going to give money to people who be- head you and crucify you to create jobs. That should never be the way we make a decision about arms sales in our country.

A famous Republican and general, General Dwight Eisenhower, said, he worried that someday we would make decisions not based on our defense but based on the military industrial complex.

I am embarrassed that people are out here firing back, making us send money and making a buck, while 17 million people live on a starvation diet and are threatened with famine. I am embarrassed that people would bring up trying to feather the nest of corpor- ations in order to sell these weap- ons. This should be made, pure and simple, on our national defense.

Saudi Arabia is not a reliable ally. Saudi Arabia should not get these weapons. For every supposed good thing they do, they do five things that are bad for America. They are the big- gest purveyor of hatred of Christianity and Judaism.

I request a “no” vote, and I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PORTMAN). The Senator from Ten- nessee.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I re- spect my friend from Kentucky. We work together on the Foreign Rela- tions Committee. I could not disagree more on this issue, and I will give a brief outline.

The Houthis are an Iran-backed enti- ty that overthrew a Western-backed government in Yemen. Last year on the floor, with a vote of 71 votes, this body voted to support the selling of tanks to Saudi Arabia.

Foreign policy partisanship generally stops at the shores. I know Senator PAUL has been very consistent on this, but I am afraid this vote is somewhat about partisan behavior. Members wanting to get a piece of President Trump’s hide on an issue that is far more important than anything like that. I am fearful that this is what is happening today on the floor.

A lot of people don’t realize that Saudi Arabia already has the bombs. What we would be selling to them is the precision-guided weaponry systems that allow these bombs to be smart bombs and not dumb bombs.

Most people have been concerned about Saudi Arabia when they have been involved in pushing back the Houthis, who, by the way, are firing weapons into their country from the southern border. It would be no dif- ferent than if Mexico were wanting that to ours. I know that is not going to happen. But, obviously, we would be firing back. So what is happening here is that they bought the bombs from Italy, and what they want to buy from us is the precision systems that allow them to not kill civilians. It is to protect civilians.

Think about this. Here in the Senate we want to protect civilians in Saudi Arabia, and in our wisdom we are look- ing at blocking the sale of the very mechanisms that would allow that to happen—in some cases, I am afraid, just to make a point against the Trump administration.

Actually, their policies here have been sound. The meeting they held in Saudi Arabia was very beneficial.

Saudi Arabia has flaws, but they have been an ally. This would show us as stepping away from an ally in a way that is cutting our nose off to spite our face by not allowing them to have the precision mechanisms to keep them from killing civilians.

We have taken Senators down in the SCIP. There is absolutely no evidence that Saudi Arabia tried to kill civil- ians—none. As a matter of fact, there is evidence to the contrary. So, please, let’s be rational. I know there are dis- agreements over some foreign policy issues. This should not be one of them. I urge defeat of this proposal.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Kentucky.

Mr. PAUL. Mr. President, Saudi Ar- abia bombed a funeral procession. There was no mistake here. There was no cloud cover. There was no growth or coppice of trees and they accidentally bombed a funeral procession. They bombed them and killed 122 civilians in a funeral. They wounded 500. This was no mistake. This was no error. This was them, pointlessly dropping bombs on civilians.

They put protestors in jail. They have a 17-year-old—he is now 20—who has been in jail for 3 years. He will be beheaded and then crucified. We should not be giving these people weapons. They supported ISIS. They are on the wrong side of the war. They are the greatest purveyor of hatred for Chris- tianity and Judaism. They do not de- serve your weapons. They are going to give your weapons. They belong to the American people. They are going to give them to people who behead and crucify protestors.

You can’t take a Bible into Saudi Arabia. You can’t visit their major cit- ies.

We can’t make them be like us, but we don’t have to encourage their be- havior by giving them weapons that may well fall into the hands of people who are our enemies.

I urge a “no” vote. I think we should not be selling arms to Saudi Arabia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.

The question is on agreeing to the motion to discharge Mr. WHITEHOUSE. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient sec- ond.

The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 47, nays 53, as follows:

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The motion was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The major- ity leader.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the McConnell second-degree amendment No. 233 be withdrawn; that the pending cluture motion with respect to amend- ment No. 232 be withdrawn; that the amendment be modified with the tech- nical changes at the desk; and that at 2 p.m., Wednesday, June 14, the Senate vote on adoption of the McConnell for Crapo amendment No. 232, as modified, with no intervening action or debate and no second-degree amendments in order to amendment No. 232 prior to the vote; finally, that following leader remarks on Wednesday, June 14, the time until 2 p.m. be equally divided in the usual form.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I will not object, but I reserve the right to object.

First, I want to thank the majority leader, as well as Senators CORKER, CARDIN, CRAPO, and BROWN. This is an- other example of how we can work to- gether on issues we agree on. I am very proud of this bill. I think it will do a lot of good in both directions—in the Iran direction and particularly in the Russia direction. The lack of trust of Mr. Putin on both sides of the aisle here is paramount. Now this says that these sanctions will stay in place un- less Congress disapproves them and adds some new sanctions—both good things. I hope the House will pass the bill without change and send it to the President’s desk.
With that, I withdraw any objection and again thank the majority leader for the cooperation we have had.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment (No. 232), as modified, is as follows:

On page 33, line 18, strike ‘‘subsection (a)’’ and insert ‘‘subsection (b)’’.

On page 33, line 15, strike ‘‘subsection (a)’’ and insert ‘‘subsection (b)’’.

On page 37, line 18, strike ‘‘The President’’ and insert ‘‘Except as provided in subsection (b), the President’’.

On page 47, line 22, insert ‘‘other than subsection (b)’’ after ‘‘this Act’’.

At the end, add the following:

**TITLE IV—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILILIC FINANCING**

**SEC. 211. FINDINGS.**

This title may be cited as the “Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017.”

**Subtitle A—Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian Federation**

**SEC. 211. FINDINGS.**

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13662 (Fed. Reg. 13693; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on those determined to be undermining democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine through threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. President Obama subsequently issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) and Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) to expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine.

(2) December 18, 2014, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 was enacted (Public Law 113–272; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), which includes provisions directing the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons that the President determines to be entities owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation or nationals of the Russian Federation, to engage in activities that describe the proposed action and the reasons for that action.

(3) On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13664 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on persons determined to be engaged in malicious cyber-hacking.

(4) On July 26, 2016, President Obama approved a Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident Coordination, which states, “certain cyber incidents that have significant impacts on an entity, our national security, or the broader economy require a unique approach to response efforts’’.

(5) On December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an annex to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on the following entities under paragraph (a):

(A) The Main Intelligence Directorate also known as Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie or the GRU in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(B) The Federal Security Service (also known as Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB in Moscow, Russian Federation).

(C) The Special Technology Center (also known as STLC, Ltd. Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation.

(D) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(E) The autonomous noncommercial organization known as the Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(F) Igor Valerievich Korobov.

(G) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizinov.

(H) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov.

(I) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev.

(6) On January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United States intelligence community entitled, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections” stated, “Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential election.” The assessment warns that “Moscow will apply lessons learned from the Putin-ordered campaign against the United States and their election processes”.

**SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

It is the sense of Congress that the President—

(I) should engage to the fullest extent possible with partner governments with regard to closing loopholes, including the allowance of extended prepayment for the delivery of goods and services and other loopholes, in multilateral and unilateral restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, with the aim of maximizing alignment of those measures.

(2) should increase efforts to vigorously enforce compliance with sanctions in place as of the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to the Russian Federation in response to the crisis in eastern Ukraine, cyber intrusions and attacks, and human rights violations in Russian violators.

**PART I—CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

**SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

The amendment (No. 232), as modified, is as follows:

(A) In general.—An action described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of why the action is not intended to achieve a reciprocal diplomatic outcome.

(B) In the case of a report that relates to an action described in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the appropriate committees a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that action.

**SEC. 213. REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

**SEC. 213. REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

**PART I—CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

**SEC. 213. REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

(a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.—

(1) In general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that action.

(2) Actions described.—

(A) In general.—An action described in this paragraph is—

(i) an action to terminate the application of sanctions described in subparagraph (B); and

(ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an action to waive the application of those sanctions with respect to that person; or

(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United States’ foreign policy with regard to the person.

(B) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The actions described in this subparagraph are—

(i) sanctions provided for under—

(A) this title or any provision of law amended by this title, including the Executive Orders codified under section 222; or

(B) the Support for the Security of Freedom’s Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.); or

(ii) the prohibition on access to the properties of the Government of the Russian Federation located in Maryland and New York under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including any
additional period for such review as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with the proposed action is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).

(4) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the joint resolution of disapproval.

(5) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action for a period of 12 calendar days after the date of the joint resolution of disapproval.

(6) EFFECT OF ENACTMENT OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action.

(c) JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR APPROVAL DEFINED.—In this subsection:

(1) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.—The term ‘‘joint resolution of approval’’ means any joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(A) the title of which is as follows: ‘‘A joint resolution approving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation.’’; and

(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: ‘‘Congress approves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation.’’; and

(2) JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—The term ‘‘joint resolution of disapproval’’ means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(A) the title of which is as follows: ‘‘A joint resolution disapproving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation.’’; and

(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: ‘‘Congress disapproves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on [ ]’’—

with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.

(3) INTRODUCTION.—During the period of 30 calendar days for under subsection (b)(1), including any additional period as applicable under the exception provided in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced—

(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader and his or her majority leader designee; and

(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader’s designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader’s designee).

(4) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

(A) REPORTS AND DISCHARGE.—If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House, the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of that House.

(B) RECONSIDERATION.—Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or has been discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution, it shall be in order to move to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution in the Senate that was taken within 10 calendar days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.

(C) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—Beginning on the second legislative day after each committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or has been discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution, it shall be in order to move to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution in the Senate that was taken within 10 calendar days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.

(5) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.—

(A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—A joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be considered as read. All points of order against the joint resolution and amendments thereto shall be in order. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to sustain a vote by which the joint resolution is considered to be out of order shall not be in order.

(B) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on [ ]—

(i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs if the joint resolution relates to foreign relations; or

(ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations if the joint resolution relates to a report under section 216A3 that is described as an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to the Russian Federation; and

(C) TREATMENT OF JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—If, following passage of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, that joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate calendar.

(D) APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEASURES.—The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.

(7) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.—This subsection is enacted by Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each House, but applicable only with respect to the procedures to be followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND LEADERSHIP DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees and leadership’’ means—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

PART I—APPLICATION OF NEW CYBER SANCTIONS

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

In this part:

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) GOOD.—The term ‘‘good’’ has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1934 (50 U.S.C. 6161) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(3) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘international financial institution’’ has the meaning given that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 265c(c)).

(4) KNOWNLY.—The term ‘‘knowingly,’’ with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(5) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means an individual or entity.

(6) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United States person’’ means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of a United States person.

SEC. 222. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) CODIFIED.—The United States sanctions provided for in Executive Order 13669 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13665 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13692 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13658 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to blocking property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), and Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to blocking additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) are hereby codified and shall be referred to as the ‘‘sanctions described in subsection (a) that are imposed on a person in connection with activity conducted by the person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

(1) the person knowingly engaged in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions described in subsection (a) in the future.

(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive Order 13694 or 13757 only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

(c) APPLICATION OF NEW CYBER SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive Order 13694 or 13665 only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to improve the enforcement of this title.

(d) MODIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE.—The President may modify Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive, so as to—

(1) allow entities to engage in financial services, or technology in support for, or goods or services (except financial services) in support of, an activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and

(2) in which a Russian energy firm is involved; and

(3) that involve any person determined to be subject to the directive or the property or interests in property of such a person.

SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

(1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly engages in significant activities undermining cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution, or government on behalf of the Russian Federation;

(A) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution, or government on behalf of the Russian Federation; and

(B) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person described in paragraph (1)(A); and

(2) impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services (except financial services) in support of, an activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and

(3) impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section 4(c) of the of the Ukraine Reform and Support Act (12 U.S.C. 8923(c)) with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly provides financial services in support of an activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.,) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to the restrictions and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND REVOCATION OF VISAS OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION.—In the case of an alien determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1), denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1221(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.

(c) APPLICATION OF NEW CYBER SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person only if the President...
submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

SEC. 227. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS SUBJECT TO SUBSIDIZE CRIMEAN PENALTY.

Section 206 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so, sanctions that—

(a) in General.—The President shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so, sanctions that—
(B) any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of a person subject to subsection (a) in the future.

SEC. 228. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

Section 206 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so, sanctions that—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) at any time after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, and
(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or aids or abets in the violation of any assertion described in subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of this section.

(4) Application of New Sanctions.—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—
(A) a written determination that the waiver—
(1) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or
(2) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
(3) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so, sanctions that—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so, sanctions that—
(B) any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of a person subject to subsection (a) in the future.

SEC. 229. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

Section 206 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so, sanctions that—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may impose sanctions under subsection (b) at any time after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, and
(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or aids or abets in the violation of any assertion described in subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of this section.

(4) Application of New Sanctions.—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—
(A) a written determination that the waiver—
(1) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or
(2) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
(3) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.
certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).

"(F) Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).

"(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term 'foreign person' has the meaning given such term in section 31 of Title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017).

"(3) The term 'structured', with respect to a transaction, has the meaning given the term 'structure' in paragraph (xx) of section 1060.100 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.

"SEC. 11. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIVITIES OF A UNITED STATES PERSON.

"(a) In General.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that the foreign person, based on credible information, on or after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, (1) is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation; (2) materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support, or direct or indirect services to, a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or (3) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).

"(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

"(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).

"(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out subsection (b)(1) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

"(c) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

"(1) a notice and justification for the termination; and

"(2) a notice—

"(A) that—

"(i) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

"(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future; or

"(B) that the President determines that insufficient basis exists for the determination by the President under subsection (a) with respect to the person.

"(d) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Section 2(2) of the Supplemental, War, and Security Appropriations Act, 2015, is amended by striking ''section 4(i)'' and inserting ''section 4(h)''.

"SEC. 229. NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS UNDER THE RUSSIA SANCTIONS REVIEW ACT OF 2017.

"(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO UNDERMINING THE PEACE, SECURITY, STABILITY, SOVEREIGNTY, OR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF UKRAINE.—Section 8 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8007) is amended—

"(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

"(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

""(e) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees notice that—

""(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

""(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.

"(b) SANCTIONS RELATING TO RUSSIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8602) is amended—

"(1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and

"(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:

""(e) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (d) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees notice that—

""(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

""(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.

"(c) APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

"(1) a written determination that the waiver—

"(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

"(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and

"(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made efforts to reduce serious human rights abuses in territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by that Government.

"(d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 285 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).

"(1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively;

"(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:

""(e) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees notice that—

""(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

""(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the foreign person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.

"(2) in paragraph (B)(ii) of subsection (a)(3), by striking ""section (h)"" and inserting ""section (i)"".

"(3) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by striking ""section 4(h)"" and inserting ""section 4(i)"".
transaction with a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, including the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation;

(b) APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PIPELINES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section 232 if the President determines that a person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment described in subsection (b) or sells, leases, or provides services, technology, information, or support to the Russian Federation, for the construction of Russian energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology, information, or support described in subsection (c)—

(1) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or

(2) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more.

(b) INVESTMENT DESCRIBED.—An investment described in this subsection is an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines.

(c) GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.—Goods, services, technology, information, or support described in subsection (b) are or come within the possession or control of a person that—

(1) makes an investment of $10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not less than $1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds any such amount within any 12-month period), or facilitates such an investment, if the President determines that foreign person has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria significant financial, material, or technological support that contributes materially to the ability of the Government of Syria to—

(A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies;

(B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile capabilities;

(C) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons;

(D) acquire significant defense articles, defense services, or defense information (as such terms are defined in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or

(E) acquire items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

(2) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or

(B) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be imposed are the sanctions described in subsection (b) which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any sanctions that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

SEC. 234. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSITION TO A LONG-Term SOLUTION AND RELATED MATERIAL TO SYRIA

(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose on a foreign person the sanctions described in subsection (b) if the President determines that such foreign person has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria significant financial, material, or technological support that contributes materially to the ability of the Government of Syria to—

(A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies;

(B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile capabilities;

(C) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons;

(D) acquire significant defense articles, defense services, or defense information (as such terms are defined in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or

(E) acquire items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

(2) APPLICABILITY TO OTHER FOREIGN PERSONS.—The sanctions described in subsection (b) shall also be imposed on any foreign person that—

(A) is a successor entity to a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or

(B) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be imposed are the sanctions described in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President shall exert all powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, come within the possession or control of a United States person, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) ALIEN'S INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES.—If the foreign person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, the foreign person.

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—In general: An issuing consular officer, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa or other entry document issued to the foreign person regardless of when issued.

(ii) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the foreign person.

(c) WAIVER.—Subject to section 216, the President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) FINANCIAL, MATERIAL, OR TECHNOLOGICAL SUPPORT.—The term ‘‘financial, material, or technological support’’ has the meaning given such term in section 542.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign person’’ has the meaning given such term in section 594.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

(3) SYRIA.—The term ‘‘Syria’’ has the meaning given such term in section 542.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

SEC. 235. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED

(a) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be imposed are—

(1) a suspension of economic relations with the person;

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation not to give approval to the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in the extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to the sanctioned person.

(3) SANCTION AGAINST EXPORT.—The President may order the United States Government not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the sanctioned person unless—


(B) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1944 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); or

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services.

(5) LOANS FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The President may prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than $1,000,000 in any 12-month period unless the person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such activities.

(6) LOANS FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The President may direct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to use the vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the international financial institution that would benefit the sanctioned person.

(7) PROHIBITIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The following prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if that person is a financial institution:

(i) In general: No financial institution may serve as a repository of government funds.

(ii) Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may serve as the primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments.

(iii) The term ‘‘service as a repository of government funds’’ means that the financial institution may not serve as the agent of the
United States Government may or serve as repository for United States Government funds. The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b), and the imposition of both such sanctions shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b).

(6) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest.

(7) FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest.

(8) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest.

(9) PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest.

(10) BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest.

(11) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.—The President may direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, a sanctioned person.

(12) SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.—The President may impose on the principal executive officer or officers of the sanctioned person, or on persons performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this subsection.

SEC. 236. EXCLUSIONS, WAIVER, AND TERMINATION.

(a) EXCEPTIONS.—The provisions of this part and amendments made by this part shall not apply with respect to the following:

(1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.), or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.


(b) EXCLUSION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—No requirement to impose sanctions under this part or an amendment made by this part shall include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(c) WAIVER OF SANCTIONS THAT ARE IMPOSED.—Subject to section 216, if the President imposes sanctions with respect to a person under paragraph (A) or (B) as a result of an action not authorized by this part, the President shall waive the application of such sanctions if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(d) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under section 224, 231, 232, 233, or 234 with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the following:

(1) A notice of and justification for the termination; and

(2) A notice that:

(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under this part in the future.

SEC. 237. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this part or the amendments made by this part shall be construed—

(1) to supersede the limitations or exceptions on the use of rocket engines for national security purposes under section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 620 et seq.), amended by section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1100) and section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2382); or

(2) to prohibit a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Defense from acquiring components referred to in such section 1608.

PART III—REPORTS

SEC. 241. REPORT ON OLIGARCHS AND PARASTATAL ENTITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing in detail the potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property and interests of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), or any successor directive to include sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 242. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS TO INCLUDE SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DERIVATIVES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing in detail the potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), or any successor directive to include sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
(a) In general.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than the end of each year thereafter until 2021, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing interagency efforts in the United States to combat illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall contain a summary of efforts by the United States to do the following:

(1) Identify, investigate, map, and disrupt illicit financial flows linked to the Russian Federation, including by imposing sanctions on financial institutions, to prevent illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1) from being used to violate the law.

(2) Conduct outreach to the private sector, including information sharing efforts to strengthen compliance efforts by entities, including financial institutions, to prevent illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1) from being used to support the activities of the Russian Federation.

(3) Engage and coordinate with allied international partners on illicit finance, especially in Europe, to coordinate efforts to uncover and disclose networks that are responsible for illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1), including examples of that engagement and coordination.

(4) Report on sanctions evaders and loopholes within the sanctions regimes of foreign partners of the United States.

(5) Expand the number of real estate geographic typing orders or other regulatory actions, as appropriate, to deride illicit financial activity relating to the Russian Federation in relation to the financial system of the United States.

(6) Provide support to counter those involved in illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation across all appropriate law enforcement, intelligence, regulatory, and financial authorities of the Federal Government, including by imposing sanctions with respect to or prosecuting those involved.

(7) In the case of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Justice, investigate or otherwise develop major cases, including a description of those cases.

(c) Form.—Each report submitted under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(d) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) Illicit finance.—The term ‘illicit finance’ means the financing of terrorism, narcotics trafficking or other major drug-related offenses, money laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the President.

Subtitle B—Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

SEC. 251. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of the Russian Federation has sought influence throughout Europe and Eurasia, including in the former states of the Soviet Union, by promoting political parties, think tanks, and civil society groups that sow distrust in democratic institutions and actors, promote xenophobic and illiberal views, and otherwise undermine unity. The Government of the Russian Federation has also engaged in well-documented corruption practices as a means to undermine and buying influence in European and Eurasian states, including by imposing sanctions with respect to or prosecuting those involved.

(2) The Government of the Russian Federation has largely eliminated a once-vibrant Russian-language media organization that are funded and controlled by the Russian Federation and disseminate information within and outside of the United States. The Government of the Russian Federation is failing to comply with the terms of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement relating to Georgia, which requires the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops, free access by humanitarian entities to identify humanitarian needs in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and monitoring of the conflict areas by the European Union Monitoring Mission.

(3) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to violate its commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the ‘Helsinki Final Act’), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of Security and Co-operation in Europe, of which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.

(4) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to engage in aggression in connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the ‘Helsinki Final Act’), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of Security and Co-operation in Europe, of which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.

(5) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to engage in aggression in connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the ‘Helsinki Final Act’), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of Security and Co-operation in Europe, of which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.

(6) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to engage in aggression in connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the ‘Helsinki Final Act’), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of Security and Co-operation in Europe, of which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.

(7) The United States supports the institutionalization of counter-Russian efforts; and

(8) The United States supports the institutionalization of counter-Russian efforts; and

(9) The United States supports the institutionalization of counter-Russian efforts; and

(10) The President of the United States should use the authority of the President to impose sanctions against individuals or organizations that—

(A) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(B) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(C) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(D) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(E) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(F) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(G) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(H) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(I) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(J) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(11) The United States should impose sanctions against individuals or organizations that—

(A) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(B) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(C) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(D) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(E) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(F) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(G) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(H) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(I) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(J) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(K) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(L) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(M) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(N) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(O) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(P) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

(Q) are considered by the Secretary of State to be foreign officials.

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SEC. 253. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

The United States, consistent with the principle of non recognition of the territorial changes caused by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Transnistria.

SEC. 254. COORDINATING AID AND ASSISTANCE ACROSS EUROPE AND EURASIA.

(a) Authority of Appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund $250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

(b) Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund shall be used to effectively implement, prioritized in the following order and subject to the availability of funds:

(1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following countries:

(A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of State determines:

(i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation; and

(ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of the United States.

(B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.

(2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

(4) To improve participatory legislative processes and legal education, political transparency and competition, and compliance with international obligations in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and independent nongovernmental organizations countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthfully informed citizens freely in all regions of the Russian Federation and in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the functions specified in section 1297(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) for the purposes of recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering Russian influence and disinformation efforts by foreign governments, in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State.

(c) Revision of Activities for Which Amounts May Be Used.—The Secretary of State shall, as part of the annual report on Russian Federation interference in the 2018 presidential election, identify, and identify with respect to each program or activity described in subparagraph (a) and (b) of section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and Her Europeanneighbors from further destabilizing and invasiveness by the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

SEC. 255. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.

The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the United States Government is properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of law, and building the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a description of media organizations that are controlled and funded by the government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

(c) Ensuring Adequate Staffing for Government Activities.—In order to ensure that the United States Government is properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of law, and building the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a description of media organizations that are controlled and funded by the government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

SEC. 256. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS IN EUROPE AND EURASIA.

(a) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a description of media organizations that are controlled and funded by the government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

(b) Form of Report.—Each report required by subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(c) Russian Person Defined.—In this section, the term “Russian person” means—

(i) an individual who is a citizen or national of the Russian Federation;

(ii) an entity organized under the laws of a country whose government is controlled and funded by the Government of the Russian Federation or any Russian person with the intention of influencing the outcome of any election or campaign in any country in Europe or Eurasia during the preceding year, including through direct support to any political party, candidate, lobbying campaign, nongovernmental organization, or civic organization;

SEC. 257. UKRAINIAN ENERGY SECURITY.

(a) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) support the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereign and territorial integrity;

(2) condemn and oppose all of the destabilizing efforts by the Russian Federation in Ukraine in violation of its obligations and international commitments;

(3) never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of any portion of Ukraine under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation.

(b) Authorization of Appropriations.—The Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the appropriate congressional committees, request through the President to appropriate congressional committees the following goals:

(1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following countries:

(A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of State determines:

(i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation; and

(ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of the United States.

(B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.

(2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

(4) To improve participatory legislative processes and legal education, political transparency and competition, and compliance with international obligations in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and independent nongovernmental organizations countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthfully informed citizens freely in all regions of the Russian Federation and in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the functions specified in section 1297(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) for the purposes of recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering Russian influence and disinformation efforts by foreign governments, in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State.

(7) To consider the reports submitted under subsection (a) of this section.

(8) To revise the list of programs and activities set forth in subsection (b) of section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and Her Europeanneighbors from further destabilizing and invasiveness by the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

(c) Implementing the Act.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a description of media organizations that are controlled and funded by the government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

(d) Ensuring Adequate Staffing for Government Activities.—In order to ensure that the United States Government is properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of law, and building the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a description of media organizations that are controlled and funded by the government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

(e) Assistance to Civil Society.—The President shall, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, establish a pilot program for Foreign Service officers focused on governance and anticorruption activities in such countries.
(6) to encourage and support fair competition, market liberalization, and reliability in Ukraine’s energy sector;
(7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and partners in Europe reduce their dependence on Russian energy resources, especially natural gas, which the Government of the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to intimidate, intimidate, and influence other countries;
(8) to work with European Union member states and European Union institutions to promote energy security by developing diversified and liberalized energy markets that provide diversified sources, suppliers, and routes;
(9) to continue to oppose the NordStream 2 pipeline given its detrimental impacts on the European Union’s energy security, gas market development in Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine; and
(10) that the United States Government should prioritize the export of United States energy and technology to help Ukraine modernize and diversify its energy system, improve energy security, and foster economic growth.

SEC. 261. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

PART I—NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORIST AND OTHER ILlicit FINANCING

SEC. 261. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President, acting through the Secretary, shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the appropriate Federal banking agencies and Federal functional regulators, develop a comprehensive national strategy for combating the financing of terrorism and related forms of illicit finance.

(b) TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive national strategy developed in accordance with subsection (a).

(c) SEPARATE PRESENTATION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.—Any part of the national strategy that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by law shall be submitted separately in a classified annex and, if requested by the chairman or ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees, as a briefing at an appropriate level of security.

SEC. 262. CONTENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

The strategy described in section 261 shall contain the following:

(1) EVALUATION OF EXISTING EFFORTS.—An assessment of the effectiveness of and ways in which the United States is currently addressing the highest priority laudable forms of illicit finance, including those identified in the documents entitled “2015 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment” and “2015 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment”, published by the Department of the Treasury and a description of how the strategy is integrated into, and supports, the interagency counter-terrorism strategy of the United States.

(2) GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND PRIORITIES.—A comprehensive, research-based, long-range, and multiyear plan to address goals, objectives, and priorities for disrupting and preventing illicit finance activity within and
transiting the financial system of the United States that outlines priorities to reduce the incidence, dollar value, and effects of illicit finance.

(3) THREATS.—An identification of the most significant illicit finance threats to the financial system of the United States.

(4) REVIEWS AND PROPOSED CHANGES.—Reviews of federal Department of the Treasury coordinated and effective efforts at all levels of government, and with international partners of the United States, in the fight against illicit finance.

(5) DETECTION AND PROSECUTION INITIATIVES.—A description of efforts to improve, as necessary, detection and prosecution of illicit finance, including efforts to ensure that—

(a) subject to legal restrictions, all appropriate data collected by the Federal Government that is relevant to the efforts described in this section be available in a timely fashion to—

(ii) all appropriate Federal departments and agencies; and

(iii) as appropriate and consistent with section 314 of the International Money Laundering Abatement and Finance Terrorism Act of 2001 (31 U.S.C. 5311 note), to financial institutions to assist the financial institutions in conducting compliance activities with laws aimed at curtailing illicit finance.

(B) approprate efforts are undertaken to ensure that Federal departments and agencies charged with reducing and preventing illicit finance make thorough use of publicly available data in furtherance of this effort.

(6) THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN ILlicit FINANCE.—A discussion of ways to enhance partnerships between the private financial sector and Federal departments and agencies with regard to the prevention and detection of illicit finance, including—

(A) efforts to facilitate compliance with laws aimed at stopping such illicit finance while maintaining the effectiveness of such efforts; and

(B) providing guidance to strengthen internal controls and to adopt an industry-wide basis for effective policies.

(7) ENHANCEMENT OF INTEGROVERNMENTAL COOPERATION.—A discussion of ways to combat illegal financial practices—

(A) cooperative efforts between and among Federal, State, and local officials, including State regulators, State and local prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials; and

(B) cooperative efforts with and between governments of countries with and with intergovernmental institutions with expertise in fighting illicit finance, including the Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.

(8) TREND ANALYSIS OF EMERGING ILlicit FINANCE THREATS.—A discussion of and data regarding trends in illicit finance, including evolving forms of value transfer such as so-called cryptocurrencies, other methods that are computer, telecommunications, or Internet-based, cyber crime, or any other threats that the Secretary may choose to identify.

(9) BUDGET PRIORITIES.—A multiyear budget plan that identifies sufficient resources needed to successfully execute the full range of mission goals for this section.

(10) TECHNOLOGY ENHANCEMENTS.—An analysis of current and developing ways to leverage technology to improve the effectiveness of efforts to combat illicit finance, including and other forms of illicit finance, including better integration of open-source data.
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;  
(2) the term “appropriate Federal banking agencies” has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813);  
(3) the term “Bank Secrecy Act” means—  
(A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1821);  
(B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91–606 (12 U.S.C. 1651 et seq.); and  
(C) subchapter II of chapter 33 of title 31, United States Code;  
(4) the term “Federal functional regulator” has the meaning given that term in section 560 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6802);  
(5) the term “illicit finance” means the financing of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money laundering, or other forms of illicit financing nationally or internationally, as defined by the President;  
(6) the term “money services business” has the meaning given the term under section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations;  
(7) the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Treasury; and  
(8) the term “State” means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, and each territory or possession of the United States.

Subtitle D—Rule of Construction

SEC. 291. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title (other than sections 216 and 236(b)) shall be construed to limit the authority of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I just want to say to my colleague, the Democratic leader for his comments. I think it is good for the Senate and important for us to move forward.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is now in order.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume consideration of S. 722.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report the bill.

The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 722) to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran’s ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes.

Pending:  
McConnell (for Crapo) amendment No. 232, as modified, to impose sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation and to combat terrorism and illicit financing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona?

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. President, rumor has it that on Friday the President will announce a change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. There are lots of different rumors about what that might entail. I thought I would talk for just a couple of minutes about the consequences of such action, what has been accomplished in Cuba, what our goals are, and what the long-term impact might be.

We have had a long policy of isolation with regard to Cuba. For more than 50 years, we tried to isolate the island and hope the government would change somehow. It didn’t. For more than 50 years we have prohibited Americans from freely traveling to Cuba. We have had periods that the restrictions have gone down a bit and then up again, but by and large Americans have been prohibited, unless they fall into certain classes, to travel to Cuba. Then, when they are in Cuba, their travel around the island, the activities they undertake, are specifically prescribed by the U.S. Government.

I always thought that certainly there is a place for economic sanctions. Sometimes they can help nudge countries or push countries toward a desired outcome—but a travel ban? You only impose a travel ban under extreme circumstances, such as when national security and national security interests dictate, and there hasn’t, for a long time, been national security reasons for a travel ban. I have always thought that as an American citizen, that as an American citizen, that is what America should be doing. That is why we have had for so many years and not really been on Cubans; they have been on Americans. Gratefully, the previous administration lessened these restrictions or lessened the impact around them. Around 2008 or 2009, the last administration said that Cuban Americans should be able to travel freely at least. Prior to that, we had instances where Cuban Americans would have to decide, if their parents, for example, were still in Cuba and were aging, maybe their mother was infirm—they had to decide if my mother passes away, do I attend her funeral or if my father passes away within 3 years—see, it was used to be that Cuban Americans couldn’t travel to the island just once every 3 years. They had to decide whether to attend their mother’s funeral or their father’s funeral. What a terrible thing for our government to tell American citizens, that they have to choose between attending their family’s funeral or their father’s funeral. What kind of a country is that? Why would we do that? Yet we did for a number of years.

Gratefully, the last administration lifted restrictions on American travel and at the same time lifted considerable restrictions on remittances, allowing money to flow more freely to relatives and others on the island. That coincided with the time the Cuban Government realized they couldn’t employ every Cuban, not even at $20 a month, so they said: Go ahead and find another line of work in the private sector, run a bed and breakfast, have a restaurant, run a repair facility or a beauty shop. Hundreds of thousands of Cubans have done so over the past 5 years, largely with seed capital provided by travel from Americans, particularly Cuban-American travel and remittances.

So there was a situation where virtually no Cuban was employed in the private sector 5 years ago, but today as much as 25 percent of the Cuban workforce is now in the private sector. They have obviously more economic freedom. The average waiter in a Cuban private restaurant brings in $40 to $50 a day, while the average Cuban working for the Cuban Government brings in $20 to $30 a day. That is a significant more economic freedom for those in the private sector in Cuba but also significantly more personal freedom as well. That is a good thing. That stands with the policy and goal we always had to increase freedom for the Cuban people.

Now we hear that the administration may want to turn back some of that progress and say that Americans shouldn’t be able to travel as frequently or as frequently to Cuba. Some of the rumors say they will limit travel to once a year. We don’t know if that will be for Cuban Americans or all Americans. By the way, it seems rather strange to have a policy that is a policy that is a policy against Cuba, by the way, it seems rather strange to have a policy that is a policy that is a policy against Cuba. Some of the rumors say you are a Cuban American, you can travel, but if you are another type of American, you can’t. That just seems pretty un-American. We can’t get back into a situation where we say: You are a Cuban American, you can travel, but if you are another type of American, you can’t. That just seems pretty un-American.

We can’t get back into a situation where we say: You are a Cuban American, you can travel, but if you are another type of American, you can’t. That just seems pretty un-American.

The other thing we have to consider is that when Americans travel more freely, as they have been able to do under what is called a general license for individual travelers—that was one of the changes that was made in just the past couple of years—then individual American travelers tend to go to Cuba and stay in a bed and breakfast run by a private Cuban citizen, travel in private taxi cabs, frequent a private restaurant. My own family has done that.

If we go back to the time when American travelers have to travel under a specific license or as a group, then those travelers will be pushed toward the Cuban hotels which are owned by the Cuban Government. Therefore, you have aided the Cuban Government more than the Cuban people. Under no system will you be able to cut off money completely from the Cuban Government or the private sector. There is leakage everywhere. That is how economies work. Why in the world do we have a policy where we directly benefit the Cuban Government?