Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the ''When Women Succeed, America Succeeds: An Economic Agenda for Women and Families.''

Let me first thank Leader PELOSI, of course, and Representatives MATSUI and FRANKEL for their unwavering dedication to our Democratic Women's Working Group and for women and families all across the country.

Mr. Speaker, this agenda is about improving the future of our families and the economic security of all women. It is about increasing access to child care, retirement security, and equal pay for equal work. It is simply unacceptable in 2015 that women are still being paid 78 cents for every dollar that a man makes. African American women and Latinas are being paid even less, at 64 cents and 56 cents respectively, despite doing the same work as men. This is wrong. It is an embarrassment.

We must do more to advance the economic security of all women, like providing access to high quality and affordable child care. As a single mother who raised two amazing boys, I know what it is like to struggle to make ends meet. When I was a student at Mills College in Oakland, California, oftentimes I took my sons to class with me because I could not afford child care. Now, that was in the day. This is 2015, and women deserve better. So let's support this agenda and lift women up. When women succeed, America succeeds.

WOMEN AND RETIREMENT SECURITY

(Ms. MATSUI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of retirement security for women. We celebrate the month of May as Older Americans Month. This year also marks the 50th anniversary of Medicare and Medicaid and the 80th anniversary of Social Security.

There is no better time to recognize the profound impact that these important programs have had on our country. They are vital programs to all Americans. We also know that they are especially key for women.

Women on average live longer, have lower retirement savings, and spend more on health care. I am committed to protecting and expanding Medicare and Social Security for women and for all seniors.

Congress must also pass legislation to support caregivers—women and men—who may leave the workforce to care for a child or a sick family member. Strong retirement security policies help women succeed and America succeed.

THE DEFENSE BILL

(Mr. MOULTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Speaker, the Rules Committee just rejected an amendment to the defense bill that I offered to protect our troops on the front line by shifting funds from the A–10, an airplane the Air Force and the Department of Defense don't want, to unfunded priorities for IED protection and other things our front-line infantry troops desperately need.

Thousands of young American men and women have been killed by IEDs in the past decade. If the A–10 is so critical, why has neither the Army nor the Marine Corps, which many troops feel provides the best close air support in the world, asked for A–10s themselves? With a limitless budget we would all love to have the A–10 and other weapons. But our troops know that we live in a real world with real tradeoffs. And America expects us to make the politically difficult decisions to protect our shared national security and the lives of young Americans whom we ask to defend it.

RESIGNATION AS MEMBER OF COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. JENKINS of West Virginia) laid before the House the following resignation as a member of the Committee on Natural Resources:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, May 12, 2015.

Hon. JOHN BOEHNER,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER, It is a tremendous privilege to represent the people of the First Congressional District of Alabama in the U.S. House of Representatives.

I have greatly appreciated the opportunity to serve on the Natural Resources Committee. However, due to my appointment to the Committee on Rules, I hereby resign my seat on the Natural Resources Committee.

I look forward to continuing to serve the constituents of Alabama's First Congressional District on the Committee on Rules during the 114th Congress.

Sincerely,

BRADLEY BYRNE,
Member of Congress.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the resignation is accepted.

There was no objection.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, May 14, 2015.

Hon. JOHN A. BOEHNER,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the permission granted in Clause 2(h) of Rule II of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Clerk received the following message from the Secretary of the Senate on May 14, 2015 at 9:49 a.m.:

That the Senate passed S. Con. Res. 10.

Appointments:

Board of Visitors of the U.S. Naval Academy.

Board of Visitors of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy.

Board of Visitors of the U.S. Air Force Academy.

Board of Visitors of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

KAREN L. HAAS.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote incurs objection under clause 6 of rule XX.

Record votes on postponed questions will be taken later.

PROTECTING VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTERS AND EMERGENCY RESPONDERS ACT

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendments to the bill (H.R. 1191) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to ensure that emergency services volunteers are not taken into account as employees under the shared responsibility requirements contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the Senate amendments is as follows:

Senate amendments:

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 134 the following new section:

''SEC. 135. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN.

''(a) TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS OF NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN AND VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT WITH RESPECT TO SUCH AGREEMENTS.—

''(1) TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership—

''(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes;

''(B) a verification assessment report of the Secretary of State prepared under paragraph (2) with respect to the agreement; and

''(C) a certification that—

''(i) the agreement includes the appropriate terms, conditions, and duration of the agreement's requirements with respect to Iran's nuclear activities and provisions describing any

sanctions to be waived, suspended, or otherwise reduced by the United States, and any other nation or entity, including the United Nations; and

''(ii) the President determines the agreement meets United States non-proliferation objectives, does not jeopardize the common defense and security, provides an adequate framework to ensure that Iran's nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and ensures that Iran's nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including for any research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related military purpose.

''(2) VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT REPORT.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall prepare, with respect to an agreement described in paragraph (1), a report assessing—

''(i) the extent to which the Secretary will be able to verify that Iran is complying with its obligations and commitments under the agreement;

''(ii) the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and other assurances contained in the agreement with respect to Iran's nuclear program to ensure Iran's activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including for any research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related military purpose; and

''(iii) the capacity and capability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to effectively implement the verification regime required by or related to the agreement, including whether the International Atomic Energy Agency will have sufficient access to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of covert nuclear-related activities and whether it has the required funding, manpower, and authority to undertake the verification regime required by or related to the agreement.

''(B) ASSUMPTIONS.—In preparing a report under subparagraph (A) with respect to an agreement described in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall assume that Iran could—

''(i) use all measures not expressly prohibited by the agreement to conceal activities that violate its obligations and commitments under the agreement; and

''(ii) alter or deviate from standard practices in order to impede efforts to verify that Iran is complying with those obligations and commitments.

''(C) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—A report under subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but shall include a classified annex prepared in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information.

''(3) EXCEPTION.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—Neither the requirements of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1), nor subsections (b) through (g) of this section, shall apply to an agreement described in subsection (h)(5) or to the EU-Iran Joint Statement made on April 2, 2015.

''(B) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT.—Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), any agreement as defined in subsection (h)(1) and any related materials, whether concluded before or after the date of the enactment of this section, shall not be subject to the exception in subparagraph (A).

''(b) PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS OF NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—During the 30-calendar day period following transmittal by the President of an agreement pursuant to subsection (a), the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review such agreement.

''(2) EXCEPTION.—The period for congressional review under paragraph (1) shall be 60 calendar days if an agreement, including all materials required to be transmitted to Congress pursuant to subsection (a)(1), is transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) between July 10, 2015, and September 7, 2015.

''(3) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as provided in paragraph (6), prior to and during the period for transmission of an agreement in subsection (a)(1) and during the period for congressional review provided in paragraph (1), including any additional period as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a).

''(4) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as provided in paragraph (6), if a joint resolution of disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both Houses of Congress, the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a) for a period of 12 calendar days following the date of such passage.

''(5) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRESSIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as provided in paragraph (6), if a joint resolution of disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both Houses of Congress, and the President vetoes such joint resolution, the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a) for a period of 10 calendar days following the date of the President's veto.

''(6) EXCEPTION.—The prohibitions under paragraphs (3) through (5) do not apply to any new deferral, waiver, or other suspension of statutory sanctions pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action if that deferral, waiver, or other suspension is made—

''(A) consistent with the law in effect on the date of the enactment of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015; and

''(B) not later than 45 calendar days before the transmission by the President of an agreement, assessment report, and certification under subsection (a).

''(7) DEFINITION.—In the House of Representatives, for purposes of this subsection, the terms 'transmittal,' 'transmitted,' and 'transmission' mean transmittal, transmitted, and transmission, respectively, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

''(c) EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN.—

''(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

''(A) the sanctions regime imposed on Iran by Congress is primarily responsible for bringing Iran to the table to negotiate on its nuclear program;

''(B) these negotiations are a critically important matter of national security and foreign policy for the United States and its closest allies;

''(C) this section does not require a vote by Congress for the agreement to commence;

''(D) this section provides for congressional review, including, as appropriate, for approval, disapproval, or no action on statutory sanctions relief under an agreement; and

''(E) even though the agreement may commence, because the sanctions regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress can permanently modify or eliminate that regime, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in an orderly and deliberative manner, to consider and, as appropriate, take action affecting the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.

''(2) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, action involving any measure of statutory sanctions relief by the United States pursuant to an agreement subject to subsection (a) or the Joint Plan of Action—

''(A) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such action, if, during the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does favor the agreement;

''(B) may not be taken if, during the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the agreement; or

''(C) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such action, if, following the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is not enacted any such joint resolution.

''(3) DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this subsection, the phrase 'action involving any measure of statutory sanctions relief by the United States' shall include waiver, suspension, reduction, or other effort to provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to, Iran under any provision of law or any other effort to refrain from applying any such sanctions.

''(d) CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF IRANIAN COMPLIANCE WITH NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees and leadership fully and currently informed of all aspects of Iranian compliance with respect to an agreement subject to subsection (a).

''(2) POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT BREACHES AND COMPLIANCE INCIDENTS.—The President shall, within 10 calendar days of receiving credible and accurate information relating to a potentially significant breach or compliance incident by Iran with respect to an agreement subject to subsection (a), submit such information to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership.

''(3) MATERIAL BREACH REPORT.—Not later than 30 calendar days after submitting information about a potentially significant breach or compliance incident pursuant to paragraph (2), the President shall make a determination whether such potentially significant breach or compliance issue constitutes a material breach and, if there is such a material breach, whether Iran has cured such material breach, and shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership such determination, accompanied by, as appropriate, a report on the action or failure to act by Iran that led to the material breach, actions necessary for Iran to cure the breach, and the status of Iran's efforts to cure the breach.

''(4) SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 calendar days after entering into an agreement described in subsection (a), and not less frequently than once every 180 calendar days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report on Iran's nuclear program and the compliance of Iran with the agreement during the period covered by the report, including the following elements:

''(A) Any action or failure to act by Iran that breached the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms of the agreement.

''(B) Any delay by Iran of more than one week in providing inspectors access to facilities, people, and documents in Iran as required by the agreement.

''(C) Any progress made by Iran to resolve concerns by the International Atomic Energy

Agency about possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.

''(D) Any procurement by Iran of materials in violation of the agreement or which could otherwise significantly advance Iran's ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.

''(E) Any centrifuge research and development conducted by Iran that—

''(i) is not in compliance with the agreement; or

''(ii) may substantially reduce the breakout time of acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Iran, if deployed.

''(F) Any diversion by Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in Iran's nuclear program in violation of the agreement.

''(G) Any covert nuclear activities undertaken by Iran, including any covert nuclear weapons-related or covert fissile material activities or research and development.

''(H) An assessment of whether any Iranian financial institutions are engaged in money laundering or terrorist finance activities, including names of specific financial institutions if applicable.

''(I) Iran's advances in its ballistic missile program, including developments related to its long-range and inter-continental ballistic missile programs.

''(J) An assessment of—

''(i) whether Iran directly supported, financed, planned, or carried out an act of terrorism against the United States or a United States person anywhere in the world;

''(ii) whether, and the extent to which, Iran supported acts of terrorism, including acts of terrorism against the United States or a United States person anywhere in the world;

''(iii) all actions, including in international fora, being taken by the United States to stop, counter, and condemn acts by Iran to directly or indirectly carry out acts of terrorism against the United States and United States persons;

''(iv) the impact on the national security of the United States and the safety of United States citizens as a result of any Iranian actions reported under this paragraph; and

''(v) all of the sanctions relief provided to Iran, pursuant to the agreement, and a description of the relationship between each sanction waived, suspended, or deferred and Iran's nuclear weapon's program.

''(K) An assessment of whether violations of internationally recognized human rights in Iran have changed, increased, or decreased, as compared to the prior 180-day period.

''(5) ADDITIONAL REPORTS AND INFORMATION.—

''(A) AGENCY REPORTS.—Following submission of an agreement pursuant to subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense shall, upon the request of any of those committees or leadership, promptly furnish to those committees or leadership their views as to whether the safeguards and other controls contained in the agreement with respect to Iran's nuclear program provide an adequate framework to ensure that Iran's activities permitted thereunder will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

''(B) PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR INITIATIVES WITH IRAN.—The President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees and leadership fully and currently informed of any initiative or negotiations with Iran relating to Iran's nuclear program, including any new or amended agreement.

''(6) COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION.—After the review period provided in subsection (b), the President shall, not less than every 90 calendar days—

''(A) determine whether the President is able to certify that—

''(i) Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement, including all related technical or additional agreements;

''(ii) Iran has not committed a material breach with respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material breach, Iran has cured the material breach;

''(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program; and

''(iv) suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the agreement is—

''(I) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program; and

''(II) vital to the national security interests of the United States; and

''(B) if the President determines he is able to make the certification described in subparagraph (A), make such certification to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership.

''(7) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

''(A) United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under an agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1);

''(B) issues not addressed by an agreement on the nuclear program of Iran, including fair and appropriate compensation for Americans who were terrorized and subjected to torture while held in captivity for 444 days after the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1979 and their families, the freedom of Americans held in Iran, the human rights abuses of the Government of Iran against its own people, and the continued support of terrorism worldwide by the Government of Iran, are matters critical to ensure justice and the national security of the United States, and should be expeditiously addressed;

''(C) the President should determine the agreement in no way compromises the commitment of the United States to Israel's security, nor its support for Israel's right to exist; and

''(D) in order to responsibly implement any long-term agreement reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity to review any agreement and, as necessary, take action to modify the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.

''(e) EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF LEGISLATION.—

''(1) INITIATION.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—In the event the President does not submit a certification pursuant to subsection (d)(6) during each 90-day period following the review period provided in subsection (b), or submits a determination pursuant to subsection (d)(3) that Iran has materially breached an agreement subject to subsection (a) and the material breach has not been cured, qualifying legislation introduced within 60 calendar days of such event shall be entitled to expedited consideration pursuant to this subsection.

''(B) DEFINITION.—In the House of Representatives, for purposes of this paragraph, the terms 'submit' and 'submits' mean submit and submits, respectively, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

''(2) QUALIFYING LEGISLATION DEFINED.—For purposes of this subsection, the term 'qualifying legislation' means only a bill of either House of Congress—

''(A) the title of which is as follows: 'A bill reinstating statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran.'; and

''(B) the matter after the enacting clause of which is: 'Any statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran pursuant to _____ that were waived, suspended, reduced, or otherwise relieved pursuant to an agreement submitted pursuant to section 135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 are hereby reinstated and any action by the United States Government to facilitate the release of funds or assets to Iran pursuant to such agreement, or provide any further waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief pursuant to such agreement is hereby prohibited.', with the blank space being filled in with the law or laws under which sanctions are to be reinstated.

''(3) INTRODUCTION.—During the 60-calendar day period provided for in paragraph (1), qualifying legislation may be introduced—

''(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader or the minority leader; and

''(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader's designee).

''(4) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

''(A) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If a committee of the House to which qualifying legislation has been referred has not reported such qualifying legislation within 10 legislative days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration thereof.

''(B) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which qualifying legislation has been referred reports it to the House or has been discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the qualifying legislation in the House. All points of order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after the House has disposed of a motion to proceed on the qualifying legislation with regard to the same agreement. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.

''(C) CONSIDERATION.—The qualifying legislation shall be considered as read. All points of order against the qualifying legislation and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the qualifying legislation to final passage without intervening motion except two hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the qualifying legislation (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the qualifying legislation shall not be in order.

''(5) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.—

''(A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—Qualifying legislation introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

''(B) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If the Committee on Foreign Relations has not reported such qualifying legislation within 10 session days after the date of referral of such legislation, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of such legislation and the qualifying legislation shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.

''(C) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the committee authorized to consider qualifying legislation reports it to the Senate or has been discharged from its consideration (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of qualifying legislation, and all points of order against qualifying legislation (and against consideration of the qualifying legislation) are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the qualifying legislation is agreed to, the qualifying legislation shall remain the unfinished business until disposed of.

''(D) DEBATE.—Debate on qualifying legislation, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between the majority and minority leaders or their designees. A motion to further limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to

proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the qualifying legislation is not in order.

''(E) VOTE ON PASSAGE.—The vote on passage shall occur immediately following the conclusion of the debate on the qualifying legislation and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate, if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate.

''(F) RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCEDURE.—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to qualifying legislation shall be decided without debate.

''(G) CONSIDERATION OF VETO MESSAGES.—Debate in the Senate of any veto message with respect to qualifying legislation, including all debatable motions and appeals in connection with such qualifying legislation, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

''(6) RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

''(A) COORDINATION WITH ACTION BY OTHER HOUSE.—If, before the passage by one House of qualifying legislation of that House, that House receives qualifying legislation from the other House, then the following procedures shall apply:

''(i) The qualifying legislation of the other House shall not be referred to a committee.

''(ii) With respect to qualifying legislation of the House receiving the legislation—

''(I) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no qualifying legislation had been received from the other House; but

''(II) the vote on passage shall be on the qualifying legislation of the other House.

''(B) TREATMENT OF A BILL OF OTHER HOUSE.—If one House fails to introduce qualifying legislation under this section, the qualifying legislation of the other House shall be entitled to expedited floor procedures under this section.

''(C) TREATMENT OF COMPANION MEASURES.—If, following passage of the qualifying legislation in the Senate, the Senate then receives a companion measure from the House of Representatives, the companion measure shall not be debatable.

''(D) APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEASURES.—The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to qualifying legislation which is a revenue measure.

''(f) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.—Subsection (e) is enacted by Congress—

''(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of legislation described in those sections, and supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such rules; and

''(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

''(g) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in the section shall be construed as—

''(1) modifying, or having any other impact on, the President's authority to negotiate, enter into, or implement appropriate executive agreements, other than the restrictions on implementation of the agreements specifically covered by this section;

''(2) allowing any new waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief from statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law, or allowing the President to refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a) during the period for review provided in subsection (b);

''(3) revoking or terminating any statutory sanctions imposed on Iran; or

''(4) authorizing the use of military force against Iran.

''(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

''(1) AGREEMENT.—The term 'agreement' means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.

''(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 'appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

''(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND LEADERSHIP.—The term 'appropriate congressional committees and leadership' means the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.

''(4) IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term 'Iranian financial institution' has the meaning given the term in section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513b(d)).

''(5) JOINT PLAN OF ACTION.—The term 'Joint Plan of Action' means the Joint Plan of Action, signed at Geneva November 24, 2013, by Iran and by France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and all implementing materials and agreements related to the Joint Plan of Action, including the technical understandings reached on January 12, 2014, the extension thereto agreed to on July 18, 2014, the extension agreed to on November 24, 2014, and any materially identical extension that is agreed to on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.

''(6) EU-IRAN JOINT STATEMENT.—The term 'EU-Iran Joint Statement' means only the Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif made on April 2, 2015, at Lausanne, Switzerland.

''(7) MATERIAL BREACH.—The term 'material breach' means, with respect to an agreement described in subsection (a), any breach of the agreement, or in the case of non-binding commitments, any failure to perform those commitments, that substantially—

''(A) benefits Iran's nuclear program;

''(B) decreases the amount of time required by Iran to achieve a nuclear weapon; or

''(C) deviates from or undermines the purposes of such agreement.

''(8) NONCOMPLIANCE DEFINED.—The term 'noncompliance' means any departure from the terms of an agreement described in subsection (a) that is not a material breach.

''(9) P5+1 COUNTRIES.—The term 'P5+1 countries' means the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

''(10) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 'United States person' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511).''.

Amend the title so as to read: ''A bill to provide for congressional review and oversight of agreements relating to Iran's nuclear program, and for other purposes.''.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of May 13, 2015, the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I wish to claim the time in genuine opposition to H.R. 1191.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from New York in favor of the motion?

Mr. ENGEL. I am.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. On that basis, pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Minnesota will control 30 minutes in opposition.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL) and ask unanimous consent that he control that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes of my time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL), my ranking member, and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to control that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members of this body have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include any extraneous materials on this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation to ensure that Congress is positioned to effectively and decisively judge and to constrain President Obama's nuclear deal with Iran should a bad deal be struck. I commend Chairman CORKER and Ranking Member CARDIN for bringing this measure before their body. This bill received near unanimous support in the other body. I appreciate, as always, Ranking Member ENGEL's cooperation in bringing this to the floor.

With today's vote, this legislation will go to the President for his signature. The Foreign Affairs Committee

has held a series of hearings on the administration's nuclear negotiations with Iran, a radical state sponsor of terrorism, which is creating turmoil in a strategically vital region. It is fair to say that there are deep, bipartisan concerns about where these negotiations are heading. I fear that the agreement that is coming will be too short, sanctions relief will be too rapid, inspectors will be too restricted, and Iran's missile program will be plain ignored.

Of course, we all hope that Iran's march toward a nuclear weapon can be diplomatically stopped. This legislation should strengthen the administration's hand at the negotiating table. But Secretary Kerry must put its added leverage to use immediately so that the U.S. can gain much-needed ground in the negotiations over the next 2 months.

Mr. Speaker, much of the pressure that brought the Islamic Republic of Iran to the negotiating table was put in place by Congress over the objections of the White House and over the objections of both Republican and Democratic Presidents, and this is unfortunate. We would have had more pressure on Iran today if the Obama administration hadn't pressured the Senate to sit on the Royce-Engel sanctions bill that the Foreign Affairs Committee produced and that this House passed by a margin of 400–20.

Let's be clear. The administration has come around to support the legislation we are debating here today, but not with any enthusiasm. Having followed these negotiations since they began in November of 2013, I can tell you that the President would like nothing more than to have no such bill, to have Congress sit on the sideline and watch him negotiate an agreement, whether good or bad, and I fear bad.

Today, without this legislation in place, what is Congress' position if the President reaches a deal with Iran? Currently, there is no limitation on the President's use of waivers to suspend the sanctions Congress put in place, no requirement that Congress receive full details of any agreement with Iran, no review period for Congress to examine and weigh in on the agreement, no requirement that the President certify that Iran is complying, and no way for Congress to rapidly reimpose sanctions should Iran cheat.

Today, the President can sign a bad deal, and we, the United States Congress, are left to read about it in the paper. But with the passage of this bill, all that changes. Sanctions relief is frozen until Congress receives the agreement and then holds a referendum on its merits. Again, I believe that this gives the administration a better chance to get to a lasting and meaningful agreement.

Consider the outstanding and critical issue of verification. The ink wasn't even dry on the framework announcement and the chants of ''death to America'' led by the Supreme Leader were still fresh when the leader asserted—when the Ayatollah asserted—that Iran wouldn't allow international inspectors access to its military facilities. The deputy head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps seconded that. He said: ''They will not even be permitted to inspect the most normal military site in their dreams.''

When it comes to negotiating this inspections regime over the next 2 months, U.S. negotiators must know that these critical issues will determine Congress' assessment of any final deal.

□ 1245

Once this legislation is signed, when Secretary Kerry sits across from the Iranians, he will now have on his mind: I have got to take this to Congress.

Mr. Speaker, that prospect can only improve these negotiations. I just hope it is not too late and that we aren't too deep into a bad deal.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise in support of this legislation.

Our negotiators continue to hammer out the details of an agreement with Iran that will hopefully foreclose all pathways to a nuclear weapon. As I have said again and again, if a deal is struck, Congress must have a proper role in assessing that deal. That is what we are doing now. That is the purpose of this legislation before us today. This legislation passed the other body by a vote of 98–1.

If a deal is reached, what are the things I will be looking for? First, what will sanctions really look like? Will it be a step-by-step process, so that Iran is forced to comply with the agreement? How will we ensure that this financial windfall for Iran won't just be used to fund terrorism around the world?

Second, will a deal compel Iran to come clean on its weaponization work?

Third, will Iran's leaders agree to a verification and inspection regime that will allow for snap inspections of nuclear sites? Snap inspections mean that the inspectors can go all over Iran. They don't need special permission. We have not been hearing such positive things from the Iranian leadership who say that they will never allow inspectors on their military grounds.

We need answers to these questions. We need time to take a hard look at any deal and make sure there are no loopholes that Iran's leaders might be able to exploit. The bill we are debating today will give us that time.

My frustrations with these negotiations have stemmed from the fact that Iran was not required to cease its uranium enrichment while negotiating. When we sat down with Iran at the very beginning, more than a year ago, to negotiate with them, we should have said, While we are talking, you stop enriching. We didn't say that. I think that was a mistake.

Additionally, we negotiate as Iran continues its nefarious behavior around the world—in Syria, in Yemen, against Israel, support for terrorism. There is no sign that this agreement will lead to Iran stopping its support for terrorism or human rights violations; yet massive sanctions relief is on the table.

The fact of the matter is it is very frustrating that we are talking with Iran only about their nuclear weapons; we are not talking about the fact that they are a leading sponsor of terrorism or they are making trouble in Syria, where so many hundreds of thousands of innocents have died, or making trouble in Yemen or supporting Hezbollah, supporting Hamas.

It really is frustrating that we are talking about one aspect—their nuclear program—and meanwhile, they are free, apparently, to do whatever else they want. This really should not stand.

Perhaps the biggest question I have is whether Iran's leaders will ultimately be able to make the tough choices necessary to show the world that they are serious about living up to their commitments. This is a high bar to clear, and Iran's leaders, unfortunately, have given us no reason to trust them.

I remain concerned that the messages we are hearing from Iran directly contradict what the administration has told us. Iran's leaders have said that sanctions will be lifted immediately upon the signing of an agreement and that Iran will never accept inspections of their military sites.

This begs the question: Is Iran serious about these negotiations? We are told that any kind of sanctions relief will be incremental as Iran complies. The Iranian leaders are telling their public differently. We obviously have to settle this glaring discrepancy.

That is why this bill also includes provisions in case Iran reneges on its commitments. If Iran cheats, it would trigger immediate consideration of legislation that puts sanctions back in place, but let's hope it doesn't come to that.

The best way to avoid another war in the Middle East is a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. I wish our negotiators success. I hope this legislation sends a clear message that Congress is taking its role seriously, that we aren't playing politics with this issue and that we want these negotiations to result in a strong, verifiable deal that keeps a nuclear bomb out of Iran's hands.

I agree with Secretary Kerry when he says that no deal is better than a bad deal. The question is we want to make sure a bad deal isn't sold as a good deal. That is why it is important for Congress to be engaged.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human

Rights, and International Organizations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will suspend.

Mr. ELLISON. I don't object to the gentleman taking the 2 minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 2 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by thanking Chairman ROYCE and Ranking Member ENGEL and Senators CORKER, CARDIN, and MENENDEZ for doing their level best in the face of an administration which, throughout this process, has ignored and sought to exclude the legislature from its constitutional role in ratifying what is, in essence, a treaty—it is called an executive agreement, but it is a treaty—with the vicious, rights-abusing regime in Tehran, to salvage what we all can from an egregiously flawed framework and process.

It is clear, from the trajectory of negotiations to date, that the administration has squandered the leverage gained through sanctions, and there has been slippage—or, rather, retreat—from the strong position staked out in a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1929 agreed to in 2010. Resolution 1929 demanded that Iran: one, suspend all uranium enrichment; two, cooperate fully with the IAEA ensuring unfettered onsite inspection; and, three, refrain from any activity related to ballistic missiles.

Iran is now closer to achieving access to nuclear weapons and to the missiles to carry them to targets, including cities in the United States, while being relieved of sanctions.

From what we know now of the proposed framework, over 5,000 centrifuges will be allowed. Furthermore, it is Iran's understanding that military sites will be off limits—what?—off limits to inspection and that ballistic missiles, the delivery systems for nuclear bombs, are not part of the framework.

As a prerequisite to sitting down with the regime in Tehran, I and others have argued that the administration should have insisted that all Americans held or missing in Iran, including Christian pastor Saeed Abedini be released.

I am concerned, Mr. Speaker, that an agreement under these terms—terms which, underscore that, we have backtracked in these negotiations—will give new meaning to the phrase ''Pyrrhic victory.''

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for the time.

Also, I just want to acknowledge to my colleagues that we are here to talk about the best way to make sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. I am convinced that what we do here today is not the best way to do that.

I am convinced that the best way to make sure that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon is to allow the Commander in Chief, Chief Executive of this country, to negotiate a deal, and then Congress will be asked to relieve any sanctions, if that is warranted, and we will be able to weigh in at that time, which is the proper time. We will be able to have oversight hearings without regard to this legislation or any other, at any time we choose.

This piece of legislation, I believe, improperly, in an unhelpful manner, restrains the President by tying his hands, significantly delaying the implementation of a peace agreement, weakens our negotiating position by strengthening Iranian hard-liners—who will argue that the U.S. will not repeal sanctions even if Iran complies with the final deal—and sends a signal to the international community that the U.S. Congress is setting the stage to vote down a final agreement, compromising our relationships with NATO allies and international partners that have implemented the sanctions regime and that brought about Iran to the negotiating table.

It is very important that we acknowledge it was not the U.S. sanctions alone that has brought Iran to the negotiating table. It has been the international community and the cooperation we have enjoyed with the international community that has brought them to the negotiating table.

If we start operating as if we are going to change the deal, we signal to our partners that we are operating in less than good faith, which could collapse the whole sanctions regime internationally. This is not U.S.-Iran negotiating; this is the P5+1, and we must keep that in due regard.

Congress has an important role to play in this agreement with Iran repealing statutory sanctions. The deal cannot be implemented without congressional action. There is no reason for us to act right now. The only thing that acting now will achieve is to undermine the chance of an agreement.

Now, I believe Congress must have oversight, but I don't believe we should make this deal stillborn in the crib before it is even allowed to emerge. We don't want to abort the deal before it is born.

The deal should be allowed to come forward and the President should be allowed to make peace with a hostile nation before we start talking about what is wrong with it. We are anticipating what is wrong with it, and I don't think that is a helpful thing.

We are certainly not under any illusions about human rights, about exporting conflict from Iran. We know these things are the case.

What do you do when you want to deescalate the prospect of war? You negotiate. That is what the President is doing.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), the Democratic whip.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

First, let me say that I agree with my friend who is, I think, one of our very responsible and able leaders in this Congress, Mr. ELLISON. I appreciate his comments.

I presume that everybody on this floor, whatever their perspective is, thinks that the objective that the United States seeks and the objective that our P5 partners seek and the objective that the United Nations seeks—and that is a non-nuclear-armed Iran—is best achieved through agreement.

I think all of us would agree on that. The question is, however, for us to make it very clear the objective of that agreement and how it is achieved and how we are assured that that objective is, in fact, achieved.

Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate Senator CARDIN, my dear friend, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, for his hard work to reach this compromise with Chairman CORKER. I want to congratulate Mr. ROYCE and Mr. ENGEL for bringing it to the floor for quick consideration.

This compromise bill allows Congress to look carefully at the final agreement. For something of such consequence, that is essential. Not only is it desirable, it is essential that we do so. It will help ensure that our common goal is achieved, a non-nuclear-armed Iran.

I will say to my friend from Minnesota, my presumption is the Iranians want to get to this. They say they are not looking for nuclear arms; they want to have relief of the sanctions. It seems to me this is in their best interest, so they ought to be trying to accommodate this. I think, in fact, this can help, not hurt, our negotiating position.

I believe this bill reflects the consensus among Members of both the House and Senate that Congress, which authored the sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table—I would say, again, to my friend from Minnesota, the reason the sanctions were effective in bringing the Iranians to the table is because our European allies joined in them. I think he is absolutely right.

Unilaterally, we couldn't have done that because we don't do that much business with Iran; the Europeans do. He is absolutely right that it was in partnership that we brought the Iranians to the table.

I want to also thank, Mr. Speaker, our negotiating team for their tireless efforts to reach a framework agreement.

A letter was recently signed by 150. I didn't sign the letter, but I absolutely agreed with the substance of the letter, which said the best way to get there is through agreement, and we ought to support our negotiators who are pursuing that end.

As I have said before, any final agreement must prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and include the most intrusive inspections and access regime we have ever seen in order to verify Iran's compliance. There is no reason for us to trust Iran.

□ 1300

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. HOYER. It must address potentially military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program and bring about Iran's full cooperation with the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

The United States must never permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, and we will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel in defense of its security, which is very tied to our own security. That means ensuring Israel maintains its Qualitative Military Edge, including through robust support for antimissile systems and antitunneling defense programs. It also means supporting our gulf partners from Iran's destabilizing activities.

Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is directly in America's national security interest. A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat to us all. This bill will ensure that Congress can review any final nuclear agreement with Iran to make certain that it meets the goals we and the President share and which he has articulated emphatically and repeatedly. I encourage my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DOGGETT).

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, there is probably no more critical issue on our national agenda today than this matter with Iran. 151 Members of the House have joined together to encourage the President to ''exhaust every avenue toward a verifiable, enforceable, diplomatic solution in order to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.''

Mr. Speaker, I would ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD this communication.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington DC, May 7, 2015.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As negotiations over Iran's nuclear program continue, we urge you to stay on course, building on the recently announced political framework and continuing to work toward a strong and verifiable agreement between the P5+1 countries and Iran that will prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. We commend you and your negotiating team, as well as our coalition partners, for the significant progress made thus far.

This issue is above politics. The stakes are too great, and the alternatives are too dire. We must exhaust every avenue toward a verifiable, enforceable, diplomatic solution in order to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. If the United States were to abandon negotiations or cause their collapse, not only would we fail to peacefully prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, we would make that outcome more likely. The multilateral sanctions regime that brought Iran to the table would likely collapse, and the Iranian regime would likely decide to accelerate its nuclear program, unrestricted and unmonitored. Such developments could lead us to war.

War itself will not make us safe. A U.S. or Israeli military strike may set back Iranian nuclear development by two or three years at best—a significantly shorter timespan than that covered by a P5+1 negotiated agreement. We must pursue diplomatic means to their fullest and allow the negotiations to run their course—especially now that the parties have announced a strong framework—and continue working to craft a robust and verifiable Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by June 30.

We must allow our negotiating team the space and time necessary to build on the progress made in the political framework and turn it into a long-term, verifiable agreement. If we do not succeed, Congress will remain at-the-ready to act and present you with additional options to ensure that Iran is prevented from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Thank you for your resolve in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. We look forward to continuing our shared work on this important matter.

Sincerely,

JAN SCHAKOWSKY,
Member of Congress.
LLOYD DOGGETT,
Member of Congress.
DAVID E. PRICE,
Member of Congress.

Alma S. Adams, Pete Aguilar, Brad Ashford, Karen Bass, Joyce Beatty, Xavier Becerra, Ami Bera, Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Sanford D. Bishop, Earl Blumenauer, Suzanne Bonamici, Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Robert A. Brady, Corrine Brown, Julia Brownley, Cheri Bustos, G. K. Butterfield, Lois Capps, Michael E. Capuano, Tony Cárdenas.

John C. Carney, Jr., André Carson, Matt Cartwright, Kathy Castor, Joaquin Castro, Judy Chu, David N. Cicilline, Katherine M. Clark, Yvette D. Clarke, Wm. Lacy Clay, Emanuel Cleaver, James E. Clyburn, Steve Cohen, Gerald E. Connolly, John Conyers, Jr., Joe Courtney, Elijah E. Cummings, Danny K. Davis, Susan A. Davis, Peter A. DeFazio.

Diana DeGette, Rosa L. DeLauro, Suzan K. DelBene, Mark DeSaulnier, Debbie Dingell, Lloyd Doggett, Michael F. Doyle, Tammy Duckworth, Donna F. Edwards, Keith Ellison, Anna G. Eshoo, Elizabeth H. Esty, Sam Farr, Chaka Fattah, Bill Foster, Marcia L. Fudge, Ruben Gallego, John Garamendi, Al Green, Raúl M. Grijalva.

Luis V. Gutiérrez, Janice Hahn, Denny Heck, Brian Higgins, Rubén Hinojosa, Michael M. Honda, Jared Huffman, Sheila Jackson Lee, Hakeem S. Jeffries, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Henry C. ''Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Marcy Kaptur, William R. Keating, Robin L. Kelly, Daniel T. Kildee, Ron Kind, Joseph P. Kennedy, III, Ann M. Kuster, James R. Langevin, Rick Larsen.

John B. Larson, Brenda L. Lawrence, Barbara Lee, John Lewis, Ted Lieu, David Loebsack, Zoe Lofgren, Alan S. Lowenthal, Ben Ray Luján, Michelle Lujan Grisham, Stephen F. Lynch, Sean Patrick Maloney, Doris O. Matsui, Betty McCollum, Jim McDermott, James P. McGovern, Jerry McNerney, Gregory W. Meeks, Gwen Moore, Seth Moulton.

Grace F. Napolitano, Richard E. Neal, Richard M. Nolan, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Beto O'Rourke, Donald M. Payne, Jr., Nancy Pelosi, Ed Perlmutter, Pedro R. Pierluisi, Chellie Pingree, Stacey E. Plaskett, Mark Pocan, Jared Polis, David E. Price, Charles B. Rangel, Cedric L. Richmond, Lucille Roybal-Allard, Raul Ruiz, C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Bobby L. Rush.

Tim Ryan, Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, Linda T. Sánchez, Loretta Sanchez, Janice D. Schakowsky, Robert C. ''Bobby'' Scott, David Scott, José E. Serrano, Terri A. Sewell, Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Adam Smith, Jackie Speier, Eric Swalwell, Mark Takai, Mark Takano, Bennie G. Thompson, Mike Thompson, Paul Tonko, Norma J. Torres, Niki Tsongas.

Chris Van Hollen, Marc A. Veasey, Nydia M. Velázquez, Peter J. Visclosky, Timothy J. Walz, Maxine Waters, Bonnie Watson Coleman, Peter Welch, Frederica S. Wilson, John A. Yarmuth.

Mr. DOGGETT. While not signing this particular call for diplomacy, additional colleagues have made clear that they intend to prevent any attempted congressional veto of a strong, verifiable agreement. An agreement not based on trust, not based on liking Iran, but an agreement based on strong verification and intrusive verification.

Unfortunately, others here in this body who have embraced the wrong-headed advice of former President Bush's U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, who said that, ''To stop Iran's bomb, bomb Iran.'' These are some of the same Members who rejected the interim nuclear Joint Plan of Action before they had even read it. They are some of the same Members who were so eager to launch an unnecessary war in Iraq that only strengthened Iran and who seem to have learned very little from their previous failure, and they forget that Iran is bigger than Afghanistan and Iraq put together.

Another war will not make us safe. Bombing may set back Iranian nuclear development by two or three years at best—a significantly shorter time than that covered by a P5+1 negotiated agreement—but it will make an Iranian nuclear weapon more likely. Bombing will enflame sectarian and regional tensions. It will threaten the security of Israel and of our other allies and ultimately, it will jeopardize the safety of every American family.

That does not mean that any agreement with Iran is an acceptable agreement. Iranian hard-liners, like hard-liners elsewhere, may, ultimately, prevent an adequate verification in this agreement, but we must use every diplomatic means available, especially now with the announcement of this strong framework, and continue to work and craft a robust Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To do otherwise—to withdraw, to fail to support such an agreement—would likely collapse the multilateral sanctions among our allies and some that are not our allies but have joined with us in this regime that brought Iran to the table in the first place and would only accelerate an Iranian nuclear program that would then be unrestricted and unmonitored. Final sanctions—certainly sanctions which I have personally voted on a number of occasions in favor of—cannot be lifted without a vote of Congress, but that would not

occur until we have conclusive evidence of Iranian compliance.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ELLISON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. DOGGETT. All of us who do not trust war as the answer must continue working together to support a peaceful resolution and overcome the bellicose voices whose only alternative is the perilous course of war. We want a strong, verifiable arms accord. I favor and will vote for oversight and review today, but President Obama should know that he has the support in this House to fulfill our obligations under a verifiable agreement for a safer world and to avoid war.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MCCAUL), the chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act.

While far from perfect, the passage of this bill will ensure that Congress has a final say on the Obama administration's naive negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program.

Last week, in Israel, I met with Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, where I heard, once again, from our top ally in the region about the deep concern his country has over the dangerous agreement currently being hammered out by President Obama and the Ayatollah.

For years, my colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee have worked to ratchet up the pressure on Tehran through the toughest and most comprehensive sanctions ever devised. The sanctions passed in Congress brought Iran to the negotiating table. Last Congress, our committee, once again, passed another robust sanctions bill to give President Obama even more leverage over Tehran; but rather than accept our help, the President and his allies in the Senate opted, instead, to relieve Iran of the sanctions we had worked so hard to build.

And for what, Mr. Speaker?—for an agreement that allows the world's leading state sponsor of terror to maintain a vast nuclear infrastructure whose centrifuges will never stop spinning and, according to President Rouhani, for an agreement that does nothing to address the military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, such as the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which the Ayatollah says it should mass produce, or for an agreement that frees up billions of dollars that Iran can use to fund terror around the world.

Mr. Speaker, Congress must have a say in any final agreement with Iran, and this bill will do just that. I urge a ''yes'' vote.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. LOWEY), the ranking member on the Appropriations Committee.

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, which will ensure Congress a role in evaluating any final deal reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran.

As the author of the crippling sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table, Congress' continued oversight role is critical. Serious concerns remain about the proposed framework, particularly of the enforcement and verifiability of any deal, and whether it will, indeed, close all possible pathways to a bomb.

Any deal must include full and unfettered inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency of any facility, military or otherwise—including Parchin, Fordow, Natanz—and Iran must account for the possible military dimensions of its past activities. Given Iran's history of deception, sanctions should remain in place until Iran has taken major nuclear-related steps that demonstrate their sincerity.

We all want a diplomatic solution, but as long as Iran's leaders continue to refer to Israel as the ''barbaric'' Jewish state that ''has no cure but to be annihilated,'' we must approach any deal with the utmost scrutiny. That is why I urge the immediate passage of this important legislation.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington State (Mr. MCDERMOTT).

(Mr. MCDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MCDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, none of us want nuclear weapons in Iran; and while the White House may regard this bill as the least harmful option offered by a persistently intractable Congress—a Congress that has sought to derail all of his efforts in the past—I cannot and will not support this particular piece of legislation.

Of all of President Obama's foreign policy objectives, this is the boldest and the one that could have a meaningful impact on regional and global stability. The option of war or of increasing the sanctions simply has run its course. The time has come for diplomacy. The framework that the administration has presented to us is fair and smart. It is a good deal, one that guarantees a world safe from the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons.

We all await the details. All of this argument out here is about people who are sure of what the details are going to be. That is why this is not the time to be passing this legislation. President Obama, Secretary Kerry, and our partners—and don't forget that this is an historic thing in that we have partners of the P5+1. They deserve immense credit in their determination and commitment to a diplomatic solution to, arguably, the most dangerous and complex foreign policy challenge of our time.

We need to give the President and the negotiators the time they need. The time for us to make decisions about what happens about the sanctions will come to this floor. There is no question about it. We don't need to pass a bill saying we don't like what the President is doing. We ought to be grateful for the tenacity with which he has persisted in this diplomatic effort.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN), the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I very much thank the chairman for his leadership on our committee.

Mr. Speaker, this bill serves as a reminder of the unanswered questions surrounding the nuclear negotiations with Iran.

We know Iran can't be trusted. Everything we have seen from Iran since 1979 shows that the regime is willing to lie, to cheat, to obfuscate to achieve its agenda, and part of that agenda is to attack and to undermine the United States and our regional interests.

Can we verify Iran's compliance?

No, because Iran controls the access of the IAEA to its sites. Iran hasn't even come clean on its possible military dimension of its nuclear program yet. The regime is also likely to get a $50 billion signing bonus, when a deal is signed, in exchange for nothing.

What will Iran do with that money, Mr. Speaker?

It will continue to support terror around the globe, stoke sectarian violence as we have seen all over the Middle East, repress its own citizens, and, just today, five Iranian boats fired shots across the bow of a Singapore-flagged cargo vessel in the gulf.

Can we have snapback sanctions? Oh, please, the idea is laughable at best.

According to reports, China and Russia have stated that there will not be any automatic snapback sanctions whatsoever to reimpose on Iran even if the regime is caught in violation.

Once again, the Obama administration is playing a game of smoke and mirrors to get this deal finalized and to cement a legacy that the President has been seeking since he entered office. The deal is dangerous and will only jeopardize our national security.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DEUTCH), the ranking member on the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee and a very valued member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

□ 1315

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. When it comes to the security of our Nation and our partners around the world, the American people deserve a voice, but when Congress is unable to review or respond to policies of great consequence, like a potential nuclear

deal with Iran, the American people have no voice.

In recent days, we have heard another debate about another major international agreement also negotiated in secret, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Why do I bring that up in this context? Well, some of my colleagues who oppose this critical legislation have serious concerns about TPA and TPP. I share those concerns. I oppose fast-tracking TPP without the details on protecting jobs and workers and the environment and consumers and without any chance at making changes.

Likewise, today, I ask my colleagues to acknowledge and respect my concerns about approving a deal today with Iran when too many questions remain unanswered. On matters of national and international security, bullet points in a framework just won't do. Before Iran gains access to billions of dollars in frozen assets, I want the details. I want details on conditions for sanctions relief and access to military sites and unannounced inspections, and you should, too. No one here knows what a final deal would look like or even if we will get one, but I know you agree that, if we do, Congress should get to review the terms.

On behalf of our constituents, Congress must have a say. I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. LEE).

Ms. LEE. I thank the gentleman for yielding and also for his tremendous leadership on this very important issue. Also, I want to thank our ranking member, Mr. ENGEL, and Chairman ROYCE for their leadership on the Committee on Foreign Affairs and for all of the bipartisan work that you have done over the years together.

The poison pills have been taken out of this bill by the other body, and I still have concerns about the timing and effect of considering this legislation, but the President believes that this legislation, as written, will not undermine the administration's efforts. All of us have the same goal, and that is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

As negotiations over Iran's nuclear program enter a critical phase, Congress must give the President and our negotiators the space they need to succeed, and with the announcement of a framework agreement last month, we are closer to a strong and verifiable agreement between the P5+1 countries and Iran.

H.R. 1191 would require that Congress be given an opportunity to review any final agreement on Iran's nuclear program before the President can waive or suspend any sanctions. Supporters of this bill argue that they simply want to ensure congressional oversight of any final international agreement, and of course we all believe that there is a role for that, but we know that since negotiations began, there have been countless initiatives by Congress to purposely and deliberately thwart the success of a final deal.

Any efforts to undermine the negotiations or a final deal with Iran over its nuclear program will not make us safer, and it will not stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. In fact, it will do just the opposite.

Negotiations with Iran have already led to a first-step agreement that has significantly reduced Iran's nuclear stockpile and their ability to create a nuclear weapon. Without these negotiations and the current framework agreement, Iran's nuclear program would be unmonitored and unrestrained. Continued negotiations remain the best route to ensuring national and regional security while preventing us from going back on the path to a confrontation with Iran.

A deal with Iran has the support of the majority of the American people. An April ABC-Washington Post poll found that Americans by a nearly 2–1 margin support striking a deal with Iran that restricts the nation's nuclear program in exchange for loosening sanctions. We simply cannot afford the alternative to the negotiations, and the alternative to the negotiations, I believe, is war with Iran.

Instead of taking actions to undermine our President and international negotiators as they work to secure a final deal, Congress should be working to ensure their success. Now, let's hope that this bill does that. I hope that this Congress does not use passage of this bill as a cynical ploy to set up a vote against any final deal should there be a deal, one that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Simply put, diplomacy is the best way to cut off any potential pathway to an Iranian nuclear weapon.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. HOLDING). The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mr. ELLISON. May I ask how much time I have remaining?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Minnesota has 8 minutes remaining.

Mr. ELLISON. I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from California.

Ms. LEE. I will conclude by just saying in 2013 I introduced legislation calling for an end to the no contact policy with Iran and calling for a diplomatic initiative. I am convinced that that is the only way to ensure regional stability. Let's hope that the President's legacy does include preventing a war with Iran. What a great legacy to leave for the world.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ZELDIN), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation. I want to thank Mr. ROYCE from California for his leadership on this issue as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as Mr. ENGEL from New York for his leadership as the ranking member.

Americans want to know what is in an Iran nuclear deal. They want their Representatives in Congress to debate it. If facts come out that it turns out that this is a bad deal, which many are concerned we are on that pace for, they want Congress to reject it. I have had colleagues just now listening to those speaking in opposition talking about a nuclear framework agreement that was announced last month, people saying it is a good deal. There is no framework agreement.

The President released a fact sheet, and within 24 hours the Iranian Foreign Minister went on his Twitter feed saying it was just spin, the Ayatollah chanting ''death to America'' on the streets of Iran, saying that that fact sheet was just spin.

In order to have a deal to reach an agreement, both sides need to agree. The message to the colleagues today, I mean, this vote matters, but the work is not over. The tough work, the tough votes are still ahead.

Let's talk about what is not even part of the negotiations: Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism, work to overthrow foreign governments, development of ICBMs, pledging to wipe Israel off the map, chanting ''death to America'' on the streets, unjustly imprisoning United States citizens. That is not even part of the deal. That is not even part of the negotiations.

I want to read it. My constituents want to read a deal in English. They want to know that it is accurately translated, and the Iranians are reading their deal the same way that we are. If there is no agreement on specific terms, is there broad, vague language being used so that both sides can spin whatever they want to interpret this deal is for whatever best serves their own domestic politics?

We are elected to represent our constituents, and they are concerned about the direction of this deal. I have grave concerns. I feel like it is on pace to trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. I urge a ''yes'' vote. I thank the chairman, again, for his effort on this.

Mr. ENGEL. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. FRANKEL), a very respected member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Ms. FRANKEL of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bipartisan Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, and I want to remind everyone why it is so important that we prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state. Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, and the brutal crackdown in Syria. Iran's efforts to expand its influence is destabilizing Iraq, Lebanon, and now Yemen.

The Iran regime systematically violates its own citizens' basic rights and, as terrifying, has the potential for nuclear proliferation. If Iran becomes a

nuclear state, we will see a regional race for the bomb spreading the world's most dangerous weapons through the world's most unstable region.

Mr. Speaker, Congress played a critical role in bringing Iran to the negotiating table. Iran cannot be trusted, and Congress must continue to be vigilant.

Mr. ROYCE. I reserve the balance of my time, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PRICE).

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. I thank my colleague from Minnesota and rise today in cautious support of this legislation.

Our nuclear negotiators, with the cooperation of a fragile coalition of longstanding allies and new partners, have made historic progress toward preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, a critical foreign policy imperative for our country.

We must continue to give diplomacy a chance and allow our negotiators to build on the framework agreement they negotiated earlier this spring.

Many of our colleagues in the House of Representatives agree, Mr. Speaker. Just last week, Congresswoman SCHAKOWSKY, Congressman DOGGETT, and I sent a letter to the President urging persistence in negotiations, a letter that was signed by 148 of our colleagues.

Diplomacy isn't just the best way of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran; it is the only way. Opponents of the President's efforts have yet to provide a single viable alternative to diplomacy short of military action, and military action, defense experts tell us, would only delay nuclear development for a few years.

While I can understand why some Members of the House and Senate insisted upon congressional review of a final deal with such historic implications, I have strongly refused to support legislation or other congressional intervention that was likely to drive Iran from the negotiating table or to alienate our international partners. We must not set impossible goals for these negotiations or insist that every outstanding issue our country has with Iran be resolved before the core nuclear issue can be addressed.

The bill before us, which is a product of a thoughtful compromise between Senator CORKER and Senator CARDIN, Republicans and Democrats, does none of these harmful things. It is free of riders designed to undermine the negotiations, and it provides a reasonable path forward that allows for Congress to weigh in on a final deal without setting it up for failure.

So I rise in cautious support of this bill because I believe it clears the way for the President's negotiators to do their job, to work with our international partners to secure a comprehensive, verifiable nuclear agreement that will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and thereby will make the world a safer place.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DOLD), a member of the Committee on Financial Services.

Mr. DOLD. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Chairman ROYCE for his leadership and Ranking Member ENGEL for his leadership as well.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Speaker, I believe the greatest threat we have to our own national security here is a nuclear-armed Iran, an entity that has said time and again that they want to wipe Israel off the face of the map, that they want to drive them into the sea, that they are the Little Satan, which naturally begs the question, Mr. Speaker, as to who is the Big Satan, and it is the United States of America.

This is a framework, the framework that has been announced, the one that Iran basically said, We didn't think that was the framework. The chants of ''death to America.'' What they said is that they have to take all the sanctions off immediately upon the signature of a deal and that the IAEA will not be granted access to inspect facilities that are military facilities. Well, frankly, that is not a deal. I recognize that is a framework.

What we are debating today is really talking about Congress having the ability to say: Is this a deal that we can live with or is it not? Because, frankly, leaving Iran as a nuclear threshold state is not going to be a deal. What we are going to be debating today is, in essence, just allowing us to be able to take the next vote. That is the important one.

Madam Speaker, this is not left versus right. This isn't about Republicans and Democrats. This is about right versus wrong. This is about making sure that we do this right. If we don't do this right, if Iran is set for a path to a nuclear weapon, it is going to set an arms race in a dangerous neighborhood that will be devastating for peace and security around the globe. This is one where we are going to join hands together as a nation to make sure that the safety and security of the world is what we are going to put first and foremost.

Madam Speaker, I just got back from Israel. I had the opportunity to speak with people on multiple sides. To the person, they are all united behind the idea that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable and that this will be a bad deal.

So I urge my colleagues to vote ''yes'' on this piece of legislation to allow us to have the opportunity to take a look at this deal to move forward. With that, I sincerely hope that this is a bipartisan effort.

□ 1330

Mr. ENGEL. Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Speaker, I will yield to Chairman ROYCE for a colloquy, and I will ask him the following questions.

As I read this bill, if Congress does not enact a Joint Resolution of Disapproval, that failure to enact a Resolution of Disapproval cannot be read as Congress approving an agreement.

As I read the bill, if Congress does not enact a Resolution of Disapproval, the sole effect of that is to continue current statutes so that the President would retain his authority to provide sanctions relief.

Do you agree?

Mr. ROYCE. That is correct, Mr. SHERMAN. I see no way that a failure to override a Presidential veto or otherwise enact a joint resolution of disapproval would be construed as Congress approving a bad Iran deal. It would be that the Congress didn't have a supermajority of votes to stop the President from exercising the considerable leeway he has for the sanctions that are in place.

I would also remind the gentleman that this bill gives us the chance to have that vote. Otherwise, the President could act to waive sanctions the day after a deal is struck.

And if people are really worried about congressional intent being misconstrued, we always have the ability to make our intent crystal clear by passing a resolution or concurrent resolution, which are not subject to Presidential presentment or veto.

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for his clarification.

If this deal is signed, I do not think that Congress will enact a Resolution of Disapproval over the President's veto—maybe not even vote for it on the floor. It is even less likely that Congress will enact a Resolution of Approval.

So we will be in a situation where Congress will not have acted, and as the chairman points out, Congress would not have approved this agreement.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. BLACK). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman from California an additional 1 minute.

Mr. SHERMAN. If the President signs an agreement, Iran will get certain benefits and certain funds will be made available to them. At the same time, Iran will ship its stockpiles out of the country—or a substantial portion of them—decommission some centrifuges, and thereby delay its effort to get a nuclear weapon.

That means in 2017, and every year thereafter, future Congresses and future Presidents will have to determine what American policy is. We would be free to demand a renegotiation of the agreement, or to simply continue it in force. A President could reactivate sanctions, or continue to waive them. Congress could enact new sanctions, or repeal existing sanctions.

All options will be on the table in the years to come. And the only thing I am certain of is that we will be on this

floor debating Iran and its nuclear program for many years to come.

Mr. ELLISON. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. BLUMENAUER).

Mr. BLUMENAUER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The measure we are debating today is much better, through the hard work of Senators Corker and Cardin, and I appreciate their efforts to deescalate the conversation. I fear it is the wrong message at the wrong time. There are no good alternatives to letting negotiators prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.

Now, Congress seldom advances diplomacy. Usually, we politicize issues, playing to the bleachers. Our judgment is often suspect: the record from ignoring the lead up to World War II; misjudgments on Vietnam; the reckless rush into the war in Iraq; even maintaining a foolish policy regarding Cuba, until the President exercised leadership lately.

There is no good reason to interfere now with what the P5+1 have done, making unprecedented progress—progress we wouldn't have imagined 2 or 3 years ago. They did so using a unified force with these six countries, using the tools of the sanctions that we could not have imposed unilaterally. And we don't want to lose the leverage of those allies.

Now, I am painfully aware of the issues with Iran. It is troubling, a number of their activities. It is also ironic that our interests are aligned in some areas. And I will never forget on 9/11 there were demonstrations of support for America in Tehran. The Iranian people actually like Americans, their leaders do not—and that is why working forward to make this historic agreement a reality could be an important pivot point for the troubled relationships between our countries.

Make no mistake, there are hard-liners in Iran, just as there are hard-liners in the United States, who want to blow this agreement up. But I have been impressed, taking advantage of offers from the White House for numerous briefings on this issue, reviewing the materials, that we have made tremendous progress. We shouldn't complicate it.

As my friends have referenced here, there is no good alternative to a negotiated agreement with Iran. It is the only way we can prevent them from getting nuclear weapons.

A reckless rush to war, which some people hinted at, others would welcome, would not stop their ultimate acquisition of nuclear weapons. It is very likely to accelerate it. And to imagine going back into that area, fighting a country with a population that is larger than Iraq and Afghanistan combined—over a huge area—would be devastating.

Let's stay the course. Let's be patient. Let's try to constrain congressional interference.

Mr. ROYCE. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ENGEL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

In closing, let me first say I appreciate the thoughtfulness that I have heard during this debate from all sides. And I think that is really Congress at its best. I am proud to be a Member of Congress when I hear debates like this.

This legislation was negotiated very carefully to ensure that Iran would hear a unified and bipartisan message from Congress. Why is this important? It was Congress' work with the layers and layers of sanctions. And Mr. ROYCE has been my partner from day one. We have worked together so hard on sanctions and speaking with a unified voice in the Foreign Affairs Committee, and we have tried so hard to make the Foreign Affairs Committee the most bipartisan committee of Congress because foreign policy should be bipartisan. And what I have heard today from all across the aisle here is bipartisanship. And it is a good feeling. But it was Congress' work—the layers and layers of sanctions—that brought Iran to its knees and compelled Iran to come to the negotiating table.

I believe that it will be the threat of congressional action that will compel Iran to make the tough choices in these negotiations. But this congressional action must be bipartisan. Iran must not be able to dismiss a bill as a partisan stunt.

Congress must speak with a unified voice. We are stronger when we are unified. We are stronger when we act in a bipartisan manner. The international community followed our lead on Iran when we were unified. Iran came to the negotiating table when we were unified. And this vote should be no different: no poison pills, no extraneous messaging items that could torpedo this carefully crafted bill. Let's get this bill to the President's desk with a single voice.

Again, I want to repeat some of my trepidation. The fact that Iran was allowed to enrich uranium all these months and months of talking I think was a mistake. The fact that we are talking only with Iran about their nuclear program, not about their support for terrorism, not about Americans held in Iranian prisons, not about their ballistic weapons, not about their mischief in Iran, not about their support for international terrorism, not about their support for Hezbollah and Hamas, not about their threats of death to Israel and death to America, I think is a mistake.

But I do think negotiations are important, so I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to vote for this very, very sensible bipartisan piece of legislation. Let's get this bill to the President's desk with a single voice.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ELLISON. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

In closing, I want to thank the ranking member and the chairman for this considered debate. I will say that I do believe that this is a big deal. It is important that we debate this. I respect the position that I have heard here today, but ultimately I don't think what we are doing is necessary, and I don't believe it will help enhance peace for the United States or the world.

I think the things that we need are already in place, which is our right to have hearings on anything we want, the role we will have to play to remove any sanctions if we are satisfied, and the fact that we don't have to if we are not. We have the cards. We do not have to choke this deal in the crib, which is what I think this particular bill threatens.

Now, let me say there is nothing new, Madam Speaker, about what the President is doing here. I have a list of examples that very closely correlate to the President's effort to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran: the Helsinki Act in 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975, and the Australia Group in 1985. I don't have time to go into what all these things are, but I can say there are a number of situations where Presidents, Republican and Democrat, have used their authority to negotiate agreements with other countries in which Congress did not have to try to intervene.

Let me also point out that this situation that we are in, where we have had the framework agreement and now we are hoping to get a full agreement, I am hopeful and optimistic it will be something that is good and meaningful. So far, so good, in my opinion.

But I just want to remind everybody that the framework deal that has been struck already between the P5+1 in Iran would destroy about 14,000 centrifuges. That is what we are talking about here. Iran would destroy 97 percent of its uranium. That is 97 percent. Iran will have zero military nuclear capability.

We are at a historic moment that one keeps Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and we need to support this effort. I intend to vote ''no,'' and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

As we have heard today, Iran's rush to a nuclear weapon is a mortal threat to the United States and to our allies. And when I say it is a threat, consider for a minute the fact that Iran has, with its Quds forces, forces right now in Lebanon. It has forces in Syria. It has forces in Iraq. Its forces have just helped lead a militia to topple the government in Yemen, a government that was our ally. So that is the type of regime that we are talking about.

Just weeks ago, it was reported that Iran was passing tens of millions of dollars to Hamas. But they gave a reason. It was to rebuild the three dozen or so tunnels that were built underneath Israel so that Hamas could conduct attacks to try to capture hostages and take them back into Gaza.

□ 1345

The reason for the strategy is pretty clear. That kind of strategy would ensure that our ally Israel would have to fight block by block by block to get captives back. The one that I was in with Mr. ENGEL was not far from where it came up close to a nursery school.

This is the reality of the type of regime we are dealing with. It is not just transferring the money. It is also transferring the new rockets and the new missiles to Hamas.

Why were they doing that? Because they said the inventory is low because of the rockets fired off—this is the reality of the types of intentions that this regime has. Many times, they telegraph those intentions. When they are yelling, ''Death to the Great Satan, death to the little Satan,'' it is not as though they are not telling us the Ayatollah's intent. He is, after all, the Supreme Leader here.

Iran's support of terrorism and destabilization in the region will be far more intense, frankly, if it possesses a nuclear weapon or, indeed, if it had undetectable nuclear breakout capability.

The stakes could not be higher. That is why we need a good agreement, and I hope that all the Members support this legislation. It may not be a perfect bill, but it is a good bill. It is an important and responsible response to an administration that otherwise would shut out Congress.

I am sorry it took the White House so long to embrace it. Weeks ago, the White House was issuing veto threats and pushing back hard. Were it to pass, it would be the end of diplomacy as we know it, they said at the time. Now, they are on board, and it is good that they are on board.

With this legislation in place—and this is the great upside—Congress will be in a much better position to judge any final agreement that the President strikes with Iran, and I believe that our diplomacy will have a better shot because of it.

Instead of Iranian negotiators knowing that they can wear down the administration, this now injects Congress as an important backstop. It gives us leverage to address these issues like what we discussed today, to address the issue of: Will our inspectors, the international inspectors, have the right to go on military bases?

Let me tell you, I was part of the 1994 framework agreement, and the consequences of not getting the ability of weapons inspectors, international inspectors, to go on to military bases, not having that right to go anywhere, anytime, had profound consequences. It is why we are dealing with North Korea having the weapon today that they possess.

We should not repeat that error. U.S. diplomats should now head to the negotiating table with a stronger hand. They should work for a credible deal, a verifiable deal, and then present it to Congress to be judged. That is only appropriate, given the incredible consequences for the region, for our allies, and for the national security of the United States.

I urge the passage of this legislation.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE) that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendments to the bill, H.R. 1191.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. ROYCE. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

HEZBOLLAH INTERNATIONAL FINANCING PREVENTION ACT OF 2015

Mr. ROYCE. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 2297) to prevent Hezbollah and associated entities from gaining access to international financial and other institutions, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 2297

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ''Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015''.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Statement of policy.
TITLE I—PREVENTION OF ACCESS BY HEZBOLLAH TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS
Sec. 101. Briefing on imposition of sanctions on certain satellite providers that carry al-Manar TV.
Sec. 102. Sanctions with respect to financial institutions that engage in certain transactions.
TITLE II—REPORTS ON DESIGNATION OF HEZBOLLAH AS A SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER AND A SIGNIFICANT TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION
Sec. 201. Report on designation of Hezbollah as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker.
Sec. 202. Report on designation of Hezbollah as a significant transnational criminal organization.
Sec. 203. Rewards for Justice and Hezbollah's fundraising, financing, and money laundering activities.
Sec. 204. Report on activities of foreign governments to disrupt global logistics networks and fundraising, financing, and money laundering activities of Hezbollah.
Sec. 205. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Rule of construction.
Sec. 302. Regulatory authority.
Sec. 303. Termination.

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) prevent Hezbollah's global logistics and financial network from operating in order to curtail funding of its domestic and international activities; and

(2) utilize all available diplomatic, legislative, and executive avenues to combat the global criminal activities of Hezbollah as a means to block that organization's ability to fund its global terrorist activities.

TITLE I—PREVENTION OF ACCESS BY HEZBOLLAH TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS

SEC. 101. BRIEFING ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN SATELLITE PROVIDERS THAT CARRY AL-MANAR TV.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a briefing on the following:

(1) The activities of all satellite, broadcast, Internet, or other providers that knowingly provide material support to al-Manar TV, and any affiliates or successors thereof.

(2) With respect to all providers described in paragraph (1)—

(A) an identification of those providers that have been sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order No. 13224 (September 23, 2001); and

(B) an identification of those providers that have not been sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order No. 13224 and, with respect to each such provider, the reason why sanctions have not been imposed.

SEC. 102. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.

(a) PROHIBITIONS AND CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ACCOUNTS HELD BY FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the heads of other applicable departments and agencies, shall prohibit, or impose strict conditions on, the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the Secretary determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, engages in an activity described in paragraph (2).

(2) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign financial institution engages in an activity described in this paragraph if the foreign financial institution—

(A) knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or transactions for Hezbollah;

(B) knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or transactions of a person designated for acting on behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, Hezbollah;

(C) knowingly engages in money laundering to carry out an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B);

(D) knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or transactions or provides significant financial services to carry out an activity described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C), including—

(i) facilitating a significant transaction or transactions; or

(ii) providing significant financial services that involve a transaction of covered goods; or