

(A) a legal description of the boundary lines; and

(B) legal description of the lands transferred under subsection (a).

(2) EFFECT.—Beginning on the date on which the legal descriptions are published under paragraph (1), such legal descriptions shall be the official legal descriptions of the boundary lines and the lands transferred under subsection (a).

(g) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act shall—

(1) enlarge, impair, or otherwise affect any right or claim of the Pechanga Band of Luiseno Mission Indians to any land or interest in land that is in existence before the date of the enactment of this Act;

(2) affect any water right of the Pechanga Band of Luiseno Mission Indians in existence before the date of the enactment of this Act; or

(3) terminate any right-of-way or right-of-use issued, granted, or permitted before the date of enactment of this Act.

(h) RESTRICTED USE OF TRANSFERRED LANDS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The lands transferred under subsection (a) may be used only as open space and for the protection, preservation, and maintenance of the archaeological, cultural, and wildlife resources thereon.

(2) NO ROADS.—There shall be no roads other than for maintenance purposes constructed on the lands transferred under subsection (a).

(3) DEVELOPMENT PROHIBITED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—There shall be no development of infrastructure or buildings on the land transferred under subsection (a).

(B) OPEN SPACE.—The land transferred under subsection (a) shall be—

(i) maintained as open space; and

(ii) used only for—

(I) purposes consistent with the maintenance of the land as open space; and

(II) the protection, preservation, and maintenance of the archaeological, cultural, and wildlife resources on the land transferred.

(C) EFFECT.—Nothing in this paragraph prohibits the construction or maintenance of utilities or structures that are—

(i) consistent with the maintenance of the land transferred under subsection (a) as open space; and

(ii) constructed for the protection, preservation, and maintenance of the archaeological, cultural, and wildlife resources on the land transferred.

(4) GAMING PROHIBITED.—The Pechanga Band of Luiseno Mission Indians may not conduct, on any land acquired by the Pechanga Band of Luiseno Mission Indians pursuant to this Act, gaming activities or activities conducted in conjunction with the operation of a casino—

(A) as a matter of claimed inherent authority; or

(B) under any Federal law (including the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.) (including any regulations promulgated by the Secretary or the National Indian Gaming Commission under that Act)).

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask unanimous consent that the committee-reported amendments be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate, and any statements relating to this measure be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The committee amendments were agreed to.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill (H.R. 2963), as amended, was read the third time, and passed.

NUCLEAR FORENSICS AND ATTRIBUTION ACT

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 1086, H.R. 2631.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 2631) to strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of nuclear material.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs with an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

H.R. 2631

Be it enacted by the Senate and House Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most serious threats to the national security of the United States. In the wake of an attack, attribution of responsibility would be of utmost importance. Because of the destructive power of the weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except the radioactive material in the bomb itself.

(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing techniques and those under development, it may be possible to identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material after it is intercepted or detonated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled material is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post-detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, and the challenges are compounded by the pressures and time constraints of performing forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack.

(3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or used in an act of terror could also deter prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution could compel improved security at material storage facilities, preventing the unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials.

(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples against known signatures of nuclear and radiological material.

(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the past several decades, the ability of the United States to gather atmospheric samples, often the preferred method of sample acquisition, has diminished. This ability must be restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace existing techniques should be pursued.

(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools for analysis and characterization of sam-

ples. The number of radiochemistry programs and radiochemists in United States National Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics program.

(5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it is necessary to compare the results against samples of known material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of these samples are available to the International Atomic Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain internal sample databases. Access to samples in many countries is limited by national security concerns.

(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is necessary to have the capability to positively identify the source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware of that capability. International cooperation may be essential to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or radiological material.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION.

It is the sense of the Congress that the President should—

(1) pursue bilateral and multilateral international agreements to establish, or seek to establish under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, an international framework for determining—

(A) the source of any confiscated nuclear or radiological material or weapon; and

(B) the source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or radiological material used in such a weapon;

(2) develop protocols for the data exchange and dissemination of sensitive information relating to nuclear or radiological materials and samples of controlled nuclear or radiological materials, to the extent required by the agreements entered into under paragraph (1); and

(3) develop expedited protocols for the data exchange and dissemination of sensitive information needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear detonation.

SEC. 3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE.

(a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 592) is amended—

(1) by striking “(a) MISSION”

(2) in paragraph (9), by striking “and” at the end;

(3) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (14); and

(4) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:

“(10) develop and implement, with the approval of the Secretary, and in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of appropriate departments and agencies, a ‘National Strategy and Five-Year Implementation Plan for Improving the Nuclear Forensic and Attribution Capabilities of the United States Government’ and the methods, capabilities, and capacity for nuclear materials forensics and attribution, including—

“(A) an investment plan to support nuclear materials forensics and attribution;

“(B) the allocation of roles and responsibilities for pre-detonation, detonation, and post-detonation activities; and

“(C) the attribution of nuclear or radiological material to its source when such material is intercepted by the United States, foreign governments, or international bodies or is dispersed in the course of a terrorist attack or other nuclear or radiological explosion;

“(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, improvement, and integration for all Federal nuclear forensics and attribution activities—

“(A) to ensure an enduring national technical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen the collective response of the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attacks; and

“(B) to coordinate and implement the national strategic plan and 5-year plan to improve national forensics and attribution capabilities for all Federal nuclear and radiological forensics capabilities;

“(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program, which—

“(A) is devoted to developing and maintaining a vibrant and enduring academic pathway from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in nuclear and geochemical science specialties directly relevant to technical nuclear forensics, including radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, materials science, and analytical chemistry; and

“(B) shall—

“(i) make available for undergraduate study student scholarships, with a duration of up to 4 years per student, which shall include, if possible, at least 1 summer internship at a national laboratory or appropriate Federal agency in the field of technical nuclear forensics during the course of the student's undergraduate career;

“(ii) make available for graduate study student fellowships, with a duration of up to 5 years per student, which shall—

“(I) include, if possible, at least 2 summer internships at a national laboratory or appropriate Federal agency in the field of technical nuclear forensics during the course of the student's graduate career; and

“(II) require each recipient to commit to serve for 2 years in a post-doctoral position in a technical nuclear forensics-related specialty at a national laboratory or appropriate Federal agency after graduation;

“(iii) make available to faculty awards, with a duration of 3 to 5 years each, to ensure faculty and their graduate students have a sustained funding stream; and

“(iv) place a particular emphasis on reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics programs; and”.

(b) JOINT INTERAGENCY ANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENT TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1907(a)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 596(a)(1)) is amended—

(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking “and” at the end;

(B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(C) the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and each of the relevant Departments that are partners in the National Technical Forensics Center—

“(i) includes, as part of the assessments, evaluations, and reviews required under this paragraph, each relevant agency's activities and investments in support of nuclear forensics and attribution activities;

“(ii) attaches, as an appendix to the Joint Interagency Annual Review, the most current version of the plan required under section 1902(a)(10); and

“(iii) after March 31 of each year, funds allocated for activities authorized under section 1902 are not spent until the submission to Congress of the report required under subsection (b).”.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask unanimous consent that the committee-reported substitute be agreed to; the bill, as amended, be read a third time and

passed; the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate; and that any statements related thereto be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill (H.R. 2631), as amended, was read the third time and passed.

BROADBAND DATA IMPROVEMENT ACT

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 441, S. 1492.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 1492) to improve the quality of Federal and State data regarding the availability and quality of broadband services and to promote the deployment of affordable broadband services to all parts of the Nation.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation with an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Broadband Data Improvement Act”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:

(1) The deployment and adoption of broadband technology has resulted in enhanced economic development and public safety for communities across the Nation, improved health care and educational opportunities, and a better quality of life for all Americans.

(2) Continued progress in the deployment and adoption of broadband technology is vital to ensuring that our Nation remains competitive and continues to create business and job growth.

(3) Improving Federal data on the deployment and adoption of broadband service will assist in the development of broadband technology across all regions of the Nation.

(4) The Federal Government should also recognize and encourage complementary state efforts to improve the quality and usefulness of broadband data and should encourage and support the partnership of the public and private sectors in the continued growth of broadband services and information technology for the residents and businesses of the Nation.

SEC. 3. IMPROVING FEDERAL DATA ON BROADBAND.

(a) IMPROVING FCC BROADBAND DATA.—Within 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Federal Communications Commission shall issue an order in WC docket No. 07–38 which shall, at a minimum—

(1) revise or update, if determined necessary, the existing definitions of advanced telecommunications capability, or broadband;

(2) establish a new definition of second generation broadband to reflect a data rate that is not less than the data rate required to reliably transmit full-motion, high-definition video; and

(3) revise its Form 477 reporting requirements to require filing entities to report broadband connections and second generation broadband connections by 5-digit postal zip code plus 4-digit location.

(b) EXCEPTION.—The Commission shall exempt an entity from the reporting requirements of subsection (a)(3) if the Commission determines that a compliance by that entity with the requirements is cost prohibitive, as defined by the Commission.

(c) IMPROVING SECTION 706 INQUIRY.—Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. 157 nt) is amended—

(1) by striking “regularly” in subsection (b) and inserting “annually”;

(2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (e); and

(3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

“(c) MEASUREMENT OF EXTENT OF DEPLOYMENT.—In determining under subsection (b) whether advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion, the Commission shall consider data collected using 5-digit postal zip code plus 4-digit location.

“(d) DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FOR UNSERVED AREAS.—As part of the inquiry required by subsection (b), the Commission shall, using 5-digit postal zip code plus 4-digit location information, compile a list of geographical areas that are not served by any provider of advanced telecommunications capability (as defined by section 706(c)(1) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. 157 nt)) and to the extent that data from the Census Bureau is available, determine, for each such unserved area—

“(1) the population;

“(2) the population density; and

“(3) the average per capita income.”;

(4) by inserting “an evolving level of” after “technology,” in paragraph (1) of subsection (e), as redesignated.

(d) IMPROVING CENSUS DATA ON BROADBAND.—The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Federal Communications Commission, shall expand the American Community Survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census to elicit information for residential households, including those located on native lands, to determine whether persons at such households own or use a computer at that address, whether persons at that address subscribe to Internet service and, if so, whether such persons subscribe to dial-up or broadband Internet service at that address.

SEC. 4. STUDY ON ADDITIONAL BROADBAND METRICS AND STANDARDS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Comptroller General shall conduct a study to consider and evaluate additional broadband metrics or standards that may be used by industry and the Federal Government to provide users with more accurate information about the cost and capability of their broadband connection, and to better compare the deployment and penetration of broadband in the United States with other countries. At a minimum, such study shall consider potential standards or metrics that may be used—

(1) to calculate the average price per megabyte of broadband offerings;

(2) to reflect the average actual speed of broadband offerings compared to advertised potential speeds;

(3) to compare the availability and quality of broadband offerings in the United States with the availability and quality of broadband offerings in other industrialized nations, including countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and

(4) to distinguish between complementary and substitutable broadband offerings in evaluating deployment and penetration.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce on the results of the study, with recommendations for how industry and the Federal Communications