going to give money to people who be-
head you and crucify you to create
jobs. That should never be the way
we make a decision about arms sales in
our country.

A famous Republican and general,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, said he
would worry, my goodness, we would
make decisions not based on our defense
but based on the military industrial com-
plex.

I am embarrassed that people are out
here in this country making us some
money and making a buck, while 17 mil-
lion people live on a starvation diet
and are threatened with famine. I am
embarrassed that people would bring
up trying to feather the nest of cor-
porations in order to sell these weap-
ons. This should be made, pure and
simple, on our national defense.

Saudi Arabia is not a reliable ally.
Saudi Arabia should not get these
weapons. For every supposed good
thing they do, they do five things that
are bad for America. They are the big-
gest purveyor of hatred of Christianity
and Judaism.

I request a "no" vote, and I reserve
the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
PORTMAN). The Senator from Ten-
nessee.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I re-
spect my friend from Kentucky. We
work together on the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. I could not disagree
more on this issue, and I will give a
brief outline.

The Houthis are an Iran-backed enti-
ty that overthrew a Western-backed
government in Yemen. Last year on
the floor, with a vote of 71 votes, this
body voted to support the selling of
tanks to Saudi Arabia.

Foreign policy partisanship generally
stops at the shores. I know Senator
Paul has been very consistent on this,
but I am afraid this vote is somewhat
about image. Members wanting to get a
piece of President Trump’s hide on an
issue that is far more important than
something like that. I am fearful that
this is what is happening today on the
floor.

A lot of people don’t realize that
Saudi Arabia already has the bombs.
What we would be selling to them is
the precision-guided weaponry systems
that allow these bombs to be smart
bombs and not dumb bombs.

More and more concerned about Saudi Arabia when they have
been involved in pushing back the Houthis, who, by the way, are firing
weapons into their country from the southern border. It would be no
different than if Mexico were doing that to ours. I know that is not going to
happen. But, obviously, we would be firing back. So what is happening here
is that they bought the bombs from
Italy, and what they want to buy from us is the precision systems that
allow them to not kill civilians. It is
to protect civilians.

Think about this. Here in the Senate
we want to protect civilians in Saudi
Arabia, and in our wisdom we are look-
king at blocking the sale of the very
mechanisms that would allow that to
happen—in some cases, I am afraid,
just to make a point against the
Trump administration.

Actually, their policies here have been
sound. The meeting they had in Saudi Arabia was very beneficial.

Saudi Arabia has flaws, but they have
been an ally. This would show us as
stepping away from an ally in a way
that is cutting our nose off to spite our
face by allowing them to have the
precision mechanisms to keep them
from killing civilians.

We have taken Senators down in the
SCIF. There is absolutely no evidence
that Saudi Arabia tried to kill civil-
ians—none. As a matter of fact, there
is evidence to the contrary. So, please,
let’s be rational. I know there are dis-
agreements over some foreign policy
issues. This should not be one of them.
I urge defeat of this proposal.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Kentucky.

Mr. PAUL. Mr. President, Saudi Ara-
bia bombed a funeral procession. There
was no mistake here. There was no
cloud cover. There was no growth or
coppice of trees and they accidentally
bombed a funeral procession. They
bombed them and killed 125 civilians in
a funeral. They wounded 500. This
was no mistake. This was no error. This
was, pointedly dropping bombs on civil-
ians.

They put protestors in jail. They
have a 17-year-old—he is now 29—who
has been in jail for 3 years. He will be
beheaded and then crucified. We should
not be giving these people weapons.

They supported ISIS. They are on
the wrong side of the war. They are the
greatest purveyor of hatred for Chris-
tianity and Judaism. They do not de-
serve your weapons. They are going to
give your weapons. They belong to the
American people. They are going to
give them to people who behead and
crucify protestors.

You can’t take a Bible into Saudi Arabia. You can’t visit their major citi-
ies.

We can’t make them be like us, but
we don’t have to encourage their be-
havior by giving them weapons that
may well fall into the hands of people
who are our enemies.

I urge a “no” vote. I think we should
not be selling arms to Saudi Arabia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time
has expired.

The question is on agreeing to the
motion to discharge.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask for the yeas
and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a
sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient sec-
ond.

The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant legislative clerk
called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 47,
nays 53, as follows:
Section 211. Findings.

This title may be cited as the “Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017.”

Subtitle A—Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian Federation

Section 211. Findings.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 13661; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on those determined to be undermining democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine or threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. President Obama subsequently issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 13661; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) and Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 13662; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) to expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine.

(2) On December 18, 2014, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 was enacted (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.), which includes provisions directing the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons that the President determines to be entities owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation or nationals of the Russian Federation, and otherwise provide certain defense articles into Syria.

(3) On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 13694; relating to blocking property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on persons determined to be engaged in malicious cyber-hacking.

(4) On July 26, 2016, President Obama approved a Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident Coordination, which states, “certain cyber incidents that have significant impacts on an entity, our national security, or the broader economy require a unique approach to response efforts.”

(5) On December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an annex to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on the following entities:

(A) The Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie or the GRU) in Moscow, Russian Federation.
(B) The Federal Security Service (also known as Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian Federation.
(C) The Special Technology Center (also known as STL, Ltd. Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation.
(D) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow, Russian Federation.
(E) The autonomous noncommercial organization known as the Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) in Moscow, Russian Federation.
(F) Igor Valerievich Korobov.
(G) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizinov.
(H) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov.
(I) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev.

(6) On January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United States intelligence community entitled, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections” stated, “Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential election.” The assessment warns that “Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the U.S. Presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election processes.”

SEC. 212. Sense of Congress.

It is the sense of Congress that the President—

(1) should engage to the fullest extent possible with partner governments with regard to closing loopholes, including the allowance of extended prepayment for the delivery of goods and services, and corner loopholes in multilateral and unilateral restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, with the aim of maximizing alignment of those measures;

(2) should increase efforts to vigorously enforce compliance with sanctions in place as of the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to the Russian Federation in response to the crisis in eastern Ukraine, cyber intrusions and attacks, and human rights violations in Russian-occupied territories.

PART I—DIRECTORIAL REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Section 213. Short Title.

The part may be cited as the “Russia Sanctions Review Act.”


(a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that action.

(B) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in this paragraph is—

(i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions described in subparagraph (B); or

(ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an action to waive the application of those sanctions with respect to that person; or

(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United States’ foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.

(B) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subparagraph are—

(i) sanctions provided for under—

(ii) this title or any provision of law amended by this title, including the Executive Orders codified under section 222; and

(iii) the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 891 et seq.); or

(ii) the prohibition on access to the properties of the Government of the Russian Federation located in Maryland and New York that the President ordered vacated on December 29, 2016.

(3) Description of Type of Action.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the action—

(A) is not intended to significantly alter United States’ foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation; or

(B) is intended to significantly alter United States’ foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.

(4) Inclusion of Additional Matter.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is intended to achieve a reciprocal diplomatic outcome shall include a description of—

(i) the anticipated reciprocal diplomatic outcome;

(ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national security interests of the United States; and

(iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions affected by the action were initially imposed.

(B) Requests from Banking and Financial Services Committees.—The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives may request the submission to the Committee of the matter described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not intended to achieve a reciprocal diplomatic outcome.

(p) Period for Review by Congress.—

(1) In General.—During the period of 30 calendar days beginning on the date on which the President submits a report under subsection (a)(1)

(A) the case of a report that relates to an action that is not intended to achieve a reciprocal diplomatic outcome, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report; and

(B) the case of a report that relates to an action that is intended to achieve a reciprocal diplomatic outcome, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report.

(2) Exception.—The period for congressional review under paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in any calendar year.

(Limitation on Actions During Initial Congressional Review Period.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the period for congressional review provided for in paragraph (1), if a report is submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including any
additional period for such review as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to the action is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).

(4) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the joint resolution of disapproval.

(5) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action for a period of 12 calendar days after the date of the joint resolution of disapproval.

(b)(1), including any additional period as provided for under subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced—

(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader (or the majority leader’s designee); and

(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader’s designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader’s designee).

(4) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

(A) REPORTS AND DISCHARGE.—If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or has been discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution without debate, except that debate shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the majority leader and the minority leader.

(B) DISAPPROVAL.—On disposition of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, the rules of the House of Representatives shall be those applicable to presidential disapproval as in effect on the date the joint resolution of disapproval was reported, except that a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall not be referred to a committee.

(5) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.—

(A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—A joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be considered as read. All points of order against the joint resolution and control of the debate (including a motion to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution was defeated) are waivable. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall not be in order.

(B) DISAPPROVAL.—On disposition of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, the rules of the Senate shall be those applicable to presidential disapproval as in effect on the date the joint resolution of disapproval was reported, except that a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall not be referred to a committee.

(6) RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

(A) COORDINATION WITH ACTION BY OTHER HOUSE.—If, before the House receives an identical joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval of that House, that House receives an identical joint resolution from the other House, the following procedures shall apply:

(I) The procedure in that House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the other House.

(ii) The joint resolution of the other House shall be entitled to expedited procedures in that House under this subsection.

(B) TREATMENT OF JOINT RESOLUTION OF OTHER HOUSE.—If one House fails to introduce a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval of the other House shall be entitled to expedited procedures in that House.

(C) TREATMENT OF JOINT RESOLUTION OF OTHER HOUSE.—If, before the House receives an identical joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the other House, the following procedures shall apply:

(I) The procedure in that House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the other House.

(ii) The vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution of the other House.

(D) APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEASURES.—The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.

(7) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.—This subsection is enacted by Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each House, but applicable only with respect to the procedures to be followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND LEADERSHIP DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees and leadership’’ means—

(1) on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and

(2) on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

PART II—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

In this part:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) GOOD.—The term ‘‘good’’ has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 2091 et seq.).

(3) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘international financial institution’’ has the meaning given that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).

(4) KNOWINGLY.—The term ‘‘knowingly,’’ with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge of, or reason to know, the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(5) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means an individual or entity.

(6) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United States person’’ means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of a financial institution

SEC. 222. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) CODIFICATION.—United States sanctions provided for in Executive Order 13669 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) and Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16168; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 17537; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to blocking property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), and Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to blocking property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, including with respect to Executive Orders, shall remain in effect except as provided in subsection (b).

(b) TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS.—Subject to subsection (a), the President may terminate the application of sanctions described in subsection (a) that are imposed on a person in connection with activity conducted by the person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions described in subsection (a) in the future.

(c) APPLICATION OF CYBER SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person if the President determines that the waiver is consistent with United States national security interests.

(d) MODIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE 4.—The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 4, dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive, so that the directive prohibits the provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or indirectly, by United States persons or persons within the United States of goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects—

(1) that have the potential to produce oil; and

(2) in which a Russian energy firm is involved; and

(3) that involve any person determined to be subject to the directive or the property or interests in property of such a person.

SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall—

(1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly engages in significant activities undermining cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution, or government on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation;

(A) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution, or government on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation; and

(B) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person described in paragraph (A);

(2) impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services (except financial services) in support of, an activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and

(3) impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section 4(c) of the Ukraine Engagement Support Act (31 U.S.C. 8923(c)) with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly provides financial services in support of an activity described in paragraph (1)(A).

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to the directive or the property or interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND REVOCATION OF VISAS OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION.—In the case of an alien determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1), denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1221(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.

(c) APPLICATION OF NEW CYBER SANCTIONS.—If the President waives the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person only if the President of the United Statespersons or persons within the United States of all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of persons determined to be subject to the directive, their property, or their interests in property.

(d) MODIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE 4.—The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 4, dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive, so that the directive prohibits the conduct by United States persons or persons within the United States of all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of persons determined to be subject to the directive, their property, or their interests in property.
sponsors to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

(d) Significant Activities Undermining Cybersecurity Defined.—In this section, the term ‘significant activities undermining cybersecurity’ includes—

(1) significant efforts—

(A) to deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy information or communications technology system or network; or

(B) to exfil, degrade, corrupt, destroy, or release information from such a system or network without authorization for purposes of—

(i) conducting influence operations; or

(ii) causing a significant misappropriation of fund assets, trade secrets, personal identifications, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or financial gain;

(2) significant destructive malware attacks; and

(3) significant denial of service activities.

SEC. 225. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO SPECIAL RUSSIAN CRUDE OIL PROJECTS.

Section 1 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923(b)(1)) is amended by striking ‘‘on and after the date that is 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act’’ and inserting ‘‘on and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017’’ and

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking ‘‘President determines is’’ and inserting ‘‘President determines is, or on after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017,’’; and

(ii) by inserting ‘‘or elsewhere’’ after ‘‘in the Russian Federation’’ in subsection (d), the President;’’ and

(3) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this Act;'’ and

(4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

‘‘(d) APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

‘‘(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

‘‘(B) will further the enforcement of this Act;'’

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Protocol to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.;’’.

SEC. 228. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) in General.—The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8001 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

SEC. 10. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS THAT EVADE SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) in General.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to—

(1) a person determined by the President to be

(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant steps to stop the activity; and

(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.

(2) sanctions described in this section in connection with a covered Executive order described in subparagraphs (E) or (F) of subsection (f)(1), a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government;

(e) Termination.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

(2) a notice that—

(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant steps to stop the activity; and

(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.

(3) Covered Executive Order.—The term ‘‘covered Executive order’’ means any of the following:

Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 14949; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine);

Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15553; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine);

Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16166; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine);

Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 7737; relating to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine).
certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).

“(F) Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1), relating to taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities.

“(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign person’ has the meaning given such term in section 313, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017).

“(3) The term ‘structured’, with respect to a transaction, has the meaning given the term ‘structured’ in paragraph (xx) of section 1060.100 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or rule).”

“SEC. 11. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS ENGAGING IN SIGNIFICANT MALICIOUS CYBER-ENABLED ACTIVITIES.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that the foreign person, based on credible information, on or after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017—

“(1) is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for, ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation;

“(2) materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or services to, a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or

“(3) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).

“(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).

“(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out subsection (b)(1) shall be subject to the penalties specified in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

“(c) IMPLEMENTATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may take additional steps to address significant malicious cyber-enabled activities.

“(d) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Section 2(2) of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8907) is amended—

“(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

“(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

“(2) a notice that—

“(A) that—

“(i) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future; or

“(B) that the President determines that insufficient basis exists for the determination by the President under subsection (a) with respect to the person.

“(e) NOTIFICATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS.—The President shall notify Congress of the imposition of sanctions under subsection (b) in the future; and

“(f) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

“(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.”

“SEC. 230. STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

“(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO UNDERMINING THE SECURITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF UKRAINE.—Section 8 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8907) is amended—

“(1) by redesigning subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

“(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

“(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.”

“SEC. 229. NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS UNDER UKRAINE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2014.

“(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO DEFENSE AND ENERGY SECTORS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.—Section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923) is amended—

“(1) by redesigning subsections (g) and (h) as subsections (h) and (i), respectively; and

“(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:

“(g) NOTIFICATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS.—

“(1) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees—

“(A) of the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a) or (b),

“(B) that the President has submitted to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

“(i) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that the foreign person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a)(2) in the future;” and

“(3) in subparagraph (B)(ii) of subsection (a)(3), by striking “(b) and (c)” and inserting “(b), (c), and (d)”.

“(b) SANCTIONS ON RUSSIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924) is amended—

“(1) by redesigning subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and

“(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:

“(e) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions with respect to a foreign financial institution under subsection (a) or (b) if—

“(1) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) or (b) in the future; and

“(2) the President has submitted a notice to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

“(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.”

“(c) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).
transaction with a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, including the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.

(b) Application of New Sanctions. The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

SEC. 232. Sanctions with Respect to the Development of Pipelines in the Russian Federation

(a) In General. The President may impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 233 with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment described in subsection (b) that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines.

(b) Investment Described. An investment described in this subsection is an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines.

SEC. 233. Sanctions with Respect to Investment Facilitation of Privatization of State-Owned Assets by the Russian Federation

(a) In General. The President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 233 if the President determines that a person, with actual knowledge, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment of $10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not less than $1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds any 12-month period), or facilitates such an investment, if the investment directly and significantly contributes to the ability of the Russian Federation to privatize state-owned assets in a manner that unjustly benefits—

(1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(2) the associates or family members of those officials.

(b) Application of New Sanctions. The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any sanctions that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

SEC. 234. Sanctions with Respect to the Transfer of Materials and Related Materiel to Syria

(a) Imposition of Sanctions.

(1) In General. The President shall impose a written determination that the sanctions described in subsection (b) if the President determines that such foreign person has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria significant material, military, or technological support that contributes materially to the ability of the Government of Syria to—

(A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies;

(B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile capabilities;

(C) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons;

(D) acquire significant defense articles, defense services, or defense information (as such terms are defined under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or

(E) acquire items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

(2) Applicability to Other Foreign Persons. The sanctions described in subsection (b) shall also be imposed on any foreign person that—

(A) is a successor entity to a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or

(B) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).

(b) Sanctions Described. The sanctions to be imposed under the provisions of this section are—

(1) Blocking of Property. The President shall exercise all powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) Aliens Ineligible for Visas, Admissions, or Parole. 

(A) Exclusion from the United States. If the foreign person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, the foreign person.

(B) Current Visas Revoked.

(1) In General. If the Secretary of Homeland Security cancels any visa, or other form of entry or extension of stay, or permits the entry or extension of stay of the foreign person regardless of when issued.

(ii) Effect of Revocation. A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and shall cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the foreign person.

(c) Waiver. Subject to section 216, the President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(d) Definitions. In this section:

(1) Financial, Material, or Technological Support. The term "financial, material, or technological support" has the meaning given such term in section 542.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or rule).

(2) Foreign Person. The term "foreign person" has the meaning given such term in section 541.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or rule).

(3) Syria. The term "Syria" has the meaning given such term in section 542.316 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or rule).

SEC. 235. Sanctions Described.

(a) Sanctions Described. The sanctions to be imposed with respect to a person under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 223(a), or 223(b) are the following:

(1) Export-Import Bank Assistance for Exports to Sanctioned Persons. The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States not to give approval to the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in the extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to the sanctioned person.

(2) Export Sanction. The President may order the United States Government not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the sanctioned person under this Act.

(B) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.) (as continued in effect by any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the sanctioned person under this Act).

(3) Loans from United States Financial Institutions. The President may prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period unless the person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such activities.

(4) Loans from International Financial Institutions. The President may direct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to use the vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the international financial institution that would benefit the sanctioned person.

(5) Prohibitions on Financial Institutions. The following prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if that person is a financial institution:

(A) Exclusion from the United States. If the foreign person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, the foreign person.

(B) Current Visas Revoked. The President may order the United States Government not to issue a visa to the foreign person.

(2) Expiration of a United States Government as a condition for the export or re-export of goods or services.

(3) Loans from United States Financial Institutions. The President may prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period unless the person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such activities.

(4) Loans from International Financial Institutions. The President may direct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to use the vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the international financial institution that would benefit the sanctioned person.

(5) Prohibitions on Financial Institutions. The following prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if that person is a financial institution:

(A) Exclusion from the United States. If the foreign person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, the foreign person.

(B) Current Visas Revoked. The President may order the United States Government not to issue a visa to the foreign person.

(2) Prohibitions on Financial Institutions. The following prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if that person is a financial institution:

(A) Exclusion from the United States. If the foreign person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, the foreign person.

(B) Current Visas Revoked. The President may order the United States Government not to issue a visa to the foreign person.
United States Government or serve as repository for United States Government funds. The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b), and the imposition of both such sanctions shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b).

(6) FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest.

(7) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person.

(8) PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any person from—
(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting, any property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with respect to which the sanctioned person has any interest; or
(B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to such property; or
(C) conducting any transaction involving such property.

(9) BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations or guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the sanctioned person.

(10) SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OF A FOREIGN ENTITY.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations or guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any person with substantial influence over, or who serves in a senior executive capacity with respect to, a foreign entity, of which the sanctioned person has any interest, from acting on behalf of the foreign entity.

(11) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.—The President may direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, a sanctioned person.

(12) SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.—The President may impose on the principal executive officer or officers of the sanctioned person, or on persons performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this subsection.

SEC. 236. EXCEPTIONS, WAIVER, AND TERMINATION.

(a) EXCEPTIONS.—In this section, the term “sanctioned person” means a person subject to sanctions under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), or 233(a).

(b) SEC. 236. EXCEPTIONS, WAIVER, AND TERMINATION.

(1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.


(c) SEC. 233. EXCEPTION TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—No requirement to impose sanctions under this part or an amendment made by this part shall include the authority to impose restrictions on the importation of goods.

(d) SEC. 234. WAIVER OF SANCTIONS THAT ARE IMPOSED.—Subject to section 216, if the President imposes sanctions with respect to a person under part or the amendments made by this part, the President may waive the application of those sanctions if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(e) SEC. 235. TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under section 224, 231, 232, 233, or 234 with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—
(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and
(2) a notice that—
(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
(B) the President received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under this part in the future.

SEC. 237. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this part or the amendments made by this part shall be construed—
(1) to supersede the limitations or exceptions on the use of rocket engines for national security purposes under section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 120 Stat. 2611–2612), as amended by section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 120 Stat. 1100) and section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2382); or
(2) to prohibit a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Defense from acquiring components referred to in such section 1608.

PART II—REPORTS

SEC. 241. REPORT ON OLIGARCHS AND PARASTATAL ENTITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) SEC. 241. REPORT ON OLIGARCHS AND PARASTATAL ENTITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the following:
(A) Senior foreign political figures, including as defined in the Arms Export Control Act of 1979 (22 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.) and President Vladimir Putin or members of the Russian ruling elite.
(B) An identification of any indices of corruption with respect to those individuals.
(C) An identification of any indices of corruption with respect to those individuals.

(b) SEC. 242. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS TO INCLUDE SOVEREIGN DEBT AND INDEBTEDNESS.

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing in detail the potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), or any successor directive to include sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.

(2) SEC. 243. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committee” means—
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(3) SEC. 244. NON-RUSSIAN BUSINESS AFFILIATIONS OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS.

(A) In general.—An identification of the non-Russian business affiliations of those individuals.

(B) Russian parastatal entities, including an assessment of the following:
(i) the emergence of Russian parastatal entities and their role in the economy of the Russian Federation.

(C) The leadership structures and beneficial ownership of the Russian parastatal entities.

(D) The non-Russia business affiliations of those entities.

(E) The exposure of key economic sectors of the United States to Russian politically exposed persons and parastatal entities, including, at a minimum, the banking, securities, insurance, and real estate sectors.

(F) The likely effects of imposing debt and equity restrictions on Russian parastatal entities, as well as the anticipated effects of adding Russian parastatal entities to the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.

(G) The potential impacts of imposing secondary sanctions with respect to Russian oligarchs, Russian state-owned enterprises, and Russian parastatal entities, including impacts on the entities themselves and on the economy of the Russian Federation, as well as on the economies of the United States and allies of the United States.

(H) SEC. 245. FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(I) SEC. 246. DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) SEC. 247. SENIOR FOREIGN POLITICAL FIGURE.—The term “senior foreign political figure” has the meaning given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or rule).

SEC. 248. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS TO INCLUDE SOVEREIGN DEBT AND INDEBTEDNESS.

(A) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing in detail the potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), or any successor directive
to include sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.

(B) SEC. 249. FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(C) Appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
Subtitle B—Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

SEC. 251. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of the Russian Federation has engaged in malign influence efforts throughout Europe and Eurasia, including in the former states of the Soviet Union, by promoting Russian state-sponsored political parties, think tanks, and civil society groups that sow distrust in democratic institutions and actors, promote xenophobic and illiberal views, and otherwise undermine unity. The Government of the Russian Federation has also engaged in well-documented corruption practices as a means toward undermining and buying influence in European and Eurasian national and local elections.

(2) The Government of the Russian Federation has largely eliminated a once-vibrant Russian-language media organization that is funded and controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation and disseminate information within and outside of the Russian Federation routinely traffic in anti-Western, anti-American, anti-independence, and anti-European narratives. The Government of the Russian Federation should work with European and Asian partners to combat Russian state-media influence efforts that undermine unity in those regions.

(3) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to violate its commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the “Helsinki Final Act”), which laid the groundwork for the establishment of security in Europe and cooperation in Europe, of which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.

(4) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to undermine the terms of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement relating to Georgia, which requires the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops, free access by humanitarian organizations to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and monitoring of the conflict areas by the European Union Monitoring Mission.

(5) The Government of the Russian Federation is failing to comply with the terms of the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, as well as the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014. The Government of the Russian Federation is—

(A) in violation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1967, and entered into force June 1, 1970 (commonly known as the “INF Treaty”); and

(B) failing to meet its obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 1, 1992, and entered into force January 1, 2002 (commonly known as the “Open Skies Treaty”).

SEC. 252. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the Russian Federation bears responsibility for the continuing violence in Eastern Ukraine, including the death on April 24, 2017, of Joseph Stone, a citizen of the United States working as a monitor for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe;

(2) the President should call on the Government of the Russian Federation—

(A) to withdraw all of its forces from the territory of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine;

(B) to return control of the borders of those territories to their respective governments; and

(C) to cease all efforts to undermine the popularly elected governments of those countries;

(3) the Government of the Russian Federation should work with the United States on counter-russian efforts;

(4) in response, the United States and European allies should reduce efforts to undermine the popularly elected governments of those countries;

(5) the United States should work with the European Union to strengthen enforcement of the Minsk Agreement and the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and

(6) the United States should work with other allies and partners to strengthen their efforts to combine sanctions, intelligence, diplomatic, and other elements of influence to undermine Russian state media efforts to undermine the populations of the United States, and the European Union should redouble efforts to build resilience within their institutions, political systems, and civil societies.

(7) the United States should work with the European Union to strengthen the provisions of the Magnitsky Act and other relevant legislation, including the anti-corruption investments in Europe and Eurasia.

(8) the United States should work with the European Union as a partner on counter-russian efforts;

(9) the United States should be prepared to impose sanctions on individuals and entities involved in illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation, including financial intermediaries, to prevent illicit financial flows described in paragraphs (1) and (3);

(10) the United States should place additional sanctions on the Government of the Russian Federation, including financial intermediaries, to prevent illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1); and

(11) the United States should consider other steps to impose greater sanctions on the Government of the Russian Federation, including financial intermediaries.
SEC. 253. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

The United States, consistent with the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur, supports the policy known as the "Stimson Doctrine," which does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Transnistria. 

SEC. 254. COORDINATING AID AND ASSISTANCE ACROSS EUROPE AND EURASIA.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund $250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

(b) Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund shall be used to effectively implement, prioritized in the following order and subject to the availability of funds:

(1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following countries:
   (A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of State determines—
   (i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation; and
   (ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of the United States.
   (B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.

(2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

(4) To improve participatory legislative processes and legal education, political transparency and competition, and compliance with international obligations in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and independent nongovernmental organizations countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthful information freely in all media and institutions in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the functions specified in section 1297(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) for the purposes of recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering Russian propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthful information freely in all media and institutions in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(c) REVISION OF ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH AMOUNTS MAY BE USED.—The Secretary of State shall develop and carry out the appropriate congressionally mandated or requested goals described in subsection (b) if, not later than 15 days before revising such a goal, the Secretary notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the revised goal.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, carry out activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) for the purposes of recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthful information freely in all media and institutions in the countries described in paragraph (1). 

(2) Method.—Activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) shall be carried out through—

(A) initiatives of the United States Government;

(B) Federal grants programs such as the Information Access Fund; or

(C) nongovernmental or international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Black Sea Trust, the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the Prague Civic Society Centre, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, the European Endowment for Democracy, and related organizations.

(e) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of State, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs and activities carried out to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) during the preceding fiscal year.

(f) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by subparagraph (a) shall include, with respect to each program or activity described in that subparagraph—

(i) the amount of funding for the program or activity;

(ii) the goals described in subsection (b) to which the program or activity relates; and

(iii) an assessment of whether or not the goal was met.

(g) COORDINATION WITH GLOBAL PARTNERS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to maximize cost efficiency, eliminate duplication, and speed the achievement of the goals described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordination with—

(A) the European Union and its institutions;

(B) the governments of countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union described in paragraph (1); and

(C) international organizations and quasi-governmental funding entities that carry out programs and activities that seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b).

(2) REPORT BY SECRETARY OF STATE.—Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—

(A) the amount of funding provided to each country referred to in subsection (b) for each organization described in subparagraph (a); and

(B) an assessment of whether the funding described in subparagraph (a) is commensurate with funding provided by the United States for those organizations.

(f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to or limit United States foreign assistance provided using amounts available in the Countering Russian Influence Fund.

(g) ENSURING ADEQUATE STAFFING FOR GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES.—In order to ensure that the United States Government is properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of law and human rights, building the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall establish a pilot program for Foreign Service officer positions focused on governance and anticorruption activities in such countries.

SEC. 255. REPORT ON MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLLED AND FUNDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a description of media organizations that are controlled and funded by the Government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 256. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS IN EUROPE AND EURASIA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on funds provided by, or amounts of which was directed by, the Government of the Russian Federation or any Russian person with the intention of influencing the outcome of any election or campaign in any country in Europe or Eurasia during the preceding year, including through direct support to any political party, candidate, lobbying campaign, non-governmental organization, or civic organization.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(c) RUSSIAN PERSON DEFINED.—In this section, the term "Russian person" means—

(1) an individual who is a citizen or national of the Russian Federation; or

(2) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian Federation or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation.

SEC. 257. UKRAINIAN ENERGY SECURITY.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereign and territorial integrity;

(2) to condemn and oppose all of the destabilizing efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in violation of its obligations and international commitments;

(3) never to recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of military force by the Government of the Russian Federation or from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus;

(4) to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus; and

(5) to assist in promoting reform in regulatory oversight and operations in Ukraine’s energy sector, including the empowerment of an independent regulatory organization;
(6) to encourage and support fair competition, market liberalization, and reliability in Ukraine’s energy sector;
(7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and partner countries reduce their dependence on Russian energy resources, especially natural gas, which the Government of the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to erode, intimidate, and influence other countries;
(8) to work with European Union member states and European Union institutions to promote energy security through developing diversified and liberalized energy markets that provide diversified sources, suppliers, and routes;
(9) to continue to oppose the Nord Stream 2 pipeline given its detrimental impacts on the European Union’s energy security, gas market dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine; and
(10) that the United States Government should prioritize the export of United States energy products to help Ukraine and United States allies and partners, and strengthen United States foreign policy.

(b) PLAN TO PROMOTE ENERGY SECURITY IN UKRAINE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the Secretary of Energy, shall work with the Government of Ukraine to develop a plan to increase energy security in Ukraine, with a focus on the amount of energy produced in Ukraine, and reduce Ukraine’s reliance on energy imports from the Russian Federation.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall include strategies for market liberalization, effective regulation and oversight, supply diversification, energy reliability, and energy efficiency, such as through support:

(A) the promotion of advanced technology and modern operating practices in Ukraine’s oil and gas sector;
(B) modern geophysical and meteorological survey work as needed followed by interagency tenders to help attract qualified investment into exploration and development of areas with untapped resources in Ukraine;
(C) a broadening of Ukraine’s electric power transmission interconnection with Europe;
(D) the strengthening of Ukraine’s capability to maintain electric power grid stability and reliability;
(E) independent regulatory oversight and operations of Ukraine’s gas market and electricity sector;
(F) the implementation of primary gas law including pricing, tariff structure, and legal regulatory implementation;
(G) privatization of government-owned energy companies through credible legal frameworks and a transparent process compliant with international best practices;
(H) procurement and transport of emergency natural gas, including reverse pipeline flows from Europe;
(I) provision of technical assistance for crisis planning, crisis response, and public outreach;
(J) repair of infrastructure to enable the transport of fuel supplies;
(K) repair of power generating or power transmission equipment or facilities; and
(L) improved building energy efficiency and other measures designed to reduce energy demand in Ukraine.

(b) IMPLEMENTATION OF UKRAINE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2014 PROVISIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the plan shall be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the status of implementing the provisions required under section (c) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926(c)), including detailing the plans required under that section, the amount of funding that has been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth under that section, and progress that has been made in implementing the strategies developed pursuant to section (b).

(B) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the plan developed under paragraph (1), the level of funding that has been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth in paragraph (2), and progress that has been made in implementing the strategies.

(C) BRIEFINGS.—The Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall brief the appropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days after the submission of each report under subparagraph (B). In addition, the Department of State shall make relevant officials available upon request to brief the appropriate congressional committees on all information that relates directly or indirectly to Ukraine or energy security in Eastern Europe.

(D) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(3) USE OF COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to provide technical advice to countries that, under this section, are receiving assistance.

(4) USE OF COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be provided under section 7 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926).

SEC. 258. TERMINATION.

The provisions of this subtitle shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 259. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

Except as otherwise provided, in this subtitle, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Subtitle C—Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing

PART I—NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORIST AND OTHER ILICIT FINANCING

SEC. 261. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President, acting through the Secretary, shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the appropriate Federal banking agencies and Federal functional regulators, develop a comprehensive national strategy for combating the financing of terrorism and related forms of illicit finance.

(b) TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive, research-based, long-range, enduring national strategy for combating the financing of terrorism and related forms of illicit finance.

(2) UPDATES.—Not later than January 31, 2020, and January 31, 2022, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees updated versions of the national strategy submitted under paragraph (1).

(c) SEPARATE PRESENTATION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.—Any part of the national strategy that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by the President shall be presented separately in a classified annex and, if requested by the chairman or ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees, as a briefing at an appropriate level of security.

SEC. 262. CONTENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

The strategy described in section 261 shall contain the following:

(1) EVALUATION OF EXISTING EFFORTS.—An assessment of the effectiveness of and ways in which the United States is currently addressing the highest priority illicit financing threat described in subsection (b)(1) of such section designed to enhance energy security and lessen dependence on energy from Russian Federation sources.

(2) GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND PRIORITIES.—A comprehensive, research-based, long-range, enduring national strategy for disrupting and preventing illicit finance activities within and

(3) USE OF COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to provide technical advice to countries that, under this section, are receiving assistance.

(4) USE OF COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to provide technical advice to countries that, under this section, are receiving assistance.

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(7) USE OF COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to provide technical advice to countries that, under this section, are receiving assistance.
transiting the financial system of the United States that outlines priorities to reduce the incidence, dollar value, and effects of illicit finance.

(3) THREATS.—An identification of the most significant illicit finance threats to the financial system of the United States.

(4) REVIEWS AND PROPOSED CHANGES.—Reviews, including Department of Treasury efforts, relevant regulations and relevant provisions of law and, if appropriate, discussions of proposed changes determined to be appropriate to ensure that the United States is maximizing and effective efforts at all levels of government, and with international partners of the United States, in the fight against illicit finance.

(5) DETECTION AND PROSECUTION INITIATIVES.—A description of efforts to improve, as necessary, detection and prosecution of illicit finance, including efforts to ensure that—

(A) subject to legal restrictions, all appropriate data collected by the Federal Government that is relevant to the efforts described in this section be available in a timely fashion to;

(i) all appropriate Federal departments and agencies; and

(ii) as appropriate and consistent with section 314 of the International Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act of 2001 (31 U.S.C. 5311 note), to financial institutions to assist the financial institutions in adequate compliance with laws aimed at curtailing illicit finance;

(B) appropriate efforts are undertaken to ensure that Federal departments and agencies charged with reducing and preventing illicit finance make thorough use of publicly available data in furtherance of this effort.

(6) THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN ILLEGITIMATE TRANSACTIONS.—A discussion of ways to enhance partnerships between the private financial sector and Federal departments and agencies with regard to the prevention and detection of illicit finance, including—

(A) efforts to facilitate compliance with laws aimed at stopping such illicit finance while maintaining the effectiveness of such efforts; and

(B) providing guidance to strengthen internal controls and to adopt on an industry-wide basis effective policies.

(7) ENHANCEMENT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION.—A discussion of ways to combat illicit finance.

(A) cooperative efforts between and among Federal, State, and local officials, including State regulators, State and local prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials; and

(B) cooperative efforts with and between governments of countries and with and between international institutions with expertise in fighting illicit finance, including the Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.

(8) TREND ANALYSIS OF EMERGING ILLEGITIMATE FINANCE THREATS.—A discussion of and data regarding trends in illicit finance, including evolving forms of value transfer, such as so-called cryptocurrencies, other methods that are computer, telecommunications, or Internet-based, cyber crime, or any other threats that the Secretary may choose to identify.

(9) BUDGET PRIORITIES.—A multiyear budget plan that identifies sufficient resources needed to successfully execute the full range of missions called for in this section.

(10) TECHNOLOGY ENHANCEMENTS.—An analysis of current and developing ways to leverage technology to improve the effectiveness of efforts to stop the financing of terrorism and other forms of illicit finance, including better integration of open-source data.

PART II—ENHANCING ANTI-TERRORISM TOOLS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

SEC. 271. IMPROVING ANTI-TERRORISM FINANCE MONITORING OF FUNDS TRANSFERS.

(a) STUDY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—To improve the ability of the Department of the Treasury to better track cross-border fund transfers and identify potential financing of terrorist or other forms of illicit finance, the Secretary shall conduct a study of—

(A) the potential efficacy of requiring banking regulators to establish a pilot program to provide technical assistance to depository institutions and credit unions that wish to provide account services to money services businesses serving individuals in Somalia; and

(B) whether such a pilot program could be a model for improving the ability of United States persons to make legitimate funds transfers through transparent and easily monitored channels while preserving strict compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (Public Law 91–508; 84 Stat. 1114) and related controls aimed at stopping money laundering and the financing of terrorism; and

(C) consistent with current legal requirements regarding confidential supervisory information, the potential impact of allowing depository institutions and credit unions to share certain State examination information with depository institutions and credit unions, or whether another appropriate mechanism could be identified to allow a similar exchange of information to give the depository institutions and credit unions a better understanding of whether an individual money services business is adequately meeting its anti-money laundering and counter-terror financing obligations to combat money laundering, the financing of terror, or related illicit finance.

(2) PUBLIC INPUT.—The Secretary should solicit and consider public input as appropriate in developing the study required under subsection (a).

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a report that contains—

(1) a list of the United States embassies in which full-time Department of the Treasury financial attaches is stationed and a description of how the interests of the Department of the Treasury relating to terrorist financing and other illicit finance are addressed (via regional attaches or otherwise) at United States embassies where no such attaches are present;

(2) a list of the United States embassies at which the Department of the Treasury has assigned a technical assistance advisor from the Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury;

(3) an overview of how Department of the Treasury financial attaches and technical assistance advisors assist in efforts to counter illicit finance, to include money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing; and

(4) an overview of patterns, trends, or other issues identified by the Department of the Treasury and whether resources are sufficient to address these issues.

SEC. 274. INCLUSION OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

(a) In general.—Section 101(c)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 301(c)(1)) is amended by inserting “the Secretary of the Treasury,” before “and such other officers.”

(b) Rule of Construction.—The amendment made by subsection (a) may not be construed to authorize the National Security Council to have a professional staff level that exceeds the limitation set forth under section 101(e)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 301(e)(3)).

SEC. 275. INCLUSION OF ALL FUNDS.

(a) In general.—Section 5326 of title 31, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the heading of such section, by striking “coin and currency”;

(2) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking “subtitle and” and inserting “subtitle or to”;

(B) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “United States coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)” and inserting “United States coin or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)”;

(2) in subsection (a)—

(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “United States coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)” and inserting “United States coin or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)”;

(3) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “United States coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)” and inserting “United States coin or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)”;

(b) CLEARIiON AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting in the item relating to “United States coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)” and inserting “United States coin or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)”.

PART III—DEFINITIONS

SEC. 281. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle—

(1) the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Armed Services, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
(2) the term “appropriate Federal banking agencies” has the meaning given in the term in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813);
(3) the term “Bank Secrecy Act” means—
(A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829);
(B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91–508 (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq.); and
(C) subchapter II of chapter 33 of title 31, United States Code;
(4) the term “Federal functional regulator” has the meaning given in that term in section 569 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809);
(5) the term “illicit finance” means the financing of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the President;
(6) the term “money services business” has the meaning given in the term in section 605 of the Bank Secrecy Act (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq.); and
(7) the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Treasury; and
(8) the term “territory” means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, and each territory or possession of the United States.

Subtitle D—Rule of Construction

SEC. 291. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title (other than sections 216 and 228(b)) shall be construed to limit the authority of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I just want to say to my colleague, the Democratic leader, that I think this is a good example of the Senate at its best. We all know this has been a period of rather partisan sparring back and forth on a variety of different things, but both sides were able to put that aside and deal with two important issues in a very significant way. I think the Senate did good for the Senate and good for the country, and I thank the Democratic leader for his comments.

COUNTERING IRAN’S DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES ACT OF 2017

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume consideration of S. 722.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in recess until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

Mr. MCAULIFFE. Mr. President, the Senate is in recess until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I announce a change in my previous objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. President, in my name and the names of my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume consideration of S. 722.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in recess until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume consideration of S. 722.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in recess until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. President, rumor has it that on Friday the President will announce a change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. There are lots of different rumors about what that might entail. I thought I would talk for just a couple of minutes about the consequences of such action, what has been accomplished in Cuba, what our goals are, and what it is that we think can be accomplished.

We have had a long policy of isolation with regard to Cuba. For more than 50 years, we tried to isolate the island and hoped the government would change somehow. It didn’t. For more than 50 years we have prohibited Americans from freely traveling to Cuba. We have had periods that the restrictions have gone down a bit and then up again, but by and large Americans have been prohibited, unless they fall into certain classes, to travel to and from Cuba. Then, when they are in Cuba, their travel around the island, the activities they undertake, are specifically prescribed by the U.S. Government.

I always thought that certainly there is a place for economic sanctions. Sometimes they can help nudge countries or push countries toward a desired outcome—but a travel ban? You only impose a travel ban under extreme circumstances, such as when national security is involved. And there hasn’t, for a long time, been national security reasons for a travel ban. I have always thought that as an American citizen that if somebody is going to limit my travel, it ought to be the government of another country that wouldn’t let me in, not my own government to tell me where I can and cannot travel. I think most Americans feel that way.

I think we ought to first consider whom these sanctions are on. The sanctions we have had for so many years have not really been on Cubans; they have been on Americans. Gratefully, the previous administration lessened these restrictions or lessened the impact around them. Around 2008 or 2009, the last administration said that Cuban Americans should be able to travel freely at least. Prior to that, we had instances where Cuban Americans would have to decide, if their parents, for example, were still in Cuba and were aging, maybe their mother was infirm—they had to decide if my mother passes away, do I attend her funeral or if my father passes away within 3 years—see, it used to be that Cuban Americans had to travel to the island just once every 3 years. They had to decide whether to attend their mother’s funeral or their father’s funeral. What a terrible thing for our government to tell American citizens, that they have to choose whether to attend their father’s funeral or their mother’s funeral. What kind of a country is that? Why would we do that? Yet we did for a number of years.

Gratefully, the last administration lifted restrictions on Cuban travel and at the same time lifted considerable restrictions on remittances, allowing money to flow more freely to relatives and others on the island. That coincided with the time the Cuban Government realized they couldn’t employ every Cuban, not even at $20 a month, so they said: Go ahead and find another line of work in the private sector, run a bed and breakfast, have a restaurant, have an auto repair facility or a beauty shop. Hundreds of thousands of Cubans have done so over the past 5 years, largely with seed capital provided by travel from Americans, particularly Cuban-American travel and remittances.

So there was a situation where virtually no Cuban was employed in the private sector 5 years ago, but today as much as 25 percent of the Cuban workforce is now in the private sector. They have obviously more economic freedom. The average waiter in a Cuban private restaurant brings in $40 to $50 a day, while the average Cuban working for the Cuban Government brings in $20 to $30. That’s a significantly more economic freedom for those in the private sector in Cuba but also significantly more personal freedom as well. That is a good thing. That stands with the policy and goal we always had to increase freedom for the Cuban people.

Now we hear that the administration may want to turn back some of that progress and say that Americans shouldn’t be able to travel as frequently or as frequently to Cuba. Some of the rumors say they will limit travel to once a year. We don’t know if that will be for Cuban Americans or all Americans. By the way, it seems rather strange to have a policy that is based, where we say: You are a Cuban American, you can travel, but if you are another type of American, you can’t. That just seems pretty un-American.

We can’t get back into a situation where a Cuban American living in the United States, will have to choose whether they can attend their mother or their father’s funeral. I hope we don’t get back into that time.

Another thing we ought to consider is that when Americans travel more freely, as they have been able to do under what is called a general license for individual travelers—that was one of the changes that was made in just the past couple of years—then individual American travelers tend to go to Cuba and stay in a bed and breakfast run by a private Cuban citizen, travel in private taxi cabs, frequent a private restaurant. My own family has done that.

If we go back to the time when American travelers have to travel under a specific license or as a group, then those travelers will be pushed toward the Cuban hotels which are owned by the Cuban Government. Therefore, you have aided the Cuban Government more than the Cuban people. Under no system will you be able to cut off money completely from the private sector, have an auto repair facility. That is how economies work. Why in the world do we have a policy where we directly benefit the Cuban Government