

Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues

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Nuclear Energy: Overview of Congressional Issues

Policy debate over the role of nuclear power in the nation's energy mix is rooted in the technology's fundamental characteristics. Nuclear reactors can produce potentially vast amounts of useful energy with relatively low consumption of natural resources and low emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants. However, facilities that produce nuclear fuel for civilian power reactors can also produce materials for nuclear weapons. In addition, the process of nuclear fission (splitting of atomic nuclei) to generate power produces radioactive material that can remain hazardous for thousands of years and must be contained. How to manage the weapons proliferation and safety risks of nuclear power, or whether the benefits of nuclear power are worth those risks, are issues that have long been debated in Congress. Numerous bills in recent Congresses have focused on nuclear energy as a low-carbon source of electricity and on the potential for advanced reactor designs to reduce costs and increase safety margins.

The 94 licensed nuclear power reactors at 54 sites in the United States generate about 20% of the nation's electricity. Two new reactors, in Georgia, began commercial operation in July 2023 and April 2024. About a dozen more reactors of various designs are planned or proposed. Whether they eventually move forward will likely depend largely on their economic competitiveness with natural gas and renewable energy sources, as well as overall growth in electricity demand. Similar economic forces affect existing reactors. Thirteen U.S. reactors were permanently closed during the period from 2013 through April 2022. However, several states have taken action to prevent reactor shutdowns, and Congress has enacted federal tax credits and other support for existing reactors. Owners of two of the recently closed reactors are planning to restart them within the next four years, and a third reactor restart is under consideration.

The Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor agencies for decades have conducted research on "advanced" reactor technologies, such as fast neutron reactors, that would differ significantly from existing commercial nuclear plants and potentially be far smaller. Proponents of advanced reactors contend that they would be safer, more efficient, and less expensive to build and operate than today's conventional light water reactors (cooled by ordinary water). Skeptics raise concerns regarding weapons-proliferation risks and cast doubt on advanced reactors' affordability and sustainability. DOE is providing support for several proposed advanced reactor demonstrations, which could indicate whether the anticipated benefits can be realized. Legislation supporting U.S. production of nuclear fuel was enacted by Congress on December 14, 2023, in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024 (P.L. 118-31, §3131). The Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act of 2024, signed into law July 9, 2024, as Division B of P.L. 118-67, called for greater efficiency in nuclear plant licensing and regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Recent congressional hearings have focused on NRC's implementation of the ADVANCE Act.

Highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel that is regularly removed from nuclear reactors is currently stored primarily at power plant sites. Development of a permanent underground repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada was suspended by the Obama Administration. The Trump Administration requested funding for FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020 to revive the program, but it was not approved by Congress. No Yucca Mountain program funding has since been requested or provided.

The Obama Administration appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future to recommend an alternative approach to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act's focus on Yucca Mountain for permanent high-level waste disposal. The Commission's recommendations included selecting nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities through a consent-based process. DOE has awarded about \$2 million each to 12 consortia of universities and other organizations to develop consent-based siting approaches. In the meantime, Yucca Mountain remains the sole authorized candidate site for permanent disposal, despite its lack of funding. Nuclear waste bills in the 119th Congress include proposals to require state and local government consent for siting a nuclear waste repository (H.R. 466, S. 101).

Encouraging exports of U.S. civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while making sure they are not used for foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a fundamental goal of U.S. nuclear energy policy. Recent proposals to build reactors in several countries without nuclear power, including the Middle East, have prompted concerns about the effectiveness of international controls. The ADVANCE Act includes provisions to encourage nuclear-energy-related exports. In the 119th Congress, H.R. 1474 would require U.S. officials at multilateral development banks to advocate for removal of restrictions on nuclear energy assistance.

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Synthesis of Key Issues

The long-running policy debate over the future of nuclear energy is rooted in the technology's inherent characteristics. Initially developed for its unprecedented destructive power during World War II, nuclear energy seemed to hold promise after the war as a way of providing limitless energy to humanity. International diplomacy has focused ever since on finding institutional mechanisms for spreading the perceived benefits of nuclear energy throughout the world while preventing the technology from being used for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Much of this international effort is focused on key nuclear fuel cycle facilities—plants for enriching uranium in the fissile isotope U-235 and for separating plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel. Such plants can produce civilian nuclear reactor fuel as well as fissile material for nuclear warheads.

Yet even the use of nuclear power solely for peaceful energy production has proven intrinsically controversial. The harnessing of nuclear fission in a reactor creates highly radioactive materials that must be kept from overheating and escaping from the reactor building, as occurred during the incidents at Fukushima in Japan, Chernobyl in the Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania. Spent nuclear fuel that is regularly removed from reactors during refueling must be isolated from the environment for up to 1 million years. Proposed commercial technologies to reduce long-lived nuclear waste through recycling usually involve separating plutonium that possibly could be used for nuclear weapons, although technologies designed to reduce proliferation risks are also the subject of worldwide research and development efforts. All nuclear energy technologies, even with recycling, would still leave substantial amounts of radioactive waste for storage and disposal. Central storage and disposal sites for nuclear waste have proven difficult to develop throughout the world, as illustrated by the long-running controversy over the proposed U.S. waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada and proposed consolidated interim storage facilities in New Mexico and Texas.

The March 2011 disaster at Japan's Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, which forced the evacuation of areas as far as 30 miles away, slowed nuclear power expansion plans around the world, particularly in Japan and Western Europe. Nevertheless, dozens of new reactors are being planned and built in China, India, Russia, and elsewhere.¹ (See **Table 1.**) In these areas, nuclear power's initial promise of generating large amounts of electricity without the need for often-imported fossil fuels, along with the more recent desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, remains a compelling motivation. With 94 licensed reactors, the United States has the largest nuclear power industry in the world. But U.S. nuclear power growth has been largely stagnant for the past two decades, as natural gas and renewable energy have captured most of the market for new electric generating capacity and improvements in energy efficiency have, until recently, slowed total electricity demand growth.² Congress enacted incentives for new nuclear plants in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), including production tax credits, loan guarantees, and insurance against regulatory delays. Those incentives, combined with rising natural gas prices and concerns about federal restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions, prompted announcements by late 2008 of up to 30 new nuclear power reactors in the United States.³ However, subsequent

¹ World Nuclear Association, "World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements," January 7, 2025, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-requireme.aspx>.

² Energy Information Administration (EIA), *Short-Term Energy Outlook*, November 2024, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf.

³ Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications," updated March 28, 2008, <https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/nukerelapse/industry/expectednewrxapplications32808.pdf>.

declines in natural gas prices and uncertainty about carbon dioxide controls put most of those projects on hold.

Table 1. Planned Advanced Reactor Demonstration Plants

Selected Projects with DOE Funding or NRC License Applications

Reactor Designer	Technology	Reactor Power	Plant Owner	DOE Funding	DOE Cost Share	Plant Location	NRC Licensing Status
Terra Power	Sodium-cooled fast reactor	345 MW (electric)	PacificCorp	Up to \$1.6 billion	50%	Kemmerer, WY	Construction permit application submitted 3/28/2024
X-energy	High-temperature gas-cooled reactor	80 MW (electric)	Energy Northwest	Up to \$1.2 billion	50%	Seadrift, TX	Pre-application activities
Kairos (Hermes 1)	Fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactor	35 MW (thermal)	Kairos	Up to \$303 million	48%	Oak Ridge, TN	Construction permit approved 12/12/2023
Kairos (Hermes 2)	Fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactor, 2 units	70 MW (thermal), 20 MW (electric) (total for both units)	Kairos	None	0%	Oak Ridge, TN	Application for construction permits approved 11/20/2024
Abilene Christian University	Molten salt research reactor	1 MW (thermal)	Abilene Christian University	None for demonstration	0%	Abilene, TX	Construction permit application submitted 8/12/2022
<i>Previously funded project terminated</i>							
NuScale	Light water SMR	77 MW (electric)	Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS)	Up to \$1.4 billion	50%	Idaho Falls, ID (Idaho National Laboratory)	Standard Design Approval application submitted 1/1/2023

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as of March 2025.

Notes: MW = megawatts. For more proposed projects, see NRC, “Pre-Application Activities for Advanced Reactors,” March 17, 2025, <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/who-were-working-with/pre-application-activities.html>. NuScale/UAMPS project was terminated by sponsors on November 8, 2023. See NuScale, “Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS) and NuScale Power Agree to Terminate the Carbon Free Power Project (CFPP),” press release, November 8, 2023, <https://www.nuscalepower.com/en/news/press-releases/2023/uamps-and-nuscale-power-agree-to-terminate-the-carbon-free-power-project>. Reactors listed with only thermal output will not generate electricity.

Some of those projects began construction, with mixed results. Two new reactors in Georgia began commercial operation in July 2023 and April 2024. Two identical reactors under construction in South Carolina were canceled in July 2017. The Georgia and South Carolina projects both experienced large cost overruns and schedule delays. An older reactor, Watts Bar 2 in Tennessee, received a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) operating license on October 22, 2015, after construction had been suspended for two decades and then completed. A planned advanced nuclear plant in Idaho was terminated by its developers in November 2023 after experiencing numerous delays and cost overruns, but other advanced reactor proposals are moving forward.

Existing U.S. nuclear power plants are continuing to face strong competition from natural gas and renewable energy. Thirteen U.S. reactors were permanently closed from 2013 through April 2022. Three of those units closed because of the need for expensive repairs, three were retired under agreements with state utility regulators, and seven could not compete in their regional wholesale electricity markets. All 13 units had substantial time remaining on their initial 40-year operating licenses or had received, or planned to apply for, 20-year NRC license extensions. (See **Table 2.**)

The shutdowns prompted discussion about the future of other aging U.S. reactors and proposals for federal assistance. Action taken by states has forestalled the announced shutdowns of 20 other U.S. reactors during the past several years. Congress has also enacted federal tax credits and other support for existing and new nuclear power plants. Federal and state assistance, along with anticipated growth in electricity demand, have prompted plans to restart two closed reactors in Michigan and Pennsylvania, and regulatory filings toward possible restart of another in Iowa. Since the most recent round of plant closures in 2013-2022, no permanent reactor shutdowns have been announced.

The extent to which the growth of nuclear power should be encouraged in the United States and around the world continues to be a major component of the U.S. energy policy debate. Numerous bills in recent Congresses have focused on nuclear energy as a low-carbon source of electricity and on the potential for advanced reactor designs to reduce costs and increase safety margins. The Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act of 2024, signed into law July 9, 2024, as Division B of P.L. 118-67, called for greater efficiency in nuclear plant licensing and regulation by NRC. Recent congressional hearings have focused on NRC's implementation of the ADVANCE Act.

Other continuing issues in Congress include nuclear safety standards, development of new nuclear power and fuel cycle technologies, and nuclear waste management strategies.

Table 2. U.S. Commercial Reactor Shutdowns Since 2012

Reactor	State	Shutdown Date	Net Summer Generating Capacity (Megawatts)	Start-Up Year	Major Factors Contributing to Shutdown
Crystal River 3	Florida	February 2013	860	1977	Cost of major repairs to reactor containment
Kewaunee	Wisconsin	May 2013	566	1974	Operating losses
San Onofre 2	California	June 2013	1,070	1983	Cost of replacing new steam generators

Reactor	State	Shutdown Date	Net Summer Generating Capacity (Megawatts)	Start-Up Year	Major Factors Contributing to Shutdown
San Onofre 3	California	June 2013	1,080	1984	Cost of replacing new steam generators
Vermont Yankee	Vermont	December 2014	620	1972	Operating losses
Fort Calhoun	Nebraska	October 2016	479	1973	Operating losses
Oyster Creek	New Jersey	September 2018	614	1969	Agreement with state to avoid building cooling towers
Pilgrim	Massachusetts	May 2019	685	1972	Operating losses, rising capital expenditures
Three Mile Island 1	Pennsylvania	October 2019	803	1974	Operating losses; owner now planning restart to power a data center
Indian Point 2	New York	April 30, 2020	1,020	1974	Low electricity prices; settlement with state
Duane Arnold	Iowa	August 2020	601	1975	Lower-cost alternative power; owner considering restart
Indian Point 3	New York	April 30, 2021	1,035	1976	Low electricity prices; settlement with state
Palisades	Michigan	April 2022	784	1971	Operating losses, end of power purchase agreement; plant owner now attempting to restart with state and federal support

Source: Information from company press releases and U.S. Department of Energy on the status of reactor shutdowns since 2012.

Basic Facts and Statistics

The 94 licensed nuclear power reactors at 54 sites in the United States generate about 20% of the nation's electricity. The oldest of today's operating reactors were licensed in 1969, and the most recent to begin commercial operation were Vogtle 3 and 4 in Georgia in July 2023 and April 2024, respectively.⁴ Before that, the most recent reactors to start up were Watts Bar 2 in 2015 and its twin unit, Watts Bar 1, in 1996 in Tennessee.⁵ All U.S. reactors were initially licensed to

⁴ Georgia Power, "Vogtle Unit 4 Enters Commercial Operation," press release, April 29, 2024, <https://www.georgiapower.com/news-hub/press-releases/vogtle-unit-4-enters-commercial-operation.html>.

⁵ NRC, *Information Digest, 2020-2021*, NUREG-1350, vol. 34, Appendix A, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2304/ML23047A378.pdf>.

operate for 40 years, and nearly all of them have received or applied for 20-year license renewals by NRC.⁶ NRC issued its first “subsequent license renewals,” which allow operation for up to 80 years, to the Turkey Point 1 and 2 reactors in Florida in December 2019. Four more renewals to 80 years, for Peach Bottom 2 and 3 in Pennsylvania and Surry 1 and 2 in Virginia, were issued in March 2020 and May 2021. Another three were issued to North Anna 1 and 2 in Virginia and Monticello in Minnesota in August and December 2024. NRC is currently reviewing subsequent license renewal applications for another 13 reactors and has received letters of intent for at least 25 more.⁷ License extensions to 80 years would allow existing U.S. nuclear plants to operate until the 2050s and 2060s.⁸

Whether new reactors will be constructed to replace the existing fleet or even to expand nuclear power’s market share will likely depend largely on costs. The cost of building and operating a new nuclear power plant in the United States is generally estimated to be significantly higher than natural gas combined-cycle plants (which use both combustion and steam turbines to generate electricity) and higher than wind and solar as well. For example, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated in 2023 that, for plants coming on line in 2028, the average cost of electricity generation from a nuclear power plant would be 7.1 cents per kilowatt-hour (kwh), including tax credits, while advanced combined-cycle gas-fired generation would cost 4.3 cents/kwh and an ultracritical coal plant would cost 8.9 cents/kwh. EIA also estimated that electricity from onshore wind would cost 3.1 cents/kwh, solar photovoltaics 2.3 cents/kwh, and geothermal 3.7 cents/kwh (2022 dollars).⁹ Such estimates depend on a wide range of variables, such as future fuel costs, regional solar and wind availability, current and future tax incentives, and environmental regulations and mandates. The specific attributes of each generating technology, such as the intermittent nature of solar and wind, are also important considerations in power plant construction decisions.

The two new U.S. reactors at the Vogtle nuclear plant site in Georgia experienced severe construction delays and cost overruns.¹⁰ As noted above, construction of two new units in South Carolina has been terminated. Licenses to build and operate 10 additional reactors have been issued by NRC, although no plans for construction have been announced. Applications for 14 other new reactors have been withdrawn or suspended.¹¹

Much of the U.S. interest in new nuclear power plants is focused on “advanced” reactors, using different technology from that of existing light water reactors, which use ordinary (light) water as a coolant and moderator to slow the neutrons in the nuclear chain reaction. There is also considerable interest in “small modular reactors,” which would be smaller than today’s commercial reactors and could use a variety of technologies. NRC is conducting licensing reviews or pre-application activities for several proposed advanced reactors. Construction permits

⁶ NRC, “Status of Initial License Renewal Applications and Industry Initiatives,” October 22, 2024, <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html>.

⁷ NRC, “Status of Subsequent License Renewal Applications,” October 29, 2024, <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/subsequent-license-renewal.html>.

⁸ “Looming Retirements,” infographic, *Power*, https://www.powermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/bp_april2020_nuclearreactorage_web.pdf.

⁹ EIA, “Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2023,” April 2023, p. 8, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/electricity_generation/pdf/AEO2023_LCOE_report.pdf. Levelized costs include capital costs averaged over the life of the plant, plus fuel and maintenance costs and tax credits, in 2022 dollars.

¹⁰ Darrell Proctor, “Another Delay for New Unit at Vogtle Nuclear Plant,” *Power*, June 17, 2023, <https://www.powermag.com/another-delay-for-new-unit-at-vogtle-nuclear-plant>.

¹¹ NRC, “Combined License Applications for New Reactors,” July 3, 2023, <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html>.

for Kairos Power to build three low-power advanced test reactors in Tennessee were issued in December 2023 and November 2024.¹²

Throughout the world, 440 reactors are currently in service or operable, and 65 more are under construction. France is the most heavily nuclear-reliant country in the world, with 56 reactors generating 65% of the country's electricity in 2023. In 2025, 32 countries (plus Taiwan) generated at least some of their electricity from nuclear power.¹³

After the Fukushima incident, Germany, which had previously generated about 30% of its electricity with nuclear power, began phasing out its 17 power reactors through early 2023. Japan, which had also generated about 30% of its electricity with nuclear power and had planned to raise that level to 50%, now is planning for about 20% by 2030. All 54 Japanese reactors were closed within a year after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, 21 of them permanently. Of Japan's 33 reactors that have not permanently shut down, 14 are currently in commercial service following safety upgrades to meet new regulatory requirements, and 11 others have applied for restart. It is not clear how many of Japan's remaining operable reactors will ultimately resume operation.¹⁴

Major Nuclear Energy Issues

Advanced Nuclear Technology

Existing commercial nuclear power plants in the United States are based on light water reactor (LWR) technology, in which ordinary (light) water is used to cool the reactor and to moderate, or slow, the neutrons in a nuclear chain reaction. In the chain reaction, neutrons cause the nuclei of uranium and other heavy atoms to fission (split), releasing large amounts of energy and additional neutrons to maintain the reaction. The federal government developed LWRs for naval propulsion in the 1950s and funded the commercialization of the technology for electricity generation.¹⁵ The Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor agencies for decades have also conducted research on "advanced" reactor technologies that use different coolants and moderators, as well as fast neutron reactors that have no moderator.

The term "advanced nuclear reactor" is defined by the Energy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260, Division Z), as well as other recent laws, as a fission reactor that has "significant improvements" over existing commercial reactors, and any fusion reactor. Areas of improvement can include safety, waste generation, performance, resistance to weapons proliferation, "modular sizes," and integration of electric and non-electric applications (such as heat and hydrogen production). That

¹² NRC, "Advanced Reactors (Non-LWR Designs)," April 25, 2024, <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced.html>.

¹³ World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Generation by Country," August 6, 2024, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/nuclear-generation-by-country.aspx>; and World Nuclear Association, "World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements," January 7, 2025, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-requireme.aspx>.

¹⁴ World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Japan," February 4, 2025, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx>; and "First BWR Restarts in Japan," *World Nuclear News*, October 29, 2024, <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/first-bwr-restarts-in-japan>.

¹⁵ There are two types of light water reactor (LWR). The most common are pressurized water reactors (PWRs), in which reactor cooling water is held under pressure so that it does not boil; the pressurized water passes through a heat exchanger (called a *steam generator*) to a secondary loop of water that is allowed to boil into steam to drive an electric generator. The second type are boiling water reactors (BWRs), in which reactor cooling water is allowed to boil to make steam. For simplified diagrams, see U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy, "Nuclear 101: How Does a Nuclear Reactor Work?," August 2, 2023, <https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/nuclear-101-how-does-nuclear-reactor-work>.

definition encompasses small modular reactors (SMRs) of any type. Supporters of advanced reactors contend that their potentially lower cost and other advantages over existing commercial reactors could make them highly competitive with other low-emission energy sources and create a vast export market. Several demonstrations of advanced reactor designs are currently planned, which could provide an indication of their commercial viability.

To produce less long-lived radioactive waste than existing reactors, some advanced reactor concepts would involve the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to separate uranium, plutonium, and other long-lived radioisotopes to make new fuel for fast reactors.¹⁶ Such reprocessing, or recycling, would also reduce the need for newly mined uranium to fuel a potentially growing worldwide reactor fleet, according to proponents. However, the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel also raises significant concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. (For more information, see CRS Report R48364, *Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel*, by Lance N. Larson and Mark Holt.)

SMRs would be smaller than today's commercial LWRs, which generally have about 1,000 megawatts (MW) of electric generating capacity or more.¹⁷ Supporters of SMRs contend that they would be small enough so that reactor modules could be mass-produced in factories and shipped to reactor sites, achieving greater construction economies of scale than conventional nuclear plants. In addition, SMRs could reduce the financial risks of building a new nuclear power plant, because each module would cost less than today's large reactors and revenues could begin when the first module was complete, rather than after completion of a much larger unit. However, some analysts contend that SMRs would be too small to achieve the operational economies of scale needed to compete with other generating technologies.¹⁸ None of the currently proposed U.S. designs for SMRs have been constructed, so actual costs and construction times have yet to be demonstrated domestically.¹⁹

Very small SMRs are often called "microreactors," defined by DOE as having thermal energy capacity below 20 MW. They could provide heat or electric power at remote locations. Self-contained microreactor power units would be assembled in a factory, transported to a site in shipping containers, and set up to generate power within a week, according to DOE.

¹⁶ Radioisotopes are radioactive isotopes; isotopes are forms of an element that have different numbers of neutrons. Different radioisotopes of the same element will behave the same chemically but have different half-lives and other radioactive characteristics. Long-lived radioisotopes separated from spent fuel could in principle be fissioned or transmuted in a fast reactor into shorter-lived radioisotopes for disposal.

¹⁷ A DOE fact sheet says SMRs can "represent a variety of sizes, technology options, capabilities, and deployment scenarios" and are "envisioned to vary in size from tens of megawatts up to hundreds of megawatts." DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, "Advanced Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)," <https://www.energy.gov/ne/advanced-small-modular-reactors-smrs>. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58, §40321) and the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263, §320, amending P.L. 117-81, NDAA for FY2022) define SMRs as having generating capacity of less than 300 MW. The 300 MW limit is also used by the Atomic Energy Act in setting reactor liability limits for public damages (42 U.S.C. §2210(b)(5)). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines SMRs as having electrical capacity of up to 300 MW. IAEA, "Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Regulators' Forum," <https://www.iaea.org/topics/small-modular-reactors/smr-regulators-forum>.

¹⁸ Jason Deign, "Interest in Small Modular Nuclear Reactors Is Growing. So Are Fears They Aren't Viable," *Greentech Media*, March 14, 2018, <https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/interest-in-small-modular-nuclear-grows#gs.ph5LRao>.

¹⁹ A high-temperature gas-cooled SMR began commercial operation in China in December 2023. The 210 MW (electric) plant took 11 years to construct at a cost that was not announced. See "China's Demonstration HTR-PM Enters Commercial Operation," *World Nuclear News*, December 6, 2023, <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Chinese-HTR-PM-Demo-begins-commercial-operation>.

Microreactors would be “self-regulating,” in that their designs are intended to prevent overheating even without operator intervention.²⁰

The Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2017 (NEICA; P.L. 115-248) authorized the construction of demonstration reactors funded by the private sector at DOE sites and authorized grants to help pay for advanced reactor licensing. The Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (P.L. 115-439), enacted in 2019, required NRC to develop a new licensing framework for advanced nuclear technology. Proponents of the law contend that NRC’s existing licensing system is too focused on LWR technology and would potentially cause delays in non-LWR applications. NRC’s implementation of this law is discussed below.

Recent Events

DOE’s Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) supports demonstration plants using advanced nuclear technology and the development of technologies for possible future demonstration.²¹ The program was initially funded with \$230 million by the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) and was authorized by the Energy Act for funding through FY2025.

The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58), enacted in 2021, appropriated \$2.477 billion through FY2025 for ARDP, in addition to annual appropriations. DOE selected two demonstration projects in October 2020 to receive a total of \$3.2 billion from the program over seven years, with the project sponsors matching that amount. Five potential future reactor demonstration projects received 80% cost-share awards under ARDP in December 2020, totaling \$600 million of DOE funding over seven years.

Energy Secretary Chris Wright issued a secretarial order on February 5, 2025, that DOE “will work diligently and creatively to enable the rapid deployment and export of next-generation nuclear technology.”²² DOE announced on March 24, 2025, that it would reissue a solicitation for \$900 million from IIJA to support small modular reactors, replacing a similar solicitation from the Biden Administration.²³

In addition to the ARDP projects, DOE announced a cost-shared award of up to \$1.4 billion under an earlier program in October 2020 to demonstrate the NuScale water-cooled SMR at Idaho National Laboratory. That project was terminated on November 8, 2023, by NuScale and the intended owner of the plant, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS). According to a statement by the companies, UAMPS members (mostly small municipal power systems) did not commit to purchasing enough of the SMR plant’s planned 462 megawatts of electric generation to

²⁰ DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “What Is a Nuclear Microreactor?,” February 26, 2021, <https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/what-nuclear-microreactor>. Electrical output of a reactor can range from about 34%-39% of its thermal output. World Nuclear Association, “Is the Cooling of Power Plants a Constraint on the Future of Nuclear Power?,” May 19, 2020, p. 3, <https://world-nuclear.org/our-association/publications/technical-positions/cooling-of-power-plants>.

²¹ DOE, “Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program,” <https://www.energy.gov/ne/advanced-reactor-demonstration-program>.

²² Chris Wright, Secretary of Energy, “Unleashing the Golden Era of American Energy Dominance,” secretarial order, February 5, 2025, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-wright-acts-unleash-golden-era-american-energy-dominance>.

²³ DOE, “\$900 Million Available to Unlock Commercial Deployment of American-Made Small Modular Reactors,” March 24, 2025, <https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/900-million-available-unlock-commercial-deployment-american-made-small-modular-reactors>.

make the project economically viable.²⁴ The project had experienced a number of delays and cost increases before being terminated.²⁵

Tax credits for advanced nuclear reactors and other new zero-carbon power plants were included in the law commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA; P.L. 117-169). Qualifying plants can receive a 10-year electricity production tax credit of up to 2.6 cents/kilowatt-hour (as adjusted for inflation²⁶) or a 30% investment tax credit. IRA also includes \$700 million for DOE to develop supplies of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), needed for some advanced reactor designs, including the two non-LWR demonstration plants that DOE is supporting. HALEU, not currently available commercially, is uranium enriched in the fissile isotope U-235 above the 3%-5% level used by existing commercial reactors but below the 20% threshold for highly enriched uranium. DOE's HALEU program was authorized by the Energy Act of 2020.

The ADVANCE Act includes provisions on advanced reactor licensing reviews, licensing of nuclear non-electric applications, fusion energy regulation, demonstration of advanced reactors at DOE sites, regulatory requirements for microreactors, and NRC efficiency, among other subjects.

Authority under the Price-Anderson Act²⁷ for NRC to indemnify new reactors against damage to the public caused by major accidents was extended by the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47, Division G, §107), signed by the President on March 23, 2024. Indemnification authority under the Price-Anderson liability system, considered crucial for new reactor construction, was extended from the end of 2025 to the end of 2065.

As required by NEIMA, NRC published a proposed rule in the *Federal Register* for a “Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors” on October 31, 2024. Applicants for new reactor licenses would have the option to use the new licensing framework, Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 53, instead of existing licensing regulations at Parts 50 and 52. As of late 2024, NRC expected to finalize the new Part 53 rule “no later than the end of 2027.”²⁸

NRC is currently reviewing a design certification application for the NuScale SMR plant, which would consist of six 77 MW (electric) reactors in a large pool of water.²⁹ NRC approved construction permits for Kairos Power for adjoining test reactors on November 20, 2024, and is reviewing a construction permit for a research reactor at Abilene Christian University.³⁰ Under

²⁴ NuScale, UAMPS, “Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS) and NuScale Power Agree to Terminate the Carbon Free Power Project (CFPP),” press release, November 8, 2023, <https://www.cfppllc.com/file/44ac923c-86d2-43de-a87b-2c6e336a0db5>.

²⁵ Zach Bright, “NuScale Cancels First-of-a-Kind Nuclear Project as Costs Surge,” *Energywire*, November 9, 2023, <https://www.eenews.net/articles/nuscale-cancels-first-of-a-kind-nuclear-project-as-costs-surge>.

²⁶ The base renewable energy production tax credit of 1.5 cents/kwh, amended by IRA, was established in 1992 and has since been adjusted annually for inflation.

²⁷ Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §2210.

²⁸ NRC, “Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors,” proposed rule, 89 *Federal Register* 86918, October 31, 2024, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/31/2024-23434/risk-informed-technology-inclusive-regulatory-framework-for-advanced-reactors>.

²⁹ NRC, “NuScale US460 Standard Design Approval Application Review,” August 1, 2023, <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/smr/licensing-activities/current-licensing-reviews/nuscale-us460.html>. The first planned NuScale power plant, at Idaho National Laboratory, was canceled November 8, 2023, but the design review is continuing for other potential projects.

³⁰ NRC, “Who We’re Working With,” February 11, 2025, <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/who-were-working-with.html>; and NRC, “NRC to Issue Construction Permits for Kairos Hermes 2 Test Facility in Tennessee,” press release, November 20, 2024, <https://www.nrc.gov/cdn/doc-collection-news/2024/24-081.pdf>.

ARDP, one of the award recipients, TerraPower, is proposing to build its demonstration plant on the site of a closed coal-fired power plant in Wyoming,³¹ while the other, X-energy, is proposing to build a four-unit demonstration plant at a Dow Chemical plant in Texas.³²

The Department of Defense (DOD) awarded a contract in 2022 to BWX Technologies to build a prototype mobile microreactor as part of Project Pele. An award to develop a second prototype design went to X-energy in 2023. According to DOD's Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), "By nurturing and developing multiple micro reactor designs, SCO will not just provide options for the military Services, but will also help jumpstart a truly competitive commercial marketplace for micro reactors."³³ The BWX Technologies microreactor is to be transported to DOE's Idaho National Laboratory in four shipping containers in 2026 and positioned in a concrete shield structure for test operations. Ground was broken at the reactor test site in September 2024.³⁴

DOE's nuclear energy research and development program includes reactor modeling and simulation, experimental processing of spent nuclear fuel, development of advanced reactor concepts, and testing of "accident tolerant fuels" for existing LWRs. The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-42, Division D) included \$1.685 billion for DOE nuclear energy programs. The act provided \$316 million for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program. In addition, the act authorized DOE to spend \$900 million in unobligated appropriations from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) for two SMR demonstrations and up to \$2.720 billion to support domestic uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment, and to support the acquisition of HALEU for advanced reactors. DOE issued a solicitation for the SMR funding on October 16, 2024.³⁵

For FY2025, the Biden Administration requested \$1.591 billion for nuclear energy programs, while the House Appropriations Committee recommended \$1.793 billion (H.R. 8997; H.Rept. 118-580) and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended \$1.675 billion (S. 4927; H.Rept. 118-205). Congress enacted a full-year continuing appropriation (P.L. 119-4) on March 14, 2025, that appears to continue nuclear energy funding in FY2025 at the FY2024 level of \$1.685 billion.

The Biden Administration issued the "U.S. Nuclear Energy Deployment Framework" on November 12, 2024, calling for tripling U.S. nuclear power capacity by deploying an additional 200 gigawatts (GW) by 2050. U.S. nuclear generating capacity currently totals about 97 GW, with existing large commercial reactors each averaging about 1 GW (1,000 megawatts) of capacity. The framework report establishes an interim nuclear power target of "35 GW of new capacity by 2035 that will be operating or under construction." By 2040, according to the report,

³¹ DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, "Next-Gen Nuclear Plant and Jobs Are Coming to Wyoming," June 7, 2021, <https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/next-gen-nuclear-plant-and-jobs-are-coming-wyoming>.

³² X-energy, "Energy Northwest and X-energy Sign Joint Development Agreement for Xe-100 Advanced Small Modular Reactor Project," July 19, 2023, <https://x-energy.com/media/news-releases/energy-northwest-x-energy-joint-development-agreement-xe-100>.

³³ U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), "DOD Exercises Option on Second Micro Nuclear Reactor Design," press release, September 13, 2023, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3524458/dod-exercises-option-on-second-micro-nuclear-reactor-design>.

³⁴ DOD, "DoD Breaks Ground on Project Pele: A Mobile Nuclear Reactor for Energy Resiliency," press release, September 24, 2024, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3915633/dod-breaks-ground-on-project-pele-a-mobile-nuclear-reactor-for-energy-resiliency>.

³⁵ DOE, "\$900 Million Available to Unlock Commercial Deployment of American-Made Small Modular Reactors," March 24, 2025, <https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/900-million-available-unlock-commercial-deployment-american-made-small-modular-reactors>.

the United States should achieve a “sustained pace” of producing 15 GW of new nuclear power capacity per year, including domestic and exported nuclear plants.³⁶

President Trump issued an executive order on January 20, 2025, that included “nuclear energy resources” in a mandatory review of “agency actions that impose an undue burden on the identification, development, or use of domestic energy resources.”³⁷ Energy Secretary Chris Wright followed with a secretarial order on February 5, 2025, that said in part, “As global energy demand continues to grow, America must lead the commercialization of affordable and abundant nuclear energy. As such, the Department will work diligently and creatively to enable the rapid deployment and export of next-generation nuclear technology.”³⁸

Selected Congressional Action—119th Congress

International Nuclear Financing Act of 2025 (H.R. 1474, French)

Would require U.S. officials at the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other multilateral development banks to advocate for elimination of restrictions on financing nuclear energy projects and for the establishment of nuclear energy assistance trust funds. Introduced February 21, 2025; referred to Committee on Financial Services.

DOE and NSF Interagency Research Act (H.R. 1350, Stevens)

Would require DOE and the National Science Foundation (NSF) to coordinate activities in nuclear fusion and other specific science and engineering fields. Introduced February 13, 2025; referred to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress

Hearing to Examine the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Topics included the supply of HALEU for advanced reactors, domestic nuclear fuel production, and nuclear waste storage and disposal. Held March 9, 2023, <https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2023/3/full-committee-hearing-to-examine-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle>.

³⁶ White House, “Biden-Harris Administration Establishes Bold U.S. Government Targets for Safely and Responsibly Expanding U.S. Nuclear Energy and Announces Framework for Action to Achieve These Targets,” November 12, 2024, <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/news-updates/2024/11/12/biden-%E2%81%A0harris-administration-establishes-bold-u-s-government-targets-for-safely-and-responsibly-expanding-u-s-nuclear-energy-and-announces-framework-for-action-to-achieve-these-targets>.

³⁷ Executive Order 14154 of January 20, 2025, “Unleashing American Energy,” 90 *Federal Register* 8353, January 29, 2025, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-01956/unleashing-american-energy>.

³⁸ Chris Wright, Secretary of Energy, “Unleashing the Golden Era of American Energy Dominance,” secretarial order, February 5, 2025, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-wright-acts-unleash-golden-era-american-energy-dominance>.

Hearing on American Nuclear Energy Expansion: Powering a Clean and Secure Future, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security

Topics included conditions needed for deployment of nuclear technologies, domestic nuclear infrastructure and workforce, regulatory issues, and competition in international markets. Held April 18, 2023, <https://energycommerce.house.gov/events/energy-climate-and-grid-security-subcommittee-hearing-american-nuclear-energy-expansion-powering-a-clean-and-secure-future>.

Hearing—From Theory to Reality: The Limitless Potential of Fusion Energy, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy

Topics included the status of DOE fusion research and the growth of private-sector companies pursuing commercial fusion. Held June 13, 2023, <https://science.house.gov/hearings?ID=1A693FA1-B7A9-4408-BE83-6253FFB7787D>.

Hearing on American Nuclear Energy Expansion: Updating Policies for Efficient, Predictable Licensing and Deployment, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security

Topics included NRC licensing of advanced nuclear reactors, nuclear reactor exports, and promotion of nuclear power among U.S. allies. Held July 18, 2023, <https://energycommerce.house.gov/events/energy-climate-and-grid-security-subcommittee-legislative-hearing-american-nuclear-energy-expansion-updating-policies-for-efficient-predictable-licensing-and-deployment>.

Hearing to Examine Opportunities and Challenges Associated with Advanced Nuclear Reactor Commercialization, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Topics included the potential role of advanced nuclear technologies in securing U.S. energy security and independence, the development of small modular reactors and microreactors such as Project Pele, and federal programs to support advanced reactor projects. Held November 30, 2023, <https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2023/11/full-committee-hearing-to-examine-opportunities-and-challenges-associated-with-advanced-nuclear-reactor-commercialization>.

Hearing to Examine Fusion Energy Technology Development, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Topics included nuclear fusion energy technology development and commercialization efforts by the U.S. and foreign governments and the private sector. Held September 19, 2024, <https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2024/9/full-committee-hearing-to>.

Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act of 2023 (Division B of P.L. 118-67, S. 1111, Capito)

Authorizes NRC to establish an International Nuclear Reactor Export and Innovation Branch, restricts possession of nuclear fuel assemblies manufactured in Russia or China, requires congressional notification about nuclear exports to countries lacking specified international

safeguards, limits NRC fees for advanced reactor license applications, authorizes prizes for the first advanced reactor licenses, and excludes NRC costs for reviewing advanced reactors at DOE sites from annual fees, among other provisions. Introduced March 30, 2023; reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute by Environment and Public Works Committee July 10, 2023. Text included as Section 8141 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 (S. 2226), passed by the Senate July 27, 2023. Not included in FY2024 NDAA as enacted (P.L. 118-31). Similar provisions included in ADVANCE Act of 2024, passed by the House May 8, 2024; House amendments agreed to by the Senate June 18, 2024; signed by the President July 9, 2024.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (P.L. 118-31, H.R. 2670, Rogers)

Section 3131, the Nuclear Fuel Security Act of 2023, requires DOE to establish a Nuclear Fuel Security Program to increase the supply of HALEU for advanced reactors and, if necessary, domestically produced low-enriched uranium. DOE must enter into at least two contracts to begin acquiring at least 20 metric tons per year of HALEU by the end of 2027 or the earliest feasible date, subject to available funding. The program must use only uranium produced and processed in the United States or, if necessary, by U.S. allies or partners. Revenues from the sale and transfer of enriched uranium acquired for the program are to be deposited into a revolving fund to be used for further acquisitions. Introduced April 18, 2023; conference report passed by the Senate December 13, 2023, and by the House December 14, 2023; signed by the President December 22, 2023.

Civil Nuclear Export Act of 2024 (H.R. 10323, Nickel)

Would have authorized the Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank) to provide financial support for exports related to nuclear power projects that are permitted by U.S. bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. Also would have expanded the EXIM Bank Program on China and Transformational Exports to include nuclear power projects and limited public damage liability at EXIM Bank nuclear projects. Introduced December 6, 2024; referred to Committee on Financial Services.

Nuclear REFUEL (Recycling Efficient Fuels Utilizing Expedited Licensing) Act (H.R. 10321, Latta)

Would have amended the Atomic Energy Act definition of “production facility” (42 U.S.C. §2014(v)) to exclude spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities that do not separate plutonium from other elements. Introduced December 6, 2024; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Accelerating Reliable Capacity (ARC) Act of 2024 (S. 5421, Risch)

Would have established the “New Nuclear Investment Accelerator Program Account” in the DOE Loan Programs Office to reimburse each covered advanced nuclear energy project for up to \$1.2 billion in construction cost overruns. Introduced December 4, 2024; referred to Committee on Finance.

Advancing Research in Nuclear Fuel Recycling Act of 2024 (S. 5157, Cruz)

Would have required DOE to contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to conduct a study of recycling spent nuclear fuel. The NASEM committee conducting the study could not include authors of a previous NASEM report on the topic. Introduced September 24, 2024; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

Nuclear Waste Reprocessing Act (H.R. 9202, Donalds)

Would have required the Secretary of Energy to “develop, in consultation with relevant industry stakeholders, and implement policies for the Department of Energy to encourage and support the commercialization of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies in the United States.” Introduced July 30, 2024; referred to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and, in addition, to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Nuclear USA Act (H.R. 9201, Donalds)

Would have included uranium enrichment and conversion and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing as qualifying for tax treatment as advanced energy projects. Would have defined uranium as a critical mineral for purposes of the advanced manufacturing production tax credit. Introduced July 30, 2024; referred to Committee on Ways and Means.

Atomic Supply Chain Solutions Act (H.R. 9200, Donalds)

Would have required DOE to evaluate the supply chain for nuclear energy facilities in the United States “to further reduce regulatory barriers and associated costs for nuclear supply chain manufacturers.” Introduced July 30, 2024; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Some provisions are similar to supply chain provisions in the ADVANCE Act of 2024.

American Nuclear Workforce Act (H.R. 8129, Donalds)

Would have required the Secretary of Energy to encourage states to enhance the dissemination of nuclear science and technology information in schools and for institutes of higher education to incorporate degrees relevant to the nuclear industry. Introduced April 26, 2024; referred to Committee on Education and the Workforce. Some provisions are related to training provisions in the ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Fusion Energy Act (S. 4151, Padilla)

Would have defined material made radioactive through fusion as by-product material for the purpose of NRC regulation; would have defined fusion reactors as “fusion machines”; and would have required NRC to implement a technology-inclusive licensing framework for fusion machines. Introduced April 17, 2024; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works. Similar language, except for fusion machine licensing framework, included in ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Atomic Energy Advancement Act (H.R. 6544, Duncan)

Among other provisions, would have removed requirements for NRC to recover costs for reviewing applications and conducting pre-application for early site permits for advanced reactors. Would have required NRC to develop risk-informed and performance-based strategies and guidance for microreactor licensing. Would have authorized a pilot program for DOE long-

term power purchases from a new commercial nuclear power plant. Would have required an interagency study of the global nuclear energy industry and global supply chains. Would have required NRC to coordinate reactor import and export licensing activities and authorized an NRC International Nuclear Reactor Export and Innovation Branch. Would have extended indemnification authority for new reactors under the Price-Anderson Act nuclear accident liability and compensation system through 2065. Would have authorized the Secretary of Energy to award prizes for the first advanced reactor to receive an NRC operating license and for other licensing categories. Introduced December 1, 2023; ordered to be reported December 5, 2023, by Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions on advanced reactor licensing costs, microreactor licensing, advanced reactor prizes, and reactor export licensing included in ADVANCE Act of 2024. Price-Anderson extension enacted in Division G, Section 107, of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47).

Advanced Nuclear Deployment Act (H.R. 6526, Hudson)

Would have exempted costs related to licenses and permits for advanced reactor demonstrations at DOE sites from NRC cost-recovery requirements; would have required NRC to develop risk-informed and performance-based strategies for licensing and regulating microreactors; would have required NRC to implement an expedited procedure for issuing nuclear reactor combined construction permits and operating licenses; and would have required DOE to establish a pilot program for long-term federal purchases of nuclear power. Introduced December 1, 2023; referred to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Provisions on fees at DOE sites, microreactors, and combined construction permits are similar to provisions in the ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Advanced Reactor Fee Reduction Act (H.R. 6326, Bucshon)

Would have limited the hourly rates charged by NRC for reviewing pre-application materials for advanced reactor licenses and for reviewing advanced reactor license applications. Introduced November 9, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023, and in ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Strengthening American Nuclear Competitiveness Act (H.R. 6303, Bill Johnson)

Would have required the Secretary of Energy to report to Congress on U.S. nuclear energy industry competitiveness and to review and update the process for granting general authorization to countries for the transfer of civilian nuclear technology. Would have established exceptions to the current prohibition on foreign ownership or control of U.S. nuclear power plants. Similar provisions were included in the ADVANCE Act of 2024. In addition, would have extended indemnification authority for new reactors to be included in the Price-Anderson Act nuclear liability and compensation system from 2025 to 2065. This extension was enacted in Division G, Section 107, of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47). Introduced November 8, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce and, in addition, to Committee on Foreign Affairs for provisions under its jurisdiction.

Advanced Nuclear Reactor Prize Act (H.R. 6253, Curtis)

Would have authorized the Secretary of Energy to make awards to cover regulatory costs relating to licensing certain first-of-a-kind advanced nuclear reactors. Introduced November 7, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544,

ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023, and in ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Green Nuclear Fertilizer Act (H.R. 5750, Donalds)

Would have required NRC and the Secretaries of Energy and Agriculture to submit a report to Congress on the feasibility of producing hydrogen from advanced nuclear reactors to make “green nuclear fertilizer.” Introduced September 27, 2023; referred to Committee on Agriculture, and to Committee on Energy and Commerce for provisions under its jurisdiction.

Nuclear Fuel Security Act of 2023 (H.R. 5718, Latta; S. 452, Manchin)

Would have required DOE to ensure supplies of domestic nuclear fuel, at all stages of production, and set a goal of providing at least 10 metric tons of HALEU for advanced reactors by June 30, 2026. H.R. 5718 introduced September 26, 2023; referred to Committees on Energy and Commerce and Science, Space, and Technology. Ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023. S. 452 introduced February 15, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and reported with an amendment July 11, 2023 (S.Rept. 118-52). Provisions included as Section 3144 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (S. 2226), passed by the Senate July 27, 2023. Similar to provisions enacted as Section 3131 of P.L. 118-31 above.

U.S. Capitol Power Plant Retrofit Act (H.R. 5706, Donalds)

Would have required the Architect of the Capitol, in consultation with DOE and NRC, to study the feasibility of “retrofitting the Capitol Power Plant to incorporate an advanced nuclear reactor.” Introduced September 26, 2023; referred to Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate and House That Advanced Nuclear Power Should Be Encouraged (S.Res. 321, Budd; H.Res. 124, Donalds)

Would have expressed the sense of the Senate and House that nuclear power should be promoted as clean, reliable, and secure, that advanced nuclear reactors could be a U.S. export opportunity, and that the necessary supply chain, fuel, and workforce should be established. Senate resolution introduced July 27, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources; House resolution introduced February 14, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and to Committee on Armed Services for provisions under its jurisdiction.

Provide Logistical Aid to Airports via Advanced Nuclear Energy (PLANE) Act (H.R. 4678, Donalds)

Would have required NRC, the Federal Aviation Administration, and DOE to establish procedures to deploy microreactors at airports. Introduced July 17, 2023; referred to Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

Leverage Obligated appropriations for Advanced Nuclear (LOAN) Act (H.R. 4677, Donalds)

Would have made DOE advanced reactor demonstration projects eligible for DOE innovative technology loan guarantees. Introduced July 17, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and

Commerce, and to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology for provisions under its jurisdiction.

Advanced Nuclear Feasibility Act (H.R. 4674, Donalds)

Would have required DOE to establish a grant program for feasibility studies for the deployment of advanced nuclear reactors. Introduced July 17, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Civil Nuclear Export Act of 2023 (S. 1928, Manchin)

Would have allowed for EXIM Bank financing of fast breeder reactors and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants if they are otherwise permitted by law, add nuclear facilities to the EXIM Bank Program on China and Transformational Exports, and establish EXIM Bank liability limits for damages caused by nuclear projects financed by the bank. Introduced June 12, 2023; referred to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

21st Century American Atomic Energy Age Act (H.R. 3553, Wittman)

Would have required NRC to provide technical assistance to SMR license applicants and prohibited the import and use of nuclear fuel from Russia, among other provisions. Introduced May 18, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and to Committees on Homeland Security and Armed Services for provisions under their jurisdiction. Provisions on Russian nuclear fuel imports were included in the ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Advanced Nuclear Support Act (H.R. 3487, Donalds)

Would have provided financial support for “commercial planning for, and licensing and construction of, advanced nuclear reactors, and supply chain infrastructure associated with advanced nuclear reactors.” Introduced May 18, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology for provisions under its jurisdiction. Section 104 of the ADVANCE Act of 2024 requires a federal government study of the global nuclear supply chain.

Recoup American Nuclear Global Leadership Act (H.R. 3486, Donalds)

Would have established a Nuclear Exports Working Group composed of senior officials from DOE, EXIM Bank, NRC, Department of Commerce, and other relevant agencies. Introduced May 18, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Make Advanced Nuclear Facilities Eligible for the Qualifying Advanced Energy Project Credit (H.R. 2488, Donalds)

Would have made advanced nuclear facilities eligible for the advanced energy project tax credit. Introduced April 6, 2023; referred to Committee on Ways and Means.

International Nuclear Energy Act of 2023 (S. 826, Manchin; H.R. 2938, Donalds)

Would have required the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of Energy and Commerce, to conduct meetings with allied and partner nations to pursue collaboration on research, development, licensing, and deployment of advanced nuclear reactor technologies; and

included other provisions to encourage international civil nuclear cooperation and exports. Section 104 of the ADVANCE Act of 2024 requires the Secretary of Energy to lead a study of the global status of the civilian nuclear energy industry. Section 101 of the ADVANCE Act of 2024 requires NRC to “support interagency and international coordination” of the consideration of international technical standards for reactor licensing and regulation. Senate bill introduced March 15, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. House bill introduced April 28, 2023; referred to Committees on Foreign Affairs, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means for provisions under their jurisdiction.

National Strategy to Utilize Microreactors for Natural Disaster Response Efforts Act (H.R. 1009, Donalds)

Would have required the President, in consultation with relevant federal agencies, to develop a national strategy to utilize microreactors to assist with natural disaster response efforts. Introduced February 14, 2023; referred to Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and to Committee on Energy and Commerce and Committee on Armed Services for provisions under their jurisdiction.

Nuclear Assistance for America’s Small Businesses Act (H.R. 1007, Donalds)

Would have delayed collection of a portion of NRC fees related to advanced reactor license applications and pre-application activities. Introduced February 14, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Global Nuclear Energy Assessment and Cooperation Act (H.R. 995, Carter of Georgia)

Would have required NRC to support “the consideration of international technical standards to assist the design, licensing, and construction of advanced nuclear systems” and establish an NRC International Nuclear Reactor Export and Innovation Branch to carry out such activities, among other provisions. Introduced February 14, 2023; approved by Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security October 24, 2023. Also referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs for provisions under its jurisdiction. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023, and in ADVANCE Act of 2024.

International Nuclear Energy Financing Act of 2023 (H.R. 806, McHenry)

Would have required the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States Executive Director at the World Bank and other international financial institutions to support assistance for nuclear energy. Introduced February 2, 2023; referred to Committee on Financial Services.

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Metric and Method for Comparing Investments to Decarbonize the Electricity System, Rocky Mountain Institute, September 24, 2019, <https://rmi.org/insight/decarbonizing-the-electricity-system>.

Uranium and Fuel Supply

The nuclear fuel supply chain begins with the mining of uranium, which is found in geological deposits with widely varying concentrations throughout the world. Mined natural uranium is concentrated to the form of an oxide, U_3O_8 , known as yellowcake. About 0.7% of the uranium in yellowcake consists of the fissile isotope U-235, while the remaining 99.3% is non-fissile U-238. To make nuclear fuel appropriate for commercial light water fission reactors, the yellowcake must be chemically converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF_6) in a conversion plant. The UF_6 is then sent to a uranium enrichment plant where, in a gaseous state, it is spun in large cylindrical centrifuges to separate U-235 from the slightly more massive U-238. As a result, some of the UF_6 (toward the center of the centrifuge) gains an increased concentration, or enrichment, of U-235. To make fuel for existing commercial light water reactors, the UF_6 is fed into a series of centrifuges until the U-235 enrichment reaches between 3% and 5%. Additional centrifuges and energy would be needed to reach higher enrichment levels, such as the nearly 20% required for HALEU. Enriched uranium is transported to fuel fabrication plants to be made into fuel assemblies—bundles of long metal tubes filled with uranium—to be loaded into reactors to produce energy.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to broad sanctions on Russian exports, including those in the energy sector. However, sanctions were not initially imposed on Russian uranium exports, because of substantial reliance on those exports by the United States and Europe, particularly exports of enriched uranium.³⁹ The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (P.L. 118-62), signed by the President on May 13, 2024, phases out Russian enriched uranium imports through the end of 2027.

The countries with the most uranium mining, in descending order, are Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia, Australia, Uzbekistan, Russia, Niger, and China, which together accounted for 97% of world production of uranium in 2022. U.S. uranium production in 2022 accounted for 0.15%.⁴⁰ Canada was the largest supplier of uranium to U.S. nuclear power plants in 2022, accounting for 27%, followed by Kazakhstan at 25% and Russia at 12%. Most U.S. uranium mines halted production after 2018, primarily because of low uranium prices.⁴¹ Following a sharp increase in uranium prices and expectations of further rising demand, several U.S. mines restarted operations in 2022 and 2023, with further production growth anticipated for 2024 when full-year statistics are compiled.⁴²

The only U.S. uranium conversion plant, in Metropolis, IL, halted operation in 2017 because of low prices and oversupply. Nuclear reactors in the United States at that point became dependent on conversion plants in Canada and France, conversion conducted in Russia to prepare uranium for enrichment and subsequent export, and secondary supplies from inventories. The Metropolis plant restarted in mid-2023, following a doubling of conversion prices.⁴³

³⁹ For a European perspective, see Ashutosh Pandey, "Why EU Sanctions Don't Include Russian Nuclear Industry," *Deutsche Welle*, July 19, 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/russia-nuclear-industry-eu/a-66275352>.

⁴⁰ World Nuclear Association, "World Uranium Mining Production," May 16, 2024, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx>.

⁴¹ EIA, "U.S. Uranium Production up in 2022 After Reaching Record Lows in 2021," August 17, 2023, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=60160>.

⁴² EIA, "Domestic Uranium Production Report—Annual," May 23, 2024, <https://www.eia.gov/uranium/production/annual>; and EIA, "Domestic Uranium Market Will Grow Between 2023 and 2024," August 8, 2024, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=62744>.

⁴³ William Freebairn, "Conversion, Enrichment Suppliers Worried About Future Oversupply," *Platts NuclearFuel*, October 27, 2023.

Russia dominates world uranium enrichment capacity, with about 45%. The United States has one enrichment plant, owned by the European consortium Urenco, with about 8% of the world's capacity. Other enrichment plants are located in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.⁴⁴ In 2022, Russia supplied 24% of uranium enrichment services purchased by U.S. nuclear power plants, while the U.S. enrichment plant provided 27% and Western European plants provided 49%.

Russian uranium imports to the United States are subject to annual import limits established under the terms of the 1992 Russian Suspension Agreement, as amended, between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Russian Federation's State Atomic Energy Corporation, ROSATOM. Since that time, the Russian Suspension Agreement has been amended five times to extend and modify the limits, including the most recent amendment finalized between Commerce and ROSATOM on October 5, 2020.⁴⁵ Congress codified the amendment to the suspension agreement with Section 2007 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), which amended Title 42, Section 2297h-10a, of the *U.S. Code* by establishing additional import limits through 2040. As noted above, the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act phases out Russian enriched uranium imports by the end of 2027.

The fuel fabrication stage, in which enriched uranium is made into finished reactor fuel assemblies, does not rely on Russian capacity. Capacity at three U.S. fuel fabrication plants is more than sufficient to supply all U.S. commercial reactors. Western European reactors also do not need Russian fuel fabrication. However, some Eastern European countries with Soviet-designed reactors use fuel fabricated in Russia.⁴⁶

Recent Events

Urenco announced July 6, 2023, that it would expand the capacity of its U.S. enrichment plant in New Mexico by 15%, starting in 2025. "New commitments from U.S. customers for non-Russian fuel underpin this investment," according to a company statement.⁴⁷ Another 15% capacity increase was announced by Urenco for its Netherlands plant on December 14, 2023, along with an unspecified increase at its plant in Germany, with both increases tied to increased customer commitments.⁴⁸ French nuclear fuel firm Orano announced October 26, 2023, that it would expand its enrichment plant by 30% by 2028, which could include production of HALEU "as driven by demand."⁴⁹ The U.S. firm Centrus delivered the initial 20 kilograms of HALEU to

⁴⁴ World Nuclear Association, "Uranium Enrichment," October 25, 2024, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment.aspx>.

⁴⁵ Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Enforcement and Compliance, "2020 Amendment to the Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on Uranium from the Russian Federation," 85 *Federal Register* 64112, October 9, 2020. The finalized amendment dates were March 11, 1994; October 3, 1996; May 7, 1997; February 1, 2008; and October 5, 2020.

⁴⁶ World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Fuel and Its Fabrication," October 2021, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/fuel-fabrication.aspx>.

⁴⁷ Urenco, "Urenco's First Capacity Expansion to Be at Its U.S. Site," press release, July 6, 2023, <https://www.urencoco.com/news/global/2023/urencos-first-capacity-expansion-to-be-at-its-us-site>.

⁴⁸ Urenco, "Urenco Announces Major Netherlands Expansion to Strengthen Energy Security," press release, December 14, 2023, <https://www.urencoco.com/news/global/2023/urenco-announces-major-expansion-in-the-netherlands-to-strengthen-energy-security>.

⁴⁹ Orano, "Orano Announces 30% Increase in Uranium Enrichment Capacity by 2028," press release, October 26, 2023, <https://www.orano.group/usa/en/our-news/news-releases/2023/orano-announces-30-increase-in-uranium-enrichment-capacity-by-2028>.

DOE in November 2023 under a contract that calls for 900 kilograms by the end of June 2025 “with options to produce more in the future,” according to DOE.⁵⁰

In line with those announcements, leaders from the United States, Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom pledged on December 7, 2023, that they would “pursue at least USD \$4.2 billion in government-led and private investment in our five nations’ collective enrichment and conversion capacity over the next three years” that would be “free from Russian material.” The agreement was reached at the Net Zero Nuclear Summit on the sidelines of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28).⁵¹

The Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (P.L. 118-62; H.R. 1042) banned imports of enriched uranium from Russia starting on August 11, 2024. If no alternative supplies are available, the Secretary of Energy may grant waivers to the prohibition through the end of 2027, up to specified annual limits. DOE published procedures for granting such waivers on May 24, 2024.⁵² The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the bill would increase the price of nuclear fuel by 13% by prompting “a gradual replacement of Russian suppliers with higher-cost sources of enrichment services under the bill’s waiver provisions.”⁵³ In a March 9, 2023, hearing in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the president of the largest U.S. nuclear plant operator, Constellation Energy, testified that “while Western suppliers have said that new capacity could be available as early as 2028, that date could easily slip if legislation to support new capacity is not enacted soon.”⁵⁴

The IRA included \$700 million for DOE to develop supplies of HALEU, needed for some advanced reactor designs. The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-42, Division D), authorized DOE to spend up to \$2.72 billion of unobligated IJA appropriations to support domestic uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment, and to support the acquisition of HALEU for advanced reactors.

⁵⁰ DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “Centrus Produces Nation’s First Amounts of HALEU,” November 7, 2023, <https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/centrus-produces-nations-first-amounts-haleu>; and Centrus Energy Corp., “Centrus Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results,” February 6, 2025, <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/centrus-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2024-results-302370718.html>.

⁵¹ DOE, “At COP28, U.S., Canada, France, Japan, and UK Announce Plans to Mobilize \$4.2 Billion for Reliable Global Nuclear Energy Supply Chain,” December 7, 2023, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/cop28-us-canada-france-japan-and-uk-announce-plans-mobilize-42-billion-reliable-global>.

⁵² DOE, “Instructions for Requesting a Waiver from the Secretary of Energy for the Import of Russian Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) into the United States,” 89 *Federal Register* 45871, May 24, 2024, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/05/24/2024-11392/instructions-for-requesting-a-waiver-from-the-secretary-of-energy-for-the-import-of-russian>.

⁵³ Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate: H.R. 1042, Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, as Reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on December 1, 2023,” December 5, 2023, <https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-12/hr1042.pdf>.

⁵⁴ Testimony of Joseph Dominguez, President and Chief Executive Officer, Constellation Energy, before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March 9, 2023, <https://www.energy.senate.gov/services/files/0E076807-6F7F-4C0A-8D21-8E7E0A7ACF25>.

Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress

Hearing to Examine the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Topics included domestic nuclear fuel production, the supply of HALEU for advanced reactors, and nuclear waste storage and disposal. Held March 9, 2023, <https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2023/3/full-committee-hearing-to-examine-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle>.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (P.L. 118-31, H.R. 2670, Rogers)

Section 3131 of P.L. 118-31, which is cited as the Nuclear Fuel Security Act of 2023, requires DOE to establish a Nuclear Fuel Security Program to increase the supply of HALEU for advanced reactors and, if necessary, domestically produced low-enriched uranium. DOE must enter into at least two contracts to begin acquiring at least 20 metric tons per year of HALEU by the end of 2027 or the earliest feasible date, subject to available funding. The program must use only uranium produced and processed in the United States or, if necessary, by U.S. allies or partners. Revenues from the sale and transfer of enriched uranium acquired for the program are to be deposited into a revolving fund to be used for further acquisitions. Introduced April 18, 2023; conference report passed by the Senate on December 13, 2023, and by the House on December 14, 2023; signed by the President on December 22, 2023.

Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (P.L. 118-62, H.R. 1042, Rodgers)/Reduce Russian Uranium Imports Act (S. 763, Barrasso)

Prohibits imports of enriched uranium from Russia. If no alternative supplies are available, the Secretary of Energy may grant waivers to the prohibition through 2027, up to specified annual limits. Senate bill introduced March 9, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. House bill introduced February 14, 2023; reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 1, 2023 (H.Rept. 118-296). Passed House December 11, 2023; signed by the President May 13, 2024 (P.L. 118-62).

Nuclear Fuel Security Act of 2023 (H.R. 5718, Latta; S. 452, Manchin)

Would have required DOE to ensure supplies of domestic nuclear fuel, at all stages of production, and would set a goal of providing at least 10 metric tons of HALEU for advanced reactors by June 30, 2026. H.R. 5718 introduced September 26, 2023; referred to Committees on Energy and Commerce and Science, Space, and Technology. Ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023. S. 452 introduced February 15, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and reported with an amendment July 11, 2023 (S.Rept. 118-52). Provisions included as Section 3144 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (S. 2226), passed by the Senate July 27, 2023. Similar to provisions enacted as Section 3131 of P.L. 118-31 above.

Milestones for Advanced Nuclear Fuel Act (H.R. 8674, Brandon)

Would have required DOE to award milestone-based technology development and demonstration projects for an economically competitive advanced nuclear fuel supply chain. Introduced June 7,

2024; reported by Committee on Science, Space, and Technology September 18, 2024 (H.Rept. 118-686).

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Disruption and the Nuclear Industry, Cindy Vestergaard, Stimson Center, September 3, 2024, <https://www.stimson.org/2024/disruption-and-the-nuclear-industry>.

Radioactive Waste

After several years in a nuclear reactor, nuclear fuel (primarily uranium) can no longer economically sustain a nuclear chain reaction and becomes highly radioactive and thermally hot. Such spent nuclear fuel must be periodically removed from operating reactors and stored in adjacent pools of water, which prevents overheating and provides radiation shielding. Spent fuel consists mostly of uranium from the original fuel plus plutonium and other radioactive material produced by the irradiation of uranium. After several years of cooling, the spent fuel can be placed in dry casks for storage elsewhere on the plant site.

When existing U.S. reactors were built, spent fuel had been expected to be taken away for reprocessing (separation of plutonium and uranium to make new fuel) or permanent disposal. However, reprocessing has not become commercialized in the United States, for economic and nonproliferation reasons, and central waste storage and disposal facilities have proven difficult to site. As a result, the vast majority of U.S. commercial spent fuel remains at the nuclear plants where it was generated—estimated at 97,000 metric tons in 2025 and increasing at the rate of about 2,200 metric tons per year.⁵⁵

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPAA; P.L. 97-425, 42 U.S.C. §10172), as amended in 1987, named Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the nation’s sole candidate site for a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository. NWPAA required DOE to study the site and seek a license from NRC to build a repository there.

Citing opposition from the State of Nevada, the Obama Administration announced it would halt the Yucca Mountain project. No new funding has been appropriated for it since FY2010. The Obama Administration appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to develop an alternative nuclear waste policy, and its final report was issued in January 2012. DOE largely adopted the Commission’s recommendations in a January 2013 waste strategy that called for a consent-based process to select nuclear waste storage and disposal sites and for a surface storage pilot facility to open by 2021.⁵⁶ DOE issued a *Draft Consent-Based Siting Process* shortly before the end of the Obama Administration.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ DOE, “Resource Portal for DOE Nuclear Waste Management Information,” interactive map, accessed March 11, 2025, <https://curie.pnnl.gov/map>.

⁵⁶ DOE, *Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste*, January 2013, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013%201-15%20Nuclear_Waste_Report.pdf.

⁵⁷ DOE, *Draft Consent-Based Siting Process for Consolidated Storage and Disposal Facilities for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste*, January 12, 2017, <https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Draft%20Consent-Based%20Siting%20Process%20and%20Siting%20Considerations.pdf>.

A federal appeals court on August 13, 2013, ordered NRC to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process with previously appropriated funds.⁵⁸ In response, NRC issued the final volumes of the Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation Report (SER), which provided NRC staff's determination that the repository would meet all applicable standards. However, the staff said upon completing the SER that NRC should not authorize construction of the repository until all land and water rights requirements were met and a supplement to DOE's environmental impact statement (EIS) was completed.⁵⁹ NRC completed the supplemental EIS in May 2016 and made its database of Yucca Mountain licensing documents publicly available, using nearly all the remaining previously appropriated licensing funds.⁶⁰

Recent Events

The Trump Administration largely halted the consent-based siting process and included funding to restart Yucca Mountain licensing in its FY2018, FY2019, and FY2020 budget submissions to Congress, but the requests were not funded by Congress. The Trump Administration did not seek Yucca Mountain repository funding for FY2021, but only funds for interim storage planning, which were appropriated by Congress. The Biden Administration also requested nuclear waste funds only for planning in FY2022, FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025 (with those amounts enacted in FY2022 through FY2024).

The Biden Administration resumed the consent-based siting process in December 2021 with a request for information about the design of such a program and issued an updated report on consent-based siting in April 2023.⁶¹ Under the updated process, DOE announced grants on July 9, 2023, to 13 consortia (one of which subsequently dropped out) made up of academic, nonprofit, and private-sector institutions to “work with communities interested in DOE’s community-centered approach to storing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel.”⁶²

With no spent fuel disposal or storage facilities currently under development by DOE, two private-sector storage facilities in New Mexico and Texas have been proposed. NRC issued licenses to the Texas facility on September 13, 2021, and the New Mexico facility on May 9, 2023. These near-surface Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities are intended to hold spent fuel from nuclear power plants around the country until a permanent underground repository is available.⁶³ However, they are facing strong opposition from the two proposed host states. New

⁵⁸ U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, In re: Aiken County et al., No. 11-1271, writ of mandamus, August 13, 2013, [http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/BAE0CF34F762EBD985257BC6004DEB18/\\$file/11-1271-1451347.pdf](http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/BAE0CF34F762EBD985257BC6004DEB18/$file/11-1271-1451347.pdf).

⁵⁹ NRC, “NRC Publishes Final Two Volumes of Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation,” press release 15-005, January 29, 2015, <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2015/>.

⁶⁰ NRC, *Supplement to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada*, NUREG-2184, Final Report, May 2016, <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr2184/>; “NRC Staff Issues Volume 3 of Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation Report,” press release 14-069, October 16, 2014, <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1949/v3/>.

⁶¹ DOE, *Consent-Based Siting Process for Federal Consolidated Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel*, April 2023, <https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/Consent-Based%20Siting%20Process%20Report-0424%203.pdf>.

⁶² DOE, “DOE Awards \$26 Million to Support Consent-Based Siting for Spent Nuclear Fuel,” June 9, 2023, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-awards-26-million-support-consent-based-siting-spent-nuclear-fuel>. For more about the 12 final awards, see DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, “Consent-Based Siting Consortia,” accessed January 17, 2024, <https://www.energy.gov/ne/consent-based-siting-consortia>.

⁶³ NRC, “Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF),” December 8, 2020, <https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/cis.html>; NRC, “NRC Issues License to Interim Storage Partners for Consolidated Spent Nuclear Fuel Interim (continued...)”, accessed January 17, 2024, <https://www.nrc.gov/press-releases/2024/01/17/nrc-issues-license-to-interim-storage-partners-for-consolidated-spent-nuclear-fuel-interim>.

Mexico filed a lawsuit against NRC on March 29, 2021, and the Texas governor signed a law banning new spent fuel storage facilities in the state on August 9, 2021.⁶⁴ In a lawsuit filed by Texas, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 25, 2023, vacated the license for the Texas site on the grounds that NRC lacks authority to license nuclear waste storage facilities other than those specified by NWSA.⁶⁵ The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on an appeal of the decision on March 5, 2025.⁶⁶

Canadian plans for nuclear waste disposal have also generated congressional controversy, because some proposed sites are near the Great Lakes. In 2019, Canada's Nuclear Waste Management Organization narrowed its search for a spent nuclear fuel repository to two sites in Ontario, one located near Lake Huron.⁶⁷ The Township of Ignace, Ontario, voted to move forward with the siting process in July 2024, and the municipality of South Bruce, Ontario, followed suit in a referendum on October 28, 2024.⁶⁸

Selected Congressional Action – 119th Congress

Spent Fuel Prioritization Act of 2025 (H.R. 1012, Levin)

Would require that, in determining the order in which spent nuclear fuel will be taken by DOE from nuclear plant sites under NWSA, highest priority shall be given to plants that are permanently closed and are located in the highest-population areas, earthquake zones, and areas that pose national security concerns. Introduced February 5, 2025; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act (H.R. 466, Titus; S. 101, Cortez Masto)

Would require the Secretary of Energy to obtain the consent of affected state, local, and tribal governments before making expenditures from the Nuclear Waste Fund for a nuclear waste repository. Both bills introduced January 15, 2025. House bill referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce; Senate bill referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.

Storage Facility in Texas,” press release 21-036, September 13, 2021, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2125/ML21257A091.pdf>; and NRC, “NRC Issues License to Holtec International for Consolidated Spent Nuclear Fuel Interim Storage Facility in New Mexico,” press release 23-031, May 9, 2023, <https://www.nrc.gov/cdn/doc-collection-news/2023/23-031.pdf>.

⁶⁴ Texas Governor Greg Abbott, “Interim Storage Partners (ISP) Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Project, Docket ID NRC-2016-0231,” November 3, 2020, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2030/ML20309B061.pdf>; Texas Legislature Online, Actions, HB7, <https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/Actions.aspx?LegSess=872&Bill=HB7>; and New Mexico Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham, “Comments from Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham on Docket ID NRC-2018-0052,” September 22, 2020, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2026/ML20269A025.pdf>.

⁶⁵ *State of Texas v. NRC*, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, August 25, 2023, <https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-60743-CV0.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Supreme Court of the United States, *Interim Storage Partners v. Texas*, cert. granted October 4, 2024, <https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/23-01312qp.pdf>; and Supreme Court of the United States, *Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas and Interim Storage Partners v. Texas*, oral arguments, March 5, 2025, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1300_32q3.pdf.

⁶⁷ Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization, “About the Site Selection Process,” accessed December 7, 2023, <https://www.nwmo.ca/Site-selection>.

⁶⁸ Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization, “Municipality of South Bruce Releases Willingness Referendum Results,” October 28, 2024, <https://www.nwmo.ca/News/Municipality-of-South-Bruce-Releases-Willingness-Referendum-Results>.

Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress

Hearing on American Nuclear Energy Expansion: Spent Fuel Policy and Innovation, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security

Topics included improving spent nuclear fuel management, the federal government's responsibility for ultimate disposal of spent fuel, and prospects for technology innovation. Held April 10, 2024, <https://energycommerce.house.gov/posts/chairs-rodgers-and-duncan-announce-hearing-on-improving-spent-nuclear-fuel-management>.

Hearing to Examine the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Topics included nuclear waste storage and disposal, the supply of HALEU for advanced reactors, and domestic nuclear fuel production. Held March 9, 2023, <https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2023/3/full-committee-hearing-to-examine-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle>.

Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2024 (H.R. 9786, Levin)

Would have established the Nuclear Waste Administration to develop facilities for temporary storage and permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Nuclear waste facilities would have required consent of the host state, affected units of local government, and affected Indian tribes. Nuclear waste fee revenues, interest on the Nuclear Waste Fund, and appropriations accrued after the date of enactment were to be paid into the Working Capital Fund, which would have been immediately available to the Nuclear Waste Administration to carry out the storage and disposal program. Introduced September 24, 2024; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

100 Year Canister Life Act (H.R. 7172, Levin)

Would have prohibited NRC from certifying dry storage casks for spent nuclear fuel without determining that they could operate safely for at least 100 years. Introduced January 31, 2024; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Increasing Nuclear Safety Protocols for Extended Canister Transfers (INSPECT) Act (H.R. 5115, Levin)

Would have required NRC to assign a resident inspector to each commercial nuclear power plant that has permanently ceased operation. Would have required the inspector to conduct inspections of decommissioning activities and spent nuclear fuel transfer activities, and remain at the plant until all fuel is transferred from its spent fuel pools to dry storage. Introduced August 1, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Spent Fuel Prioritization Act of 2023 (H.R. 3862, Levin)

Would have required that, in determining the order in which spent nuclear fuel will be taken by DOE from nuclear plant sites under NWPA, highest priority shall be given to plants that are permanently closed and are located in the highest-population areas, earthquake zones, and areas

that pose national security concerns. Introduced June 6, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate and the House of Representatives That the President and the Secretary of State Should Ensure That the Government of Canada Does Not Permanently Store Nuclear Waste in the Great Lakes Basin (S.Res. 117, Stabenow; H.Res. 243, Kildee)

Would have expressed the sense of the House and Senate that Canada should not allow construction of a nuclear waste repository within the Great Lakes Basin, and that the President and the Department of State should work with Canada to prevent such construction and craft a long-term solution for nuclear waste storage that does not threaten the Great Lakes. Senate resolution introduced March 22, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. House resolution introduced March 22, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act (H.R. 1051, Titus; S. 404, Cortez Masto)

Would have required the Secretary of Energy to obtain the consent of affected state, local, and tribal governments before making expenditures from the Nuclear Waste Fund for a nuclear waste repository. Both bills introduced February 14, 2023. House bill referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce; Senate bill referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.

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Nuclear Plant Economic Viability

In recent years, U.S. nuclear power plants have faced severe financial pressure caused primarily by competition from low-cost natural gas, growing supplies of renewable energy, and, until recently, stagnant electricity demand. Thirteen U.S. reactors were permanently closed from 2013 through April 2022 (**Table 2**). Plans for up to 30 new U.S. reactors announced during the past 15 years have largely been put on hold, with 2 recently completed and 2 canceled in 2017 after construction had begun.

Now, many forecasters are projecting accelerated growth in electricity demand through 2050, primarily because of expected domestic growth in three key areas: data centers, manufacturing, and electrification of buildings and transportation.⁶⁹ Several major data center operators have pursued contracts with new and existing nuclear power plants to provide steady supplies of low-carbon electricity.⁷⁰ Two power plants are now planning to restart reactors that had been permanently closed; one of these reactors would supply power to a data center. A third power plant is also reportedly considering restarting a closed reactor. And, as noted above, U.S. demonstrations of several advanced reactor designs are currently being planned as well.

In response to the reactor shutdowns since 2013, Congress and several states took a variety of actions to keep the existing nuclear fleet operating and to encourage the construction of new reactors. Government support for nuclear power can include loan guarantees, tax credits, clean energy mandates, emissions credits, and electricity market regulations.

The two new reactors at the Vogtle plant received loan guarantees from DOE totaling \$12 billion—in 2014, 2015, and 2019—as authorized by Title 17 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58).⁷¹ The new Vogtle units also benefited from an extension of federal tax credits for electricity production from new nuclear plants under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123). Before the extension, new nuclear reactors had been required to begin operation before

⁶⁹ Cy McGeady, “Strategic Perspectives on U.S. Electric Demand Growth,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 20, 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-perspectives-us-electric-demand-growth>.

⁷⁰ For example, see Alexa St. John and Jennifer McDermott, “Amazon, Google Make Dueling Nuclear Investments to Power Data Centers with Clean Energy,” Associated Press, October 16, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/climate-data-centers-amazon-google-nuclear-energy-e404d52241f965e056a7c53e88abc91a>.

⁷¹ DOE, “Secretary Perry Announces Financial Close on Additional Loan Guarantees During Trip to Vogtle Advanced Nuclear Energy Project,” press release, March 22, 2019, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-perry-announces-financial-close-additional-loan-guarantees-during-trip-vogtle>.

January 1, 2021, to qualify for the production tax credit, which is limited to 6,000 megawatts of total generating capacity. The extension allowed new reactors to use the credit after that date if the capacity limit had not been reached. Along with the extension, the tax credit was modified to allow non-taxpaying partners in a nuclear project, such as public power agencies, to transfer their credits to a project's taxpaying partners.

The appropriate role of nuclear power, if any, in meeting national energy and environmental goals is a key question in debate over providing government incentives and subsidies. Nuclear power supporters generally point to the technology as crucial for providing a secure, domestic source of energy with low greenhouse gas and other emissions. Supporters also see a viable and growing domestic nuclear power industry as crucial in providing a technology base for naval nuclear reactors and other defense nuclear programs, and in providing a base for nuclear power plant exports to counter reactor exports being pursued by Russia and China for geopolitical purposes. Opponents generally counter that safety and proliferation risks, nuclear waste hazards, and high costs outweigh any such benefits.

Recent Events

Congress took a major step to improve the economics of existing nuclear plants for owners and investors by establishing a tax credit in IRA Section 13105. The credit provides up to 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, adjusted for inflation, for electricity generated in 2024 through 2032 by reactors operating before the date of enactment (August 16, 2022, excluding the new Vogtle reactors, which already receive the credit discussed above). IRA Section 13701 makes new nuclear reactors eligible for a similar 10-year clean electricity production credit that is available for facilities placed into service after 2024 (also excluding the new Vogtle reactors).⁷² IRA Section 13707 allows nuclear reactors to qualify for a clean electricity investment tax credit of up to 30%, if they do not take the clean electricity production credit.

IJIA created a Civil Nuclear Credit Program to provide direct financial support to nuclear power plants at risk of closure for economic reasons. Reactors certified by the Secretary of Energy as being at risk of closure can submit bids to receive credits for four years, specifying an amount per megawatt-hour of electricity generated that would be paid for each credit. DOE announced a final Civil Nuclear Credit award totaling up to \$1.1 billion to the two-unit Diablo Canyon plant in California on January 2, 2024.⁷³ The Diablo Canyon credit award, the only one issued by the program to date, is intended to prevent the planned permanent shutdown of the plant in 2025.

The one-unit Palisades nuclear power plant in Michigan ceased operation in April 2022. The plant's owner, Holtec, had purchased the plant with the intention of decommissioning it, but decided after the shutdown to try to resume operation. Holtec announced the filing of a restart application with NRC on October 6, 2023, and received a \$1.52 billion DOE loan guarantee on

⁷² Aside from the in-service date requirements, Sections 13105 and 13701 specifically exclude nuclear plants that qualify for the earlier nuclear tax credit.

⁷³ DOE, "Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Civil Nuclear Credit Program Proposed Award of Credits to Pacific Gas and Electric Company for Diablo Canyon Power Plant," 89 *Federal Register* 69, January 2, 2024, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/01/02/2023-28808/record-of-decision-for-the-final-environmental-impact-statement-for-the-civil-nuclear-credit-program>; and DOE, "Biden-Harris Administration Announces Major Investment to Preserve America's Clean Nuclear Energy Infrastructure," November 21, 2022, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-announces-major-investment-preserve-americas-clean-nuclear>.

September 30, 2024.⁷⁴ No permanently closed reactors in the United States have ever restarted.⁷⁵ The owner of Three Mile Island Unit 1, which permanently closed in 2019, announced on September 20, 2024, that it would restart the Pennsylvania reactor to power a Microsoft data center by 2028.⁷⁶ The owner of another closed reactor, the Duane Arnold plant in Iowa, has announced regulatory steps toward a possible restart “as early as the end of 2028.”⁷⁷

In addition to the federal incentives, several states have taken action to prevent nuclear plant closures. An Illinois law signed September 15, 2021, provides “carbon mitigation credits” to nuclear plants at risk of closure for economic reasons, averting the planned shutdown of two plants with four operating reactors.⁷⁸ New York and Illinois provided “zero emission credits” to seven reactors that had been at risk of retirement by 2018.⁷⁹ Connecticut enacted legislation in 2017 to make nuclear reactors eligible for a state procurement process for zero-emission electricity sources, upon certification of financial need. New Jersey enacted zero-emission credits for nuclear power in 2018.⁸⁰ Ohio enacted subsidies in July 2019 that prompted the owner of the state’s two commercial reactors, Davis-Besse and Perry, to rescind the units’ previously planned retirements, although the assistance was repealed in March 2021.⁸¹ The planned retirement of the two-unit Beaver Valley nuclear plant in western Pennsylvania was rescinded in March 2020, after Pennsylvania joined the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The plant’s owner, Energy Harbor, said RGGI would provide emissions credits “which will begin to help level the playing field for our carbon-free nuclear generators.”⁸² Michigan enacted legislation on July 31, 2023, to provide \$150 million toward restarting the closed Palisades plant.⁸³

⁷⁴ DOE, “Biden-Harris Administration Bringing Back Clean Nuclear Energy, Creating Clean Energy Union Jobs Across the Midwest,” September 30, 2024, <https://www.energy.gov/articles/biden-harris-administration-bringing-back-clean-nuclear-energy-creating-clean-energy-union>.

⁷⁵ Holtec International, “Holtec Formally Initiates Process with NRC to Reauthorize Operations at Palisades Power Plant,” October 6, 2023, <https://holtecinternational.com/2023/10/06/holtec-formally-initiates-process-with-nrc-to-reauthorize-operations-at-palisades-power-plant>.

⁷⁶ Constellation Energy, “Constellation to Launch Crane Clean Energy Center, Restoring Jobs and Carbon-Free Power to the Grid,” September 20, 2024, <https://www.constellationenergy.com/newsroom/2024/Constellation-to-Launch-Crane-Clean-Energy-Center-Restoring-Jobs-and-Carbon-Free-Power-to-The-Grid.html>.

⁷⁷ NextEra Energy, “NextEra Energy Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Financial Results,” January 24, 2025, <https://www.investor.nexteraenergy.com/~media/Files/N/NEE-IR/news-and-events/events-and-presentations/2025/2025-0124%20NEEQ42024News%20Release%20vFinal.pdf>.

⁷⁸ Illinois General Assembly, Energy Transition Act (Nuclear Plant Assistance), Public Act 102-0662, <https://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/102/102-0662.htm>.

⁷⁹ Nuclear Energy Institute, *Zero-Emission Credits*, April 2018, <https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/zero-emission-credits-201804.pdf>.

⁸⁰ Doug Vine, *Solutions for Maintaining the Existing Nuclear Fleet*, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2018, <https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/solutions-for-maintaining-existing-nuclear-fleet.pdf>.

⁸¹ “FirstEnergy Solutions Rescinds Deactivation Notices for Competitive Generating Plants in Ohio,” PR Newswire, July 26, 2019, <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/firstenergy-solutions-rescinds-deactivation-notices-for-competitive-generating-plants-in-ohio-300891786.html>. A bill repealing the Ohio nuclear plant assistance was signed by the governor on March 31, 2021. See Mike DeWine, “Governor DeWine Signs Ohio Transportation Budget,” press release, March 31, 2021, <https://governor.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/governor/media/news-and-media/transportation-budget-signed-03312021>.

⁸² Energy Harbor, “Energy Harbor Corp Rescinds Deactivation Notice for Nuclear Generating Plant in Pennsylvania,” press release, March 13, 2020, <https://energyharbor.com/en/about/news-and-information/energy-harbor-corp-rescinds-deactivation-notice-for-nuclear-gene>.

⁸³ David Dalton, “Michigan Budget Includes \$150 Million to Support Nuclear Reactor Restart,” *NucNet*, July 3, 2023, <https://www.nucnet.org/news/michigan-budget-includes-usd150-million-to-support-nuclear-reactor-restart-7-1-2023>.

DOE's Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program manages cost-shared research projects "to solve significant highest priority cost and technical problems threatening existing plants."⁸⁴ The program includes research on materials used in nuclear plants, modeling of plant aging, and plant upgrades. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-42) included \$45 million for the sustainability program, the same as in FY2023. For FY2025, the Biden Administration requested \$35 million for the program, while the House Appropriations Committee approved \$45 million (H.Rept. 118-580) and the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended \$15 million (S.Rept. 118-205). The FY2025 full-year continuing appropriation (P.L. 119-4) appears to provide \$45 million, the same as in FY2024.

Federal policy on carbon dioxide emissions could also have a significant impact on the expansion of nuclear power and the economic viability of existing reactors. The Biden Administration set a goal of eliminating carbon emissions for the U.S. power sector by 2035.⁸⁵ President Trump issued an executive order upon taking office to terminate many of President Biden's climate change policies.⁸⁶

Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress

Resolution Expressing the Sense of Congress Relating to Nuclear Power Being a Necessary Clean Baseload Energy Source to Achieve a Reliable, Secure, and Green Electric Grid (H.Con.Res. 26, Donalds)

Would have expressed the sense of Congress that "in order to achieve geopolitical energy leadership, reduce carbon emissions, and secure American energy independence, Congress is committed to embracing and accepting nuclear power as a clean baseload energy source that is easily compatible with other intermittent energy sources and necessary to achieve a reliable, secure, and green electric grid." Introduced March 17, 2003; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

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⁸⁴ DOE, "Reactor Technology Program Overview," presentation by R. Shane Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Technology Demonstration and Deployment, to the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, July 9, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/07/f53/RSJ%20Brief%20to%20NEAC%20-%20July%209%202018_0.pdf.

⁸⁵ White House, "President Biden to Catalyze Global Climate Action Through the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate," fact sheet, April 20, 2023, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-president-biden-catalyze-global-climate-action-through-the-major-economies>.

⁸⁶ Executive Order 14154 of January 20, 2025, "Unleashing American Energy," 90 *Federal Register* 8353, January 29, 2025, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-01956/unleashing-american-energy>.

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Safety and Regulation

The 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant disaster in Japan, triggered by a 9.0-magnitude earthquake and 45-foot tsunami, greatly increased concerns about safety in the nuclear policy debate. The incident clearly demonstrated the potential consequences of a total loss of power (or “station blackout”) at today’s commercial nuclear plants. Even when the nuclear reaction shuts down as designed, as at the Fukushima plant after the initial earthquake, residual radioactivity in the reactor core continues to generate “decay heat” that must be removed, typically by electrically driven or controlled cooling systems.

When the tsunami knocked out power at the three Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors that had been operating when the earthquake struck, the buildup of heat and pressure from residual radioactivity became so great that it melted the reactors’ nuclear fuel and exceeded the limits of their containment structures. The decay heat also caused steam to chemically react with the nuclear fuel cladding in the reactor cores, generating additional heat along with hydrogen that escaped into the upper part of the reactor buildings and exploded. Cooling was also lost in Fukushima’s spent fuel storage pools, causing concern that they could overheat, although later examination indicated that they did not.

Safety requirements for nuclear power plants are established and enforced in the United States by NRC, an independent regulatory agency. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires NRC to ensure that licensed nuclear facilities “provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public” (42 U.S.C. §2232). NRC may issue safety requirements that exceed the statutory “adequate

protection” standard if their benefits are found to exceed their costs (based largely on an assessment of the present value in terms of the discounted monetized value of expected net benefits).

NRC safety regulations address the effects of external events such as earthquakes and floods, equipment failure such as breaks in coolant pipes, and other problems that could lead to radioactive releases into the environment. Critics of nuclear power contend that NRC is often reluctant to impose necessary safety requirements that would be costly or disruptive to the nuclear industry. However, the industry has frequently contended that costly safety proposals are unnecessary and would not significantly increase large existing safety margins.

Following the Fukushima disaster, NRC established a task force to identify lessons applicable to U.S. reactors and recommend safety improvements. The task force’s report led to NRC’s first Fukushima-related regulatory requirements, on March 12, 2012. NRC ordered all reactors to develop strategies to maintain cooling and containment integrity during external events, such as floods and earthquakes, that were more severe than anticipated by the plants’ designs (“beyond design basis”). In addition, NRC required that U.S. reactors of similar design to the Fukushima reactors have “reliable hardened vents” to remove excess pressure from their primary containments, and that better instrumentation be installed to monitor the condition of spent fuel pools during accidents.⁸⁷

The NRC commissioners on March 19, 2013, required NRC staff to study whether to require the newly mandated containment vents to include filters or other means to reduce the release of radioactive material if the vents have to be used. The idea of requiring filters had drawn praise from nuclear critics but opposition from the industry on cost grounds.⁸⁸ NRC voted on August 19, 2015, not to proceed with rulemaking on filtered vents.⁸⁹

Congressional controversy was generated by NRC’s final rule for Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (MBDBE), announced January 24, 2019.⁹⁰ The MBDBE regulation requires nuclear power plants to implement strategies to maintain reactor core cooling when electric power is lost, as occurred during the Fukushima incident. The MBDBE proposed rule, published November 13, 2015,⁹¹ and the draft final rule, released by NRC on January 5, 2017,⁹² would have required the equipment used in those strategies to be able to withstand newly evaluated flooding and seismic risks, and that regular drills and exercises be conducted. The final rule excluded those

⁸⁷ NRC, “Actions in Response to the Japan Nuclear Accident: March 12, 2012,” updated May 30, 2012, <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan/timeline/03122012.html>.

⁸⁸ NRC, “Consideration of Additional Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containments,” staff requirements memorandum, SECY-12-0157, March 19, 2013, <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2012/2012-0157srm.pdf>; and William Freebairn, “NRC Staff Recommends Ordering Filtered Vents for 31 Power Reactors,” *Inside NRC*, November 5, 2012, p. 1.

⁸⁹ NRC, “Hardened Vents and Filtration (for Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containment Designs),” <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/hardened-vents.html>.

⁹⁰ NRC, “NRC to Issue Final Rule for Mitigating Severe Events at U.S. Reactors,” press release, January 24, 2019, <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2019/19-005.pdf>; and Letter from Sen. Tom Carper and Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse to Kristine Svinicki, NRC Chairman, April 1, 2019, <https://www.carper.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/carper-whitehouse-request-details-surrounding-nrc-s-weakening-of-post-fukushima-rule>.

⁹¹ NRC, “Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,” proposed rule, 80 *Federal Register* 70610, November 13, 2015, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-11-13/pdf/2015-28589.pdf>.

⁹² NRC, “Final Rule: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,” SECY-16-0142, Enclosure 1, January 5, 2017, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1629/ML16291A186.pdf>. For other documents related to the rule, see NRC, “SECY-16-0142: Final Rule: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,” January 5, 2017, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1630/ML16301A005.html>.

requirements, among other changes.⁹³ In supporting those exclusions, the Commission’s majority asserted that the deleted requirements did not meet NRC’s cost-benefit standards.⁹⁴ NRC is continuing to monitor the implementation of all post-Fukushima regulations and orders.⁹⁵

Recent Events

A number of congressional concerns about the efficiency of the NRC licensing process were addressed by the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act of 2024, signed into law July 9, 2024 (Division B of P.L. 118-67). Among other provisions, the ADVANCE Act requires NRC to update its mission statement to include licensing efficiency, implement “efficient, timely, and predictable” licensing reviews, strengthen the NRC workforce, and reduce and restrict fees charged to specified nuclear license applicants.

NRC published new emergency planning regulations for SMRs and other new nuclear technologies on November 16, 2023. The new rules allow SMRs and other new technologies (other than conventional large LWRs) to calculate emergency planning zones (EPZs) based on smaller inventories of radioactive materials, lower frequencies of release, and other safety improvements over existing reactors. For existing reactors, the EPZ for direct radioactive exposure (the “plume exposure pathway”), in which planning for evacuations and other protective actions is required, includes the area within about 10 miles from each reactor. Under the calculations specified by the new rules, an EPZ might not extend beyond the boundary of a nuclear plant site. In its explanation of the new rules, NRC said, “In cases where a plume exposure pathway EPZ does not extend beyond the site boundary, even in the absence of NRC requirements for offsite radiological emergency planning, the responsible OROs [offsite response organizations] would continue to take actions to protect the health and safety of the public.”⁹⁶ The new rules were long supported by the nuclear industry but criticized by groups skeptical about the nuclear industry’s safety and security record.⁹⁷

The 10th anniversary of the Fukushima disaster in March 2021 was noted around the world with retrospectives, status reports, and commentary. “An important lesson of Fukushima is that regulators must be strong, independent and adequately resourced,” the International Atomic Energy Agency said in marking the occasion.⁹⁸ The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum issued a statement declaring, “We in the nuclear industry must reflect on the Fukushima Daiichi accident

⁹³ NRC, “Staff Requirements—Affirmation Session,” SRM-M190124A, Enclosure 1, January 24, 2019, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1902/ML19024A073.pdf>. For other documents related to the rule, see NRC, “SRM-M190124A: Affirmation Session-SECY-16-0142: Final Rule: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49),” January 19, 2019, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1902/ML19023A038.html>.

⁹⁴ NRC, “Views of the Commission,” SRM-M190124A, Enclosure 4, January 24, 2019, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1902/ML19023A352.pdf>.

⁹⁵ NRC, “Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities,” December 7, 2021, <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/japan-plants.html>.

⁹⁶ NRC, “Emergency Preparedness for Small Modular Reactors and Other New Technologies,” final rule and guidance, 88 *Federal Register* 80050, November 16, 2023, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/11/16/2023-25163/emergency-preparedness-for-small-modular-reactors-and-other-new-technologies>.

⁹⁷ See, for example, “NRC’s Risky Rule Change Ignores History. More Nuclear Emergency Planning Needed, Not Less. Statement by Dr. Edwin Lyman at the Union of Concerned Scientists,” August 14, 2023, <https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/nrcs-risky-rule-change-ignores-history-more-nuclear-emergency-planning-needed-not-less>; and Nuclear Energy Institute, “NRC Staff Agrees Small Modular Reactors Won’t Need Large-Scale Emergency Zones,” August 22, 2018, <https://www.nei.org/news/2018/nrc-staff-agrees-smrs-wont-need-large-epzs>.

⁹⁸ IAEA, “Ten-Year Anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: A Decade of Improving Nuclear Safety,” March 10, 2021, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/ten-year-anniversary-of-the-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant-accident-a-decade-of-improving-nuclear-safety>.

and learn its lessons thoroughly as we firmly pledge never to allow it to recur, through our unwavering efforts to improve safety.”⁹⁹

Selected Congressional Action – 118th Congress

Hearing on the Nomination of Matthew James Marzano, of Illinois, to Be a Member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

Topics included NRC’s implementation of the ADVANCE Act of 2024 and other issues related to advanced nuclear reactor licensing. Held September 11, 2024, <https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=75D83FA2-C430-4CF2-B059-BDAE72D749F0>.

Hearing on the Nomination of Christopher T. Hanson to Be a Member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

Hearing focused on the nominee’s record as NRC Chairman and policies for licensing new nuclear facilities. Held April 17, 2024, <https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=3D615CF1-3B6F-43C9-ABDF-D8EEAD6DEB88>.

Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2025 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Budget, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security

Topics included implementation of provisions in the ADVANCE Act to improve the efficiency of NRC’s nuclear licensing process. Held July 23, 2024, <https://energycommerce.house.gov/posts/chairs-rodgers-and-duncan-announce-nrc-budget-hearing>.

Hearing on Oversight of NRC: Ensuring Efficient and Predictable Nuclear Safety Regulation for a Prosperous America, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security

Topics included how NRC should provide efficient and predictable regulation while maintaining safety as required by the Atomic Energy Act. Held June 14, 2023, <https://energycommerce.house.gov/events/energy-climate-and-grid-security-subcommittee-hearing-oversight-of-nrc-ensuring-efficient-and-predictable-nuclear-safety-regulation-for-a-prosperous-america>.

Hearing on the Nomination of Jeffery Martin Baran to Be a Member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

Hearing focused on the nominee’s record as an NRC Commissioner and whether his actions were appropriate to ensure adequate safety or imposed unnecessary burdens on the nuclear industry.

⁹⁹ Japan Atomic Industrial Forum President Shiro Arai, “Marking the Tenth Anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident,” February 26, 2021, <https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/presidents-comments/4976>.

Held May 10, 2023, <https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2023/5/hearing-on-the-nomination-of-jeffery-martin-baran-to-be-a-member-of-the-nuclear-regulatory-commission>.

Hearing on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Proposed Fiscal Year 2024 Budget, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

Topics included whether NRC has sufficient budget and staffing to ensure adequate nuclear safety, progress on developing a regulatory framework for advanced reactors, and whether the agency is operating efficiently. Held April 19, 2023, <https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2023/4/the-nuclear-regulatory-commission-s-proposed-fiscal-year-2024-budget>.

Bill to Limit the Type of Applications Reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (H.R. 9199, Donalds)

Would have limited nuclear power plant license application reviews by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to applications with novel or significant safety issues; and would have excluded the costs of such reviews from fees charged to nuclear licensees by NRC. Introduced July 30, 2024; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Maximize Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Licensing Act (H.R. 9198, Donalds)

Would have required NRC “to the maximum extent practicable” to follow guidelines for risk-informed, performance-based licensing described in a 1999 NRC policy document. Introduced July 30, 2024; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Efficient Nuclear Licensing Hearings Act (S. 4288, Scott; H.R. 6464, Griffith)

Would have allowed NRC to issue nuclear reactor licenses and permits without a hearing if none were requested. Would have required NRC to provide a 30-day notice of its intent to issue a license or permit without a hearing, unless NRC determined that no significant hazards were involved. House bill introduced November 21, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Senate bill introduced May 8, 2024; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.

Atomic Energy Advancement Act (H.R. 6544, Duncan)

Title I would have required NRC to update its mission statement to include that licensing and regulation should be efficient and not unnecessarily limit the growth and benefits of nuclear power, while remaining consistent with Atomic Energy Act safety standards. Would have required NRC to implement procedures for “efficient, timely, and predictable” licensing reviews and make other improvements in licensing efficiency. Would have authorized direct hiring and higher compensation if needed to address NRC workforce shortages. Would have reduced and restricted fees charged to specified nuclear license applicants. Introduced December 1, 2023, and ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023. Similar provisions included in ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Advancing Nuclear Regulatory Oversight Act (H.R. 6346, Lesko)

Would have required NRC to submit reports to Congress on regulatory changes adopted during the COVID-19 health emergency, possible oversight and inspection improvements, and potential

reductions in NRC's costs for office space and facilities. Introduced November 9, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Nuclear for Brownfield Site Preparation Act (H.R. 6268, Guthrie)

Would have required NRC to submit a report to Congress and initiate a rulemaking on timely licensing reviews for nuclear facilities at retired fossil fuel sites or brownfield sites. Introduced November 7, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023, and in ADVANCE Act of 2024.

NRC Mission Alignment Act (H.R. 6265, Duncan)

Would have required NRC to update its mission statement, while conforming to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to include that licensing of nuclear facilities should be efficient and not unnecessarily limit the potential benefits of nuclear energy. Introduced November 7, 2023; referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023, and in ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Modernize Nuclear Reactor Environmental Reviews Act (H.R. 6252, Weber)

Would have directed NRC to submit a report and conduct a rulemaking on facilitating efficient, timely environmental reviews of nuclear reactor applications. Introduced November 6, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023, and in ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Nuclear Licensing Efficiency Act (H.R. 6236, Allen)

Would have tightened timelines for NRC licensing reviews and required NRC, in reviewing applications for nuclear facilities at currently licensed sites, to use information previously used to license those sites, to the maximum extent practicable. Introduced November 6, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023. NRC required to submit a report on these topics by the ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Nuclear Red Tape Reduction Act (H.R. 4676, Donalds)

Would have established deadlines for interested parties to request that NRC hold hearings on applications for reactor construction permits and license applications, allowed for hearings to be waived in specified circumstances, and required NRC to report to Congress on reactor license renewal periods. Introduced July 17, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

NRC Office of Public Engagement and Participation Act of 2023 (H.R. 4530, Levin)

Would have established an Office of Public Engagement and Participation within NRC to support, coordinate, and assist public participation in NRC proceedings and advocate for the public interest within NRC. Introduced July 11, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Strengthening the NRC Workforce Act of 2023 (H.R. 4528, DeGette)

Would have authorized the NRC Chairman, upon certifying a critical hiring need or shortage of candidates, to “directly appoint highly qualified individuals into the competitive service.” Also would have established procedures for temporarily setting higher compensation levels for certain categories of employees. Introduced July 11, 2023. Related NRC workforce provisions included in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024 as passed by the Senate (S. 2226, Section 8141(u)). Similar provisions included in H.R. 6544, ordered to be reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce December 5, 2023, and in ADVANCE Act of 2024.

Hydrogen Permitting Simplification Act (H.R. 2962, Lesko)

Would have exempted certain major federal actions, including actions that produce hydrogen from nuclear reactors, from requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Introduced April 27, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce, and to Committee on Natural Resources for provisions under its jurisdiction.

Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Whistleblower Protection Act (S. 1112, Duckworth)

Would have specified that DOE and NRC employees are included in protections against management retaliation under the Energy Reorganization Act (42 U.S.C. §5851) for raising nuclear safety concerns. Introduced March 30, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Reintroduced from 116th Congress (S. 2962).

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Survey Act (H.R. 1006, Donalds)

Would have required the NRC inspector general to distribute optional and anonymous surveys about NRC’s efficiency and effectiveness to NRC employees and, if feasible, to stakeholders in the nuclear industry. Introduced February 14, 2023; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.

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Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors, World Nuclear Association, August 23, 2024, <https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx>.

Nuclear Power 101, Natural Resources Defense Council, January 5, 2022, <https://www.nrdc.org/stories/nuclear-power-101>.

Plant-Specific Safety Enhancements After Fukushima, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, web page, reviewed/updated December 7, 2021, <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/post-fukushima-safety-enhancements.html>.

Nuclear Safety: Countries’ Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure,

Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, Government Accountability Office, GAO-14-109, March 2014, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-109>.

State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1935, November 2012, <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1935>.

Security and Emergency Response

The level of security that must be provided at nuclear power plants became a high-profile issue after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Since those attacks, NRC issued a series of orders and regulations that substantially increased nuclear plant security requirements, although industry critics contend that those measures are still insufficient. Key measures include an increase in the level of attacks that nuclear plant security forces must be able to repel, requirements for mitigating the effects of large fires and explosions, and a requirement that new reactors be capable of withstanding aircraft crashes without releasing radioactive material. NRC also modified its planning requirements for evacuations and other emergency responses after the 9/11 attacks, and the Fukushima disaster illustrated the importance of emergency response to radioactive releases from any cause.

NRC issued wide-ranging revisions to its emergency preparedness regulations on November 1, 2011, dealing with duties of emergency personnel and the inclusion of hostile actions in emergency planning drills.¹⁰⁰ In response to Fukushima, NRC staff recommended that nuclear emergency plans be required to address events affecting multiple reactors and prolonged station blackout. NRC told nuclear power plants on March 12, 2012, to provide specific information and analysis on those issues.¹⁰¹

The NRC CyberSecurity Directorate was established in June 2013 to coordinate rulemaking, guidance, and oversight of cybersecurity at nuclear power plants and other regulated nuclear facilities. As part of the Directorate, NRC's Cyber Assessment Team responds to cybersecurity events at NRC-licensed facilities and coordinates threat assessments with other federal agencies.¹⁰²

Recent Events

NRC issued a final rule March 14, 2023, on “Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications.”¹⁰³ The rule establishes procedures for nuclear power plants and other licensed nuclear facilities to apply for NRC authorization to arm their security personnel with “enhanced” weapons, such as semiautomatic assault weapons and machine guns, despite any state laws prohibiting such weapons. NRC is authorized to preempt state laws for this purpose under Atomic Energy Act Section 161A, enacted by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). The rule also modifies NRC requirements for nuclear power plants and other licensed facilities to

¹⁰⁰ NRC, “Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations,” final rule, 76 *Federal Register* 72560, November 23, 2011.

¹⁰¹ NRC, “Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,” March 12, 2012, <http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12053A340.pdf>.

¹⁰² NRC, “Backgrounder on Cyber Security,” July 12, 2024, <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/cyber-security-bg.html>.

¹⁰³ NRC, “Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications,” final rule, 88 *Federal Register* 15864, March 14, 2023, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/14/2023-03944/enhanced-weapons-firearms-background-checks-and-security-event-notifications>.

report events related to physical security and would add requirements for reporting suspicious activities.

Concerns about international nuclear plant security have been raised by Russia's ongoing military occupation of Ukraine's six-reactor Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP)—the largest in Europe. Russian forces captured the plant on March 4, 2022, and it has since lost offsite power several times, increasing the risk of damage to the plant's nuclear fuel and radioactive releases to the environment. In September 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) called for "establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone" around the plant, but the proposal has not been implemented.¹⁰⁴ The IAEA issued a statement on February 20, 2025, warning of the continuing "extremely fragile nuclear safety situation during the military conflict" at ZNPP.¹⁰⁵

Selected Congressional Action—119th Congress

Sanction Russian Nuclear Safety Violators Act of 2025 (H.R. 475, Meeks)

Would require the President to impose specified sanctions on any foreign person who has endangered the integrity, safety, or undermined Ukrainian operational control of ZNPP. Introduced January 16, 2025; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on the Judiciary for provisions under its jurisdiction.

Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress

Sanction Russian Nuclear Safety Violators Act of 2023 (H.R. 3246, Meeks)

Similar to H.R. 475 in the 119th Congress. Introduced May 11, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on the Judiciary for provisions under its jurisdiction.

Bill to Require Reports on the Dangers Posed by Nuclear Reactors in Areas That Might Experience Armed Conflict (S. 571, Markey)

Would have required the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator for Nuclear Security to submit a report to Congress assessing the dangers posed by nuclear reactors in regions that have experienced armed conflict within the past 25 years or may experience armed conflict under specified scenarios. Introduced February 28, 2023; referred to Committee on Armed Services.

CRS Reports

CRS In Focus IF10821, *Price-Anderson Act: Nuclear Power Industry Liability Limits and Compensation to the Public After Radioactive Releases*, by Mark Holt.

CRS Insight IN11883, *Russian Military Actions at Ukraine's Nuclear Power Plants*, by Mark Holt and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.

¹⁰⁴ IAEA, *Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards in Ukraine*, September 5, 2022, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ IAEA, "Update 277 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine," February 20, 2025, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-277-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine>.

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Update on Radiological Emergency Preparedness Enhancement Activities Resulting from Lessons Learned Following September 11, 2001, and Other Recent Natural Disasters, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 19, 2019, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1911/ML19116A159.pdf>.

Nuclear Plant Security, Union of Concerned Scientists, web page, updated February 25, 2016, <https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-power/nuclear-plant-security#.W2RtxtJKiUk>.

Protecting Our Nation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/BR-0314, Rev. 4, August 2015, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1523/ML15232A263.pdf>.

Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation

Encouraging exports of U.S. civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while making sure they are not used for foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a fundamental goal of U.S. nuclear energy policy. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act requires that any country receiving U.S. nuclear technology, equipment, or materials implement a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. These so-called 123 agreements are intended to prevent the diversion of U.S. nuclear exports for nuclear weapons purposes and to generally discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Section 123 allows nuclear cooperation agreements to take effect after 90 days of continuous congressional session if they adhere to specified criteria.

International controls and inspections are intended to ensure the peaceful use of civilian nuclear facilities and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, recent plans or proposals to build nuclear power plants in countries¹⁰⁶ that have not previously used nuclear energy, including several in the Middle East and countries without nuclear experience, have prompted concerns that international controls may not be sufficient to prevent weapons proliferation. Numerous recommendations have been made in the United States and elsewhere to create new incentives for nations to forgo the development of uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities that could produce weapons materials as well as civilian nuclear fuel.

Iran's nuclear energy program is a major example of the tension between peaceful and weapons uses of nuclear technology. Long-standing world concern has focused on the Iranian uranium enrichment program, which Iran contends is solely for peaceful purposes but which the United States and other countries argue may be for producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. Beginning in 2007, the UN Security Council adopted several resolutions, some of which imposed sanctions on Iran, calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment program and other sensitive nuclear activities. However, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran finalized on July 14, 2015, with the United States and the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, lifted the UN sanctions in return for specified Iranian nonproliferation measures.

¹⁰⁶ World Nuclear Association, "World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements," March 18, 2025, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-requireme>.

President Trump announced on May 8, 2018, that his Administration would cease implementing the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions that the United States had suspended pursuant to the JCPOA.¹⁰⁷ Other parties to the JCPOA have not followed the U.S. lead.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran's nuclear activities were exceeding JCPOA-mandated limits; Iran has since increased the number of activities that violate JCPOA restrictions. The Biden Administration, beginning in April 2021, participated in indirect talks about mutual re-implementation of the JCPOA.¹⁰⁹ The talks did not produce an agreement.

An extension of the U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea generated controversy but no congressional action to block it. During negotiations on the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation extension, which entered into force November 25, 2015, South Korea had sought advance U.S. consent for spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment. The United States did not provide such consent, on general nonproliferation grounds and because such consent could affect other ongoing issues on the Korean peninsula. The new agreement did, however, establish a bilateral "high level commission" to further consider those issues. The high-level commission's deliberations are to be informed by the results of a 10-year Joint Fuel Cycle Study by scientists from the two countries that was scheduled to be completed in April 2021. According to DOE, some aspects of the study have not been completed and discussions on how to move forward are continuing.¹¹⁰

Japan's long-standing nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States automatically renewed on July 17, 2018, and will remain in force indefinitely unless terminated by either side.¹¹¹ The agreement allows Japan to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from its U.S.-designed reactors, separating plutonium and uranium for use in new fuel. A long-delayed commercial reprocessing plant at Rokkasho is scheduled to be completed in 2026 at the earliest.¹¹² Some nuclear nonproliferation groups had urged the United States to use the renewal of the U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement as an opportunity to urge Japan not to begin its reprocessing program. They noted that Japan already has substantial stockpiles of previously separated

¹⁰⁷ The United States ceased participating in 2018. White House, "President Donald J. Trump Is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal," May 8, 2018, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal>.

¹⁰⁸ European Union, "Joint Statement on the Re-imposition of U.S. Sanctions Due to Its Withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)," June 8, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/49141/joint-statement-re-imposition-us-sanctions-due-its-withdrawal-joint-comprehensive-plan-action_en.

¹⁰⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Briefing with Senior State Department Official on Recent U.S. Engagement in Vienna Regarding the JCPOA," April 9, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-official-on-recent-u-s-engagement-in-vienna-regarding-the-jcpoa>.

¹¹⁰ Emails from John Krohn, DOE Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, March 31, 2021, and June 28, 2021. The March email says that "the US and ROK are continuing to talk to determine how to 'finalize' the study, as well as potential continued work in this area." An article in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* quoted an unnamed senior U.S. official as saying that "at least three or four more years will be necessary for the two governments to be in a position to draw any actual conclusions related to the technical and economic feasibility and nonproliferation acceptability of pyroprocessing on the Korean Peninsula." Frank N. von Hippel and Jungmin Kang, "Why Joint U.S.-South Korean Research on Plutonium Separation Raises Nuclear Proliferation Danger," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 13, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/01/why-joint-us-south-korean-research-on-plutonium-separation-raises-nuclear-proliferation-danger>. No progress had been announced as of November 2024.

¹¹¹ DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, "123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation," December 7, 2022, <https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/123-agreements-peaceful-cooperation>.

¹¹² Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, "Reprocessing," accessed November 8, 2024, <https://www.jnfl.co.jp/en/business/reprocessing>; and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, "Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant Completion Date Pushed Back to FY26," September 24, 2024, <https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/news/7186>.

plutonium that could potentially be used for weapons as well as reactor fuel.¹¹³ Japan approved a Strategic Energy Plan July 3, 2018, that includes a pledge to reduce Japanese plutonium inventories, reportedly following pressure from the United States and other countries.¹¹⁴

Discussions between the United States and Saudi Arabia toward drafting a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement have prompted substantial controversy. The U.S. nuclear industry strongly supports an agreement, so that it could supply reactors and other nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia.¹¹⁵ Nuclear nonproliferation advocacy groups have argued that any such agreement should include a binding commitment from Saudi Arabia to forswear uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing on its territory.¹¹⁶ Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 24, 2018, that the United States was insisting that Saudi Arabia accept such a commitment as part of any 123 agreement, despite Saudi arguments that the country has a right to enrich and reprocess under international inspections.¹¹⁷ Then-Secretary of Energy Rick Perry told reporters at a meeting in September 2019 that the United States also would condition any U.S.-Saudi 123 Agreement on Saudi acceptance of the Additional Protocol, which allows strengthened international safeguards on nuclear facilities.¹¹⁸

Recent Events

The Biden Administration included U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation as a potential element of a larger diplomatic normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, an effort that was suspended after the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas but has reportedly resumed under the Trump Administration.¹¹⁹

Congress prohibited the use of FY2024 funds for EXIM Bank support for nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia until the kingdom has a 123 agreement in effect that commits to renouncing uranium enrichment and reprocessing and has signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA (P.L. 118-47, Division F, §7041(h)). The same provision was included for appropriations in FY2023 (P.L. 117-328), FY2022 (P.L. 117-103), FY2021 (P.L. 116-260) and FY2020 (P.L. 116-94).

¹¹³ Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Tokyo and Washington Have Another Nuclear Problem,” August 17, 2017, <http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1341&rid=2>.

¹¹⁴ Reuters, “Japan Pledges to Cut Plutonium Stockpile Amid Growing Concern by Neighbours,” July 31, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-nuclear-plutonium/japan-pledges-to-cut-plutonium-stockpile-amid-growing-concern-by-neighbors-idUSKBN1KL0I4>.

¹¹⁵ Nuclear Energy Institute, “As Saudi Arabia Considers New Reactors, NEI Conducts Trade Mission,” April 26, 2018, <https://www.nei.org/news/2018/saudi-arabia-considers-new-reactors>.

¹¹⁶ Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “Letter to Congress on Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia,” May 24, 2018, <http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1395&rtid=4>.

¹¹⁷ Steven Mufson, “Pompeo: Saudis Must Not Enrich Uranium if It Seeks Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” May 24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pompeo-saudis-must-not-enrich-uranium-if-it-seeks-civilian-nuclear-cooperation/2018/05/24/714c5e30-5f92-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html.

¹¹⁸ Ari Natter, “U.S. Says Saudis Must Forgo Enrichment for Nuclear Sharing Deal,” *Bloomberg*, September 18, 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-19/u-s-says-saudis-must-forgo-enrichment-for-nuclear-sharing-deal>.

¹¹⁹ Daniel B. Shapiro, “Israeli-Saudi Normalization Is Within Reach,” Atlantic Council, February 2, 2025, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/israeli-saudi-normalization-is-within-reach-heres-what-trump-and-netanyahu-need-to-do-next>; and Samuel Hickey, “Amid Gaza War, a Beefed Up Saudi Nuke Program Is Still on the Table,” *Responsible Statecraft*, October 26, 2023, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/saudi-arabia-nuclear-israel>.

Selected Congressional Action—119th Congress

Nuclear Weapons Abolition and Conversion Act of 2025 (H.R. 1888, Norton)

Would require that after all countries with nuclear weapons “verifiably and irreversibly” begin complying with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the United States redirect resources from nuclear weapons programs to climate and infrastructure programs. Introduced March 5, 2025; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs and additionally to the Committee on Armed Services.

Affirming the Threats to World Stability from a Nuclear Weapons-Capable Islamic Republic of Iran (S.Res. 101, Graham; H.Res. 105, Moskowitz)

Would demand that Iran cease all threats to the national security of the United States and its allies, including uranium enrichment and development of nuclear warheads. Senate resolution introduced February 27, 2025; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. House resolution introduced February 4, 2025; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Calling on the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (E3) to Initiate the Snapback of Sanctions on Iran Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) (H.Res. 139, Tenney)

Urges the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to impose snapback sanctions on Iran under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 for Iran’s increases in its uranium stockpile, enrichment of uranium to 60% uranium 235, and other efforts toward developing nuclear weapons. Introduced February 14, 2025; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Selected Congressional Action—118th Congress

Iran Nuclear Verification Act (H.R. 6057, McClain)

Would have prohibited the United States from becoming a party to the JCPOA or any other nuclear agreement with Iran until the President certifies that United Nations inspectors are allowed full access to all Iranian nuclear facilities and have completed a comprehensive report on those facilities. Introduced October 25, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Resolution Expressing Support of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Role (S.Res. 429, Lujan; H.Res. 641, Foster)

Would have resolved that the Senate and House maintain that the IAEA “plays an indispensable role in strengthening nuclear security and safety around the globe” and encourage the United States and other nations to ensure that the IAEA has sufficient resources to carry out its duties. Senate resolution introduced October 25, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. House resolution introduced August 1, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Solidify Iran Sanctions Act of 2023 (S. 1390, Scott; H.R. 3033, Steel)

Would have eliminated the sunset provision in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-172), which imposes various sanctions on Iran for its programs to develop nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Senate bill introduced May 1, 2023; referred to Committee on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. House bill introduced April 28, 2023; ordered to be reported by Committee on Foreign Affairs June 21, 2023.

Iran Nuclear Treaty Act (S. 472, Johnson)

Would have declared that any agreement reached by the President regarding Iran's nuclear program shall be a treaty subject to Senate advice and consent. Introduced February 16, 2023; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.

Bill to Terminate Certain Waivers of Sanctions with Respect to Iran Issued in Connection with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (S. 256, Cruz)

Would have revoked certain waivers of sanctions relating to Iran's nuclear activities and prohibited the President from issuing a new waiver relating to such activities. Introduced February 2, 2023; referred to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

CRS Reports

CRS In Focus IF12106, *Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production*, by Paul K. Kerr.

CRS Report R40094, *Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations*, by Paul K. Kerr.

CRS Report RS22937, *Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer*, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.

CRS Report R41910, *Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress*, by Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Mark Holt.

CRS In Focus IF10799, *Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation*, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.

CRS Report R44942, *U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement*, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Valerie Heitshusen.

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