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Senate

The Senate met at 9:30 a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore (Mr. HATCH).

PRAYER

The Chaplain, Dr. Barry C. Black, offered the following prayer:

Let us pray.

Holy God, in whose presence dark nights of challenges are dispelled by the dawn of Your love, You know our needs before we express them. Thank You for daily providing our lawmakers with guidance and strength.

Lord, we pause to thank You for the courage and sacrificial service of our Capitol Police. Forgive us when we take their daily courageous service for granted. Lord, forgive us, also, when we seem to forget that words matter and can become seeds that will bring a bitter harvest.

Bring speedy healing to all those injured in yesterday's shooting and solace for all of us affected by this tragedy.

Today, use our Senators as instruments of Your peace, bringing unity from division, light from darkness, joy from sadness, and hope from despair.

We pray in Your sacred Name. Amen.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The President pro tempore led the Pledge of Allegiance, as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HELLER). Under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

COUNTERING IRAN'S DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES ACT OF 2017

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will resume consideration of S. 722, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 722) to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other purposes.

Pending:

Corker (for Graham) amendment No. 240, to reaffirm the strategic importance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its contribution to maintaining stability throughout the world.

Gardner modified amendment No. 250, to provide an exception for activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time until 11 a.m. will be equally divided between the two leaders or their designees.

RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

PRAYERS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BASEBALL PRACTICE SHOOTING

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, this morning, the Senate continues to send its prayers to all the victims of yesterday's horrific shooting. We know our House colleagues are all thinking about their colleague, Majority Whip SCALISE. It has been an immensely difficult 24 hours for all the victims, including Matt Mika, who remains in ICU, Zach Barth, and, of course, Capitol Police Officers Crystal Griner and David Bailey. Those officers didn't back down when faced with this threat. Instead, as the Capitol Police always do, they put themselves in harm's way to help protect others. Without them, we know so many more would have been injured.

So we want to continue to express our gratitude to all those who gra-

ciously put their lives on the line to keep the Capitol community safe. In doing so, we are also reminded of the bravery of our colleagues on the field yesterday—those who stepped in to help friends who had been injured as they waited for first responders to arrive. I think it says something about the character of those people as well.

The events of yesterday were devastating, and we know it will take time to heal. But for now, the members of the congressional baseball team have made the decision to go forward with tonight's game, which will be played for charity. I know we will be thinking about each of them as they take the field tonight.

Mr. President, the Senate today will take a final vote on the bipartisan first step to hold Iran and Russia accountable. This follows overwhelmingly bipartisan action yesterday to approve the Russia sanctions amendment, an effort that would not have been possible without the good work of our Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Senator CORKER, and our Banking chair, Senator CRAPO, and their ranking members.

After 8 years of failed foreign policy under the Obama administration, 8 years of following the Obama administration's preferred strategy of drawing down both our forces and our commitments, we must take a stronger stance in deterring Iran and holding its regime accountable for its actions and addressing Russia's years-long pattern of provocations.

These sanctions, which are just one of our foreign policy tools, will only work as part of a broader effort to rebuild our military force structure and combat readiness in order to send a strong signal to friend and foe alike. The United States should no longer stand by and allow threats like these to go unaddressed.

When the administration completes its series of strategic reviews, I will

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.



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look forward to hearing from the President and his advisers their recommendations for countering Iran's malign conduct across the Middle East and their recommendations for countering Russia's persistent efforts to undermine NATO.

As I said earlier this week, this Iran and Russia sanctions agreement reflects good bipartisan work. I want to thank Senators on both sides of the aisle for coming together to codify and strengthen existing sanctions. Let's come together again now and pass these sanctions later this morning.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, have you announced the business for the day?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have laid down the business.

Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DACA

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, today is the fifth anniversary of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program, known as DACA. DACA provides temporary legal status to immigrant students who arrived in the United States as children and infants, if they register with the government, pay a fee, and pass a criminal background check.

The program is based on the DREAM Act, a piece of legislation I introduced 16 years ago in 2001. That legislation gave undocumented students who grew up in this country a chance to earn a path to legal status and citizenship. These young people have come to be known as DREAMers. What used to be a word reserved for rock-and-roll groups is now a word that has become part of our common language to describe an immigration challenge and opportunity.

These DREAMers came to the United States as children. They are American in every way except for their legal immigration status. We have already invested a lot of money in these kids. We educated them. We made them part of this country, and it makes no sense to squander their talents by deporting them at this moment in their lives.

In April 2010, I sent a letter to President Obama. Dick Lugar, the Republican Senator from Indiana, joined me. On a bipartisan basis, we said to President Obama: Stop deporting these young kids. They did nothing wrong. Their parents made the decision to come here. Give them a chance. The President responded. It is now clear the DACA Program he created by Executive order has been a great success.

More than 780,000 DREAMers have come forward and received DACA protection and status that has allowed them to contribute more fully to this country as students, as teachers, as nurses, as engineers, as entrepreneurs.

A recent study by the Center for American Progress found that ending DACA—saying to these 780,000 young people they are no longer part of America—would cost us. It would cost our economy over \$400 billion in gross domestic product over the next 10 years. These are productive citizens doing good things for America. I should take that back. They are not citizens yet. They are productive people doing good things for America whom I want to make citizens if the DREAM Act becomes law.

I have many differences with President Trump on immigration. For example, the President's January 25 Executive order makes up to 8 million immigrants priorities for deportation, and seeks to create a deportation force by tripling the number of immigration agents. This ignores the reality that the vast majority of undocumented immigrants are law-abiding individuals who make important economic contributions to this country, and have deep roots in the United States.

I am grateful, and I say that publicly. I have said it before. I am grateful President Trump has decided to keep the DACA Program in place. Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service Director nominee, Francis Cissna, have promised me personally and publicly that they will maintain the existing guidelines for the DACA Program. I appreciate this commitment. I intend to hold them to it.

Congress also has an obligation to do its job. We ought to do something we rarely do in the U.S. Senate—pass legislation, fix our broken immigration system. Think about this: On June 27, 2013—4 years ago—the Senate, on a bipartisan basis, passed comprehensive immigration reform by a vote of 68 to 32, better than 2 to 1. I was glad to be part of the Gang of 8 Democratic and Republican Senators who worked for months on the bill that passed by this margin. It strengthened border security, protected American workers, and it established a tough but fair path to citizenship for 11 million undocumented people in this country.

Unfortunately, the Republican majority of the House of Representatives would not debate it, would not consider it, would not bring it for a vote, and it died in the U.S. House of Representatives. If they had done their job, their work, it would have passed with a bipartisan majority. President Obama would have signed it into law. I might not be standing here today talking about this issue.

Over the years, I have come to the floor of the Senate to tell story after story about DREAMers, the young immigrant students who grew up in this

country. These stories put a human face on the DACA Program and the DREAM legislation. They show that immigration makes our country stronger.

Today, I want to say a word about Gissel Escobedo. This is Gissel. She came to the United States at the age of 3. Her family emigrated from Mexico. She grew up in my home State of Illinois, in the town of Cicero. She was an honors student in high school. She attended their gifted program. She had a big responsibility personally. From a young age, she was one of the primary caregivers for her brother who suffers from severe autism. During the little spare time she had, Gissel was a volunteer in her community, helping organizations provide care for children with autism.

As an undocumented student though, Gissel was not eligible for any Federal assistance to go to college, but as a result of her academic achievements in high school, she received a private scholarship to attend the University of Illinois at Chicago. As a college student, Gissel was a writing tutor and a leader in student organizations for future teachers. In 2010, she graduated from the University of Illinois Chicago and the College of Education with a degree in elementary education. After the graduation ceremony, Gissel received a Dean's Merit Award. She delivered the graduation speech for her class.

She wanted to start using her degree as an elementary school teacher, but because she was undocumented, that wasn't possible. Instead, she continued her education and earned a master's degree at the University of Illinois. She was accepted into a disability leadership program as a family advocate.

Then, in 2012, the world changed for the better for Gissel. President Obama established the DACA Program. She immediately applied for DACA. Then, in 2013, she completed her master's degree and became an elementary school teacher. For the last 4 years, Gissel has been a teacher in the Berwyn South School District. Last year, she was awarded a certificate of achievement for her leadership as one of two teachers to implement the first-ever dual-language program in the district.

Gissel sent me a letter. I would like to read part of it as part of the RECORD. Here is what she said:

DACA has enabled me to become a meaningful member of society by opening doors that would have otherwise not been accessible. DACA recipients, like myself, are more than just a policy. My hope is that when people listen to our stories, they will notice the kind of individuals that we are and the kind of contributions we make—not only to the economy, but to our society.

I reflect on that paragraph to think about this young woman, the challenges she has faced within her family, and challenges imposed by the fact that she was undocumented. She has never lost sight of her commitment to her family, to her disabled sibling, and to many others in her community.

Now she wants to be a teacher. Wouldn't you be proud and honored to have your child in a classroom with someone with Gissel's master's degree and values? I certainly would. Gissel and other DREAMers have so much to give to the United States, but without DACA and without the DREAM Act, Gissel would be deported back to Mexico—a country she hasn't lived in since she was 3 years old.

Will America be a stronger country if we send away people like Gissel, if we deport them and say we don't need them in our future? Of course not. The answer is clear. Gissel will make America a better place. Today we celebrate the DACA Program, which has given Gissel and hundreds of thousands of other DREAMers the chance to finally come out of the shadows, but we also recognize DACA as a temporary solution.

Ultimately, Congress—and especially the Senate—must step up and show leadership here; make certain that we address the failings and weaknesses of our broken immigration system; say to the 780,000 protected by DACA that you stepped forward, paid your fee, submitted yourself to a background check, and have been given a temporary opportunity to be part of America. Now it is our job to translate that into a permanent opportunity for these young people to make America a better place.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.

THANKING SENATOR DURBIN

Mr. SCHUMER. First, I thank my friend and colleague for his outstanding words on DACA. No one has fought more for the DACA kids than he has, not just in the last year but over the last decade. The fact that so many of them are here is, in good part, due to his great work and effort. Thank you.

THOUGHTS AND PRAYERS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BASEBALL PRACTICE SHOOTING

Mr. President, we are still all a bit shaken by the horrors of yesterday's shooting. It was a senseless act of violence, made even more chilling by the circumstances at a baseball practice for a bipartisan charity event. I understand that Representative SCALISE is still in critical condition following surgery last night. When we hear the word "critical" attached to his condition, it sends shivers down our spines. We hope and pray for a quick and full recovery. I know that all of his House colleagues are wishing him well right now, and I want him to know his friends in the Senate do as well.

The same goes for the other four who were injured in the attack, including two members of our Capitol Police Force. Our thoughts and prayers go with them as well. We remain grateful for their service and bravery and for the service and bravery of all of our Capitol police officers. Their presence at the field yesterday—the presence of those two Capitol police officers at the

field yesterday prevented a bad situation from getting worse and undoubtedly saved lives. Had the two brave police officers not acted or if they had not been there, it might well have been a massacre.

We would all be wise to reflect on the importance of civility in our Nation's politics this morning. We disagree vehemently at times in Congress and folks out in the country do, too, but the level of nastiness, vitriol, and hate that has seeped into our politics must be excised. Let us all strive at all times—whatever our disagreements—to respect those who disagree with us, to seek a greater understanding of them, to walk in their moccasins—as Native Americans have always said. Let us strive always to conduct our politics with civility.

I was heartened to hear that the congressional baseball game will still be played this evening. Let it be a symbol that hate and violence do not cast too long or too great a shadow, that we can and will come together this evening, and the game will go on. I will be going to the game with the three congressional leaders as a show of solidarity.

Mr. President, last evening, the Senate showed it can come together. Last night, we voted, in an overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion, to strengthen a package of sanctions against Russia. It was the product of diligent weeks of bipartisan negotiations. I saw the Senator from Maryland behind me a few minutes ago. He deserves lots of credit, as do the Senators from Ohio, Tennessee, and Idaho. The final result is a very good one for our country because yesterday the U.S. Senate said to Mr. Putin, in no uncertain terms, that when he violates international norms and interferes with our election, he will not escape reproach.

Not only did we pass a new round of tough sanctions for Russia's meddling in our election, we codified existing sanctions into law, making them harder to lift, and we moved to make the Congress—not the President—the final arbiter of sanctions relief when necessary. Any ideas of the President that he can lift sanctions on his own, for any reason, are dashed by this legislation.

The House of Representatives should take notice that 97 Senators voted in favor of this package. I hope Leader RYAN will move with the same haste to pass this package of sanctions through the House. I hope the President will sign it. The months-long effort to forge bipartisan consensus on Russia sanctions—an issue that gets to the vital interests of our country, the wellspring of our democracy—gives me hope that Democrats and Republicans can come together and work together on a number of big issues this year.

There are several issues coming before this body soon where we can come together: another budget—passing another budget; reauthorizing flood insurance and children's health insurance; raising the debt ceiling. Each of

those issues will, by definition, demand bipartisan effort.

A lesson that all of us have learned here in the Senate is that legislation is made better and much more likely to pass when both parties are involved in crafting it.

I have noticed the media has been questioning all morning why Congress isn't more bipartisan. We should be. But when the Russia sanctions agreement passes and the budget deal passes, both major bipartisan efforts, they are proof that we can get things done together. If those agreements were given a little more recognition by the media—the fact that we can at times, at least, work in a bipartisan way—that would help. For too many of us on both sides of the aisle, it seems as though when there is divisiveness, it gets far more attention in the media than when there is comity between the parties.

HEALTHCARE LEGISLATION

Mr. President, finally, I would suggest to my colleagues that the most immediate place where we can translate the rhetoric calling for us to come together into reality is on healthcare. A goal many of us share on both sides of the aisle is to improve the law, bring costs down for consumers, stabilize the marketplace, and make it easier for older Americans to afford the ever-rising out-of-pocket costs of prescription drugs.

I would conclude by stating that we can make the rhetoric of bipartisanship not empty by both parties coming together and working together on healthcare. We have shown thus far in this Congress with the passage of the budget and Russia sanctions that significant legislation can best be served by bipartisanship. Opening up the process and having us all come together on healthcare would be a very good, concrete reaffirmation of bipartisanship and would translate the rhetoric—not bad at all—that we have heard here today into reality.

In conclusion, the rhetoric about bipartisanship can be strengthened. Hopefully healthcare is a place where we can strengthen it, by opening up the process, having hearings, and having open discussion.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time during the quorum calls on S. 722 be charged equally to both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STRANGE). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 250, AS MODIFIED

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I am very pleased that the Senator from

Alabama is presiding over this very important debate because one of the most important issues to both of our States, Colorado and Alabama, is the economy and the economic well-being of our great country. The amendment that I will be discussing today goes to the very heart of our opportunities in space, our opportunities in innovation, our opportunities to ensure that we have the most reliable information as it relates to weather and to weather events.

It is a great partnership that we have had with the Senator from Alabama, who has been absolutely critical and instrumental in ensuring a persistent, reliable space presence. I thank the Senator from Alabama, Mr. STRANGE, for his incredible leadership when it comes to making sure that we are able to reach space, that we are able to continue our space mission. Whether it is in the defense of this country or in understanding where the next tornado may strike, I thank the Senator from Alabama for the leadership that has been provided to ensure that constant presence and persistence.

Of course, I rise to speak in support of the bipartisan Gardner-Nelson-Warner et al. amendment, amendment No. 250. Yet, truly, to the Senate—to my colleagues here—I rise in support of America's role and leadership in space.

I rise on behalf of the hardworking men and women across this Nation who make our country's aerospace industry second to none, because, over the past 70 years, the United States has led the way in space exploration. From the Apollo missions to the space shuttle to the Orion program, we are the leaders in exploring the great frontier of space. That is who this country is. That is who we are—explorers, pioneers. We were the first to the Moon, and I hope we are the first to Mars, but we cannot give up that pioneering innovation that has led this country to greatness.

I will share with colleagues of the Senate a CNBC story from March that China is building a manned spacecraft that is capable of sending astronauts to the Moon as well as to near-Earth orbit flight.

Can you imagine the day when the stars and stripes on the lunar surface stands not alone but stands next to the stars of a flag of another nation—perhaps China's, perhaps somebody else's?

When it comes to our access to space, this debate is absolutely critical because without the passage of amendment No. 250, we lose a tremendous portion of our access to space. We lose it for commercial applications, and we lose it for civil applications.

In the past few months, this China activity has shown the importance of U.S. leadership. That is why this bipartisan amendment comes with a very simple point. It ensures that NASA and our commercial space industry will continue to be the country's leader in aerospace.

The ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator MARK

WARNER, of Virginia, is coleading my amendment. The Senator has done a phenomenal job in leadership on the Intelligence Committee in leading this amendment.

I see that my colleague from Florida, Senator NELSON, has joined this debate. He has done a phenomenal job in leading this effort. As the ranking member of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, with jurisdiction over NASA, Senator BILL NELSON is the leading co-sponsor of this effort.

They understand how important it is to address this issue for NASA and other space missions.

I stand here in support of the greater goals of the underlying bill that we will be amending today. I believe sanctions against our adversaries are warranted and justified and, indeed, should move forward. This amendment is not designed to undermine the intent of the bill, but it seeks to ensure that space exploration may continue as it is currently planned.

Without this bipartisan amendment, multiple missions on the books today—that are already planned today—will be delayed or even canceled and will be subjecting the U.S. taxpayers to significant cost increases. Without this amendment, missions like the commercial resupply program, which delivers critical supplies to the International Space Station, will be jeopardized by the language of the bill as it is written. American astronauts at the International Space Station, as we speak, are dependent on those supplies, but we are cutting off the American lifeline without the adoption of this amendment. Future missions, like the commercial crew program—a partnership between NASA and private industry to bring astronauts to the International Space Station on a U.S.-manufactured spacecraft—will be put at risk without the adoption of this amendment.

Without this bipartisan amendment, we will continue to rely on Russian spacecraft to take U.S. astronauts to the International Space Station. Let me just make that more clear. Without the adoption of this amendment, NASA and our astronauts will be dependent on Russia for access to space for even longer. Rejection of this bipartisan amendment results in further Russian dependence.

I do not believe this was the intent of the language when the bill was first written. The Gardner-Nelson-Warner-Shelby et al. amendment creates the certainty that NASA needs and supports to ensure currently planned NASA and commercial launch missions can continue without interruption.

NASA contacted my office yesterday and said of amendment No. 250: "We believe this provides us the flexibility to maintain our commitments to our national space program."

It is not just the commercial crew and cargo missions that are going to be impacted. Several other missions will be subjected to delays—missions like

the Joint Polar Satellite System. This constellation of satellites will give us the ability to constantly monitor the globe for significant weather events, such as floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes. As I stand here today, the three Senators on the floor who are listening to this important debate—with more on C-SPAN—have been impacted dramatically by floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes.

In 2013, we had dramatic flooding in Colorado that damaged thousands and thousands of homes and cost lives. I know the Presiding Officer has faced the same challenge when it has come to tornadoes and incredibly tragic weather events. The Senator from Florida has faced hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes. That is the importance of this amendment—to understand our weather systems and predictions.

I am proud to say that JPSS is being developed in my home State of Colorado. The JPSS and other essential programs in which we have already invested hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions of dollars already, are now put at risk of significant delays or cost increases to the taxpayer without the adoption of this amendment.

I am also on the floor to talk about a longer term mission that I truly believe in and hope to see our Nation achieve, one that goes to the very heart of our pioneering spirit of who we are as a people. It is our future manned mission to Mars.

As I have spoken on the floor before, as I child I wanted to be an astronaut. I was inspired as I watched NASA astronauts explore that next frontier. I believe that the next destination for human beings to explore is, indeed, Mars, but without this bipartisan amendment, the Mars 2020 rover, which will continue to prepare us for that future manned mission, will be put in doubt. It will be a significant setback and will make the future goal of getting to Mars seem that much further away.

This amendment, amendment No. 250, allows these missions to move forward with certainty and as scheduled. It is a bipartisan effort to affirm America's leadership in space.

Let's be clear. Last summer we had a debate on this very same issue—that by 2022 we were going to have an "America first" opportunity. That is the spirit of this amendment—to make sure that we have access to these vital and critical space missions, access to space, and to continue to grow economic opportunities for the American people. That is what this debate is all about.

I yield the floor to my colleague Senator NELSON and then, of course, will continue with debate.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.

MR. NELSON. Mr. President, I thank Senator GARDNER.

Indeed, this is an example of the Senate working together. There is, simply, a problem in the bill that was passed.

It is a technical problem, but it goes to the heart of our military-civilian space program. It goes to the heart of the cooperation that we have had with Russia that goes back to the Soviet Union days when, in fact, in 1975, in the middle of the Cold War, a crew from America rendezvoused and docked with the crew from the Soviet Union. Ever since that crew, which was led by Lt. Gen. Tom Stafford, of the United States, and General Alexey Leonov, of the Soviet Union, we have had cooperation in space, and that program continues today on the International Space Station.

Before I get into talking about the details of the amendment, as Senator GARDNER has discussed so well already, I hope that the Senate will treat it as technical in nature because it corrects what was not intended. Unless corrected, it will be disastrous not only for NASA but for all of the burgeoning commercial space industry, which we are bringing back to America. What has happened over the last four decades, in the meantime, is that a lot of that commercial space industry has flown the coop to other launchers from other nations. But it is coming back to America.

PRAYERS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL BASEBALL PRACTICE SHOOTING

Mr. President, before I get into the substance, I just want to speak with regard to the terrible tragedy that occurred yesterday and of my feelings about this violence that has occurred. I don't know whether it has occurred because of the excessive rhetoric and the sharpness and the fact that politics has become a blood sport, but we are so divided.

This is what I want to say. We are Americans first, regardless of party. In times of threat, we come together. We are all on the same team.

This Senator has prayed, as I know others have, for the complete recovery of all of those who were wounded yesterday, two of whom were apparently grievously wounded. We pray for their full recovery. It was a heinous attack. Let's come together in bipartisanship.

AMENDMENT NO. 250, AS MODIFIED

Mr. President, right here is an example of coming together. Recognizing there is a technical problem, we are coming together to fix that problem. Let's do this in the spirit of what Americans do. We are Americans first.

I am obviously here, as I demonstrated in my vote yesterday, for the Iran sanctions bill, as well as the Russia sanctions amendment, which we adopted yesterday. Both were bipartisan efforts. I wish to thank our colleagues, especially the members of the Banking and Foreign Relations Committees.

This Senator is a cosponsor of the sanctions bill which addresses Iran's support for terrorism, ballistic missile activity, and human rights violations—these destabilizing activities—and this bill strengthens the hand of the United States in countering Iran. These are

destabilizing activities separate and apart from the Iran nuclear agreement, and to date, the United States has the evidence that they have complied with the Iran nuclear agreement.

At the same time, we are facing an aggressive Vladimir Putin. The Russia bill which we debated yesterday and which will come to final passage shortly strengthens our hand against Putin's Russia. The U.S. intelligence community has already made clear that Putin attempted to interfere in our election. Let me tell my colleagues, that didn't stop with the past election. It is continuing. And we better be ready for it next year in the 2018 elections because Putin and the GRU have done all the groundwork. But that is nothing new because he had done it in elections before in Europe, and he has been doing it in elections right now, as we saw in France. It boomeranged on him, thank goodness. We will see an attempt on the upcoming German elections.

The intelligence community has made it very clear—the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee is here—that Putin and the GRU are likely to do this again. That is why I say beware. They have laid the groundwork for next year's elections to try to interfere. Putin's influence campaign struck at the very core of our democracy and simply must not be permitted to do it again.

Now is not the time to cozy up to Russia; rather, the United States must redouble our cyber defenses and our cyber offenses to deter him, to make him feel enough pain so that he won't do it again. The sanctions we will adopt today are tough. We need this, but we need more.

Shortly, we are going to vote on the amendment Senator GARDNER has explained. Interestingly, in all of this angst and conflict with Russia, we get along with Russia in the civilian and commercial space program. We have had peaceful cooperation in outer space ever since what I told my colleagues about; that is, since 1975, in the middle of the Cold War, the rendezvous and docking and living together in space for 9 days, a Soviet crew and an American crew. That has been the central theme of our space program since that time. The shining example of that now is the cooperation in the International Space Station, the football field-sized—it is 120 yards long; think one goalpost to another. People don't have any idea of how big it is on orbit. It circles the Earth every 90 minutes.

We have been working in space together with many nations but especially our partner the Russians for over 16 years. So the peaceful cooperation in space has been good for business. It has been good for jobs in America. And we are working to grow our share of an over \$300 billion global space economy.

That is what this amendment is about. It is about fixing the question on the purchase of those RD-180 engines, the Russian engine that is used

in the Atlas V, that is used not only for defense launches but for commercial launches and will be one of the two rockets launching American astronauts within a year and a half to and from the International Space Station.

So this amendment is for the benefit of our economy, as well as the betterment of our civilization.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, first of all, I wish to thank my friend, the Senator from Florida, for his comments. There is no one in this body who is more familiar with and more knowledgeable about our space programs than is Senator NELSON.

I also want to associate myself with two comments he made. No. 1, as the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I echo what he said about the very real, tangible threat the Russians, their spy agencies, and their agents pose to not just our democratic process but—as the Senator from Florida has outlined, not only did they attack us in 2016, they attacked the Dutch, which is why they had to hand-count their ballots, and they attacked the French, and Facebook took down 30,000 Facebook accounts because of fear of Russian manipulation. They will attack the Germans.

One of the things that is so concerning to me is that if you add up the amount of disruption the Russians have caused in Western societies at large without firing a shot or shooting a missile—and all that for less than 5 percent of the cost of an aircraft carrier—it is a pretty good return.

Our country needs to be strong against Russia, and I support the Russia sanctions, but I also support, as the Senator has indicated, a really critical part—that we continue our space program. I stand here to join with Senator NELSON and my good friend, the Senator from Colorado, Mr. GARDNER, in support of this amendment No. 250, which will allow civilian agencies to continue to launch crucial science, civil, and commercial space missions and which will continue to support NOAA and NASA, which depend upon their research.

Without this amendment—and I think this is an amendment that corrects a mistake in the original bill—billions of dollars and years of planning that have gone into missions like, as the Senator mentioned, the International Space Station, commercial cargo, Mars 2020, and the Joint Polar Satellite System, just wouldn't be possible. In many ways, without this amendment, we could even become more dependent upon Russian technology.

Again, as the Senator mentioned, I think the overwhelming majority of this body is very supportive of sanctions against Iran. We are very supportive, and I appreciate the opportunity to add stronger sanctions against Russia and sanctions that this

President cannot arbitrarily withdraw. But we have to make sure that in this bill we don't do unintentional harm to our space interests—space interests that I know are in Colorado and Florida and my home State of Virginia, where we have a flight facility at NASA Wallops, which is over on our Eastern Shore, where we launch both NASA and commercial satellites.

We have one of America's leading commercial and military companies, Orbital ATK, which is headquartered in Virginia and launches the Antares rocket from Wallops. The fact is, without this amendment, Orbital ATK would be prevented from buying the Russian RD-181 engines for its Antares rockets. That will do nothing to help America's space mission. The fact is, without those engines, Orbital would not be able to fulfill a \$1.2 billion contract for launching from Wallops.

Quite simply, as the Senator indicated and I am repeating, this amendment is broadly bipartisan. My friend Senator GARDNER and I chair the Cyber Caucus. The amendment is supported by our leading expert in the Senate on space, Senator NELSON, as well as Senator SHELBY and Senator BENNET and a host of others. I imagine the Presiding Officer is also a supporter of this. The amendment would simply provide civil and commercial space parity with the defense industry, for which an exemption has already been provided. It is in the interests of defense and civil space to continue the current status quo in order to maintain a competitive environment until a domestic capability has been developed.

Let me be clear. I think it is important that over a very short time, we get away from purchasing Russian rockets, but we need that transition period, and the transition period the chairman of the Armed Services Committee laid out on the defense side ought to be extended as well on the commercial side.

So a "yes" vote on amendment No. 250 will support continued access to space for NASA, as well as for those equally important commercial space missions. One of the things that I feel is so important about the commercial space missions is that we have to have that competition, candidly, with NASA and to push our defense industry if we are going to bring down space costs. To put a dagger in the heart of our commercial space industry as it has been slowly evolving would be a grave mistake.

I have taken on this issue on the intelligence side as I have tried to get smarter on the whole question of our overhead capabilities. The amount of dollars that we spend and the lack of competitiveness that we have in terms of some of our more traditional government-purchased space assets are both a waste of taxpayer dollars, and, candidly, we have an architecture overhead that is not modern enough to recognize the threats that Russians, Chinese, and others pose in terms of the

ability to jam our satellites and use laser beams and other things. In a sense, in many ways, it is almost as if our defense and the intelligence community, on overhead architecture—nobody ever saw a James Bond movie. We built these large, bulky platforms in the sky with the assumption that America would always dominate space. That dominance—it is unfortunate because our adversary changes, it is coming to an end, and we need the competition from the commercial industry, quite honestly, to push the IC and push the defense toward smaller, more resilient, and more flexible platforms.

While I share the desire of the chairman of the Arms Services Committee to get us off this Russian hardware, we do need this transition. I think the amendment that has been put forward by the Senator from Colorado provides that transition, led by the transition that was laid out on defense. I believe commercial space needs that same type of transition.

I hope the amendment will pass. I look forward to our continued bipartisan support of both NASA and commercial space and obviously our defense assets and IC assets as well.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the Russian sanctions amendment passed by this body 97 to 2 last year—I take it the Senator from Florida and the Senator from Virginia were here at the time; it was one person who was not—was negotiated between Senators of both parties on multiple committees, including Foreign Relations, Banking, and Armed Services. It was specifically designed to impose tough sanctions on Russian defense and intelligence sectors, to impose tough sanctions on the Russian military industrial complex and intelligence agencies that have made it possible for Russia to invade Ukraine, annex Crimea, terrorize Syria, threaten our NATO allies, and attack America's election in 2016. Have no doubt about what this amendment is, my dear colleagues and friends. It is a give-away to the Russian military industrial complex.

There has always been a collection of lawmakers, executives, and lobbyists who have accepted continuing, even deepening, our Nation's dependence on Russian rocket engines. That is exactly what will happen if we allow this amendment to pass, and the door will once again fly open for taxpayer dollars to be used to subsidize purchases of Russian rocket engines—purchases which line the pockets of Vladimir Putin's cronies.

My friends, if you want to vote to buy more Russian rocket engines, just say it. That is fine. That is fine with me, but to cloak it in some kind of bipartisan agreement that somehow we are going to have to continue to buy these Russian rocket engines, after we had an agreement last year 97 to 2—97 to 2—what does this do? This undoes

last year's 97-to-2 agreement. We don't need this amendment to meet America's needs in space.

As a result of last year's bipartisan agreement and the NDAA, the Department of Defense is on a path to gradually eliminate dependence on Russia as quickly as possible while fostering competition among American companies. NASA needs to do the same. NASA needs to do the same. NASA needs to do the same.

Sanctions, by definition, require tradeoffs. Sanctions are not free. Countries that impose sanctions must be willing to pay a cost, too, if and when a greater principle, a great national security interest, is at stake.

Let me conclude because I note the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking member here. There are costs and tradeoffs the United States has been asking our European allies to make in the last few years. We have leaned on France to cancel a sale of naval vessels to Russia. We have been warning Central and Eastern European allies against deepening their dependence on Russian energy with various energy deals and infrastructure projects. We should not be asking our allies to make these sacrifices unless we are prepared to do the same.

We will probably pass this amendment. If there is ever a doubt in any of our constituents' minds about the influence of special interests, it will be with passage of this amendment—which, by the way, with all due respect to my friends and colleagues, was the one thing they didn't want. The one thing they didn't want was an on-the-record vote on this amendment, which is why I am confident it will lose, but I want every Member of the U.S. Senate to look in the eyes of the mother whose son was just killed by a Russian sniper, as I did, down in Mariupol not too long ago.

I urge a "no" vote on the amendment. I know how it is going to come out, but Members of the U.S. Senate will at least be on record. I say this is not the most courageous chapter in the history of this institution. I urge a "no" vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am not involving myself in this debate.

I just want to say to Senator McCAIN: You demonstrated yesterday the best of the U.S. Senate when an issue like this arose, and instead of blocking a vote, you said you were glad to have a vote. You are obviously in strong disagreement with the substance of this amendment.

I just want to tell you how much I personally appreciate your allowing a vote on this, the role you played in all things Russia and Iran, your forceful nature on these issues, your great leadership, and the role you have played in getting us today to a vote that isn't requiring cloture, where you have allowed this amendment to take place. I

cannot tell you how much I appreciate that and appreciate the role you play in this body.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Tennessee and my friend from Maryland.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Arizona as well for allowing this vote to move forward, but in his statements, he said NASA needs to do the same. He repeated it several times.

I would just say that this amendment could actually be titled "NASA Needs to Do the Same" because what we had agreed to last year, when it comes to defense, is a way forward on the Atlas V rocket, the RD-180. We agreed to that. I believe it was a unanimous consent agreement. If there was an objection at that time, then it should have been expressed when we made this agreement.

Our colleagues across the aisle, for a unanimous consent, it takes all of us 100 people to agree to a unanimous consent agreement. That agreement was made on the National Defense Authorization Act. NASA needs to do the same.

Our colleague, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, MARK WARNER, made the point of parity between civil, commercial, and defense. That is what this amendment does.

There are a lot of issues that we come to the floor and we talk about this issue not being rocket science: It is not that difficult. It is not rocket science. Well, we actually have an issue that is rocket science. The mission set before American astronauts is jeopardized if this amendment doesn't pass. The taxpayers of this country face billions of dollars in costs if this amendment doesn't pass. Reliance on Russian technology to get to the space station or resupplying American astronauts will increase if this amendment doesn't pass.

If we want to talk about protecting the people of this country, let's talk about the victims of floods in Colorado, let's talk about people who have died in tornadoes because we didn't have the most accurate ability to forecast where they were coming from, when they were going to strike, and who would be hit. This amendment will allow these weather satellites to go into space to protect the men and women of this country from natural disasters. Again, it brings parity to an agreement that was decided upon through unanimous consent last year.

I support the underlying legislation, and I support this amendment and urge my colleagues to support it as well. I thank the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee for their leadership on this committee.

I yield the floor.

Mr. KAIN. Mr. President, I applaud the bipartisan work that my Senate

colleagues have put into legislation to impose sanctions on Russia. Russia's interference in the 2016 election represents an assault on our democracy that, until this point, has gone largely unanswered by the Administration and Congress. Russia has also conducted cyber attacks on allies and illegally invaded and violated the sovereignty of Ukraine and Georgia. I know that my colleagues take this issue very seriously, and I support the bipartisan compromise, which will maintain existing sanctions on Russia for its cyber and military intrusions in Ukraine and require additional mandatory sanctions on Russia's energy sector, those providing arms to Syrian troops, corrupt Russian oligarchs and their networks, and human rights abusers. We cannot allow Russia's hostile actions toward Western democracies to go unchecked. This legislation sends an important message to Russia and the world that the United States stands strongly against Russia's anti-democratic actions.

At the same time, the original version of the legislation would have had unintended consequences for our nation's civil and commercial space sectors. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, and commercial space missions are critical to space exploration, weather data, and sending U.S. astronauts to the International Space Station, as well as supplying them with cargo and instruments for scientific research. Under the original legislation, these missions would have been threatened or prevented from moving forward. In response, Senator GARDNER introduced an amendment that would exempt NASA and commercial space-related launch activities from the sanctions bill. I was proud to cosponsor this amendment.

In addition to our defense assets, Virginia is at the epicenter of the Nation's civil space program and commercial space industry. For more than 70 years, NASA's Wallops Flight Facility has served as a key national asset to the U.S. space program, an economic driver for the Eastern Shore, and an invaluable benefit to the Commonwealth. The Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport at Wallops Island serves as a leader in commercial space, partnering with Virginia-headquartered Orbital ATK to launch critical cargo to the International Space Station. Finally, research projects at NASA Langley Research Center and Virginia's superb academic institutions are developing tomorrow's innovative technologies and scientific discoveries. As Governor and now Senator, I have remained a strong supporter of Virginia's booming industry, research, and launch services. Without Senator GARDNER's amendment, some of these activities in Virginia would cease to exist.

To be clear, I stand in agreement with my Senate colleagues on the issue of Russian sanctions. I also believe that our space program must transi-

tion to American-made rocket engines and parts, and I know that U.S. companies are working hard in conjunction with NASA toward that goal. But we need time for that transition to occur, and this important amendment would make it possible without hurting our current capabilities. In addition, while the Department of Defense has been afforded the opportunity to develop new technologies while maintaining the status quo, it is only fair that we provide the same chance to civil and commercial space entities.

For these reasons, I was proud to cosponsor Senator GARDNER's bipartisan amendment to S. 722. I look forward to working with my colleagues in the future to enhance and expand our Nation's space program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator CARDIN and I will speak for a few moments, and then we will have three votes, one of which will be on the RD-180 issue, one of which will be on the NATO issue, and then final passage; is that correct? Am I correct in that?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 6 minutes remaining before the first vote on the Gardner amendment.

Mr. CORKER. Then there will be a series of votes, with no comments made in advance of those votes; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I will be very brief, and we will split our time.

I want to say that, to me, today the U.S. Senate is functioning in the way our Founders intended for it to function.

It has been my goal, since the beginning of my leadership on the Foreign Relations Committee, for our committee and for this Senate to reaffirm its role in foreign policy issues. Today, the U.S. Senate, in a time of uncertainty around our Nation and uncertainty about some of our foreign policy issues, is asserting its responsibilities as it relates to foreign policy for the United States of America. I thank Senators on both sides of the aisle for the role they have played in getting us here.

This is a very strong piece of legislation that in many ways has almost occurred under the radar screen because of the way it has been done. The fact that we have had no cloture vote, the fact that we are having amendments, as has been discussed before, and the fact that this legislation sends a very strong signal to Russia that the nefarious activities they have been involved in—it does the same with Iran, with the activities outside of the JCPOA that they have been involved in, affirming our commitment to NATO, which we will do to article 5, NATO, in just a few moments.

I thank this body. I thank Leaders MCCONNELL and SCHUMER for allowing the environment to exist for us to work

in the manner we have. I thank our ranking member, Senator CARDIN, and those members—Senator CRAPO and BROWN and others—who have played such a significant role. Senator MCCAIN is on the floor, Senator GRAHAM, Senator RUBIO, Senator MENENDEZ, Senator SHAHEEN—so many members who have gotten us to this place.

This is a great moment for the U.S. Senate. This is the way the Senate is supposed to function, and this is the way the Senate is supposed to exercise its prerogatives as it relates to foreign policy, a great moment for our body.

Senator CARDIN.

Mr. CARDIN. Well, first, to Senator CORKER. There is a reason Members want to serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We had a long list of Members who wanted to join our committee in this Congress. Quite frankly, I think the reason they want to join is not only the challenges we have globally but the fact that this is a committee that works bipartisanly and respects the views of every single Member, both Democratic and Republican, on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The bill we have before us reflects that—in the best tradition of the U.S. Senate and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That is due, in large part, because of the talent, leadership, and commitment of our chairman. I thank Senator CORKER for allowing us to reach this very important moment in the U.S. Senate, to be able to vote on a bill that is consequential for America's national security.

I believe this is the first major bill we have had on the floor of the U.S. Senate, the first bill we have had amendments to, and I concur in the Senator's observations that our leaders allowed us to let the process work in the best traditions of the U.S. Senate.

It is difficult for many of us to explain how the Senate operates at times. It really is difficult, but it is a body which respects the rights of each Member, and they have certain abilities to slow things down or bring us to a stop, and the process doesn't work the way it is supposed to work, but this bill has been handled very quickly on a major subject because we respected the rights of every single Member of the U.S. Senate. It doesn't mean we reach total agreement. We didn't, but we have a bill that accomplishes three very important things:

First, it stands up to the aggression of Russia and Iran. Yes, we have been talking about this—and I am glad Senator MCCAIN is on the floor. Senator MCCAIN has been one of the most ardent crusaders to point out the risk factors of Russia to our national security and that of our allies.

I started with Senator MCCAIN in January. We sat down, and he informed me why we had to do certain things and make it very clear and not have any ambiguity because Russia would run right through that ambiguity. Thanks to that initial leadership, we

have those provisions in the underlying bill. There will be no ambiguity as to what Congress is saying in regard to Russia's behavior.

I also acknowledge we have a review process in here. Senator GRAHAM brought that to our attention very early in the process in January so Congress can insert itself.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CARDIN. That review process will give Congress the right role to review executive actions so we are stronger, working together. It also gives the President a stronger hand in negotiating with Mr. Putin and Russia because Congress has said: You must accomplish certain objectives, such as getting Russia's aggression to end in Ukraine or get Russia to stop supporting war crimes in Syria, to stop interfering with our democratic election systems. That is what we say, and we are very clear about that.

Then we take the third step, which I think is very important; that is, provide the wherewithal of U.S. leadership, working with our European allies, to protect our democratic institutions.

All of that is included in the bill that we are going to have a chance to vote on in a few minutes, and I want to thank all who were involved. I am going to include staff who worked so hard on this.

They were here 24/7 putting this bill together—Damian Murphy, in my office; Margaret Taylor; and Jessica Lewis, Dana Stroul, Lowell Schwartz, Sean Bartlett, Chris Barr, John Ryan, Leslie Bull, Danny Ricchetti, as well as Todd Womack, Rob Strayer, David Kinzler, and Ben Purser.

They were extraordinary in helping us reach this day.

Mr. CORKER. No question. I thank the Senator for those comments.

Our staffs have been remarkable, and the years of experience and knowledge they bring to this no doubt allowed us to do something so substantial in an amount of time, yet do so in a methodical way.

With that, I ask unanimous consent that the votes following the first vote in this series be 10 minutes in length.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

All time has expired.

VOTE ON AMENDMENT NO. 250, AS MODIFIED

The question now occurs on agreeing to amendment No. 250, as modified, offered by the Senator from Colorado, Mr. GARDNER.

Mr. BARRASSO. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant bill clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 94, nays 6, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 145 Leg.]

YEAS—94

Alexander	Franken	Nelson
Baldwin	Gardner	Paul
Barrasso	Gillibrand	Perdue
Bennet	Grassley	Peters
Blunt	Harris	Portman
Booker	Hassan	Reed
Boozman	Hatch	Risch
Brown	Heinrich	Roberts
Burr	Heitkamp	Rounds
Cantwell	Heller	Rubio
Capito	Hirono	Sanders
Cardin	Hoehn	Schatz
Carper	Inhofe	Schumer
Casey	Isakson	Scott
Cassidy	Johnson	Shaheen
Cochran	Kaine	Shelby
Collins	Kennedy	Stabenow
Coons	King	Strange
Corker	Klobuchar	Tester
Cornyn	Lankford	Thune
Cortez Masto	Leahy	Tillis
Cotton	Lee	Toomey
Crapo	Manchin	Udall
Cruz	Markey	Van Hollen
Daines	McCaskill	Warner
Donnelly	McConnell	Warren
Duckworth	Menendez	Whitehouse
Durbin	Merkley	Wicker
Enzi	Moran	Wyden
Feinstein	Murkowski	Young
Fischer	Murphy	
Flake	Murray	

NAYS—6

Blumenthal	Graham	Sasse
Ernst	McCain	Sullivan

The amendment (No. 250), as modified, was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

AMENDMENT NO. 240

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 minutes, evenly split between Senator CORKER and me, to speak on the NATO amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I would add that my fellow Ohioan, Senator PORTMAN, is a cosponsor of this. Special thanks go to Senator GRAHAM—this is the Graham-Brown NATO amendment—also to Senators MCCAIN, RUBIO, CASEY, and JACK REED and SHELDON WHITEHOUSE from Rhode Island.

This is especially important to the Ukrainian community in my State. A number of them have been in town the last couple of days. They know how critical support for our allies is and how important it is that this amendment sends a clear message that the United States will uphold our half-century commitment to NATO, combined with a strong signal to Russia to clean up its act. That is the importance of this amendment. I ask support from my colleagues.

I yield to Senator CORKER.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank all those involved in the message that is being sent. I support the amendment, and I urge a "yes" vote. Thank you.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on agreeing to amendment No. 240, offered by the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. CORKER.

Mr. CORKER. I ask for the yeas and nays.

- Sec. 273. Examining the counter-terror financing role of the Department of the Treasury in embassies.
- Sec. 274. Inclusion of Secretary of the Treasury on the National Security Council.
- Sec. 275. Inclusion of all funds.

PART III—DEFINITIONS

- Sec. 281. Definitions.
- Subtitle D—Rule of Construction
- Sec. 291. Rule of construction.
- Sec. 292. Sense of Senate on the strategic importance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.—The term “act of international terrorism” has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means a person that is not a United States person.

(4) IRANIAN PERSON.—The term “Iranian person” means—

(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.

(5) IRGC.—The term “IRGC” means Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

(6) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly” has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

(7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 3. REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL AND ASYMMETRIC IRANIAN THREATS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for deterring conventional and asymmetric Iranian activities and threats that directly threaten the United States and key allies in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include at a minimum the following:

(1) A summary of the near- and long-term United States objectives, plans, and means for countering Iran’s destabilizing activities, including identification of countries that share the objective of countering Iran’s destabilizing activities.

(2) A summary of the capabilities and contributions of individual countries to shared efforts to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities, and a summary of additional actions or contributions that each country could take to further contribute.

(3) An assessment of Iran’s conventional force capabilities and an assessment of Iran’s plans to upgrade its conventional force capabilities, including its acquisition, develop-

ment, and deployment of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime offensive and anti-access or area denial capabilities.

(4) An assessment of Iran’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities and an assessment of Iranian plans to upgrade its chemical or biological weapons capabilities.

(5) An assessment of Iran’s asymmetric activities in the region, including—

(A) the size, capabilities, and activities of the IRGC, including the Quds Force;

(B) the size, capabilities, and activities of Iran’s cyber operations;

(C) the types and amount of support, including funding, lethal and nonlethal contributions, and training, provided to Hezbollah, Hamas, special groups in Iraq, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Houthi fighters in Yemen, and other violent groups across the Middle East; and

(D) the scope and objectives of Iran’s information operations and use of propaganda.

(6) A summary of United States actions, unilaterally and in cooperation with foreign governments, to counter destabilizing Iranian activities, including—

(A) interdiction of Iranian lethal arms bound for groups designated as foreign terrorist organizations under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);

(B) Iran’s interference in international commercial shipping lanes;

(C) attempts by Iran to undermine or subvert internationally recognized governments in the Middle East region; and

(D) Iran’s support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, including—

(i) financial assistance, military equipment and personnel, and other support provided to that regime; and

(ii) support and direction to other armed actors that are not Syrian or Iranian and are acting on behalf of that regime.

(c) FORM OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 4. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should continue to implement Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass destruction delivery system proliferators and their supporters).

(b) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially contributes to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its ballistic missile program, or any other program in Iran for developing, deploying, or maintaining systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such capabilities;

(2) is a successor entity to a person referred to in paragraph (1);

(3) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person referred to in paragraph (1);

(4) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions that would otherwise be imposed pursuant to paragraph (3);

(5) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4); or

(6) knowingly provides or attempts to provide financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in sup-

port of, a person referred to in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4) or (5).

(c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President shall block, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person subject to subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.—The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to subsection (b) that is an alien.

(d) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(e) REPORT ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing each person that—

(A) has, during the period specified in paragraph (2), conducted any activity that has materially contributed to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its ballistic missile program, or any other program in Iran for developing, deploying, or maintaining systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such capabilities;

(B) is a successor entity to a person referred to in subparagraph (A);

(C) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person referred to in subparagraph (A);

(D) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions that could be imposed as a result of a relationship described in subparagraph (C);

(E) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D); or

(F) is known or believed to have provided, or attempted to provide, during the period specified in paragraph (2), financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, any material contribution to a program described in subparagraph (A) carried out by a person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).

(2) PERIOD SPECIFIED.—The period specified in this paragraph is—

(A) in the case of the first report submitted under paragraph (1), the period beginning January 1, 2016, and ending on the date the report is submitted; and

(B) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day period preceding the submission of the report.

(3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF TERRORISM-RELATED SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IRGC.

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The IRGC is subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); relating to blocking property of weapons of mass destruction delivery system proliferators and their supporters), the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), Executive Order 13553 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); relating to blocking property of certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of Iran), and Executive Order 13606 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); relating to blocking the property and suspending entry into the United States of certain persons with respect to grave human rights abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via information technology).

(2) The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—Quds Force (in this section referred to as the “IRGC—QF”) is the primary arm of the Government of Iran for executing its policy of supporting terrorist and insurgent groups. The IRGC—QF provides material, logistical assistance, training, and financial support to militants and terrorist operatives throughout the Middle East and South Asia and was designated for the imposition of sanctions by the Secretary of Treasury pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism) in October 2007 for its support of terrorism.

(3) The IRGC, not just the IRGC—QF, is responsible for implementing Iran’s international program of destabilizing activities, support for acts of international terrorism, and ballistic missile program.

(b) **IN GENERAL.**—Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to the IRGC and foreign persons that are officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC.

(c) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—The sanctions described in this subsection are sanctions applicable with respect to a foreign person pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism).

SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of each person the Secretary determines, based on credible evidence, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(1) is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed against individuals in Iran who seek—

(A) to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of the Government of Iran; or

(B) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the rights to a fair trial and democratic elections; or

(2) acts as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign person in a matter relating to an activity described in paragraph (1).

(b) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President may, in accordance with the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person on the list required by subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) **PENALTIES.**—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out paragraph (1) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

SEC. 7. ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGOS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subsection (d), the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any person that the President determines—

(1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer directly or indirectly to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts; or

(2) knowingly provides to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in paragraph (1).

(b) **SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.**—

(1) **BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.**—The President shall block, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) **EXCLUSION FROM UNITED STATES.**—The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to subsection (a) that is an alien.

(c) **PENALTIES.**—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(d) **EXCEPTION.**—The President is not required to impose sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person for engaging in an activity described in that subsection if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) permitting the activity is in the national security interest of the United States;

(2) Iran no longer presents a significant threat to the national security of the United States and to the allies of the United States; and

(3) the Government of Iran has ceased providing operational or financial support for acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

(e) **STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “state spon-

sor of terrorism” means a country the government of which the Secretary of State has determined to be a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism for purposes of—

(1) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4605(j)(1)(A)) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.);

(2) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a));

(3) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)); or

(4) any other provision of law.

SEC. 8. REVIEW OF APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN’S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a review of all persons on the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for activities relating to Iran—

(1) to assess the conduct of such persons as that conduct relates to—

(A) any activity that materially contributes to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its ballistic missile program; or

(B) support by the Government of Iran for acts of international terrorism; and

(2) to determine the applicability of sanctions with respect to such persons under—

(A) Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); relating to blocking property of weapons of mass destruction delivery system proliferators and their supporters); or

(B) Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism).

(b) **IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS.**—If the President determines under subsection (a) that sanctions under an Executive Order specified in paragraph (2) of that subsection are applicable with respect to a person, the President shall—

(1) impose sanctions with respect to that person pursuant to that Executive Order; or

(2) exercise the waiver authority provided under section 12.

SEC. 9. REPORT ON COORDINATION OF SANCTIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the following:

(1) A description of each instance, during the period specified in subsection (b)—

(A) in which the United States has imposed sanctions with respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in which the European Union has not imposed corresponding sanctions; and

(B) in which the European Union has imposed sanctions with respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in which the United States has not imposed corresponding sanctions.

(2) An explanation for the reason for each discrepancy between sanctions imposed by the European Union and sanctions imposed

by the United States described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).

(b) PERIOD SPECIFIED.—The period specified in this subsection is—

(1) in the case of the first report submitted under subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date the report is submitted; and

(2) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day period preceding the submission of the report.

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 10. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS DETAINED BY IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United States citizens, including United States citizens who are also citizens of other countries, detained by Iran or groups supported by Iran that includes—

(1) information regarding any officials of the Government of Iran involved in any way in the detentions; and

(2) a summary of efforts the United States Government has taken to secure the swift release of those United States citizens.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 11. EXCEPTIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE; RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The following activities shall be exempt from sanctions under sections 4, 5, 6, and 7:

(1) Any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such admission is necessary to comply with United States obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, or under the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or other applicable international obligations of the United States.

(3) The conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran, including engaging in a financial transaction relating to humanitarian assistance or for humanitarian purposes or transporting goods or services that are necessary to carry out operations relating to humanitarian assistance or humanitarian purposes.

(b) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—A requirement or the authority to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 shall not include the authority to impose sanctions with respect to the importation of goods.

(c) IMPLEMENTATION.—Except as provided in subsection (b), the President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this Act.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act (other than subsection (b)) shall be construed to limit the authority of the President under the International Emer-

gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY.—The term “agricultural commodity” has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).

(2) GOOD.—The term “good” has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).

(3) MEDICAL DEVICE.—The term “medical device” has the meaning given the term “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(4) MEDICINE.—The term “medicine” has the meaning given the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

SEC. 12. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY.

(a) CASE-BY-CASE WAIVER AUTHORITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive, on a case-by-case basis and for a period of not more than 180 days, a requirement under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 to impose or maintain sanctions with respect to a person, and may waive the continued imposition of such sanctions, not less than 30 days after the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to waive such sanctions.

(2) RENEWAL OF WAIVERS.—The President may, on a case-by-case basis, renew a waiver under paragraph (1) for an additional period of not more than 180 days if, not later than 15 days before that waiver expires, the President makes the determination and submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report described in paragraph (1).

(3) SUCCESSIVE RENEWAL.—The renewal authority provided under paragraph (2) may be exercised for additional successive periods of not more than 180 days if the President follows the procedures set forth in paragraph (2), and submits the report described in paragraph (1), for each such renewal.

(b) CONTENTS OF WAIVER REPORTS.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of sanctions under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 with respect to a person, or the renewal of such a waiver, shall include—

(1) a specific and detailed rationale for the determination that the waiver is vital to the national security interests of the United States;

(2) a description of the activity that resulted in the person being subject to sanctions;

(3) an explanation of any efforts made by the United States, as applicable, to secure the cooperation of the government with primary jurisdiction over the person or the location where the activity described in paragraph (2) occurred in terminating or, as appropriate, penalizing the activity; and

(4) an assessment of the significance of the activity described in paragraph (2) in contributing to the ability of Iran to threaten the interests of the United States or allies of the United States, develop systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, support acts of international terrorism, or violate the human rights of any person in Iran.

(c) EFFECT OF REPORT ON WAIVER.—If the President submits a report under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of sanctions under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 with respect to a person, or the renewal of such a waiver, the President shall not be required to impose or maintain sanctions under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8, as applicable, with respect to the person described in the report during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a).

TITLE II—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the “Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017”.

Subtitle A—Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian Federation

SEC. 211. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on those determined to be undermining democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine or threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. President Obama subsequently issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) and Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) to expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine.

(2) On December 18, 2014, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 was enacted (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.), which includes provisions directing the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons that the President determines to be entities owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation or nationals of the Russian Federation that manufacture, sell, transfer, or otherwise provide certain defense articles into Syria.

(3) On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on persons determined to be engaged in malicious cyber-hacking.

(4) On July 26, 2016, President Obama approved a Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident Coordination, which states, “certain cyber incidents that have significant impacts on an entity, our national security, or the broader economy require a unique approach to response efforts”.

(5) On December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an annex to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on the following entities and individuals:

(A) The Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie or the GRU) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(B) The Federal Security Service (also known as Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(C) The Special Technology Center (also known as STLC, Ltd. Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation.

(D) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(E) The autonomous noncommercial organization known as the Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) in Moscow, Russian Federation.

(F) Igor Valentinovich Korobov.

(G) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov.

(H) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov.

(I) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev.

(6) On January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United States intelligence community entitled, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections” stated, “Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential election.” The assessment warns that “Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the U.S. Presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election processes”.

SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the President—

(1) should engage to the fullest extent possible with partner governments with regard to closing loopholes, including the allowance of extended prepayment for the delivery of goods and commodities and other loopholes, in multilateral and unilateral restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, with the aim of maximizing alignment of those measures; and

(2) should increase efforts to vigorously enforce compliance with sanctions in place as of the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to the Russian Federation in response to the crisis in eastern Ukraine, cyber intrusions and attacks, and human rights violators in the Russian Federation.

PART I—CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 215. SHORT TITLE.

The part may be cited as the “Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017”.

SEC. 216. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED ACTION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that action.

(2) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in this paragraph is—

(i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions described in subparagraph (B);

(ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an action to waive the application of those sanctions with respect to that person; or

(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United States’ foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.

(B) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subparagraph are—

(i) sanctions provided for under—

(I) this title or any provision of law amended by this title, including the Executive Orders codified under section 222;

(II) the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.); or

(III) the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.); and

(ii) the prohibition on access to the properties of the Government of the Russian Federation located in Maryland and New York that the President ordered vacated on December 29, 2016.

(3) DESCRIPTION OF TYPE OF ACTION.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the action—

(A) is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation; or

(B) is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.

(4) INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL MATTER.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation shall include a description of—

(i) the significant alteration to United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation;

(ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national security interests of the United States; and

(iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions affected by the action were initially imposed.

(B) REQUESTS FROM BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEES.—The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives may request the submission to the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.

(b) PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—During the period of 30 calendar days beginning on the date on which the President submits a report under subsection (a)(1)—

(A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report; and

(B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report.

(2) EXCEPTION.—The period for congressional review under paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in any calendar year.

(3) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the period for congressional review provided for under paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including any additional period for such review as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to that action is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).

(4) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that

action for a period of 12 calendar days after the date of passage of the joint resolution of disapproval.

(5) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRESSIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint resolution, the President may not take that action for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the President’s veto.

(6) EFFECT OF ENACTMENT OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action.

(c) JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR APPROVAL DEFINED.—In this subsection:

(1) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.—The term “joint resolution of approval” means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(A) the title of which is as follows: “A joint resolution approving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation.”; and

(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: “Congress approves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _____ relating to _____,” with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.

(2) JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—The term “joint resolution of disapproval” means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—

(A) the title of which is as follows: “A joint resolution disapproving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation.”; and

(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: “Congress disapproves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _____ relating to _____,” with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.

(3) INTRODUCTION.—During the period of 30 calendar days provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any additional period as applicable under the exception provided in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced—

(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader or the minority leader; and

(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader’s designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader’s designee).

(4) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

(A) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred

has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.

(B) **PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.**—Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or has been discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in the House. All points of order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after the House has disposed of a motion to proceed on the joint resolution. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.

(C) **CONSIDERATION.**—The joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be considered as read. All points of order against the joint resolution and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall not be in order.

(5) **CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.**—

(A) **COMMITTEE REFERRAL.**—A joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate shall be—

(i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs if the joint resolution relates to a report under section 216 A3 that is described as an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation; and

(ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations if the joint resolution relates to a report under section 216 A3 that is described as an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to the Russian Federation.

(B) **REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.**—If the committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval was referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.

(C) **PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.**—Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.

(D) **RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCEDURE.**—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a joint resolution of approval or

joint resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.

(E) **CONSIDERATION OF VETO MESSAGES.**—Debate in the Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(6) **RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.**—

(A) **COORDINATION WITH ACTION BY OTHER HOUSE.**—If, before the passage by one House of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval of that House, that House receives an identical joint resolution from the other House, the following procedures shall apply:

(i) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee.

(ii) With respect to the joint resolution of the House receiving the joint resolution from the other House—

(I) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the other House; but

(II) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution of the other House.

(B) **TREATMENT OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF OTHER HOUSE.**—If one House fails to introduce a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval of the other House shall be entitled to expedited procedures in that House under this subsection.

(C) **TREATMENT OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION IN SENATE.**—If, following passage of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, that joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate calendar.

(D) **APPLICATION TO REVENUE MEASURES.**—The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.

(7) **RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE.**—This subsection is enacted by Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(d) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND LEADERSHIP DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees and leadership” means—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

PART II—SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

In this part:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) **GOOD.**—The term “good” has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).

(3) **INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.**—The term “international financial institution” has the meaning given that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).

(4) **KNOWINGLY.**—The term “knowingly”, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(5) **PERSON.**—The term “person” means an individual or entity.

(6) **UNITED STATES PERSON.**—The term “United States person” means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 222. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **CODIFICATION.**—United States sanctions provided for in Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine), Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), and Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, including with respect to all persons sanctioned under such Executive Orders, shall remain in effect except as provided in subsection (b).

(b) **TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS.**—Subject to section 216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions described in subsection (a) that are imposed on a person in connection with activity conducted by the person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions described in subsection (a) in the future.

(c) **APPLICATION OF NEW CYBER SANCTIONS.**—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive

Order 13694 or 13757 only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

(d) APPLICATION OF NEW UKRAINE-RELATED SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive Order 13660, 13661, 13662, or 13685 only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

SEC. 223. MODIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13662.

(a) DETERMINATION THAT CERTAIN ENTITIES ARE SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury may determine that a person meets one or more of the criteria in section 1(a) of Executive Order 13662 if that person is a state-owned entity operating in the railway, shipping, or metals and mining sector of the economy of the Russian Federation.

(b) MODIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE 1 WITH RESPECT TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ECONOMY.—The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the conduct by United States persons or persons within the United States of all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 14 days maturity or new equity of persons determined to be subject to the directive, their property, or their interests in property.

(c) MODIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE 2 WITH RESPECT TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ECONOMY.—The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 2 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the conduct by United States persons or persons within the United States of all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of persons determined to be subject to the directive, their property, or their interests in property.

(d) MODIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE 4.—The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 4, dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or indirectly, by United States persons or persons within the United States, of goods, services (except for

financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects—

(1) that have the potential to produce oil; (2) in which a Russian energy firm is involved; and

(3) that involve any person determined to be subject to the directive or the property or interests in property of such a person.

SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

(1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any person that the President determines—

(A) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution, or government on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(B) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person described in subparagraph (A);

(2) impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services (except financial services) in support of, an activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and

(3) impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section 4(c) of the of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923(c)) with respect to any person that the President determines knowingly provides financial services in support of an activity described in paragraph (1)(A).

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION.—In the case of an alien determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1), denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.

(c) APPLICATION OF NEW CYBER SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application under subsection (a) of sanctions with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

(d) SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES UNDERMINING CYBERSECURITY DEFINED.—In this section, the term “significant activities undermining cybersecurity” includes—

(1) significant efforts—

(A) to deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an information and communications technology system or network; or

(B) to exfiltrate, degrade, corrupt, destroy, or release information from such a system or network without authorization for purposes of—

(i) conducting influence operations; or

(ii) causing a significant misappropriation of funds, economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifications, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain;

(2) significant destructive malware attacks; and

(3) significant denial of service activities.

SEC. 225. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO SPECIAL RUSSIAN CRUDE OIL PROJECTS.

Section 4(b)(1) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923(b)(1)) is amended by striking “on and after the date that is 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose” and inserting “on and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, the President shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so,”.

SEC. 226. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking “may impose” and inserting “shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so,”; and

(B) by striking “on or after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting “on or after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017”; and

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking “may impose” and inserting “shall impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so,”; and

(B) by striking “on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting “on or after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017”.

SEC. 227. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SIGNIFICANT CORRUPTION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

Section 9 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908(a)) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “is authorized and encouraged to” and inserting “shall”; and

(B) in paragraph (1)—

(i) by striking “President determines is” and inserting “President determines is, on or after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017,”; and

(ii) by inserting “or elsewhere” after “in the Russian Federation”;

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e);

(3) in subsection (c), by striking “The President” and inserting “except as provided in subsection (d), the President”; and

(4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application

of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a written determination that the waiver—

“(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

“(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and

“(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.”.

SEC. 228. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS EVADERS AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 10. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS THAT EVADE SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that the foreign person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017—

“(1) materially violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition contained in or issued pursuant to any covered Executive order; or

“(2) facilitates significant deceptive or structured transactions for or on behalf of—

“(A) any person subject to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian Federation; or

“(B) any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of an individual described in subparagraph (A).

“(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(c) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

“(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b).

“(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out subsection (b) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

“(d) APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application

of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a written determination that the waiver—

“(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

“(B) will further the enforcement of this Act;

“(2) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section in connection with a covered Executive order described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of subsection (f)(1), a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine; and

“(3) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section in connection with a covered Executive order described in subparagraphs (E) or (F) of subsection (f)(1), a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

“(e) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

“(2) a notice that—

“(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.

“(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) COVERED EXECUTIVE ORDER.—The term ‘covered Executive order’ means any of the following:

“(A) Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine).

“(B) Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine).

“(C) Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine).

“(D) Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine).

“(E) Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).

“(F) Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).

“(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign person’ has the meaning given such term in section 595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017).

“(3) STRUCTURED.—The term ‘structured’, with respect to a transaction, has the meaning given the term ‘structure’ in paragraph (xx) of section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of

Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

“SEC. 11. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

“(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that the foreign person, based on credible information, on or after the date of the enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017—

“(1) is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation;

“(2) materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or

“(3) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).

“(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

“(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

“(2) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION.—In the case of an alien determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a), denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.

“(c) APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a written determination that the waiver—

“(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

“(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and

“(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made efforts to reduce serious human rights abuses in territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by that Government.

“(d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

“(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).

“(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out subsection (b)(1) shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

“(e) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017,

the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

“(2) a notice—

“(A) that—

“(i) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future; or

“(B) that the President determines that insufficient basis exists for the determination by the President under subsection (a) with respect to the person.”

(b) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Section 2(2) of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901(2)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting “the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,” before “the Committee on Foreign Relations”; and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting “the Committee on Financial Services” before “the Committee on Foreign Affairs”.

SEC. 229. NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS UNDER UKRAINE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2014.

(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO DEFENSE AND ENERGY SECTORS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.—Section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections (h) and (i), respectively;

(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:

“(g) NOTIFICATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS.—

“(1) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a) or (b).

“(2) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN PRODUCERS, TRANSFERORS, OR BROKERS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a)(2) with respect to a foreign person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

“(A) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

“(B) a notice that—

“(i) the foreign person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that the foreign person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a)(2) in the future.”; and

(3) in subparagraph (B)(ii) of subsection (a)(3), by striking “subsection (h)” and inserting “subsection (i)”.

(b) SANCTIONS ON RUSSIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively;

(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:

“(e) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days after

imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign financial institution under subsection (a) or (b).”; and

(3) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by striking “section 4(h)” and inserting “section 4(i)”.

SEC. 230. STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) SANCTIONS RELATING TO UNDERMINING THE PEACE, SECURITY, STABILITY, SOVEREIGNTY, OR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF UKRAINE.—Section 8 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8907) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

“(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.”

(b) SANCTIONS RELATING TO CORRUPTION.—Section 9 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) TERMINATION.—Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice that—

“(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.”

SEC. 231. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS ENGAGING IN TRANSACTIONS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE OR DEFENSE SECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to a person the President determines knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, engages in a significant transaction with a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, including the Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.

(b) APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.

SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PIPELINES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment described in subsection (b) or sells, leases, or provides to the Russian Federation, for the construction of Russian energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology, information, or support described in subsection (c)—

(1) any of which has a fair market value of \$1,000,000 or more; or

(2) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of \$5,000,000 or more.

(b) INVESTMENT DESCRIBED.—An investment described in this subsection is an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines.

(c) GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.—Goods, services, technology, information, or support described in this subsection are goods, services, technology, information, or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of energy pipelines by the Russian Federation.

SEC. 233. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENT IN OR FACILITATION OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ASSETS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 235 if the President determines that a person, with actual knowledge, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment of \$10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not less than \$1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds \$10,000,000 in any 12-month period), or facilitates such an investment, if the investment directly and significantly contributes to the ability of the Russian Federation to privatize state-owned assets in a manner that unjustly benefits—

(1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(2) close associates or family members of those officials.

(b) APPLICATION OF NEW SANCTIONS.—The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver—

(A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or

(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and

(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

SEC. 234. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL TO SYRIA.

(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose on a foreign person the sanctions described in subsection (b) if the President determines that such foreign person has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria significant financial, material, or technological support that contributes materially to the ability of the Government of Syria to—

(A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies;

(B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile capabilities;

(C) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons;

(D) acquire significant defense articles, defense services, or defense information (as such terms are defined under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or

(E) acquire items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

(2) APPLICABILITY TO OTHER FOREIGN PERSONS.—The sanctions described in subsection (b) shall also be imposed on any foreign person that—

(A) is a successor entity to a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or

(B) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be imposed on a foreign person described in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President shall exercise all powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES.—If the foreign person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, the foreign person.

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The issuing consular officer, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued to the foreign person regardless of when issued.

(ii) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A revocation under clause (i) shall take effect immediately and shall automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the foreign person.

(c) WAIVER.—Subject to section 216, the President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) FINANCIAL, MATERIAL, OR TECHNOLOGICAL SUPPORT.—The term “financial, material, or technological support” has the meaning given such term in section 542.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” has the meaning given such term in section 594.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

(3) SYRIA.—The term “Syria” has the meaning given such term in section 542.316 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

SEC. 235. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.

(a) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be imposed with respect to a person under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), or 233(a) are the following:

(1) EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ASSISTANCE FOR EXPORTS TO SANCTIONED PERSONS.—The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States not to give approval to the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in the extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to the sanctioned person.

(2) EXPORT SANCTION.—The President may order the United States Government not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the sanctioned person under—

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.));

(B) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); or

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services.

(3) LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The President may prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the sanctioned person totaling more than \$10,000,000 in any 12-month period unless the person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such activities.

(4) LOANS FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The President may direct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the international financial institution that would benefit the sanctioned person.

(5) PROHIBITIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The following prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if that person is a financial institution:

(A) PROHIBITION ON DESIGNATION AS PRIMARY DEALER.—Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the continuation of any prior designation of, the financial institution as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments.

(B) PROHIBITION ON SERVICE AS A REPOSITORY OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS.—The financial institution may not serve as agent of the United States Government or serve as repository for United States Government funds.

The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be treated as 1 sanction for purposes of subsection (b), and the imposition of both such sanctions shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b).

(6) PROCUREMENT SANCTION.—The United States Government may not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.

(7) FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and

in which the sanctioned person has any interest.

(8) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the sanctioned person.

(9) PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any person from—

(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting any property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with respect to which the sanctioned person has any interest;

(B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to such property; or

(C) conducting any transaction involving such property.

(10) BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON.—The President may, pursuant to such regulations or guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the sanctioned person.

(11) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.—The President may direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, the sanctioned person.

(12) SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.—The President may impose on the principal executive officer or officers of the sanctioned person, or on persons performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this subsection.

(b) SANCTIONED PERSON DEFINED.—In this section, the term “sanctioned person” means a person subject to sanctions under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), or 233(a).

SEC. 236. EXCEPTIONS, WAIVER, AND TERMINATION.

(a) EXCEPTIONS.—The provisions of this part and amendments made by this part shall not apply with respect to the following:

(1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.

(2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such admission is necessary to comply with United States obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, under the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other international agreements.

(b) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—No requirement to impose sanctions under this part or an amendment made by this part shall include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(c) WAIVER OF SANCTIONS THAT ARE IMPOSED.—Subject to section 216, if the President imposes sanctions with respect to a person under this part or the amendments made by this part, the President may waive the application of those sanctions if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

(d) **TERMINATION.**—Subject to section 216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions under section 224, 231, 232, 233, or 234 with respect to a person if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and

(2) a notice that—

(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and

(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to sanctions under this part in the future.

SEC. 237. EXCEPTION RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not apply with respect to activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

(b) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to authorize the imposition of any sanction or other condition, limitation, restriction, or prohibition, that directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Russian Federation of any product or service, or the procurement of such product or service by any contractor or subcontractor of the United States or any other entity, relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for—

(1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; or

(2) any other non-Department of Defense customer.

SEC. 238. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this part or the amendments made by this part shall be construed—

(1) to supersede the limitations or exceptions on the use of rocket engines for national security purposes under section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113-291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note), as amended by section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1100) and section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2582); or

(2) to prohibit a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Defense from acquiring components referred to in such section 1608.

PART III—REPORTS

SEC. 241. REPORT ON OLIGARCHS AND PARASTATAL ENTITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the following:

(1) Senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, including the following:

(A) An identification of the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth.

(B) An assessment of the relationship between individuals identified under subparagraph (A) and President Vladimir Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite.

(C) An identification of any indices of corruption with respect to those individuals.

(D) The estimated net worth and known sources of income of those individuals and

their family members (including spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets, investments, other business interests, and relevant beneficial ownership information.

(E) An identification of the non-Russian business affiliations of those individuals.

(2) Russian parastatal entities, including an assessment of the following:

(A) The emergence of Russian parastatal entities and their role in the economy of the Russian Federation.

(B) The leadership structures and beneficial ownership of those entities.

(C) The scope of the non-Russian business affiliations of those entities.

(3) The exposure of key economic sectors of the United States to Russian politically exposed persons and parastatal entities, including, at a minimum, the banking, securities, insurance, and real estate sectors.

(4) The likely effects of imposing debt and equity restrictions on Russian parastatal entities, as well as the anticipated effects of adding Russian parastatal entities to the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.

(5) The potential impacts of imposing secondary sanctions with respect to Russian oligarchs, Russian state-owned enterprises, and Russian parastatal entities, including impacts on the entities themselves and on the economy of the Russian Federation, as well as on the economies of the United States and allies of the United States.

(b) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(c) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) **SENIOR FOREIGN POLITICAL FIGURE.**—The term “senior foreign political figure” has the meaning given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

SEC. 242. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS TO INCLUDE SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing in detail the potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), or any successor directive, to include sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.

(b) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(c) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on For-

ign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 243. REPORT ON ILLICIT FINANCE RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than the end of each one-year period thereafter until 2021, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing interagency efforts in the United States to combat illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall contain a summary of efforts by the United States to do the following:

(1) Identify, investigate, map, and disrupt illicit financial flows linked to the Russian Federation if such flows affect the United States financial system or those of major allies of the United States.

(2) Conduct outreach to the private sector, including information sharing efforts to strengthen compliance efforts by entities, including financial institutions, to prevent illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1).

(3) Engage and coordinate with allied international partners on illicit finance, especially in Europe, to coordinate efforts to uncover and prosecute the networks responsible for illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1), including examples of that engagement and coordination.

(4) Identify foreign sanctions evaders and loopholes within the sanctions regimes of foreign partners of the United States.

(5) Expand the number of real estate geographic targeting orders or other regulatory actions, as appropriate, to degrade illicit financial activity relating to the Russian Federation in relation to the financial system of the United States.

(6) Provide support to counter those involved in illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation across all appropriate law enforcement, intelligence, regulatory, and financial authorities of the Federal Government, including by imposing sanctions with respect to or prosecuting those involved.

(7) In the case of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Justice, investigate or otherwise develop major cases, including a description of those cases.

(c) **BRIEFING.**—After submitting a report under this section, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to that report.

(d) **COORDINATION.**—The Secretary of the Treasury shall coordinate with the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of State in preparing each report under this section.

(e) **FORM.**—Each report submitted under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(f) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) **ILLICIT FINANCE.**—The term “illicit finance” means the financing of terrorism,

narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the President.

Subtitle B—Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

SEC. 251. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of the Russian Federation has sought to exert influence throughout Europe and Eurasia, including in the former states of the Soviet Union, by providing resources to political parties, think tanks, and civil society groups that sow distrust in democratic institutions and actors, promote xenophobic and illiberal views, and otherwise undermine European unity. The Government of the Russian Federation has also engaged in well-documented corruption practices as a means toward undermining and buying influence in European and Eurasian countries.

(2) The Government of the Russian Federation has largely eliminated a once-vibrant Russian-language independent media sector and severely curtails free and independent media within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russian-language media organizations that are funded and controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation and disseminate information within and outside of the Russian Federation routinely traffic in anti-Western disinformation, while few independent, fact-based media sources provide objective reporting for Russian-speaking audiences inside or outside of the Russian Federation.

(3) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to violate its commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the "Helsinki Final Act"), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, of which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.

(4) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to ignore the terms of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement relating to Georgia, which requires the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops, free access by humanitarian groups to the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and monitoring of the conflict areas by the European Union Monitoring Mission.

(5) The Government of the Russian Federation is failing to comply with the terms of the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, as well as the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014.

(6) The Government of the Russian Federation is—

(A) in violation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 (commonly known as the "INF Treaty"); and

(B) failing to meet its obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into force January 1, 2002 (commonly known as the "Open Skies Treaty").

SEC. 252. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the Russian Federation bears responsibility for the continuing violence in Eastern Ukraine, including the death on April 24, 2017, of Joseph Stone, a citizen of the United States working as a monitor for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;

(2) the President should call on the Government of the Russian Federation—

(A) to withdraw all of its forces from the territories of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova;

(B) to return control of the borders of those territories to their respective governments; and

(C) to cease all efforts to undermine the popularly elected governments of those countries;

(3) the Government of the Russian Federation has applied, and continues to apply, to the countries and peoples of Georgia and Ukraine, traditional uses of force, intelligence operations, and influence campaigns, which represent clear and present threats to the countries of Europe and Eurasia;

(4) in response, the countries of Europe and Eurasia should redouble efforts to build resilience within their institutions, political systems, and civil societies;

(5) the United States supports the institutions that the Government of the Russian Federation seeks to undermine, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union;

(6) a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization is critical to maintaining peace and security in Europe and Eurasia;

(7) the United States should continue to work with the European Union as a partner against aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation, coordinating aid programs, development assistance, and other counter-Russian efforts;

(8) the United States should encourage the establishment of a commission for media freedom within the Council of Europe, modeled on the Venice Commission regarding rule of law issues, that would be chartered to provide governments with expert recommendations on maintaining legal and regulatory regimes supportive of free and independent media and an informed citizenry able to distinguish between fact-based reporting, opinion, and disinformation;

(9) in addition to working to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, the United States should work with the individual countries of Europe and Eurasia—

(A) to identify vulnerabilities to aggression, disinformation, corruption, and so-called hybrid warfare by the Government of the Russian Federation;

(B) to establish strategic and technical plans for addressing those vulnerabilities;

(C) to ensure that the financial systems of those countries are not being used to shield illicit financial activity by officials of the Government of the Russian Federation or individuals in President Vladimir Putin's inner circle who have been enriched through corruption;

(D) to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption by Russian actors; and

(E) to work toward full compliance with the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (commonly referred to as the "Anti-Bribery Convention") of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; and

(10) the President of the United States should use the authority of the President to impose sanctions under—

(A) the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 112-208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note); and

(B) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

SEC. 253. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

The United States, consistent with the principle of *ex injuria jus non oritur*, supports the policy known as the "Stimson Doctrine" and thus does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Transnistria.

SEC. 254. COORDINATING AID AND ASSISTANCE ACROSS EUROPE AND EURASIA.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund \$250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

(b) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund shall be used to effectively implement, prioritized in the following order and subject to the availability of funds, the following goals:

(1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following countries:

(A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of State determines—

(i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation; and

(ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of the United States.

(B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.

(2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

(4) To improve participatory legislative processes and legal education, political transparency and competition, and compliance with international obligations in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthful information, and operate freely in all regions in the countries described in paragraph (1).

(6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the functions specified in section 1287(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) for the purposes of recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering propaganda and disinformation efforts by foreign governments, in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State.

(c) REVISION OF ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH AMOUNTS MAY BE USED.—The Secretary of State may modify the goals described in subsection (b) if, not later than 15 days before revising such a goal, the Secretary notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the revision.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (authorized pursuant to section 601 of the Support for East European Democracy

(SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5461) and section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)), and in consultation with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, coordinate and carry out activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b).

(2) **METHOD.**—Activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) shall be carried out through—

(A) initiatives of the United States Government;

(B) Federal grant programs such as the Information Access Fund; or

(C) nongovernmental or international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Black Sea Trust, the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the Prague Civil Society Centre, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, the European Endowment for Democracy, and related organizations.

(3) **REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of State, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs and activities carried out to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) during the preceding fiscal year.

(B) **ELEMENTS.**—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to each program or activity described in that subparagraph—

(i) the amount of funding for the program or activity;

(ii) the goal described in subsection (b) to which the program or activity relates; and

(iii) an assessment of whether or not the goal was met.

(e) **COORDINATION WITH GLOBAL PARTNERS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—In order to maximize cost efficiency, eliminate duplication, and speed the achievement of the goals described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordination with—

(A) the European Union and its institutions;

(B) the governments of countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union; and

(C) international organizations and quasi-governmental funding entities that carry out programs and activities that seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b).

(2) **REPORT BY SECRETARY OF STATE.**—Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—

(A) the amount of funding provided to each country referred to in subsection (b) by—

(i) the European Union or its institutions;

(ii) the government of each country that is a member of the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and

(iii) international organizations and quasi-governmental funding entities that carry out programs and activities that seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b); and

(B) an assessment of whether the funding described in subparagraph (A) is commensurate with funding provided by the United States for those goals.

(f) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to or limit United States foreign assistance not provided using amounts available in the Countering Russian Influence Fund.

(g) **ENSURING ADEQUATE STAFFING FOR GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES.**—In order to ensure that the United States Government is properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of law, and building the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall establish a pilot program for Foreign Service officer positions focused on governance and anticorruption activities in such countries.

SEC. 255. REPORT ON MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLLED AND FUNDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a description of media organizations that are controlled and funded by the Government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.

(b) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 256. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS IN EUROPE AND EURASIA.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on funds provided by, or funds the use of which was directed by, the Government of the Russian Federation or any Russian person with the intention of influencing the outcome of any election or campaign in any country in Europe or Eurasia during the preceding year, including through direct support to any political party, candidate, lobbying campaign, nongovernmental organization, or civic organization.

(b) **FORM OF REPORT.**—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(c) **RUSSIAN PERSON DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “Russian person” means—

(1) an individual who is a citizen or national of the Russian Federation; or

(2) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian Federation or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation.

SEC. 257. UKRAINIAN ENERGY SECURITY.

(a) **STATEMENT OF POLICY.**—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereign and territorial integrity;

(2) to condemn and oppose all of the destabilizing efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in violation of its obligations and international commitments;

(3) to never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of military force;

(4) to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus;

(5) to assist in promoting reform in regulatory oversight and operations in Ukraine’s

energy sector, including the establishment and empowerment of an independent regulatory organization;

(6) to encourage and support fair competition, market liberalization, and reliability in Ukraine’s energy sector;

(7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and partners in Europe reduce their dependence on Russian energy resources, especially natural gas, which the Government of the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to coerce, intimidate, and influence other countries;

(8) to work with European Union member states and European Union institutions to promote energy security through developing diversified and liberalized energy markets that provide diversified sources, suppliers, and routes;

(9) to continue to oppose the NordStream 2 pipeline given its detrimental impacts on the European Union’s energy security, gas market development in Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine; and

(10) that the United States Government should prioritize the export of United States energy resources in order to create American jobs, help United States allies and partners, and strengthen United States foreign policy.

(b) **PLAN TO PROMOTE ENERGY SECURITY IN UKRAINE.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the Secretary of Energy, shall work with the Government of Ukraine to develop a plan to increase energy security in Ukraine, increase the amount of energy produced in Ukraine, and reduce Ukraine’s reliance on energy imports from the Russian Federation.

(2) **ELEMENTS.**—The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall include strategies for market liberalization, effective regulation and oversight, supply diversification, energy reliability, and energy efficiency, such as through supporting—

(A) the promotion of advanced technology and modern operating practices in Ukraine’s oil and gas sector;

(B) modern geophysical and meteorological survey work as needed followed by international tenders to help attract qualified investment into exploration and development of areas with untapped resources in Ukraine;

(C) a broadening of Ukraine’s electric power transmission interconnection with Europe;

(D) the strengthening of Ukraine’s capability to maintain electric power grid stability and reliability;

(E) independent regulatory oversight and operations of Ukraine’s gas market and electricity sector;

(F) the implementation of primary gas law including pricing, tariff structure, and legal regulatory implementation;

(G) privatization of government owned energy companies through credible legal frameworks and a transparent process compliant with international best practices;

(H) procurement and transport of emergency fuel supplies, including reverse pipeline flows from Europe;

(I) provision of technical assistance for crisis planning, crisis response, and public outreach;

(J) repair of infrastructure to enable the transport of fuel supplies;

(K) repair of power generating or power transmission equipment or facilities; and

(L) improved building energy efficiency and other measures designed to reduce energy demand in Ukraine.

(3) **REPORTS.**—

(A) **IMPLEMENTATION OF UKRAINE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2014 PROVISIONS.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment

of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the status of implementing the provisions required under section 7(c) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926(c)), including detailing the plans required under that section, the level of funding that has been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth under that section, and progress that has been made in implementing the strategies developed pursuant to that section.

(B) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the plan developed under paragraph (1), the level of funding that has been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth in paragraph (2), and progress that has been made in implementing the strategies.

(C) **BRIEFINGS.**—The Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall brief the appropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days after the submission of each report under subparagraph (B). In addition, the Department of State shall make relevant officials available upon request to brief the appropriate congressional committees on all available information that relates directly or indirectly to Ukraine or energy security in Eastern Europe.

(D) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this paragraph, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(i) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(C) **SUPPORTING EFFORTS OF COUNTRIES IN EUROPE AND EURASIA TO DECREASE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN SOURCES OF ENERGY.**—

(1) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following findings:

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation uses its strong position in the energy sector as leverage to manipulate the internal politics and foreign relations of the countries of Europe and Eurasia.

(B) This influence is based not only on the Russian Federation’s oil and natural gas resources, but also on its state-owned nuclear power and electricity companies.

(2) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) the United States should assist the efforts of the countries of Europe and Eurasia to enhance their energy security through diversification of energy supplies in order to lessen dependencies on Russian Federation energy resources and state-owned entities; and

(B) the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation should play key roles in supporting critical energy projects that contribute to that goal.

(3) **USE OF COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.**—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to provide technical advice to countries described in subsection (b)(1) of such section designed to enhance energy security and lessen dependence on energy from Russian Federation sources.

(d) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State a total of \$30,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 to carry out the strategies set forth in subsection (b)(2) and other activities under this section related to the promotion of energy security in Ukraine.

(e) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the responsibilities required and authorities provided under section 7 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926).

SEC. 258. TERMINATION.

The provisions of this subtitle shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 259. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

Except as otherwise provided, in this subtitle, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Subtitle C—Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing

PART I—NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORIST AND OTHER ILLICIT FINANCING

SEC. 261. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President, acting through the Secretary, shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the appropriate Federal banking agencies and Federal functional regulators, develop a national strategy for combating the financing of terrorism and related forms of illicit finance.

(b) **TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive national strategy developed in accordance with subsection (a).

(2) **UPDATES.**—Not later than January 31, 2020, and January 31, 2022, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees updated versions of the national strategy submitted under paragraph (1).

(c) **SEPARATE PRESENTATION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.**—Any part of the national strategy that involves information that is properly classified under criteria established by the President shall be submitted to Congress separately in a classified annex and, if requested by the chairman or ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees, as a briefing at an appropriate level of security.

SEC. 262. CONTENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

The strategy described in section 261 shall contain the following:

(1) **EVALUATION OF EXISTING EFFORTS.**—An assessment of the effectiveness of and ways in which the United States is currently addressing the highest levels of risk of various forms of illicit finance, including those identified in the documents entitled “2015 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment” and “2015 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment”, published by the Department of the Treasury and a description of how the strategy is integrated into, and supports, the broader counter terrorism strategy of the United States.

(2) **GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND PRIORITIES.**—A comprehensive, research-based, long-range,

quantifiable discussion of goals, objectives, and priorities for disrupting and preventing illicit finance activities within and transiting the financial system of the United States that outlines priorities to reduce the incidence, dollar value, and effects of illicit finance.

(3) **THREATS.**—An identification of the most significant illicit finance threats to the financial system of the United States.

(4) **REVIEWS AND PROPOSED CHANGES.**—Reviews of enforcement efforts, relevant regulations and relevant provisions of law and, if appropriate, discussions of proposed changes determined to be appropriate to ensure that the United States pursues coordinated and effective efforts at all levels of government, and with international partners of the United States, in the fight against illicit finance.

(5) **DETECTION AND PROSECUTION INITIATIVES.**—A description of efforts to improve, as necessary, detection and prosecution of illicit finance, including efforts to ensure that—

(A) subject to legal restrictions, all appropriate data collected by the Federal Government that is relevant to the efforts described in this section be available in a timely fashion to—

(i) all appropriate Federal departments and agencies; and

(ii) as appropriate and consistent with section 314 of the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (31 U.S.C. 5311 note), to financial institutions to assist the financial institutions in efforts to comply with laws aimed at curbing illicit finance; and

(B) appropriate efforts are undertaken to ensure that Federal departments and agencies charged with reducing and preventing illicit finance make thorough use of publicly available data in furtherance of this effort.

(6) **THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN PREVENTION OF ILLICIT FINANCE.**—A discussion of ways to enhance partnerships between the private financial sector and Federal departments and agencies with regard to the prevention and detection of illicit finance, including—

(A) efforts to facilitate compliance with laws aimed at stopping such illicit finance while maintaining the effectiveness of such efforts; and

(B) providing guidance to strengthen internal controls and to adopt on an industry-wide basis more effective policies.

(7) **ENHANCEMENT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION.**—A discussion of ways to combat illicit finance by enhancing—

(A) cooperative efforts between and among Federal, State, and local officials, including State regulators, State and local prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials; and

(B) cooperative efforts with and between governments of countries and with and between multinational institutions with expertise in fighting illicit finance, including the Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.

(8) **TREND ANALYSIS OF EMERGING ILLICIT FINANCE THREATS.**—A discussion of and data regarding trends in illicit finance, including evolving forms of value transfer such as so-called cryptocurrencies, other methods that are computer, telecommunications, or Internet-based, cyber crime, or any other threats that the Secretary may choose to identify.

(9) **BUDGET PRIORITIES.**—A multiyear budget plan that identifies sufficient resources needed to successfully execute the full range of missions called for in this section.

(10) **TECHNOLOGY ENHANCEMENTS.**—An analysis of current and developing ways to leverage technology to improve the effectiveness

of efforts to stop the financing of terrorism and other forms of illicit finance, including better integration of open-source data.

PART II—ENHANCING ANTITERRORISM TOOLS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

SEC. 271. IMPROVING ANTITERROR FINANCE MONITORING OF FUNDS TRANSFERS.

(a) STUDY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—To improve the ability of the Department of the Treasury to better track cross-border fund transfers and identify potential financing of terrorist or other forms of illicit finance, the Secretary shall carry out a study to assess—

(A) the potential efficacy of requiring banking regulators to establish a pilot program to provide technical assistance to depository institutions and credit unions that wish to provide account services to money services businesses serving individuals in Somalia;

(B) whether such a pilot program could be a model for improving the ability of United States persons to make legitimate funds transfers through transparent and easily monitored channels while preserving strict compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (Public Law 91-508; 84 Stat. 1114) and related controls aimed at stopping money laundering and the financing of terrorism; and

(C) consistent with current legal requirements regarding confidential supervisory information, the potential impact of allowing money services businesses to share certain State examination information with depository institutions and credit unions, or whether another appropriate mechanism could be identified to allow a similar exchange of information to give the depository institutions and credit unions a better understanding of whether an individual money services business is adequately meeting its anti-money laundering and counter-terror financing obligations to combat money laundering, the financing of terror, or related illicit finance.

(2) PUBLIC INPUT.—The Secretary should solicit and consider public input as appropriate in developing the study required under subsection (a).

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that contains all findings and determinations made in carrying out the study required under subsection (a).

SEC. 272. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING INTELLIGENCE.

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Crimes, should intensify work with foreign partners to help the foreign partners develop intelligence analytic capacities, in a financial intelligence unit, finance ministry, or other appropriate agency, that are—

(1) commensurate to the threats faced by the foreign partner; and

(2) designed to better integrate intelligence efforts with the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes of the foreign partner.

SEC. 273. EXAMINING THE COUNTER-TERROR FINANCING ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IN EMBASSIES.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Banking,

Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that contains—

(1) a list of the United States embassies in which a full-time Department of the Treasury financial attaché is stationed and a description of how the interests of the Department of the Treasury relating to terrorist financing and money laundering are addressed (via regional attachés or otherwise) at United States embassies where no such attachés are present;

(2) a list of the United States embassies at which the Department of the Treasury has assigned a technical assistance advisor from the Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury;

(3) an overview of how Department of the Treasury financial attachés and technical assistance advisors assist in efforts to counter illicit finance, to include money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing; and

(4) an overview of patterns, trends, or other issues identified by the Department of the Treasury and whether resources are sufficient to address these issues.

SEC. 274. INCLUSION OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 101(c)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(c)(1)) is amended by inserting “the Secretary of the Treasury,” before “and such other officers”.

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The amendment made by subsection (a) may not be construed to authorize the National Security Council to have a professional staff level that exceeds the limitation set forth under section 101(e)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(e)(3)).

SEC. 275. INCLUSION OF ALL FUNDS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 5326 of title 31, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the heading of such section, by striking “coin and currency”;

(2) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking “subtitle and” and inserting “subtitle or to”; and

(B) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “United States coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in such order)” and inserting “funds (as the Secretary may describe in such order)”;

(3) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “coins or currency (or monetary instruments)” and inserting “funds”; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)” and inserting “funds (as the Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended in the item relating to section 5326 by striking “coin and currency”.

PART III—DEFINITIONS

SEC. 281. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle—

(1) the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Armed Services, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-

mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

(2) the term “appropriate Federal banking agencies” has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813);

(3) the term “Bank Secrecy Act” means—

(A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b);

(B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C. 1951 et seq.); and

(C) subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code;

(4) the term “Federal functional regulator” has the meaning given that term in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809);

(5) the term “illicit finance” means the financing of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the President;

(6) the term “money services business” has the meaning given the term under section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations;

(7) the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Treasury; and

(8) the term “State” means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, and each territory or possession of the United States.

Subtitle D—Rule of Construction

SEC. 291. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title (other than sections 216 and 236(b)) shall be construed to limit the authority of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

SEC. 292. SENSE OF SENATE ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following findings:

(1) The principle of collective defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is immortalized in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which members pledge that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”.

(2) For almost 7 decades, the principle of collective defense has effectively served as a strategic deterrent for the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and provided stability throughout the world, strengthening the security of the United States and all 28 other member nations.

(3) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the Alliance agreed to invoke Article 5 for the first time, affirming its commitment to collective defense.

(4) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have made historic contributions and sacrifices while combating terrorism in Afghanistan through the International Security Assistance Force and the Resolute Support Mission.

(5) The recent attacks in the United Kingdom underscore the importance of an international alliance to combat hostile nation states and terrorist groups.

(6) At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided that all countries that are members of NATO would spend an amount equal to 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense by 2024.

(7) Collective defense unites the 29 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, each committing to protecting and supporting one another from external adversaries, which bolsters the North Atlantic Alliance.

(b) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate—

(1) to express the vital importance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as it continues to serve as a critical deterrent to potential hostile nations and terrorist organizations;

(2) to remember the first and only invocation of Article 5 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001;

(3) to affirm that the United States remains fully committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will honor its obligations enshrined in Article 5; and

(4) to condemn any threat to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom, or democracy of any country that is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

AMENDMENT NO. 255

Mr. MCCONNELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the title amendment at the desk be agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment (No. 255) was agreed to, as follows:

Amend the title so as to read:
"An Act to Provide Congressional Review and to Counter Iranian and Russian Governments' Aggression."

UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT—EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. MCCONNELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at 5 p.m. on Monday, June 19, the Senate proceed to executive session for consideration of Executive Calendar No. 108. I further ask that there be 30 minutes of debate on the nomination, equally divided in the usual form, and that following the use or yielding back of time, the Senate vote on confirmation of the nomination with no intervening action or debate; and that if confirmed, the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table and the President be immediately notified of the Senate's actions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. MCCONNELL. Madam President, I move to proceed to executive session to consider Calendar No. 94.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the nomination.

The senior assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Sigal Mandelker, of New York, to be Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Crimes.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. MCCONNELL. Madam President, I send a cloture motion to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.

The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the nomination of Sigal Mandelker, of New York, to be Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Crimes.

Mitch McConnell, Roger F. Wicker, John Thune, Mike Rounds, Tim Scott, John Hoeven, Pat Roberts, Orrin G. Hatch, Tom Cotton, Thom Tillis, Michael B. Enzi, John Boozman, James M. Inhofe, John Cornyn, James Lankford, Cory Gardner, John Barrasso.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MCCONNELL. Madam President, I move to proceed to legislative session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion. The motion was agreed to.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. MCCONNELL. Madam President, I move to proceed to executive session to consider Calendar No. 97.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the nomination.

The senior assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Marshall Billingslea, of Virginia, to be Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, Department of the Treasury.

CLOTURE MOTION

Mr. MCCONNELL. Madam President, I send a cloture motion to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.

The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

CLOTURE MOTION

We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the nomination of Marshall Billingslea, of Virginia, to be Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, Department of the Treasury.

Mitch McConnell, Orrin G. Hatch, John Hoeven, John Cornyn, John Barrasso, John Boozman, Mike Rounds, Chuck Grassley, Steve Daines, Thom Tillis, John Thune, Mike Crapo, Bill Cassidy, James M. Inhofe, Thad Cochran, Tom Cotton, Roger F. Wicker.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum call with respect to both cloture motions be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Virginia.

INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE IMPROVEMENT ACT

Mr. KAINE. Madam President, I rise to speak about the ongoing debate in the body concerning the next chapter in healthcare and what we can do about it together and, especially, to address one part of the healthcare market—the individual market.

As most know—and this has been an item about which we are deep into discussions, the people and the Members of this body—before the passage of the Affordable Care Act, Americans with preexisting conditions faced unfair barriers to accessing health insurance coverage, and healthcare costs had risen rapidly. Prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act, my own family, which is probably like the healthiest family in America because the five of us have only had three hospitalizations for three childbirths—all for my wife—we had twice been turned down for insurance coverage for at least one member of our family because of preexisting conditions.

Since 2010, the rate of uninsured Americans has declined to a historic low. More than 20 million Americans have gained access to health insurance coverage—many for the first time in their lives. In Virginia, over 410,000 Virginians have accessed care on the individual marketplace and another 400,000 would be eligible if Virginia decided to expand Medicaid.

Many Virginians use the individual market, and they have shared their stories with me on my website. I have on my Senate website "ACA Stories," where I encourage people to share their stories.

The individual marketplace, as folks know, is if you are buying health insurance, not through an employer, and you are buying individually—you may or may not be qualified for a subsidy—that particular marketplace is really important for people who aren't employed by companies that offer group plans, but it also has its challenges.

One of my stories was from Lauren Carter, who lives in Lovingson, VA, in Nelson County. She wrote in to say:

My 39-year-old son has cerebral palsy and a blood clotting disorder. His "pre-existing conditions" started at conception. Three years ago, he lost his full time job with health insurance benefits.

The ACA allows him to continue receiving medical care and purchase his life saving medications. He supports himself through multiple part time jobs—

This young man with cerebral palsy—

employer based insurance is not an option for him at this time.

Laura Kreynus from Mechanicsville, VA, near Richmond wrote:

My daughter was diagnosed with Crohn's Disease in April of 2013. That September, my husband was diagnosed with Parkinson's Disease. We are farmers, we raise the food for America. As such, we are independently insured.