we have been here before. This administration is trying to create an international crisis by inflating Iran's nuclear development into an Iraq-type WMD hoax. ''Iran is not an imminent threat,'' this from Dr. Hans Blitz, former Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector, speaking to our congressional oversight subcommittee the other day.

The International Atomic Energy Agency points out that Iran has an enrichment level of about 3.6 percent. You have to go to 90 percent to have weapons quality enrichment. Iran is not an imminent threat. Iran does not have nuclear weapons.

This is a time for us to engage Iran with direct talks, our President to their President. This is the time to give assurance to Iran that we are not going to attack them.

Unfortunately, this administration has chosen to conduct covert ops in Iran. This administration has chosen to select 1,500 bombing targets with the Strategic Air Command. This administration has chosen plans for a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. This administration looked the other way when a congressional staff report basically claimed that Iran was trying to engage in nuclear escalation.

We don't need war, we need to talk, and that is what we ought to stand for here. No more Iraqs.

THE END OF THE ''SUMMER OF DIPLOMACY'': ASSESSING U.S. MILITARY OPTIONS ON IRAN

A CENTURY FOUNDATION REPORT

(By Sam Gardiner, Colonel, USAF (Ret.))

This report is part of a series commissioned by The Century Foundation to inform the policy debate about Iran-related issues.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. Nothing written here is to be

construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Century Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

''The doctrine of preemption remains sound and must remain an integral part of our national security strategy. We do not rule out the use of force before the enemy strikes.''—Stephen Hadley, March 16, 2006.

Introduction

The summer of diplomacy began with a dramatic announcement: on May 31, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that if the Ahmadinejad government agreed to halt Iran's nuclear enrichment program, the United States would talk directly with Tehran. Secretary Rice crafted the statement working alone at home. She called President Bush and received his approval. The Bush administration announced it as a significant initiative; it appeared to reflect a major change in policy.

This shift was not uncontroversial within the administration; Vice President Dick Cheney had opposed the announcement. But the rationale that prevailed seems to have been that if the United States were going to confront Iran, the diplomacy box had to be checked. The secretary of state was given the summer to try it.

Well, the summer is over. Diplomacy was given a chance, and it now seems that the diplomatic activity of the past several months was just a pretext for the military option.

Unfortunately, the military option does not make sense. When I discuss the possibility of an American military strike on Iran with my European friends, they invariably point out that an armed confrontation does not make sense—that it would be unlikely to yield any of the results that American policymakers do want, and that it would be highly likely to yield results that they do not. I tell them they cannot understand U.S. policy if they insist on passing options through that filter. The ''making sense'' filter was not applied over the past four years for Iraq, and it is unlikely to be applied in evaluating whether to attack Iran.

In order to understand the position of those within the U.S. government who will make the final decision to execute a military option against Iran, you must first consider the seven key truths that they believe: Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction—that is most likely true. Iran is ignoring the international community—true. Iran supports Hezbollah and terrorism—true. Iran is increasingly inserting itself in Iraq and beginning to be involved in Afghanistan—true. The people of Iran want a regime change—most likely an exaggeration. Sanctions are not going to work—most likely true. You cannot negotiate with these people—not proven.

If you understand these seven points as truth, you can see why the administration is very close to being left with only the military option. Administration officials say that they want to give diplomacy a chance. But when they say that, we need to remind ourselves that they do not mean a negotiated settlement. They mean that Iran must do what we want as a result of our nonmilitary leverage: suspend enrichment, and we will talk. But enrichment appears to continue, and there are no direct discussions between the two main parties. Satisfied that nonmilitary leverage is not going to work, those who believe the seven ''truths'' argue that the only viable option remaining is a military one. The story, however, is more complicated.

This report draws on my long experience of running military war games to examine some of the complications of the current situation: the various pressures and rationales for an attack on Iran; the probable direct and indirect consequences of air strikes; the significant gap between what proponents of the military option want to achieve and what in fact such attacks will achieve; and the likelihood that policymakers will ignore those gaps and proceed to war despite them.

Timing and Uncertainty

Waiting makes it harder. The history of warfare is dominated by attackers who concluded that it was better to attack early than to wait. One source of the momentum in Washington for a strike on Iran's nuclear program is the strategic observation that if such an attack is in fact inevitable, then it is better done sooner than later.

I conducted a war game for the Atlantic Monthly magazine two years ago. On a chart prepared for a mock meeting of the National Security Council, I identified thirteen nuclear-related targets in Iran. I still do this kind of gaming. My most recent chart reflects twenty-four potential nuclear-related facilities. In the past few years we have seen Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility buried under more than fifteen meters of reinforced concrete and soil. There is evidence that similar hardening is taking place at other facilities, and there is some evidence of facilities being placed inside populated areas. The longer the United States waits, the harder the targets—and the harder the targeting.

Another major issue that affects timing is the conspicuous absence of reliable intelligence about Iran. A report by the House Intelligence Committee found that we have serious gaps in our knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program. Paradoxically, those gaps in intelligence produce not caution, but further pressure to attack. U.S. intelligence agencies do not know the locations of all of Iran's facilities; they are not certain how far Iran has gone with enrichment. They know that Iran's nuclear program bears a striking resemblance to the Pakistani program, but they do not know whether Iran has acquired technology that might put it ahead of current estimates.

Some U.S. officials say that Iran is ten years from a weapon. The Pentagon, we are told, is operating under the assumption that Iran could have a weapon in five years. Some Israeli estimates say that Iran could have a weapon in three years. John Negroponte, the U.S. director of national intelligence, recently said that Iran could not develop a nuclear weapon until some time in the next decade. But the next day, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did not trust estimates of the Iranian program.

The very ambiguity of the intelligence picture has become another argument for military options, because even if U.S. policymakers could agree on a firm policy red line, there would be no way of determining if and when Iran crossed that line. Vice President Cheney's espoused calculation for dealing with global threats is that if there is even a 1 percent chance of a country passing WMD to a terrorist, the United States must act. Because there is a 1 percent chance Iran could pass WMD to a terrorist, the Bush administration finds itself obliged to reject nonmilitary options.

Regional Pressures

Adding to the political momentum toward war with Iran is significant pressure from the Israeli security establishment. Israel says that it has a plan for attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. Israel recently appointed an airman to be in charge of the Iranian theater of operations. It was announced that this major general would coordinate Israeli planning for Iran. Israeli military planners have U.S. penetrating weapons and a replica of the Natanz facility. They say that the attack would resemble the kind of operation they used against Egypt in 1967. They say that the plan involves more than just air strikes from the ''Hammers'' of the Israeli Air Force's 69 Squadron. It would include Shaldag commando teams, possibly some version of sea-launched missiles, and even explosive-carrying dogs that would penetrate the underground facilities.

Israel probably could hit most of the known nuclear targets. But such an attack would leave Iran with significant retaliatory options. That is a serious problem. U.S. forces and interests in the region would be likely targets of Iranian retaliation, so even an independent Israeli military operation would have critical consequences for the United States.

Part of the problem is that the two countries' red lines for Iran are not the same. Israel's red line is enrichment. The U.S. red line used to be the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. But over the past six months, America's red line has drifted closer to Israel's. On March 21, the president said that the United States could not allow Iran to have the knowledge to make a weapon. He repeated the phrase in August.

By redrawing the red line in this manner, U.S. policymakers are creating pressure to go to war with Iran. In saying that Iran could not be permitted to have the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons, the president used almost the exact words the Israeli Foreign Minister had used a year earlier. More recently, a senior State Department official said that Iran was near ''the point of no return'' on its nuclear program. Again, this was an exact echo of the words of Israeli officials. The Israeli pressure has worked.

Marketing the Military Option

I often hear from those who were strongly supportive of the Iraq invasion that the targeting of the Iranian facilities would be simple. If you understand the elements of the nuclear process, all you have to do is go after a small number of targets. The argument continues that Iran's nuclear facilities could be devastated on a single night, in a single strike, by a small number of U.S. B–2 bombers. The apparent ease of the operation is another element of this pressure to go now: If the Iranian nuclear program can be stopped in one night by a simple strike, why should the United States wait?

But the elimination of Iran's nuclear capability, while it might be the stated aim for the United States, is only part of the objective. While the Iranian regime's weapons program is a genuine source of concern, American policymakers are also troubled by Iran's interference in Iraq. Despite U.S. warnings, the Revolutionary Guard continues to supply weapons, money, and training to insurgents inside Iraq. Some proponents of attacking Iran feel that Tehran should be punished for supporting militias and extremists in Iraq.

In addition to Iran's role as an aspiring nuclear rogue and a supporter of the insurgency in Iraq, the country has been repeatedly portrayed as a key adversary in the war on terrorism. The United States has put Iran into a separate and new terrorism category, dubbing it the ''Central Banker of Terrorism.'' The new National Security Strategy says, ''Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror, such as Syria or Iran, has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace. The world must hold those regimes to account.'' ''Unnamed intelligence officials,'' citing evidence from satellite coverage and electronic eavesdropping, have told the press that Iran is hosting al Qaeda, granting senior operatives freedom to communicate and plan terrorist operations.

Indeed, the case against the regime is so forceful, and so multifaceted, that it becomes clear that the goal is not simply to do away with the regime's enrichment program. The goal is to do away with the regime itself.

And on top of all of those pressures—pressure from Israel, pressure from those worried about a nuclear Iran, Iran in Iraq, and Iran in the war on terrorism—is another, decisive piece of the puzzle: President George W. Bush. The argument takes several forms: the president is said to see himself as being like Winston Churchill, and to believe that the world will only appreciate him after he leaves office; he talks about the Middle East in messianic terms; he is said to have told those close to him that he has got to attack Iran because even if a Republican succeeds him in the White House, he will not have the same freedom of action that Bush enjoys. Most recently, someone high in the administration told a reporter that the president believes that he is the only one who can ''do the right thing'' with respect to Iran. One thing is clear: a major source of the pressure for a military strike emanates from the very man who will ultimately make the decision over whether to authorize such a strike-the president. And these various accounts of his motivations and rationales have in common that the president will not allow does-not-make-sense arguments to stand in the way of a good idea.

Below the CNN Line

Stay below the ''CNN line.'' That was the guidance given to the Air Component Commander, General Mike Mosley, as the secret air strikes began against Iraq in operation SOUTHERN FOCUS. It was July 2002. This classified bombing campaign would involve strikes on almost 400 targets. It was initiated just after the president visited Europe where he announced numerous times, ''I have no war plans on my desk.''

There was no UN resolution. The congressional authorization was not to come for four months. But the United States was starting the war.

All of the pressures described above are pushing for war with Iran, and increasingly, a public case for such a war is being made. But behind the scenes, military operations are already under way. (See Figure 1.) Most likely, the same guidance has been given to military commanders. The pattern is repeating.

When U.S. commandos began entering Iran—probably in the summer of 2004—their mission appears to have been limited. The objective was to find and characterize the Iranian nuclear program. From press reports, we know that the task force doing these operations was implanting sensors to detect radioactivity. Intelligence for these early operations inside Iran was coming from information provided by A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani dealer in black market nuclear material. The incursions were focused in the northeast, where the Iranian nuclear facilities are concentrated. The base of these incursions was most likely Camp War Horse in Iraq.

Israel also was conducting operations inside Iran in late 2003 or early 2004. The Israeli commandos reportedly were operating from a base in Iraq. These commandos also were implanting sensors. I would expect the U.S. and Israeli operations to have been coordinated. At about this time the United States began operating remotely piloted vehicles inside Iran over nuclear facilities. (Although this was certainly an embarrassment to the Iranians, they mentioned the flights numerous times in their press.)

In 2005, the balance within the U.S. government shifted in favor of those who were pushing for regime change in Iran. This was to result in the eventual creation of the Iran/Syria Operations Group inside the State Department, a request to Congress for $75 million, and the creation of a robust ''democracy promotion'' program. Meanwhile the United States moved from intelligence collection inside Iran, to establishing contact with ethnic minorities, to being involved in—and most likely conducting—-direct action missions. Reports suggest that the United States is supporting militant groups in the Baluchistan region of Iran. There have been killings and kidnappings in this region. Iran Revolutionary Guard convoys have been attacked. In a New Yorker article, Seymour Hersh confirmed that this region was one of the areas where U.S. forces were operating. The Iranian press also has accused the United States of operating there. In addition, press reports suggest that the United States may be sponsoring former members of the Iraq-based MEK (Mojahedin-e Khalq) in Baluchistan.

I recently attended a Middle East security conference in Berlin. At dinner one night, I sat next to the Iranian ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali-Asghar Soltanieh. I told him I had read that the Iranians were accusing the United States of supporting elements in Baluchistan. I asked him how they knew that. Without any hesitation, Soltanieh told me that they have captured militants who confessed that they were working with the Americans.

The United States is also directly involved in supporting groups inside the Kurdish area of Iran. According to both western and Iranian press reports, the Iranian Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) has been allowed to operate from Iraq into Iran and has killed Revolutionary Guard soldiers. The Iranians have also accused the United States of being involved in shooting down two of their aircraft, an old C–130 and a Falcon jet, carrying Revolutionary Guard leaders.

NEXT STEPS: Above the CNN Line

How do we get from being below the CNN line to the next step? The path is fairly clear. The United Nations Security Council will fall short of imposing serious sanctions on Iran. The United States, then, will look for a coalition of the willing to implement smart sanctions, focused on the Iranian leadership.

But the sanctions will be designed less to ensure compliance from the Iranians than to generate domestic and international support for the American position. I do not know an Iranian specialist I trust who believes that the sanctions would cause the Iranians to abandon their nuclear program, any more than did the sanctions on India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998. The sanctions will be used to raise the collective conscience that Iran is a threat, and to convince the world that the United States has tried diplomatic solutions.

If the experience of 1979 and other sanctions scenarios is a guide, sanctions will actually empower the conservative leadership in Iran. There is an irony here. It is a pattern that seems to be playing out in the selection of the military option. From diplomacy to sanctions, the administration is not making good-faith efforts to avert a war so much as going through the motions, eliminating other possible strategies of engagement, until the only option left on the table is the military one.

When imposing the sanctions fails to alter Tehran's position, policymakers will revert to a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. One can imagine the words of a planner in the meeting: ''If we are going to do this, let's make certain we get everything they have.'' I have done some rough ''targeting'' of nuclear facilities for which I can find satellite photos on the Web. By my calculation, an attack of relatively high certainty on nuclear targets would require 400 aim points. (An aim point is the specific location where an individual weapon is directed. Most targets would have multiple aim points.) I estimate seventy-five of these aim points would require penetrating weapons. (See Table 1, page 12.)

But it is unlikely that a U.S. military planner would want to stop there. Iran probably has two chemical weapons production plants. He would want to hit those. He would want to hit Iran's medium-range ballistic missiles that have just recently been moved closer to Iraq. There are fourteen airfields with sheltered aircraft. Although the Iranian Air Force is not much of a threat, some of these airfields are less than fifteen minutes flying time from Baghdad. Military planners would want to eliminate that potential threat. The Pentagon would want to hit the assets that could be used to threaten Gulf shipping. That would mean targeting cruise missile sites, Iranian diesel submarines, and Iranian naval assets.

TABLE 1. TARGETS IN IRAN

Initial strikes	Follow-on strikes
Nuclear facilities	Revolutionary Guard bases.
Military air bases	Command and governance assets:
Air defense command and control	Intelligence
Terrorist training camps	Military command
Chemical facilities	Radio and television
Medium-range ballistic missiles	Communications
23rd Commando Division	Security forces in Tehran.
Gulf-threatening assets:	
Submarines	Leadership: targeted killing.
Anti-ship missiles.	
Naval ships.	
Small boats.	

After going through the analysis, I believe that the United States can and will conduct the operation by itself. There may be low-visibility support from Israel and the U.K., and France may be consulted. But it will be an American operation.

What about casualties? Although the United States would suffer casualties in the Iranian retaliation, the honest answer to the president if he asks about losses during the strike itself is that there probably will not be any. The only aircraft penetrating deep

into Iranian airspace will be the B–2s at night. B–52s will stand off, firing cruise missiles. Other missile attacks will come from Navy ships firing at a safe distance.

Targeting the Nuclear Program? Or the Regime?

Air-target planners orchestrate strikes on the basis of desired target destruction criteria. In the case of an attack on Iran, after five nights of bombing, we can be relatively certain of target destruction. It is even possible to project the degree to which parts of the Iranian nuclear program would be set back. For example, using Web pictures of the Natanz enrichment facility, it is possible to see three years worth of construction. An attack on that construction might appear to set the program back three years. But it is hard to judge. David Kay, the former top U.S. weapons inspector, observed during our discussions that there is the program we see, but there is also the program we do not see. Because of the gaps in U.S. intelligence on Iran, and specifically on Iran's nuclear program, American military leaders are growing increasingly uneasy about the reliability and comprehensiveness of target selection. In other words, after the five-night military attack we would not be able with any degree of certainty to say how we had impacted the Iranian nuclear program.

If this uncertainty does not appear to worry the proponents of air strikes in Iran it is in no small part because the real U.S. policy objective is not merely to eliminate the nuclear program, but to overthrow the regime. It is hard to believe, after the misguided talk prior to Iraq of how American troops would be greeted with flowers and welcomed as liberators, but those inside and close to the administration who are arguing for an air strike against Iran actually sound as if they believe the regime in Tehran can be eliminated by air attacks.

In this case, the concept is not a ground force Thunder Run into Tehran of the sort used in Baghdad. It is a decapitation-based concept. Kill the leadership and enable the people of Iran to take over their government. More reasonable leadership will emerge.

Under this concept, the air operation would take longer than the five nights. The targets would be expanded. The Revolutionary Guard units would be attacked since according to the argument they are the primary force that keeps the current regime in power. There are other regime protection units in Tehran. Most important, the U.S. operation would move into targeted killing, seeking to eliminate the leadership of Iran.

It sounds simple. Air planners always tell a good story. By the same token, they almost always fall short of their promises, even in strictly military terms. That was true in World War II. It was true in Korea. It was true in Vietnam. It has just proved true with the Israeli attacks on Hezbollah. No serious expert on Iran believes the argument about enabling a regime change. On the contrary, whereas the presumed goal is to weaken or disable the leadership and then replace it with others who would improve relations between Iran and the United States, it is far more likely that such strikes would strengthen the clerical leadership and turn the United States into Iran's permanent enemy.

Iran's Response

Having demonstrated that air strikes are unlikely either to eliminate the nuclear program or to bring about the overthrow of the Islamic regime in Iran, we must now turn to what, precisely, they would achieve. It is important to remember that some of Iran's threats, demonstrations of new weapons, and military exercises are designed to have a deterrent effect. As such we should not deduce too much about what Iran would do in the event of an attack on the basis of what it might say and do in advance of an attack. A former CIA Middle East Station Chief told me once that predicting the consequences of a strategic event in the Middle East was as difficult as predicting how an Alexander Calder mobile would come to rest after you flicked one of its hanging pieces.

It is possible, however, to identify some high probability immediate consequences.

The Iranians would likely look to target Israel as a response to a U.S. strike, using Hezbollah as the primary vehicle for retaliation. For Tehran, there is the added benefit that blaming Israel (even for a U.S. strike) would play well at home, and probably throughout the region.

Moqtada al-Sadr has said publicly that if the United States were to attack Iran, he would target U.S. forces in Iraq.

Iran could channel more individuals and weapons into Iraq. Specifically, Iran could upgrade technology among Shiite militias, with weapons like the laser-guided anti-tank missiles Hezbollah had in Lebanon. We might even see more direct operations like missile attacks against U.S. forces.

Moqtada al-Sadr controls the large Facilities Protection Service forces in Iraq. Some estimates put this force as large as 140,000. Among other missions, they guard the oil pipelines. If Iran wants to cut the flow of oil, Iraq is the best place to begin, and the means are in place to take on the mission. The impact of severing Iraq's oil supplies would be an immediate increase in its own oil revenue.

Iran is not going to wipe Israel from the map or force the United States to leave Iraq with these operations. But in causing these various complications, Iran can still achieve a degree of success. As we recently witnessed in the clash between Hezbollah and Israel, Iran can seem stronger just by virtue of making the United States and Israel seem weaker.

Round Two

Once the nature of the Iranian retaliation becomes apparent, the United States will not likely declare success and walk away from the problem. Clearly, the pressure will be to expand the targets and punish Iran even more. The government of Iran is fragile, the thinking goes; it could even be on the verge of falling; it is time to ''enable'' the Iranian people. The Iranians will react with their own horizontal escalation. (See Table 2, page 16.)

Iran has been sending mixed signals about whether or not it would cut its own oil production or attempt to restrict the flow of oil from the Gulf. A strike of five nights might not push them to cut the flow of oil. But continued operations probably would. Iran does have some flexibility to do without oil revenues for a period because of surpluses from currently high oil prices. In addition, it has plans for rationing refined petroleum products that it must import.

Executing the oil option might not be limited to operations against tankers moving in and out of the Gulf. Iran has the capability, and we have seen some indications of the intent, to attack facilities of other oil providers in the region.

It would be tougher for Iran and Hezbollah to attack UN forces in Lebanon. If the UN forces were to become too aggressive in response to Hezbollah attacks against Israel, they would most likely become targets. In addition, at some point in the expanding conflict, Iran might see a value to making the war about attempts at Western domination of the region and not just about the United States and Israel. In that case, a focused attack on something like the Italian headquarters would resonate in the region.

It took a while for the nations of the region to react to the Israeli attack into Lebanon. That most likely would be the case in the event of a U.S. strike against Iran. As attacks continued and as the television coverage intensified, however, we could see something similar to the reactions to the Danish cartoons. We could see the ''Arab Street'' asserting itself.

Syria and Iran signed a defense agreement on June 15. Under this agreement Syrian forces would be brought into a fight if Iran were attacked. Syrian President Bashar Assad might be a reluctant participant, but as the conflict expands, he might not have a choice.

The Iranians could conduct targeted killing outside the region. They have used this tactic in the past: in 1991, Shapour Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, was decapitated in his apartment in Paris.

Continued air strikes and demonstrations could have a compounding effect. Weak governments in the Muslim world could be threatened. The governments of Pakistan, Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are vulnerable.

TABLE 2. CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTACK

	Type of Operation	
	Short strike	Regime change
Hezbollah attacks on Israel	High probability	High probability.
Attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq	High probability	High probability.
Sabotage pipelines in Iraq	High probability	High probability.
Street demonstrations on a wide scale.	Possible	High probability.
Hezbollah attacks outside the region.	Possible	High probability.
Iran stopping its own oil exports	Possible	High probability.
Iran blocking Gulf oil flow	High probability	High probability.
Iran attacking other regional oil facilities.	Possible	Possible.
Iran suicide attacks	Not likely	Possible.
Syria involved	Not likely	Possible.
Threats to regional governments	Not likely	Possible.

As an obvious consequence of the instability resulting from a U.S. strike, the price of oil almost certainly will spike. The impact will depend on how high and how long. The longer the conflict goes, the higher the price. A former Kuwaiti oil minister privately suggested a plateau of $125 per barrel. Confidential analysis by a major European bank suggests it would level off at $130, and a very conservative estimate would be over $200.

With prices surging to this level, third order consequences become apparent. The most obvious would be a global, synchronized recession, intensified by the existing U.S. trade and fiscal imbalances. Another political consequence would be that oil exporting countries outside the region would enjoy significant surges in revenue from higher prices. As a result, countries such as Venezuela and Russia would enjoy expanded influence while the West would be reeling from recession.

I should note that in the preceding discussion of the cycle of action and reaction, I have not mentioned large U.S. ground unit formations. That is because I do not believe we will come to a point where that option will make sense to policymakers. This is the one lesson the administration seems to have learned from Iraq—occupation does not work. And that realization brings us back to why the air strike option has been so attractive to the administration from the beginning.

When Is the Strike?

When does it all come together? When could the United States pull the trigger on the military option? The most important point in understanding the window for an attack is that the military preparations will not be the determining factor. This operation will not resemble the six months of

preparations for Operation Desert Shield in 1990. The preparations will be much less visible than the movements to the region in early 2003. We will not read about discussions with Turkey for basing permission. It will not be a major CNN event.

Instead, preparations will involve the quiet deployment of Air Force tankers to staging bases. We will see additional Navy assets moved to the region. The more significant indications will come from strategic influence efforts to establish domestic political support. The round of presidential speeches on terrorism is a beginning, but I expect more. An emerging theme for the final marketing push seems to be that Iran threatens Israel's existence. We can expect the number of administration references to Iran to significantly increase, and will see three themes—the nuclear program, terrorism, and the threat to Israel's existence.

The issue of congressional approval plays into the timing question. Administration officials have been asked numerous times if the president would require authorization by Congress for a strike on Iran. Secretary Rice responded to that question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 2005 by saying, ''I will not say anything that constrains his authority as Command in Chief.'' Congressmen Peter DeFazio and Maurice Hinchey offered an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill in June that would have required the president to get authorization from Congress before taking military action against Iran. The amendment failed.

Over the past few months, we have seen numerous leaks and administration documents that raise an Iran-al Qaeda connection. In addition, the House Permanent Select Committee report on the threat of Iran implied an al Qaeda connection. This linkage of Iran and al Qaeda fits neatly into the broader effort to sell a strike to the American people. But more importantly, it opens the way for an argument that a strike on Iran was part of the global war on terrorism already authorized by Congress.

In other words, approval by Congress does not necessarily have to be part of the calculation of when an attack could take place. If the determining factor of timing is neither the preparation of military forces nor congressional approval, one question remains: How much public support do decisionmakers believe they need before pulling the trigger? And that question brings us back to the beginning of the summer of diplomacy. Vice President Cheney had to be convinced that it was necessary to give some lip service to diplomacy, checking that box in order to secure public support. President Bush seems to be convinced of the rightness of his cause and vision. He repeats often that he does not care about public opinion.

The window for a strike on Iran stands open.

Finally

Policymakers who begin with the seven ''truths'' of the situation can easily proceed down a path that leaves the military option as the only one on the table. There is a certain inevitability to this path, a certain inexorability to the momentum toward war. The policymakers will say that the Iranians have forced us to go in this direction. But the painful irony is that these policymakers are forcing the direction on themselves.

At the end of the path that the administration seems to have chosen, will the issues with Iran be resolved? No. Will the region be better off? No. Is it clear Iran will abandon its nuclear program? No. On the other hand, can Iran defeat the United States militarily? No.

Will the United States force a regime change in Iran? In all probability it will not. Will the economy of the United States suffer? In all probability it will.

Will the United States have weakened its position in the Middle East? Yes. Will the United States have reduced its influence in the world? Yes.

When I finished the 2004 Iran war game exercise, I summarized what I had learned in the process. After all the effort, I am left with two simple sentences for policymakers. ''You have no military solution for the issues of Iran. You have to make diplomacy work.'' I have not changed my mind. That conclusion made sense then. It still makes sense today.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield 1–1/3 minutes to my dear friend and distinguished colleague on the International Relations Committee, the Congresswoman from Nevada (Ms. BERKLEY).

Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend Mr. LANTOS for yielding to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. Each day brings something new from Iran, a new boast, a new rant, a new threat. Yet we have made little progress in convincing our allies that the Iranian regime means business, and that business is funding and supplying terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, wiping Israel off the face of the map and denying the Holocaust.

We must not allow them to acquire the means to carry out their ambitions. It would be difficult to overstate the danger Iran represents. Unchecked Iranian nuclear proliferation, combined with increasing support for international terrorism, poses a grave threat to United States forces in the Middle East, moderate Islamic Arab countries in the region, the State of Israel. And a nuclear Iran poses just as much of a threat to Europe as it does to the countries in the Middle East.

Incomprehensibly, many of our allies seem oblivious to these dangers. Their strategy of negotiations, incentives, and concessions are not working. Stronger measures are necessary. This bill will ramp up the pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions and cooperate with the international community.

Iran is a radical fundamentalist country headed by a President who I believe is as dangerous to the world community in the 21st century as Hitler was in the 20th century. Every time this man opens his mouth, he proves it. We must deny Iran the technology and financial resources that will enable this regime to carry out its threats.

I urge support of this bill.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PAUL).

(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

□ 1330

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill, and let me give you a few reasons why.

In the introduction to the bill, it says that its purpose is to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition of its government; and I would just ask one question: Could it be possible that others around the world and those in Iran see us as participating in ''threatening behavior?'' We should make an attempt to see things from other people's view as well.

I want to give you three quick reasons why I think we should not be going at it this way:

First, this is a confrontational manner of dealing with a problem. A country that is powerful and self-confident should never need to resort to confrontation. If one is confident, one should be willing to use diplomacy whether dealing with our friends or our enemies; I think the lack of confidence motivates resolutions of this type.

The second reason that I will give you for opposing this is that this is clearly seeking regime change in Iran. We are taking it upon ourselves that we do not like the current regime. I don't like Almadinyad, but do we have the responsibility and the authority to orchestrate regime change? We approach this by doing two things: Sanctions to penalize, at the same time giving aid to those groups that we expect to undermine the government. Do you know if somebody came into this country and paid groups to undermine our government, that is illegal? Yet here we are casually paying money, millions of dollars, unlimited sums of money to undermine that government. This is illegal.

The third point. This bill rejects the notion of the nonproliferation treaty. The Iranians have never been proven to be in violation of the nonproliferation treaty; and this explicitly says that they cannot enrich, uranium even for private and commercial purposes.

For these three reasons we obviously should reconsider and not use this confrontational approach. Why not try diplomacy? Oppose this resolution.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1⅓ minutes to Mr. SHERMAN.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant support of this bill and in strong support of its authors—who got what they could from a President who has a veto pen, and is determined to continue our ineffectual policy toward Iran.

America has been blinded by the flash of this President's overly aggressive response to Iraq's tiny ''weapons of mass destruction'' program. So, as a result, we have settled for a loud but pitifully ineffectual effort, both toward North Korea's nuclear program and toward Iran's.

In this bill, I had an amendment that would have prohibited U.S. corporations from doing business with Iran through their foreign subsidiaries. That amendment was stripped in conference. So Halliburton is protected; the American people are not.

This bill extends the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which was so effective,

along with other measures, in getting Khadaffi to change his policies. However, as toward Iran, the last administration and this administration has a policy of ignoring widely reported investments in the Iran oil sector. The bill says we are supposed to sanction oil companies that invest even $40 million in Iran's oil sector. When tens of billions of dollars of investments are announced in the Wall Street Journal, the President's response is, he didn't get that copy.

We have got to pass this bill, but we have got to do a lot more. And we have got to make sure that, in our policy toward Russia and China about Moldova, Abkhazia, and currency controls, that we make it clear that support on Iran will lead to our change on those issues that are so important to Russia and China. We need linkage, and we need an effective policy.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. MCDERMOTT).

Mr. MCDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, the American people need to know the Republican majority today has created the House Failed Diplomacy Caucus.

The Republicans need another press release before they go home, so we have 20 minutes to offer our thoughts on a bad bill sent to the floor by Republicans to show how tough they are.

Showing how smart we are would be a far better idea for dealing with nations like Iran and Iraq. But global diplomacy isn't the stuff of press releases; rhetoric is. So the Republicans have shut down debate by bringing legislation to the floor under a closed rule. They don't want ideas or improvements for making the world a safer place. They want leaflets to drop during the campaign, and they are being printed en mass right now. It is the Republican Iraq strategy all over again. Different nation, same flawed approach.

Republicans have given us H.R. 6198, the We Run the World Act. There is no need for other nations to actually have governments, actually. We will send our press releases. Just follow along, Russia, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Lebanon, and anywhere else where we think we run them.

Republicans want Americans to point the finger and send along instructions. They are staging a campaign event right here on the floor. You watch how quick it makes it into the ads of television.

This is not, not, going to help America chart a path to deal with what is wrong with the Iranian government. No one disagrees with the fact that it is not a government we want in control of that country. It will only entrench and bolster those who are wrong.

The press release won't protect anybody. But, in fact, the Iranian dissidents don't want the money. Do you know why? Just like many Republicans today don't want Bush to come into their district and put his arm around them in the midst of this campaign, the Iranian dissidents know that, if it becomes American money, they are done. They will not be able to do what they need to. We need to vote ''no'' on this initiative.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to yield time to my colleague from Florida on this bipartisan bill, the essence of which has been extensively debated on the floor several times and in committees, as well.

I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SHAW).

Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding this time to me and congratulate the committee on both sides of the aisle.

I think, however, when we look around and see some of the rhetoric that is going on, let's take a look at what is happening.

We have probably one of the most dangerous countries in the world run by fanatics that is in the process of producing a nuclear weapon. We have the Iranians financing the terrorists in Iraq killing American soldiers. We have the Iranians in Iraq killing innocent Iraqis. We have the Iranians in Iraq killing innocent Lebanese with the Hezbollah. And we are standing here today listening to people talk about press releases.

Come on, guys. Isn't there something that can draw this Congress together? It already has brought together responsible Democrats and Republicans. But to come forward and talk of this nature is absolutely counterproductive. It does not help us in our country, and we should stop it now. We need to put up a unified force in this country.

We are aiding and abetting the enemy when we stress our division. Of course we are going to disagree. That is healthy. That is what democracy is all about. But on some of these items, such as what we are talking about here today, when American soldiers are spilling their blood and that blood is being spilt with Iranian money, can't we start talking about America and quit talking about politics?

Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Oregon for yielding me this time and providing it to us in the context of this debate.

This proposed legislation is contrary to the best interest of Iran and the United States. It is, unfortunately, reminiscent of the State of the Union address which declared Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as part of the Axis of Evil; and we are now very familiar with the consequences of that statement. We have seen a disastrous situation develop in Iraq, and we have also seen the revival of nuclear interest both in North Korea and in Iran.

The attitude of our country toward Iran now for more than 50 years has been overly aggressive and overbearing, and the consequences of it have been very dangerous. We should be acting in a much more mature and responsible way, particularly toward this country. This is a very significant country, not only in the Middle East but in the world generally. The people of this country are good, sound, solid, reasonable people, and we need to be appealing to them on that basis, not on the basis of the language of this resolution, which continues to create this atmosphere of hostility which is, as I have indicated, has been going on now for more than 50 years.

That needs to change. We need to change our attitude, change our approach to this nation. We need to engage them more objectively, more seriously, and in a much more filial way, a much more friendlier way. And if we were to do that, we would find that this country would react and respond to us in a similar fashion.

Unfortunately, this proposed legislation does exactly the opposite. It places us, continues to place us in a difficult and dangerous, antagonistic circumstance between ourselves and this country, and unnecessarily so. So this legislation is contrary to our interests, just as it is contrary to the interests of Iran, and so it should be rejected by this body.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of our time to the distinguished member of the International Relations Committee, Mr. ENGEL, from New York.

Mr. ENGEL. I thank my distinguished friend from California for yielding to me, and I rise in strong support of this bill.

My colleagues, we have to deal with things as they are, not as what we wish them to be. I wish there was reasonableness among the government of Iran today. I wish there were people that we could talk to on a friendly basis and reason with them and come to some kind of a compromise.

But that is not what we have here. We have a belligerent regime that is pursuing nuclear weapons, that is hostile towards the United States, that is hostile towards the West, that is hostile towards Israel. You have a president of that country who has said every foul thing imaginable, denies the Holocaust, says he wants to wipe Israel off the face of the map, and says that Americans are his sworn enemy.

This bill makes sense. This bill extends the current law and sanctions and provides important additional authorities to fight that threat. It is the carrot and the stick. We are having democracy building in this bill. We are being able to try to reach the Iranian people, who are good friends of the American people, but they are trapped by a repressive government and a government that doesn't have their best interests at heart, let alone anybody else's best interest.

So this is sort of a carrot-and-stick approach. We slap sanctions when sanctions are needed. We amend, also we expand it. It is expiring if we don't amend it, and it does what we know needs to be done.

Iran needs to be challenged. It cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons.

This is the same policy, it is a centrist policy, it makes a lot of sense, and I urge strong bipartisan support for this bill.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. LEACH. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

First, let me stress, this bill has strong bipartisan support. It also has significant bipartisan opposition. And so it should be considered in the category of individual judgment, not politics.

On the plus side of the bill, let me note that it does stress sanctions, not military action, and it quite properly gives the executive discretion to lift these sanctions.

On the minus side, and this is the compelling point, it represents an escalation of tension, policy, and attitudinal friction with Iran.

□ 1345

It is an escalation that is guaranteed to fail. You might ask, Why is it guaranteed to fail? It is because unilateral sanctions don't work, and there is no evidence that the other principal parties that are dealing with Iran will follow this example.

We can pound our chest all we want to suggest that a Russia or a China should follow our lead, but these kinds of suggestions from Congress simply carry no weight.

Secondly, no one should doubt that this complicates problems for our troops in Iraq today. That is an absolute utter circumstance that has to be dealt with, and we have to think it through.

Thirdly, this step implicitly underscores and advances a diplomacy-less strategy. That is, the United States of America has advanced a no-talk-with-Iran strategy for more than this administration, for quite a number of years, and the question is does it work, is it as hapless as our strategy towards certain other countries in the world, including Cuba.

In the backdrop is the issue of force, and also the issue of dominoes, dominoes in the sense of decisionmaking. Often policies that don't work implicitly are followed by other policies that we hope will work. If this particular policy doesn't work, do we then have to go to the force option?

There is a neocon desire, as has been written about extensively, to consider the idea of a preemptive strike. All I would say is there is a ''3–3–100'' set of principles that we have to think through.

The first ''three'' is there are three ways of obtaining nuclear weapons: one is to develop them; another is to steal them; and another is to buy them.

If we bomb Iran, there is no doubt whatsoever we will put back their capacity to develop. But it might also accelerate the capacity to steal or purchase.

The second ''three'' principle is that there are three weapons of mass destruction. We not only have nuclear; we have chemical and biological. And knocking back their nuclear certainly will accelerate the other two.

The third issue is the issue of a ''hundred.'' We have the idea that we can do a preemptive strike quickly and it will be over. But the fact is that the other side will respond. They might respond for 100 years.

I think it is time we talk about from the people's House the issue of developing mutual self-interest, not antagonism, and we ought to move in the direction of realism instead of taking ideological steps that don't fit the times.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentlewoman's work because the bill that we have before us, as I mentioned earlier, is, a substantial improvement over the one that was approved by the House earlier this year. I had hoped it would come back to our committee because I think these issues are worthy of further discussion, and there is more fine-tuning we could do.

For instance, dealing with the provisions for terms of the promotion of democracy, reading the language that is in this bill, the Ayatollah Khomeini, in exile in France, would have qualified for U.S. assistance. We could have had a debacle like we had with Chalabi. I don't think it is as tight and precise as we would like.

But most important, it fails to deal with the fundamental choice we need to make between whether we want regime change or whether we want to stop nuclear proliferation.

I deeply appreciate the points raised by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. LEACH). We could end up actually making the situation worse.

I am deeply troubled that we are going to ratchet up the pressure on the very people who we most need for a diplomatic solution, the people like China and Russia who are going to be key to ultimately resolving it.

Mr. Speaker, part of the problem that we have great difficulty with is that some of the most disagreeable people, some of the most dangerous people, are people that we ignore at our peril. We should not do that. We should engage them directly, diplomatically and not under the auspices of this bill, which I hope that the House will reject.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, as recently as last month, Iran blatantly refused to respond to the August 31 deadline as set forth by the United Nations Security Council to stop enriching its uranium in exchange for a very generous incentives package.

We have tried to coax. We have tried to induce. We have tried to talk the Iranians into cooperating. Enough with the carrots; it is time for the stick.

We hope that all freedom-loving nations are allies in this struggle for nonproliferation efforts and would, out of their own volition, take the necessary steps to hold Iran accountable for its own behavior. However, sometimes even friends need a little prodding.

Writer Charles Krauthammer points out the chilling reality of the opportunity costs of not dealing effectively with Iran at this time. He says, ''If we fail to prevent an Iranian regime run by apocalyptic fanatics from going nuclear, we will have reached the point of no return. It is not just Iran that might be the source of great concern, but that we will have demonstrated to the world that for those similarly inclined, there is no serious impediment.''

This bill will help contain the Iranian threat and will send a clear message that we will not tolerate flagrant violations of international nonproliferation obligations.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6198, legislation to hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran. As an original cosponsor of the legislation I am pleased that the House is considering it today.

The threat from Iran is plain. The Iranian mullahs have lied to the international community about their nuclear program for years. They have, again and again and again, defied the clear will of the international community that has demanded that they freeze their efforts to enrich uranium. Iran has been, and remains today, the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world. Iran provides hundreds of millions of dollars, shiploads of weapons, advanced military training and substantial political cover to Hizballah, Hamas and other radical, violent Islamist groups in the Middle East. Their most senior officials continue to make pronouncements that call into question their attachment to reality. Supreme Leader Khamenei has confirmed that Iran would share its nuclear technology with other states. President Ahmadinejad has made a hobby out of Holocaust denial and at every opportunity violates the most fundamental tenet of international law by calling for the annihilation of Israel, a sovereign member of the international community.

In Iran, we have exactly what we thought we had in Iraq: a state with enormous wealth in natural resources; significant WMD capabilities and the means to deliver them; and the use of terrorist organizations as an instrument of state policy. But what will amaze the historians who look back on this period will be the stunning lack of urgency with which the Bush Administration and this Congress has approached this problem.

I will be the first to admit that our policy options toward Iran are unappetizing at best. We have little diplomatic leverage, since we don't talk with Iran directly, except in very limited circumstances. Any military operation beyond pinpoint air strikes is quite simply beyond our capacity at the moment, given our situation in Iraq. And we should honestly acknowledge that even a robust campaign of air strikes targeted at Iran's nuclear facilities might have only a marginal effect on Iran's nuclear program. We don't know where all of it is hidden and many of the sites that we do know of can't be effectively attacked from the air. Further, since our intelligence is so incomplete, we would have a very limited ability to assess

how much damage our strikes had actually done to the Iranian program. In addition to questions about the direct affects, a decision to strike Iran, would have enormous diplomatic consequences for the United States, and would likely lead to Iranian retaliation against our already overextended troops in Iraq, and probably against our ally, Israel.

So without a viable military option, we are left with maklng multi-lateral diplomacy effective. This is the right course, but it is one that the Bush administration has been extremely loathe to pursue, and one at which they have shown little proficiency.

If a nuclear-armed Iran is ''very de-stabilizing,'' as the President has said it is—and I do believe it is—then we need to make that view, and the implications of that view, clear to Russia and China and even to our partners in Europe. Fortunately, this legislation provides the administration with new and useful tools that can be applied to help make that case. Our message must be that this urgent problem can be addressed if the will is there to do so.

In short, Iran needs to become urgent for the administration before it will become urgent for anyone else. Only concerted, sustained multilateral pressure has any chance of convincing Iran to change course. And if Iran chooses not to change course, then the international community must be prepared to pursue effective multilateral sanctions against the regime. Unfortunately, while the EU–3 shares our view that an Iran with nuclear weapons is not an acceptable outcome, it seems that Russia and China do not. If the administration can't convince those nations that it is in their interest for Iran not to have nuclear weapons, then we need to start considering what options remain to us unilaterally, what the cost of the options would be and how we could go about containing a nuclear-armed Iran.

One last point Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that the bill we are considering today does not contain the language regarding pension plans and mutual funds that would require the managers of such funds to notify investors if any of the assets of a particular fund are invested in an entity which has invested in Iran and may be subject to sanctions under ILSA. I think such notifications are consistent with the fiduciary responsibilities of fund managers and would have prevented Americans from unwittingly fueling Iran's drive to acquire nuclear weapons, simply by contributing to their 401(k)'s. Nevertheless, I strongly urge my colleagues to support the bill.

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the march to war with Iran. I am as concerned as the authors and supporters of this bill about Iran's nuclear weapons program. But I do not believe that levying additional sanctions and encouraging regime change is the correct course. Instead, we should work with our allies to negotiate a diplomatic solution.

The ''Iran Freedom Support Act'', H.R. 6198, will antagonize Iran's government. Provisions calling for democracy promotion and ''the exercise of self-determination'' will be interpreted as a direct assault on Iran's sovereignty and may prompt Iran to discontinue ongoing negotiations. Unilateral sanctions may also discourage France, Germany, Italy, and Spain from working to broker an international agreement. Our allies do not appreciate it when we ''go it alone.''

Dissidents will also be hurt by our offer of financial and political assistance. As in Iraq, individuals and groups that ally with America will see their integrity questioned and their reputations for independence undermined.

Iranian families will be hurt by sanctions that prohibit foreign investment in the country's petroleum industries. Sanctions already in place have not impacted Iran's behavior. Why would new prohibitions on investment succeed where old sanctions have failed?

Finally, the American people will be less secure. Antagonizing Iran will not stop or even slow nuclear weapons development. Instead, sanctions will prompt Iran to redouble its efforts as a means of saving domestic and international face.

The Bush administration and Republicans in Congress have already made a mess of Iraq and allowed warlords to gain control of much of Afghanistan's countryside. This legislation takes us a step closer to similar results in Iran. I urge my colleagues to vote ''no''.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 6198, introduced by my colleagues on the House International Relations Committee.

The international community continues to look the other way as Iran claims they will move forward in the process of enriching uranium.

The leaders of Iran decided the IAEA deadline did not apply to them and I strongly believe have no interest in negotiating with the West.

The President of Iran was clear about his intentions to enrich uranium at the United Nations General Assembly a few weeks ago.

His performance in New York and at the Council of Foreign Relations was a display of insanity.

He continues to proudly defend his comments about the Holocaust being a myth and how Iran is not trying to acquire nuclear weapons even as more and more information comes out about their covert nuclear program that was helped along by AQ Khan's black market nuclear network

This is a man who was basically appointed by the Mullahs in Tehran.

I say this because any reform minded candidate was removed from the ballots. Iran is not a democracy; the government of Iran is run by zealots using terrorism to meet their goals.

We need to support the people of Iran as they continue to be repressed by the Mullahs.

The people of Iran deserve freedom and democracy.

I strongly support this bill and I urge all of my colleagues to support this important piece of legislation.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6198, the Iran Freedom Support Act, because this bill could very well derail the diplomatic efforts currently underway that are our best hope for ending the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Let me be clear that I agree with the great majority of which this bill would do. I believe that we should extend the Iran Libya Sanctions Act. I believe that we should support human rights in Iran.

But as with so many things in life, Mr. Speaker, timing is everything. And this is the wrong time to pass this bill.

Crucial negotiations between Iran and the European Union in Berlin are reportedly closing in on a deal that would suspend Iran's uranium enrichment program while multilateral talks commence. The Bush administration has so botched the issue of containing Iran's nuclear ambitions that we have few choices left. These negotiations were just suspended for a week, and it would surprise no one if Iran did not return to the table. But make no mistake: as bad as the negotiation option may turn out to be, it remains our best chance of stopping Iran from ever building a nuclear weapon.

We need to support these negotiations, not undermine them. For the Congress to pass language which essentially makes regime change in Iran the official policy of the United States would be counterproductive while these negotiations in Berlin remain promising.

I could support this bill at another time, but not now, not when its passage could kill the ongoing negotiations.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6198, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2006

Mr. ROGERS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6162) to require financial accountability with respect to certain contract actions related to the Secure Border Initiative of the Department of Homeland Security.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 6162

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Secure Border Initiative Financial Accountability Act of 2006''.

SEC. 2. SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security shall review each contract action related to the Department's Secure Border Initiative having a value greater than $20,000,000, to determine whether each such action fully complies with applicable cost requirements, performance objectives, program milestones, inclusion of small, minority, and women-owned business, and timelines. The Inspector General shall complete a review under this subsection with respect to a contract action—

(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the initiation of the action; and

(2) upon the conclusion of the performance of the contract.

(b) REPORT BY INSPECTOR GENERAL.—Upon completion of each review described in subsection (a), the Inspector General shall submit to the Secretary of Homeland Security a report containing the findings of the review, including findings regarding any cost overruns, significant delays in contract execution, lack of rigorous departmental contract management, insufficient departmental financial oversight, bundling that limits the