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# Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Recruiting

## Congressional Role

The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power “To raise and support Armies” and “To provide and maintain a Navy.” In the exercise of this authority, Congress has historically shown interest in military recruiting, which is critical to maintaining a fully manned and capable volunteer military workforce. Congress exercises a powerful influence on recruiting through its establishment of personnel end-strength levels for the Active and Reserve Components. Higher end-strengths generally require more new recruits, higher rates of retention among current servicemembers, or some combination of the two. Through its oversight powers, Congress monitors the performance of the executive branch in managing the size and quality of the military workforce. Congress influences the achievement of recruiting goals by the armed services in several ways:

- authorizing military compensation packages that are competitive with civilian employers (e.g., basic pay, education, housing, and health benefits);
- establishing criteria that affect eligibility for enlistment such as age, cognitive, behavioral, and citizenship requirements; and
- funding recruiting programs that provide for dedicated recruiters, market research, advertising, and military entrance processing stations.

Successful recruiting often depends on identifying a population that is *eligible* and has a *propensity* for enlistment. The policy levers most commonly used to address recruiting issues include increased funding for additional recruiters, advertising, and enlistment incentives (e.g., bonuses, education benefits). When recruiting shortfalls occur, or are anticipated, Congress may elect to apply additional resources to these mechanisms. Likewise, when recruiting is expected to be strong, Congress may elect to shift resources away from these areas. Congress might also consider nonmonetary initiatives that reduce barriers to enlistment or otherwise increase the pool of eligible individuals (e.g., waivers, process improvements).

## Recruiting

Without a robust ability to bring new personnel into the military, the armed services could lack sufficient manpower to carry out mission essential tasks in the near term. Moreover, without stable recruiting levels they could lack a sufficient pool of entry-level personnel to develop into the mid-level and upper-level leaders of the future. To maintain a healthy military force structure, each armed service sets goals for new personnel *accessions* each fiscal year for both its Active and Reserve Components. Officer and enlisted goals are set separately. For enlisted personnel, there are both *quantity* and *quality* goals.

## Quantity Goals

Quantity goals are typically based on each armed service’s projected need for new personnel (both officer and enlisted) over the course of the year to meet its congressionally authorized end-strength. Enlisted quantity goals are based on the proportion of congressionally authorized end-strength that a specific armed service and component allocates to its enlisted force, less the projected number of currently serving enlisted personnel it expects to retain through the end of the year. As a hypothetical example, assume an armed service has an authorized Active Component end-strength of 200,000 total personnel, comprised of 30,000 officers and 170,000 enlisted personnel. If it projects that it will retain 140,000 of its current enlisted personnel through the end of the fiscal year, it might set a goal of enlisting 30,000 new individuals for that year plus a certain number more to account for those new enlistees who are separated before the end of the year (for example, for medical disability). The actual number of new enlistees needed may also change during the year as new projections are made about the retention of currently serving enlisted personnel, or if the armed service must increase or decrease the total size of its force (for example, if a Service Secretary were to exercise the authority of 10 U.S.C. §115(g)(1)(A) to increase congressionally authorized active duty end-strength for that armed service by up to 2%). **Table 1** lists recruit quantity goals and results for FY2023-FY2025.

## Quality Goals

Quality goals for *non-prior service* (NPS) recruits, are established through law and policy. Two principal Department of Defense (DOD—which is also using a secondary “Department of War” designation under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025) quality benchmarks apply to NPS recruits. The first is the percentage of NPS enlistees who are high school diploma graduates (HSDGs). The second is the percentage of scores above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT Categories I-III A). DOD’s recruit quality benchmarks stipulate that at least 90% of NPS enlistees must be HSDGs and at least 60% must score above average on the AFQT. Supplementary ways to assess the quality of enlistment cohorts include the percentage of NPS enlistees who score well-below average on the AFQT (Category IV) and the number and types of enlistment waivers granted to enlistees for medical reasons, misconduct, or drug use. Law (10 U.S.C. §520) stipulates that no more than 4% of an annual enlistment cohort may be Category IV (10<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup> percentile on the AFQT). However, the 4% threshold may be increased to 20% at the request of the Secretary, with congressional notification. DOD policy specifies that those who score in Category V (1<sup>st</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> percentile on the AFQT) are ineligible to enlist. **Table 2** and **Table 3** list recruit quality benchmarks and results for FY2023-FY2025.

**Table 1. Non-Prior Service Accessions Data (Quantity)**

Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2023-FY2025

Armed Service	FY2023			FY2024			FY2025		
	Goal	Achieved	Percent of Goal	Goal	Achieved	Percent of Goal	Goal	Achieved	Percent of Goal
Army	65,500	50,181	76.6%	55,000	55,150	100.3%	61,000	62,050	101.7%
Navy	37,700	30,236	80.2%	40,600	35,804	88.2%	40,600	44,096	108.6%
Marine Corps	28,900	28,921	100.1%	27,500	27,500	100.0%	26,600	26,600	100.0%
Air Force	26,977	24,100	89.3%	27,200	27,303	100.4%	30,100	30,166	100.2%
Space Force	492	537	109.2%	704	716	101.7%	796	819	102.9%

**Source:** Department of Defense Action Memo on file with author.**Table 2. Non-Prior Service Accessions Data (Quality – High School Diploma Graduates)**

Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2023-FY2025

Armed Service	DOD Benchmark	Achieved FY2023	Achieved FY2024	Achieved FY2025
Army	90%	94.6%	94.5%	95.0%
Navy	90%	96.7%	95.4%	93.6%
Marine Corps	90%	98.3%	97.9%	98.1%
Air Force	90%	98.6%	98.6%	98.7%
Space Force	90%	99.4%	99.9%	99.9%

**Source:** Department of Defense Action Memo on file with author.**Table 3. Non-Prior Service Accessions Data (Quality – Above Average AFQT Score)**

Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2023-FY2025

Armed Service	DOD Benchmark	Achieved FY2023	Achieved FY2024	Achieved FY2025
Army	60%	61.1%	60.3%	56.5%
Navy	60%	54.5%	54.2%	60.5%
Marine Corps	60%	64.9%	64.0%	64.2%
Air Force	60%	80.1%	80.1%	79.5%
Space Force	60%	99.3%	99.3%	98.9%

**Source:** Department of Defense Action Memo on file with author. **Note:** For FY2023 and FY2024 the Navy did not meet DOD benchmarks for Cat I-III A and Cat IV recruits. AQFT is the Armed Forces Qualification Test. For FY2025, the Army did not meet the Cat I-III A benchmark.**DOD Resources**

DOD Instruction 1304.26, Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction

DOD Instruction 1145.01, Qualitative Distribution of Military Manpower

DOD Instruction 6130.03, Medical Standards for Military Service: Appointment, Enlistment or Induction

DOD Instruction 1304.32, Military Services Recruiting Related Reports

Defense Manpower Data Center, DOD Personnel, Workforce Reports, and Publications

**Relevant Statutes**

Title 10, Chapter 31, of the U.S. Code

10 U.S.C. §115

10 U.S.C. §520

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