Grossman, who I had the opportunity to visit with recently before she left to return.

This is a wonderful opportunity to celebrate our two countries on this special Canada Day.

Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my support for H. Res. 519 and join with our neighbors to the North in celebration of Canada Day.

On July 1st, 1867, the British North America Act went into effect, officially uniting the British North American colonies into one self-governing federation called Canada.

Earlier this month, Canadians across North America celebrated the anniversary of their country's birth, their long tradition of democracy, and their national achievements.

The United States shares in the celebration of this special day because we have strong economic, political and cultural ties with Canada.

Washington State's 2nd Congressional District, which I represent, contains over 60 miles of our common border with Canada. As a member of the Northern Border Caucus, I view our partnership with Canada as one that is vital to both of our countries' national security and economic prosperity.

With nearly $600 billion in goods and millions of people crossing the border each year, Canada is not only the United States' largest trading partner, but also a key international ally.

In addition to sharing a common border that spans more than 5,500 miles, the United States and Canada share a deep commitment to democratic principles. It is because of this commitment that our governments have worked so closely to address the common challenges we face, such as narcotics and terrorism. And it is in defense of these same democratic principles that our servicemen and women have fought side by side in Afghanistan and throughout the world.

I congratulate Canada on the occasion of the 142nd Canada Day and I look forward to celebrating with them for many years to come.

Mr. KLEIN of Florida. I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. KLEIN) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 519.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 2009, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. LARSON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. LARSON of Connecticut addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

CELEBRATING THE LIFE OF FRANK MICKENS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. TOWNS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to recognize a great educator who passed away just a few days ago. This man was a tremendous leader. He was the principal of Boys and Girls High School in the borough of Brooklyn, a gentleman by the name of Frank Mickens.

Frank Mickens really, really provided the leadership that we need so desperately today, and he did it with grace. He would insist that his students wore neckties. Of course, the board of education and people were very concerned about that fact, and they said he was not following the rules and regulations of the board of education.

But Frank's argument was, if a youngster had on a shirt and a tie, his behavior would be different, and he would be more eager to learn. Of course, Frank proved to everybody that what he was saying was right. He proved to everybody that this made sense. He also said, if a youngster were in a suit and a tie, that he would not be too interested in gangs and in gang life, because gangs would wear colors and all of that. If a youngster did not have a tie, Frank Mickens provided a tie. He had a closet with shirts and ties and with all of that in it to make certain that youngsters who came to school did not have to worry about whether they had ties or not, because he would provide ties for them.

It was so interesting because, when he took over the Boys and Girls High School, it was viewed as one of the worst schools in the City of New York. I remember on many occasions how parents would come to me and would say, Help me to make certain that my child does not have to attend Boys and Girls High School. I remember one family in particular. The mother came to me, trying to make certain that her daughter did not attend the high school. Then just a few years later, after Frank Mickens turned the school around, of course everybody wanted their children to go to Boys and Girls. Then there were no seats available.

She said to me, If you really are strong and if you're my Congressman, then I want you to be able to get my son into Boys and Girls High School. Here was the same lady who did not want her older child to go to Boys and Girls. Now she was fighting to get her son into Boys and Girls.

That points out the kind of leadership that Frank provided. He did not always go by the guidelines and by the rules and regulations of the education board, but the point was that they could not say that he was not effective.

He was also effective as a coach. He coached at Boys and Girls High School. As the coach of Boys and Girls High School, he won the city championship, and that was a very exciting time for a school that had not done that in many, many years.

He was a natural educator. He had the ability to pull teachers together and to get them to work extra hours and to do all kinds of things to make certain that the youngsters were able to learn. He had the youngsters from that school going to some of the best colleges and universities in the Nation. This was a school that people had basically written off, but now they were going to all of the top schools because these teachers were working very closely with Frank to make certain that Boys and Girls High School was one of the top schools in the City of New York.

We're going to miss Frank because he was considered the person who motivated everybody, who got things done, who was able to get scholarships for his young students, and he was respected in the neighborhood. People would just come to him, looking for leadership, looking for advice and all of that.

He is going to be missed because Frank truly made a difference, and I would say that I am just so happy that I had an opportunity to know him and to work with him and to live during his lifetime.

Frank, we will miss you, but I'll tell you that your work is something that will live on and on and on. You were truly a leader. You provided educational leadership in a way that will never, never, never be forgotten.

So let me say to your family that I know that they will miss Frank dearly as well, but here again, I think we can be proud of the fact that the legacy that Frank leaves and the life that he lived are things that we should never, never forget. So I would say to all of the people, not only in Brooklyn but throughout this Nation, that we should commit ourselves to try to be the kind of educational leaders that Frank Mickens was.

□ 1800

EXONERATING LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. BROW AND MAJOR BROOKS S. GRUBER

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. SCHAUER). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. JONES) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, on July 16 of 2009, I spoke on the House floor to

express my thanks to the United States Marine Corps for their help in exonerating the late Lieutenant Colonel John A. Brow and the late Major Brooks S. Gruber, who was a resident of Jacksonville, North Carolina. On April 8, 2000, these men were the Marine pilots of the MV–22 Osprey that crashed in Marana, Arizona. The mishap occurred during a training mission as part of a test phase to determine the aircraft's suitability for the Marine Corps. Seventeen other Marines were killed in the crash.

From that day until today, I've worked with many aviation experts in the Corps and outside the Corps who helped me reach the conclusion that these pilots were not at fault for the crash. Over the past 9 years, many times, both on TV and in the print media, inaccurate reports have spread misinformation by faulting the pilots and calling the crash as pilot error. That's why it's so important to set the record straight.

So in 2009, I asked the Marine Corps to include in the official military personnel files of Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber a memo which exonerates them from any responsibility for the mishap. The memo includes 17 facts regarding the crash which were developed based on my review of official investigations and public records as well as extensive discussions with aviation experts.

The evidence shows that the fatal factor in the crash was the aircraft's lack of a vortex ring state warning system and the pilots' lack of critical training regarding the extreme dangers of VRS onset in the Osprey.

Mr. Speaker, Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber and their families are dishonored by the assertions that the air crew were at fault for this fatal crash. That's why I am grateful that the Marine Corps has accepted the relevance of these facts, and on February 20 of 2009 they included my memo in the personnel files of these two Marines.

To finally bring this tragedy to a conclusion and to remove the stigma that has been unfairly attached to these two pilots, I have written the Navy to ask that they do the same thing as the Marine Corps did in doing the right thing by including this memo in the official safety investigation report of this mishap.

Mr. Speaker, I am entering into the record my letter to Rear Admiral A.J. Johnson, dated June 11 of 2009, which includes my request and the 17 facts about the crash.

As of this afternoon, I am very disappointed to say that I still have not received a response to this letter. Again, Mr. Speaker, the letter was dated June 11 of 2009. My request to the Navy is simple and the facts have not been disputed.

We have just over a week until the House adjourns for the August work period. I will have to consider pursuing other options if the Navy fails to approve my request. If necessary, I will ask that the crash investigation be reopened, and I will take legislative action to clear the names of these two pilots.

Mr. Speaker, I sincerely hope that the Navy will follow the example of the Marine Corps and help properly honor the sacrifice of these pilots who bravely gave their lives in service of this country.

And with that, Mr. Speaker, as I do frequently, I will ask God to please bless our men and women in uniform in Afghanistan and Iraq. I will ask God to bless the families of our men and women in uniform. I will ask God in His loving arms to hold the families who have given a child dying for freedom in Afghanistan or Iraq. And, Mr. Speaker, as I do in closing, three times I will ask God, please God, please God, please God, continue to bless America.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, June 11, 2009.

Rear Admiral ARTHUR J. JOHNSON,
Commander, Naval Safety Center,
Norfolk, VA.

DEAR REAR ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Thank you for your response to my letter of April 21, 2009. Notwithstanding your regulations regarding the purpose of the Naval Aviation Mishap Safety investigations, I am convinced that the Memorandum of the Record (Memorandum) must be included in the AMB report and JAGMAN investigation as a matter of public record.

Over the last several years, numerous articles and stories referencing the April 8, 2000 crash of the V–22 Osprey have incorrectly identified Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber as the cause of the accident and have brought unmerited mental hardship on their families. I outlined two of these incidents in my previous letter. As a reminder, the press release issued by the Marine Corps attributed the accident to the pilot's ''extremely rapid rate of descent.'' Statements such as this and the incomplete nature of the AMB report and JAGMAN investigation have formed the basis for the public's perception of the role of the pilots in this unfortunate accident and must be supplemented with clarifying language.

For example, the JAGMAN stated that the aircraft found itself in vortex ring state (VRS) condition with no apparent warning to the aircrew. It was not until after the accident that Naval Air Systems Command called for a new flight limitation, pilot procedures, and a cockpit warning system for VRS. Clearly, the record must reflect this reality.

Your response stated that safety investigations ''are conducted to determine root causes and identify corrective actions, not to assign blame or document accountability.'' In the case of the Osprey accident, the process of determining root causes and identifying corrective actions led to assigning blame to the pilot and co-pilot by outside organizations because the role of VRS has not been given its proper emphasis. If investigations undertaken after completion of the accident report place the root cause of the accident on other causes, there is reason to acknowledge that and include such a finding in the AMB report and JAGMAN investigation.

There were many subsequent investigations into the safety of the Osprey and the dangers of VRS. Therefore, the process of investigating this accident is not ''closed to outside influences.'' Insights gained after the completion of an accident report can appropriately be appended to an official safety or investigative report.

Everyone can appreciate the desire to close an official investigation. However, subsequent developments clearly demonstrate that the accident report was incomplete. There is a legitimate basis for correcting what was determined in order to promote public justice and remove the stigma attached to the pilot and co-pilot.

In discussions with experts within and outside of the military, additions to closed investigations happen frequently. If you do not agree to place the Memorandum in the AMB report and JAGMAN investigation, I request that you specifically identify whether any of the 17 facts contained in the Memorandum are inaccurate. Inclusion of the Memorandum in the Official Military Personnel Files of these brave Marines is insufficient.

Thank you for your service to our nation. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

WALTER B. JONES,
Member of Congress.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Based on my review of official investigations and public records regarding this mishap as well as extensive discussions with aviation experts, I, U.S. Congressman Walter B. Jones, have concluded that the fatal factor in the crash of an MV–22 Osprey on April 8, 2000 in Marana, Arizona was the aircraft's lack of a Vortex Ring State (VRS) warning system as well as the pilots' lack of critical training regarding the extreme dangers of VRS onset in the Osprey. I also believe the Marine Corps has blamed the mishap on the pilots' drive to accomplish the mission and a combination of aircrew human factors. Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber and their families are dishonored by the assertion that the aircrew was in any way responsible for this fatal accident. Therefore, I request that the following findings be included in all official records relating to this mishap:

1. The fatal crash of an MV–22 on April 8, 2000, in Marana, Arizona, was not a result of aircrew human factors or pilot error that can be attributed to the late Lieutenant Colonel John A. Brow or the late Major Brooks S. Gruber who competently and professionally performed their duties as United States Marine Corps aviators.

2. The fatal factor in the crash of an MV–22 on April 8, 2000, was the aircraft's lack of a Vortex Ring State (VRS) warning system and the Department of the Navy's failure to provide the pilots with critical training regarding the extreme dangers of VRS onset in the MV–22.

3. Because of inadequate High Rate of Descent (HROD) and VRS developmental testing, the pilots of the MV–22 involved in the accident on April 8, 2000, were not trained or able to recognize, avoid, or recover from VRS onset in the MV–22.

4. Had adequate HROD and VRS developmental testing been conducted prior to the Operational Evaluation of April 8, 2000, and had a VRS warning system been installed in the aircraft, Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber would have been better able to avoid or recover from VRS.

5. LtCol Brow and Maj Gruber were in formation behind another MV–22. The lead aircraft had overshot its intended approach angle and therefore steepened the approach angle. Unaware of the extreme dangers of VRS onset in the MV–22, LtCol Brow and Maj Gruber slowed their airspeed and descended even quicker, to maintain position on the lead aircraft. Twenty three seconds prior to the crash, the co-pilot of the lead aircraft stated ''If you want you can take it long if you need to or you can wave it off. It's your

call. You're hanging dash two out there.'' The lead aircraft pilot decided to continue his rapid descent at a slow forward airspeed, clearly oblivious of the extreme dangers of VRS onset in the MV–22.

6. Numerous reviews and investigations following the mishap have documented that the pilots of the mishap aircraft were not provided with the necessary and critical knowledge and training to recognize, avoid, or recover from the extreme dangers of Vortex Ring State (VRS) onset in the MV–22 and the potential for sudden loss of controlled flight in the MV–22 following VRS onset.

7. After the mishap, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) called for a thorough investigative flight test program to find the boundaries of VRS, characterize its handling qualities, and establish the basis for a new flight limitation, pilot procedures, and a cockpit warning system.

8. As a result of testing following the fatal accident, a visual and aural cockpit warning system was developed to alert the aircrew when the aircraft exceeded the NATOPS flight manual's rate-of-descent limit.

9. On July 27, 2000, the Marine Corps publicly announced in a press release that a combination of ''human factors'' caused the April 8, 2000 crash. The press release went on to implicate the mishap aircraft pilots by stating that ''deviations from the scheduled flight plan, an unexpected tailwind and the pilot's extremely rapid rate of descent into the landing zone created conditions that led to the accident.'' The release also stated that ''although the report stops short of specifying pilot error as a cause, it notes that the pilot of the ill-fated aircraft significantly exceeded the rate of descent established by regulations for safe flight.'' In this Official USMC press release, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James L. Jones is quoted as saying: ''the tragedy is that these were all good Marines joined in a challenging mission. Unfortunately, the pilots' drive to accomplish that mission appears to have been the fatal factor.''

10. This clearly damaging language is inaccurate, based on the fact that at the time of the crash, adequate testing of the MV–22 in the High Rate of Descent/Vortex Ring State (HROD/VRS) regime had not been conducted, the MV–22 did not have a VRS warning system, and the pilots did not have adequate knowledge and training to recognize and avoid the extreme dangers of Vortex Ring State (VRS) onset in the MV–22 and the potential for sudden loss of controlled flight in the MV–22 following VRS onset.

11. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force's V–22 Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) report indicated that the MV–22 ''Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) manual lacked adequate content, accuracy, and clarity at the time of the accident. Additionally, because of incomplete developmental testing in the High Rate of Descent (HROD) regime, there was insufficient explanatory or emphatic text to warn pilots of hazards of operating in this area. The flight stimulator did not replicate this loss of controlled flight regime.'' Also, the preliminary NATOPS manual and V–22 ground school syllabus provided insufficient guidance/warning as to high rate of descent/slow airspeed conditions and the potential consequences.

12. The Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) Investigating Officer stated that ''the fact that the aircraft found itself in VRS condition with no apparent warning to the aircrew, but also departed controlled flight is particularly concerning.''

13. On December 15, 2000, after a second crash of the V–22 that year, then-Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen determined that the accident history of V–22 aircraft and other testing issues required an independent, high-level review of the program. He established a Blue Ribbon Panel to review the safety of the V–22 aircraft and to recommend any proposed corrective actions.

14. This panel was briefed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the contents of this brief were incorporated into a subsequent GAO report. The GAO report cited concerns about the adequacy of development tests conducted prior to the aircraft entering the operational test and evaluation phase and that completion of these tests would have provided further insights into the V–22 Vortex Ring State phenomenon. In particular, the GAO found that developmental testing was deleted, deferred or stimulated in order to meet cost and schedule goals.

15. The original plan to test the flying qualities of the flight control system included various rates of descent, speeds, and weights. This testing would have provided considerable knowledge of MV–22 flight qualities especially in areas related to the sudden loss of controlled flight following VRS onset. To meet cost and schedule targets, the actual testing conducted was less than a third of that originally planned.'' In addition, MV–22 pilots did not understand the optimum use of nacelle tilt to recover from VRS onset. In my opinion, this testing clearly could have prevented this tragic accident by providing the pilots the knowledge and training to either avoid or recover from VRS.

16. The GAO presentation also revealed that the JAGMAN Investigating Officer opined that the MV–22 Program Manager (PMA–275), Naval Aviation Training Systems (PMA–205) and the Contractor ''needed to expedite incorporation of Vortex Ring State and Blade Stall warnings and procedures into the MV–22 NATOPS. The preliminary NATOPS manual and V–22 ground school syllabus provided insufficient guidance/warning as to high rate of descent/slow airspeed conditions and the potential consequences.''

17. The GAO report also revealed that the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) stated that ''while the possible existence of VRS in the V–22 was known when flight limits for OPEVAL were established, the unusual attitude following entry into VRS was not expected.'' DOT&E goes on to say ''thus, the first indication the pilot may receive that he has encountered this difficulty is when the aircraft initiated an uncommanded, uncontrollable roll.''

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WOOLSEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Ms. WOOLSEY addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

THE HEALTH OF OUR ECONOMY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, our whole economy has been in trouble for a long time. We can no longer look at foreclosure rates but ignore our trade deficit, or discuss high gas prices without mentioning the billions spent on Wall Street and the growing U.S. debt that results from an economy not in charge of itself.

Mr. Speaker, the health of our economy is not just one number, like Wall Street profits. It's not just our budget deficit. There are so many more aspects to our economy that weigh heavily on how prosperous America could be. Those aspects include having grown more dependent year after year on foreign products.

This first chart shows since the 1970s how deeply into debt we have fallen in terms of more imports coming into our country than exports year after year for so much of what drives this economy. Three quarters of a trillion dollars more imports in here than our exports out. More foreign imports into the United States means less U.S. jobs. More of our exports out means more jobs here.

Our trade deficit has been driven up to nearly 5 percent of what's called the gross domestic product—a shocking number by any measure—by this growing dependence on foreign goods starting with oil, which consumes over half of this deficit, and bad trade deals. In fact, when you look at this chart, it's hard to imagine that almost half a trillion dollars is related to imports of energy.

With high gas prices and bad trade deals have come growing legions of the unemployed with climbing rates higher and higher. There's been a steady pattern of this deepening crisis over the last several years. In fact, it's interesting to look at this chart which shows the relationship between unemployment, rising oil prices, and unemployment.

And going back to the 1970s, with the first embargo of oil from the Middle East, we saw a huge peak in price and then a huge peak in unemployment. And the same is true in every succeeding decade in the 1980s, in the 1990s, and certainly now. There has been a steady pattern of this deepening crisis over the last 20 years.

In 1993, when NAFTA was rammed through this Congress, they said it would create jobs. It did just the reverse. There's been a huge net job loss for our country.

In the late 1990s, when they passed PNTR for China, they said, Oh, that will create more jobs here. Well, no. It did exactly the reverse net; more jobs were outsourced.

At home, in places like Toledo, Ohio, 15.6 percent of our people are officially unemployed as foreclosures continue, deep, huge payouts to Wall Street continue, and now 12 percent of our housing stock foreclosed. The gap between the super-super rich and the rest of us is getting wider all the time, and those numbers threaten the future of our Republic.

At a recent job fair in Toledo, unemployed workers were able to post video resumes courtesy of local television stations. One man, a CVL licensed truck driver in his early sixties, said he was looking for anything, ''even something in fast food.''

We don't lack for a work ethic in our area, we lack for jobs. But with so