

FY2024 NDAA: Summary of Funding Authorizations

Updated December 29, 2023

Of the **\$910.8 billion** requested in the FY2024 President’s budget for activities within the **national defense** budget function, **\$874.2 billion** fell within the scope of the proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (NDAA; H.R. 2670; S. 2226; P.L. 118-31). While the NDAA generally does not provide funding (i.e., *budget authority*), historically the legislation has served as an indicator of congressional views on funding for such activities.

During deliberation of the FY2024 NDAA, Congress debated whether to authorize more, the same, or less funding than the President requested for such activities. The enacted version of the legislation authorized \$874.2 billion, as requested. **Table 1** **Error! Reference source not found.** shows amounts authorized in the enacted FY2024 NDAA for DOD-military activities (including by major appropriation title), atomic energy defense programs, and certain other defense-related activities.

Including amounts for certain defense-related programs not within the purview of the legislation or requiring additional authorization, the discretionary budget authority implication of the enacted FY2024 NDAA totaled **\$886.3 billion**—consistent with the defense **discretionary spending cap** for FY2024 in P.L. 118-5 (**137 Stat. 12**).

Table 1. Summary of Funding Authorizations in FY2024 NDAA

(in billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority)

Title	FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117- 263)	FY2024 President’s budget request ^a	House-passed NDAA (H.R. 2670)	Senate- passed NDAA (S. 2226)	FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31)
Procurement	\$163.15	\$167.99	\$168.57	\$169.84	\$169.17
Research and Development	\$138.86	\$144.98	\$145.21	\$146.14	\$145.94
Operation and Maintenance	\$278.79	\$290.07	\$289.17	\$291.75 ^b	\$288.82
Military Personnel	\$172.02	\$178.87	\$178.63	\$177.33	\$176.77
Other Authorizations	\$44.36	\$42.60	\$42.46	\$42.60	\$42.52

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Title	FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117- 263)	FY2024 President's budget request ^a	House-passed NDAA (H.R. 2670)	Senate- passed NDAA (S. 2226)	FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31)
Military Construction and Family Housing	\$19.49	\$16.67	\$17.47	\$16.67	\$18.17
Subtotal, Department of Defense-Military (051)	\$816.68	\$841.19	\$841.51	\$844.34	\$841.40
Atomic Energy Defense Programs (053)	\$30.27	\$32.65	\$32.26	\$32.47	\$32.38
Defense-Related Activities (054)	\$0.38	\$0.38	\$0.44	<i>n/a^c</i>	\$0.44
Total	\$847.32	\$874.21	\$874.21	\$876.81	\$874.21

Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany H.R. 7776, P.L. 117-263, Book 2 of 2, committee print, 118th Congress, 1st sess., January 2023, 50-665, pp. [2168-2173](#); H.Rept. 118-125 accompanying H.R. 2670, pp. [421-426](#); S.Rept. 118-58 accompanying S. 2226, pp. [400-403](#); and U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, conference report to accompany H.R. 2670, 118th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 118-301, December 6, 2023, pp. [1390-1395](#).

Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth.

- Amounts in this column reflect those in H.Rept. 118-301.
- S.Rept. 118-58 included a higher requested amount for Air Force, Operation and Maintenance funding than H.Rept. 118-125 ([\\$65.72 billion](#) vs [\\$62.75 billion](#)).
- The SASC typically does not authorize appropriations for the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration Maritime Security Program and Tanker Security Program; however, the final version of the NDAA typically does.

House-passed NDAA (H.R. 2670)

H.R. 2670 would have authorized [\\$874.2 billion](#)—the level of funding the President’s budget requested for activities within the scope of the legislation, according to the accompanying committee report (H.Rept. 118-125). The bill would have authorized slightly more funding than requested for the U.S. Department of Defense, or DOD; less funding than requested for atomic energy defense programs; and more funding than requested for certain other defense-related activities.

During debate of H.R. 2670 in the HASC, Representative Rob Wittman, Chair of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, [said](#) he supported an effort by Representative Mike Rogers, Chair of the HASC, to align funding authorized by the legislation to the spending cap in the debt-limit deal negotiated in part by Representative Kevin McCarthy, former Speaker of the House. Wittman said, “The overall debt agreement enacted earlier this year, and the associated appropriations allocations, are the right medicine to our rampant government spending. So, as I begin our debate today, I support Chairman Rogers’ defense top line proposal, and Speaker McCarthy’s defense approach, to make sure that we rapidly access every programmatic efficiency available.” Representative Barbara Lee proposed [an amendment](#) that would have reduced the amount authorized by the bill by \$100 billion, excluding accounts related to the Defense Health Program, military personnel, and pay and benefits. In [a statement](#), Representative Lee described the amendment, which was not considered for debate, as an effort to “rein in Pentagon spending.”

Senate-passed NDAA (S. 2226)

S. 2226 would have authorized [\\$876.8 billion](#)—approximately the level the President’s budget requested for activities within the scope of the legislation, after adjusting for a difference in the requested amount for the Air Force, Operation and Maintenance account, according to the accompanying committee report

(S.Rept. 118-58). The legislation would have authorized slightly more funding than requested for the DOD and less funding than requested for atomic energy defense programs, including for defense uranium enrichment decontamination and decommissioning. The committee report stated, “The committee recommends an overall discretionary authorization of \$886.3 billion in fiscal year 2024”—the level of the defense discretionary spending cap for FY2024 in P.L. 118-5.

During debate of the bill in a closed session, SASC voted 12-13 opposing an amendment to “raise the topline for implementation of the National Defense Strategy and for other purposes.” Senator Roger Wicker, Ranking Member of SASC, reportedly filed the motion to increase funding authorized in the legislation by \$25 billion. On July 19, in remarks on the Senate floor, Senator Wicker said, “Ideally, we would have an annual 3% to 5% boost to our topline above inflation.” Section 1004 of the legislation included a Sense of the Senate provision on the need for emergency supplemental funding in FY2024. The section stated, in part, “there are growing national security concerns that require additional funds beyond the revised security spending limit, to include continued support to the Ukrainian armed forces, additional munitions production, additional large surface combatants, shipbuilding industrial base modernization investments, submarine industrial base and supply chain management, additional production of wheeled and tracked combat vehicles, and emergent capabilities and exercises in the United States Indo-Pacific Command.” Senator Elizabeth Warren, who opposed reporting the legislation to the Senate, has described the FY2024 DOD budget request as “massive” and expressed concern that the department’s unfunded priorities lists “distort our budget process.”

In Statements of Administration Policy on H.R. 2670 and S. 2223, the White House pledged to work with Congress to set “appropriate and responsible levels of defense and non-defense spending to support the security of the Nation consistent with the Fiscal Responsibility Act.”

Enacted NDAA (P.L. 118-31)

The enacted version of the FY2024 NDAA authorized \$874.2 billion, as requested. In terms of DOD titles, the legislation authorized more funding than requested for military construction and family housing; procurement; and research, development, test, and evaluation; and less funding than requested for military personnel; operation and maintenance; and other authorizations (e.g., National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund). The legislation authorized less funding than requested for atomic energy defense programs, including for defense uranium enrichment decontamination and decommissioning; and more funding than requested for certain other defense-related activities, including a program to provide DOD access to commercial tanker vessels.

Table 2 shows the difference between requested and authorized funding in the NDAA over the past decade.

Table 2. Requested and Authorized Funding in the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2015-FY2024

(in billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority)

Fiscal Year	Public Law (P.L.)	President’s Budget Request	Authorized	% Change (Authorized-Request)
2015	P.L. 113-291	\$577.15	\$577.15	0.0%
2016	P.L. 114-92	\$604.21	\$599.21	-0.8%
2017	P.L. 114-328	\$607.98	\$611.17	0.5%
2018	P.L. 115-91	\$665.72	\$692.10	4.0%

2019	P.L. 115-232	\$708.11	\$708.10	0.0%
2020	P.L. 116-92	\$741.93	\$729.93	-1.6%
2021	P.L. 116-283	\$731.61	\$731.61	0.0%
2022	P.L. 117-81	\$743.09	\$768.21	3.4%
2023	P.L. 117-263	\$802.36	\$847.32	5.6%
2024	P.L. 118-31	\$874.21	\$874.21	0.0%

Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in conference reports or explanatory statements accompanying National Defense Authorization Acts. Links to sources are embedded in figures.

Note: Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth. The “% Change” column is the percentage change between authorized and requested amounts.

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