

# U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

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# U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

**Overview.** Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees U.S. foreign assistance for sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”), which is often the largest regional recipient of U.S. aid each year. In the past decade, State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance allocated for Africa has generally fluctuated around \$8 billion annually (in inflation-adjusted dollars). Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa were in the top 10 recipients of nonemergency State Department- and USAID-managed aid allocations globally in FY2022. African countries receive other U.S. assistance via funding managed by other U.S. agencies, allocated from global accounts or programs (e.g., humanitarian aid), or furnished through contributions to multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations.

**Objectives and Delivery.** Around 70% of annual (non-humanitarian) State Department and USAID-administered aid for Africa supports health programs; HIV/AIDS assistance is by far the largest category of U.S. aid for the region. Other funding aims to foster agricultural productivity and economic growth; bolster security; promote democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG); and improve access to quality education and social services. The U.S. government provides a large share of U.S. aid for Africa through multi-country initiatives focused largely or entirely on the region, such as the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative, Feed the Future, Prosper Africa, and Power Africa. Government-to-government aid comprises a small share of U.S. aid for Africa: U.S.-based contractors and nongovernmental organizations, as well as multilateral actors (such as U.N. agencies), implement most U.S. aid programs in the region.

**The Biden Administration.** The Biden Administration has maintained long-standing U.S. assistance priorities in Africa (e.g., global health, agricultural productivity, and DRG) while increasing support for climate change adaptation, among other shifts in emphasis. Administration officials pledged new health, food security, governance, technology, and youth exchange initiatives at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS) in December 2022; implementation of many Summit outcomes will hinge on congressional support, including foreign aid appropriations. In its FY2024 budget request, the Administration proposed \$8.00 billion in assistance for Africa, up from \$7.95 billion in FY2022, including allocations of supplemental appropriations. Broadly consistent with funding trends over the past decade, health programs comprise approximately 73% of the FY2024 proposal for Africa, economic growth assistance 14%, DRG programs 5%, peace and security assistance 5%, and education and social service funding 3%. Nigeria (\$622 million), Mozambique (\$564 million), Tanzania (\$560 million), Uganda (\$559 million), and Kenya (\$512 million) would be the top recipients of U.S. non-humanitarian aid for the region.

**Issues for Congress.** The 118<sup>th</sup> Congress is considering the request for Africa as it debates FY2024 appropriations. Members of Congress have expressed interest in monitoring ALS deliverables. More broadly, policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the impact and effectiveness of U.S. assistance for Africa, as well as the appropriate level and balance of such funding. Members also have considered how best to approach U.S. engagement with authoritarian governments in the region, the possible unintended consequences of U.S. foreign assistance, and the ways that U.S. assistance could help promote U.S. influence vis-à-vis China, Russia, and other global competitors. That comprehensive regional- or country-level breakouts of U.S. assistance are not routinely made available in public budget documents may complicate congressional oversight, inhibit efforts to assess impact, and obscure policy dilemmas. Congress may continue to assess whether the executive branch provides sufficient programmatic, funding, and performance evaluation information to Congress to enable effective oversight and timely responses to challenges.

Congress has shaped U.S. assistance for Africa through authorizing legislation and annual appropriations measures directing allocations for certain activities and countries. Congress has also enacted appropriations provisions and other legislation prohibiting or imposing conditions on aid to specific countries in Africa, and on certain kinds of assistance, on various grounds (e.g., related to trafficking in persons, child soldiers, terrorism, military coups, and religious freedom).

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## Introduction

This report is intended to serve as a primer on U.S. assistance for sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”) to inform Congress as it authorizes, appropriates funds for, and oversees such programming. A separate report, CRS Report R45428, *Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview and U.S. Engagement*, discusses U.S.-Africa policy and U.S. commercial and military engagement in the region.

This report focuses primarily on funds administered by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and allocated specifically for African countries and regional programs. It includes more-limited discussion of funding provided through global accounts and programs, which is not reported by country or region in annual State Department *Congressional Budget Justifications* (CBJs), and of funding managed by other U.S. departments and agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and Department of Defense (DOD).<sup>1</sup> It does not address U.S. assistance channeled through international financial institutions and other multilateral bodies (e.g., U.N. agencies). Unless otherwise noted, figures in this report refer to actual allocations of funding appropriated in the given fiscal year (hereinafter, “allocations”).<sup>2</sup>

## Funding Trends, Objectives, and Delivery

In the past decade, Africa has regularly received 35%-40% of annual non-humanitarian State Department- and USAID-administered assistance allocated on a regional basis.<sup>3</sup> U.S. assistance for Africa grew markedly during the 2000s (see **Figure 1**), as Congress appropriated substantial funds in support of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which the George W. Bush Administration launched in 2003 with bipartisan support in Congress.<sup>4</sup> As discussed below, aid to address HIV/AIDS remains by far the leading category of U.S. aid for Africa. Other development and security aid for Africa also increased during the 2000s, albeit to a lesser extent. Annual U.S. aid allocations for Africa have since remained generally level, typically fluctuating between \$7.7 billion and \$8.3 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars from FY2012 to FY2022.<sup>5</sup>

In the past decade, health assistance has typically comprised approximately 70% of annual State Department- and USAID-administered aid allocations for Africa; HIV/AIDS-related funding alone often accounts for around half of all U.S. aid for the region each fiscal year.<sup>6</sup> Economic growth assistance, led by agricultural development aid, generally has comprised the second-largest focus area of U.S. assistance for Africa in the past decade, followed by peace and security, education and social services, and democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance.

<sup>1</sup> The CBJ provides information on the planned allocation of appropriated assistance. See CRS In Focus IF11515, *U.S. Foreign Assistance: Budget Development and Execution*.


<sup>2</sup> “Actual” allocations reflect a final plan for the use of appropriated funding, though agencies may continue to transfer or reprogram assistance, subject to availability and legislative authorities.

<sup>3</sup> CRS calculations based on actual allocation data provided in Country/Account Summaries (“Spigots”) in State Department CBJs for FY2014-FY2024. Calculations do not include P.L. 480 Title II (Food for Peace) assistance.

<sup>4</sup> See CRS In Focus IF12463, *PEPFAR Extension Act of 2018: Expiring Authorities*.

<sup>5</sup> CRS calculation based on allocations for FY2012-FY2022, drawn from State Department CBJs for FY2014-FY2024; constant FY2022 dollars based on deflators from Office of Management and Budget Historic Budget Tables, FY2022.

<sup>6</sup> Figures in this paragraph reflect CRS calculations based on State Department CBJs for FY2014-FY2024.

**Figure 1. U.S. Assistance for Africa, Select State Department and USAID Accounts**

**Source:** CRS graphic, based on State Department *Congressional Budget Justifications* (CBJs) for FY2002-FY2024.

**Notes:** CSD=Child Survival and Disease Programs; CSH=Child Survival and Health Programs; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; GHP=Global Health Programs; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; PKO=Peacekeeping Operations. Calculations do not include funding allocated from global accounts or programs.

## Health

Congress funds U.S. health assistance for Africa primarily through appropriations to the Global Health Programs accounts, which includes a State Department (GHP-State) and a USAID (GHP-USAID) appropriation. Assistance to improve access to water and sanitation is generally funded under the Development Assistance (DA) account. Other federal entities, notably the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), manage additional health programs in Africa, including for infectious disease preparedness, surveillance, and response (see “Other U.S. Departments and Agencies”).

**HIV/AIDS.** As noted above, most U.S. health assistance for Africa supports HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention (see **Figure 2**), provided under the State Department-led, interagency President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Congress first authorized appropriations in support of PEPFAR in the “Leadership Act” of 2003 (P.L. 108-25) and has since enacted several bills reauthorizing or reshaping global HIV/AIDS assistance—most recently the PEPFAR Extension Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-305), which extended several provisions through September 30, 2023. Congress is considering whether, and with what possible changes, to reauthorize funding for PEPFAR.<sup>7</sup> GHP-State is the main account for HIV/AIDS assistance for Africa, though additional assistance is provided via GHP-USAID and CDC-managed funding appropriated in Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS) appropriations.


**Malaria.** Programs to prevent and treat malaria, a life-threatening but usually curable disease caused by parasites transmitted through bites of infected mosquitoes, typically constitute the second-largest category of U.S. health assistance for the region. The U.S. President’s Malaria

<sup>7</sup> See CRS Video WVB00632, *International HIV/AIDS Assistance: What next for PEPFAR?*

Initiative (PMI), a USAID-led initiative launched in 2005, is the main channel for U.S. malaria-related assistance for Africa. In April 2023, the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator announced the expansion of PMI to three new countries—Burundi, Gambia, and Togo—bringing the total number of African PMI focus countries to 27, out of 30 focus countries globally. Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which accounted for around 45% of global malaria deaths in 2021, regularly rank as the leading recipients of U.S. counter-malaria assistance in Africa.<sup>8</sup>

**Figure 2. Health Assistance for Africa in FY2022**

State Department and USAID



**Source:** Graphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2024. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding.

**Maternal and Child Health and Family Planning and Reproductive Health.** Maternal and child health programs, primarily administered by USAID, aim to improve maternal, newborn, and early childhood care. Family planning and reproductive health programs, for their part, support access to contraception and efforts to curb child marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and gender-based violence, among other issues.<sup>9</sup>

**Other Health Assistance.** Other U.S. health assistance for Africa seeks to boost access to improved water and sanitation facilities, strengthen infectious disease preparedness and response

<sup>8</sup> World Health Organization (WHO), *World Health Statistics 2023: Monitoring Health for the SDGs*, 2023.

<sup>9</sup> CRS Report R46215, *U.S. Bilateral International Family Planning and Reproductive Health Programs: Background and Selected Issues*.


(categorized under “global health security in development”), control tuberculosis, and improve nutrition. As discussed in further detail below, the United States provides additional health aid for Africa through global programs not accounted for in regional allocation data; via other U.S. federal entities and agencies, such as the CDC; and through contributions to multilateral health initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund).

## **Economic Growth**

Economic growth assistance typically comprises the second-largest sector of U.S. aid for Africa each year. Led by funding for agricultural development, economic growth assistance may also support entrepreneurship training, trade and investment capacity-building, and climate change adaptation, among other activities (see **Figure 3**). Congress provides economic growth aid primarily under the DA account, though some is provided via the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account.

**Figure 3. Economic Growth Assistance for Africa in FY2022**

State Department and USAID



**Source:** Graphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2024. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding.

**Agricultural Development.** Support for agricultural development usually constitutes the largest category of U.S. economic growth aid for Africa. Programs aim to improve agricultural productivity by strengthening value chains, enhancing land tenure systems and access to markets, promoting climate-resilient farming practices, and funding agricultural research. Feed the Future (FTF), a USAID-led interagency initiative launched by the Obama Administration that aims to reduce food insecurity, is the main channel for U.S. agricultural assistance for Africa; as of September 2023, 16 FTF partner countries were in Africa, out of 20 globally.<sup>10</sup> The Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195), reauthorized through 2028 as part of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263, Section 5588 of Title LV, Subtitle G), established a legislative framework for FTF.

<sup>10</sup> African FTF focus countries are DRC, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.



**Trade and Investment.** Prosper Africa, a USAID-led, multiagency initiative launched by the Trump Administration in 2019, is the main vehicle for U.S. trade and investment aid for Africa. It aims to increase two-way U.S.-Africa trade and investment, foster business environment reforms in Africa, counter the economic influence of China and other U.S. competitors, and harmonize the services and programs of 17 U.S. federal departments and agencies with trade and investment promotion and economic development mandates.<sup>11</sup> These entities generally use their own resources to carry out initiative work; USAID manages some funding to support its coordination activities and selected initiative-related work by USAID missions in Africa.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended), a cornerstone of U.S.-Africa trade policy, established a nonreciprocal U.S. trade preference program that provides duty-free access to the U.S. market for certain exports from eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>12</sup> It also directed the President to provide trade capacity-building (TCB) assistance to the region, aimed at bolstering African countries' ability to trade with other countries and with the United States. In the last two decades, much of this activity was channeled through USAID-administered sub-regional trade and investment hubs located in Southern, East, and West Africa. Only the West Africa hub—located in Nigeria—remains in operation as of September 2023.<sup>13</sup>

**Climate Change and Energy.** The State Department and USAID classify a range of U.S. assistance to mitigate and address the impacts of climate change under the umbrella of economic growth aid.<sup>14</sup> During the Biden Administration, a large portion of climate change-related aid for Africa has supported Power Africa, a USAID-led electrification effort launched by the Obama Administration that provides technical assistance, grants, loans, financial risk mitigation, and other support to increase access to power, including renewable energy.<sup>15</sup> Power Africa continues to support some fossil fuel-related investments and projects. Facilitating private sector power generation projects is a core focus of the initiative, which aims to create 30,000 megawatts of power generation capacity and 60 million new connections in Africa by 2030.<sup>16</sup> Congress established a framework for Power Africa under the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-121).

Other climate change aid includes support for adaptation, or resilience to the impacts of climate shocks, for which the Biden Administration has requested a large increase in funding in FY2023 and FY2024 (see “The FY2024 Aid Budget Request for Africa”). “Sustainable landscapes” programs entail efforts to promote sustainable land use and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

**Environment.** U.S. economic growth aid also funds environment programs, activities related to natural resources that are not directly focused on climate change (e.g., wildlife or biodiversity conservation). Funding for the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE), administered through USAID's Central Africa Regional Mission, is usually the largest allocation of environment aid for Africa. Implemented by USAID and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, CARPE promotes conservation and sustainable land use in the Congo Basin. Congress has supported efforts to curb wildlife trafficking and other environmental crime in Africa.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>11</sup> CRS In Focus IF11384, *The Trump Administration's Prosper Africa Initiative*. In the 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., H.R. 6455 would have codified Prosper Africa, among other provisions.

<sup>12</sup> CRS In Focus IF10149, *African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)*.

<sup>13</sup> See the USAID West Africa Trade and Investment Hub's web page at <https://westafricatradehub.com/>.

<sup>14</sup> State Department, “Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions.”

<sup>15</sup> The Trump Administration, which ended most climate change-related aid, categorized Power Africa funding under a separate program classification, “Modern Energy Services,” which does not specifically refer to climate change.

<sup>16</sup> For more on Power Africa, see USAID, “Power Africa,” available at <https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica>.

<sup>17</sup> See CRS Insight IN12171, *Foreign Assistance for International Conservation*.

**Other Economic Growth Assistance.** Other U.S. economic growth programs support economic policy reform and analysis, access to credit, other private sector strengthening, and infrastructure development. As discussed below, the Biden Administration also has requested funding to promote information and communications technology (ICT) access in Africa under a new Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) initiative, announced at the 2022 ALS.

## Peace and Security

U.S. peace and security assistance for Africa includes State Department-administered aid to build the capacity of African military and police forces, along with programs to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts. (DOD administers additional security cooperation programs with its own funds; see “Other U.S. Departments and Agencies.”) State Department-administered security assistance, authorized under Title 22 of the *U.S. Code*, is primarily funded via five accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The Department of Defense (DOD), other federal entities, and private contractors implement some of these programs. Conflict prevention and mitigation programs are typically funded via DA and ESF. As discussed below, many countries receive additional peace and security assistance via global programs.

**Strengthening Military Partnerships and Capabilities.** Funds for military training, equipment, and professionalization regularly constitute the largest category of annual peace and security aid for Africa (see **Figure 4**). The PKO account is the largest vehicle of U.S. security aid for Africa; despite its name, PKO supports a range of programs, most of which are unrelated to peacekeeping (see **Text Box**). For over a decade, Somalia has received the largest annual allocation of PKO funding for Africa, in support of an African Union (AU) stabilization operation and a U.N. presence that aids the AU mission.<sup>18</sup> Most other PKO funding for Africa is generally requested and allocated for regional programs under the State Department’s Africa Regional allocation.

### The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account

PKO is the primary vehicle for State Department-administered security assistance to African countries, accounting for between half and three-quarters of annual Title 22 assistance allocated for Africa in the past decade.<sup>19</sup> Despite its name, PKO supports not only capacity-building for peacekeepers, but also counterterrorism, maritime security, and security sector reform. This entails funding for a range of regional security programs, including the Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security (ACSB) program, Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), Africa Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI), Africa Regional Counterterrorism (ARCT) program, and Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC), which aims to address malign foreign influence. PKO funds also support two interagency counterterrorism programs in Africa: the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP, focused on North and West Africa). In addition, the PKO-funded Global Peace Operations Initiative trains and equips militaries that provide or plan to provide U.N. peacekeeping troops, many of which are in Africa. Public budget materials do not disaggregate allocations for these programs by country. A separate Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account funds U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping budgets.<sup>20</sup>


<sup>18</sup> From FY2009-FY2021, successive Administrations requested funding for the U.N. Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS, formerly known as the U.N. Support Office for AMISOM, after the name of the AU mission) via the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account, but Congress appropriated funds through PKO. Since FY2022, the Biden Administration has requested funding for UNSOS under PKO.

<sup>19</sup> CRS calculation based on State Department CBJs for FY2014-FY2024.

<sup>20</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10597, *United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping*.

**Figure 4. Peace and Security Assistance for Africa in FY2022**

State Department and USAID



**Source:** Graphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding.

Strengthening Military Partnerships and Capabilities assistance also includes IMET, which is allocated for nearly all African countries, and supports professionalization, military exchanges, and English instruction, often in the United States. Africa receives a small share of global FMF funding, which supports grant-based transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment and training. In the past five years, among African countries, only Djibouti—which hosts the sole enduring U.S. military base in Africa—has received country-specific allocations of FMF, though additional FMF funding has been channeled for the region through global and regional programs.

**Counterterrorism.** PKO is a lead vehicle for State Department-administered aid to build African security forces' counterterrorism capacities, alongside NADR, which is primarily focused on strengthening non-military security institutions such as law enforcement agencies, gendarmes, national guard corps, and border security entities. Additional assistance focused on countering

violent extremist ideology and recruitment is funded through the ESF and DA accounts. Somalia and Kenya have been top country recipients of Title 22 counterterrorism assistance, though most such funding is allocated via regional programs. DOD provides additional counterterrorism training and equipment for African countries (see “Other U.S. Departments and Agencies”).

**Other Peace and Security Assistance.** The State Department also administers programs to build the capacity and professionalism of law enforcement bodies and other justice sector institutions, funded primarily under the INCLE account and often implemented by the Justice Department. USAID administers other programs to increase access to justice, primarily funded through the DA account. U.S. assistance also funds State Department-administered efforts to destroy excess or obsolete small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and unexploded ordnance, and improve stockpile management. Conflict mitigation and stabilization aid aims to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts through support for early warning systems, reconciliation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Most such aid is funded under DA or ESF, or under global programs such as aid authorized under the Global Fragility Act (“Funding from Regional and Global Programs”).


## **Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG)**

U.S. DRG programs in Africa seek to enhance democratic institutions, improve government accountability and responsiveness, and strengthen respect for human rights and the rule of law (see **Figure 5**). Activities include efforts to strengthen civil society and independent media, enhance the capacity and effectiveness of state institutions, combat corruption, promote legal reform and justice sector operations and independence, and foster participatory political systems characterized by credible elections and other democratic processes. The DA and, to a lesser extent, ESF accounts are the main vehicles for such assistance in Africa, with additional funding to help strengthen law enforcement and justice sector authorities provided via INCLE.

In cumulative terms, over the past five years, Somalia, Nigeria, DRC, Liberia, South Sudan, and Kenya have ranked as the top recipients of U.S. DRG assistance in Africa. Regionally allocated DRG assistance for Africa supports the Africa Regional Democracy Fund, funded via ESF, which supports programs across DRG focus areas to strengthen democratic institutions.

**Figure 5. DRG Assistance for Africa in FY2022**

State Department and USAID



**Source:** Graphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding.


## Education and Social Services

DA is the primary funding vehicle for U.S. education and social service assistance for Africa. U.S. basic, secondary, and higher education programs constitute the majority of U.S. education and social service support for Africa (see **Figure 6**).<sup>21</sup> Most funding is allocated toward basic education programs, of which DRC has been the top recipient since FY2017. Malawi is regularly the top recipient of U.S. higher education assistance in Africa; Congress has included provisos in successive SFOPS appropriations (most recently, Section 7042[f] of P.L. 117-328, Division K) directing that funds be made available for higher education and professional development in Malawi. The Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development (READ) Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-56) articulated U.S. policy for education assistance, required a strategy for administering basic education assistance, and established performance evaluation mechanisms.

<sup>21</sup> See CRS Report R44676, *Foreign Assistance and the Education Sector: Programs and Priorities*.

U.S. higher education programs include the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), which provides training and mentorship, networking, and exchange-based fellowships to emerging African business, science, and civic leaders. Regional funding for YALI supports four Africa Regional Leadership Centers, based in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa. The Mandela Washington Fellowship program, which brings YALI fellows to the United States to study at U.S. colleges and universities, is administered by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and is not accounted for in regional budget allocations.

**Figure 6. Education and Social Services Assistance for Africa in FY2022**



**Source:** Graphic by CRS. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2024. Numbers may not sum to total due to rounding.

## Funding from Regional and Global Programs

As noted above, regional assistance allocation data do not account for U.S. assistance provided for African countries via global programs. This notably includes humanitarian assistance, which is appropriated on a global basis and allocated in response to needs and U.S. policy priorities, as well as a range of global health and peace and security programs through which African countries receive considerable funding in addition to regional and country-specific allocations.

### Humanitarian Assistance

As a region, Africa generally receives a large share of annual U.S. humanitarian assistance. This includes State Department-managed Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), and USAID-administered International Disaster



Assistance (IDA) and Food for Peace (FFP) aid—the latter authorized under Title II of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480, known as “P.L. 480”) and appropriated in agriculture appropriations.<sup>22</sup> MRA, ERMA, IDA, and FFP assistance obligations for African countries totaled \$6.53 billion in FY2022, accounting for around 52% of the global total.<sup>23</sup> Ethiopia, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, and DRC were the top African recipients of U.S. humanitarian aid obligations in FY2022.<sup>24</sup>

## Health Assistance

Health assistance for Africa provided under global programs includes funding (mostly provided under GHP-State) to support the State Department’s Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy (GHSD), which oversees PEPFAR. The Biden Administration launched GHSD in 2023, merging the Office of International Health and Biodefense and the functions of the Coordinator for Global COVID-19 Response and Health Security with the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. The bureau intends to coordinate the State Department’s “work on strengthening global health security to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS.”<sup>25</sup> Global health assistance that benefits Africa also includes funding for replenishments of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund), a multilateral initiative that has historically directed a large share of its aid toward Africa.<sup>26</sup>

Other global health assistance for Africa includes GHP-USAID International Partnerships funding supporting contributions to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, an international organization that works to improve access to vaccines in poor countries; a large share of Gavi’s work is focused on Africa. It also comprises a range of U.S. special-focus health programs that operate in Africa and other regions (e.g., to eradicate neglected tropical diseases). As noted above, the CDC administers substantial additional pandemic preparedness and global health security aid programs in Africa.

## Peace and Security Assistance

Many African countries receive U.S. peace and security assistance through global programs. As noted above (see “The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account” text box, above), this includes PKO funding for the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), which aims to strengthen partner security forces’ peacekeeping capacities, and for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a sub-regional counterterrorism program.<sup>27</sup> The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages PKO funding for GPOI and TSCTP, while its Bureau for Counterterrorism manages the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), a NADR-funded program to build the counterterrorism capacities of non-military security forces (e.g., police).

Other assistance seeks to help African countries prevent, mitigate, and transition out of conflict. This includes most funding provided pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of Division J, P.L. 116-94), which authorized aid for preventing conflict and promoting stability through two global funds: the State Department-managed Prevention and Stabilization Fund and

<sup>22</sup> USAID also administers nonemergency food assistance authorized under FFP Title II, which supports countries to transition away from emergency food assistance. See CRS Report R45422, *U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview* and CRS Report R45879, *International Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs*.

<sup>23</sup> CRS calculation based on FY2022 obligations data from ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed June 29, 2023.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> State Department, “Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy.”

<sup>26</sup> For disbursement data by country and region, see Global Fund Data Explorer, <https://data.theglobalfund.org/>.

<sup>27</sup> Successive Administrations have requested non-PKO funding for TSCTP—including DA, ESF, INCLE, and NADR funding—on a regional or bilateral basis, while requesting PKO funds under the State Department’s Bureau of Military Affairs allocation. See Supplementary Tables in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications.

the USAID-managed Complex Crises Fund (CCF).<sup>28</sup> The Biden Administration has selected part of coastal West Africa (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo) and Mozambique as two of five GFA focus areas. Separately, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provides short-term aid focused on averting conflict, supporting reconciliation and recovery, and encouraging political transitions. As of October 2023, OTI had programs in coastal West Africa (Ghana, Benin, and Togo), Ethiopia, and Sudan.<sup>29</sup>

## Other U.S. Departments and Agencies

While the State Department and USAID administer the majority of U.S. foreign aid for Africa, other federal departments and agencies also manage or support aid programs in the region. For example, the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Treasury conduct technical assistance programs and other activities in Africa, and in some cases implement State Department- and USAID-administered programs in the region.

### The Department of Defense (DOD)

As noted above, DOD implements some State Department-administered security assistance in Africa and is also authorized, under Title 10 of the *U.S. Code*, to use DOD appropriations to fund and conduct security cooperation activities with foreign partner militaries and internal security entities.<sup>30</sup> Most Title 10 assistance for Africa is provided under DOD's "global train and equip" authority, 10 U.S.C. §333 ("Section 333").<sup>31</sup> Section 333 authorizes DOD—subject to "joint" planning, coordination, and concurrence from the Secretary of State—to provide training and equipment to foreign military and internal security forces to build their capacity to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and transnational crime, and to bolster maritime and border security and military intelligence.

Other DOD security cooperation programs in Africa include the State Partnership Program (SPP), in which U.S. state National Guards partner with foreign militaries for capacity-building, training, and other military-to-military engagements. As of mid-2023, there were 16 SPP partnerships in Africa.<sup>32</sup> In the past decade, Congress has authorized additional DOD security cooperation programs in Africa on a temporary basis, under global or region-specific authorities (e.g., to bolster the counterterrorism capacity of African countries deploying troops to Somalia, or to help a Ugandan-led regional force combat the Lord's Resistance Army rebel group in Central Africa between FY2012 and FY2017). Comprehensive regional- or country-level funding data for DOD security cooperation programs are not publicly available, although funding data are reported to committees of jurisdiction pursuant to legislative reporting and notification requirements.

<sup>28</sup> The CCF account supports USAID responses to emerging crises, with projects aimed at addressing the root causes of instability. Previously funded through Defense appropriations (as authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, Section 1207, P.L. 109-163), today USAID administers CCF under Section 509(b) of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (Title V of Division J of P.L. 116-94). See CRS Report R40482, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts*.

<sup>29</sup> USAID Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization, "Where We Work," accessed September 27, 2023.

<sup>30</sup> DOD uses the term "security assistance" to denote Title 22 (State Department-administered) programs, including those implemented by DOD, and the term "security cooperation" to denote activities authorized under Title 10. CRS In Focus IF11677, *Defense Primer: DOD "Title 10" Security Cooperation*.

<sup>31</sup> This authority was first established in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY2006 (P.L. 109-163). In the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328), Congress codified and expanded this authority under 10 U.S.C. §333 ("Section 333"), consolidating various capacity-building authorities it had granted DOD on a temporary or limited basis.

<sup>32</sup> National Guard, "State Partnership Program," accessed October 27, 2023.



## Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)

The MCC, which Congress established in 2004 (Title VI of Division D, P.L. 108-199), supports economic growth programs in developing countries that meet a range of governance and development benchmarks.<sup>33</sup> The MCC funds two types of programs: large, five-year investments (typically amounting to several hundred million dollars) known as “compacts” that aim to address key “constraints to growth” identified during the project design phase, and smaller, shorter-term “threshold programs,” that aim to help countries advance reforms to become compact-eligible.

As of September 2023, the MCC had active compacts in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal and threshold programs in Gambia and Togo, a total MCC commitment of \$1.15 billion.<sup>34</sup> The MCC has signed compacts with Lesotho, Malawi, and Mozambique valued at an additional \$1.15 billion and approved a \$60 million threshold program for Kenya. It also has selected Gambia, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia as eligible to develop compacts, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal as eligible for regional (cross-border) compacts, and Mauritania as eligible to develop a threshold program.

The MCC has suspended or terminated engagement with some governments due to failure to meet governance or other criteria. Most recently, in 2023, the MCC suspended aid for Niger after a military takeover, pausing activity on an existing \$442.6 million compact and preparatory work for a concurrent cross-border compact with Benin.<sup>35</sup> The MCC had previously announced that it would “significantly reduce” funding for Benin under that joint compact due to concerns over democratic backsliding under Benin’s current government.<sup>36</sup> In 2022, the MCC paused and later terminated Burkina Faso’s eligibility for MCC engagement due to a military coup, and in 2021, it discontinued development of a threshold program for Ethiopia amid the country’s civil war.<sup>37</sup>

## U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)<sup>38</sup>

DFC provides developing countries with loans, loan guarantees and insurance, direct equity, and technical assistance aimed at fostering economic development and advancing U.S. economic interests and foreign policy aims. In general, DFC must prioritize projects in low-income and lower-middle-income countries to help foster economic development, with some exceptions for upper-middle-income countries when presidentially determined U.S. economic or foreign policy interests are at stake. Africa has been a leading recipient of DFC financing, historically second only to Latin America.<sup>39</sup> During the 2022 ALS, DFC reported that its active commitments across Africa totaled more than \$11 billion.<sup>40</sup> Top investment categories in Africa include finance and insurance, energy, and natural resources.<sup>41</sup> DFC participates in several aid initiatives in Africa,

<sup>33</sup> See CRS Report RL32427, *Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues*.

<sup>34</sup> This includes an addition of \$12 million to the MCC compact for Côte d’Ivoire to accommodate a one-year extension due to COVID-19-related delays. CRS calculation based on compact and threshold program data in MCC, “Where We Work,” accessed September 27, 2023, available at <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work>.

<sup>35</sup> MCC, “MCC Board Suspends Assistance to Niger, Approves FY2024 Selection Criteria and Methodology Report,” September 13, 2023.

<sup>36</sup> MCC, “MCC’s Board Selects Belize, Zambia for Grant Assistance,” December 15, 2021.

<sup>37</sup> MCC, “MCC Board Approves Agency’s First Regional Grant Program,” September 28, 2022; and “MCC’s Board Selects Belize, Zambia for Grant Assistance,” December 15, 2021.

<sup>38</sup> CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance Shayerah I. Akhtar and Analyst in Foreign Assistance Nick Brown authored this section. See CRS In Focus IF11436, *U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)*.

<sup>39</sup> This trend dates back to DRC’s predecessor agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).

<sup>40</sup> DFC, “At U.S.-Africa Business Forum DFC Announces Active Commitments in Africa Top \$11 Billion,” December 14, 2022.

<sup>41</sup> CRS analysis of DFC’s active projects database.

including Power Africa and Prosper Africa, and has launched its own Africa-focused programs, such as the ICT-focused Connect Africa and the 2X Africa Women's Investment Initiative.<sup>42</sup>

## **African Development Foundation (USADF)**

The USADF is a federally funded, independent nonprofit corporation, established by Congress under the African Development Foundation Act of 1980 (Title V of P.L. 96-533). The USADF provides targeted grants worth up to \$250,000 that typically serve as seed capital for small-scale economic growth projects. The Foundation focuses on women- and youth-led entrepreneurship, agriculture and food security, and off-grid electricity projects, and also plays a role in selected multi-agency initiatives (e.g., Power Africa and YALI).

## **The Peace Corps**

Peace Corps Volunteers lead local programs in education, agriculture, community development, youth engagement, health, and the environment.<sup>43</sup> As of FY2022, the Peace Corps was active in 24 African countries, and almost 45% of Peace Corps Volunteers were serving in Africa, the largest share of any region.<sup>44</sup>

## **International Financial Institution Assistance**

The United States provides substantial additional funds for African countries via contributions to international financial institutions.<sup>45</sup> These include replenishments, appropriated by Congress and administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, for the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and African Development Bank. The United States plays a role in approving investments and projects by these institutions.

## **The Biden Administration and the FY2024 Request**

The Biden Administration has maintained long-standing U.S. assistance priorities in Africa (e.g., global health, agricultural productivity, and DRG) while increasing support for climate change adaptation and mitigation, among other shifts in emphasis. U.S. assistance for Africa totaled \$7.95 billion in FY2022 allocations, excluding humanitarian aid but including \$337 million in supplemental economic aid provided in the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128).<sup>46</sup> Health assistance comprised roughly 70% of FY2022 allocations for Africa, followed by assistance to promote economic growth and respond to food insecurity. Consistent with past years, assistance for peace and security, social services (including education), and DRG programs made up the balance. FY2023 allocation data were not publicly available as of September 2023.

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<sup>42</sup> OPIC launched Connect Africa in 2018. See DFC, "DFC to Launch Regional Team Based in Africa," July 14, 2020.

<sup>43</sup> See CRS Report RS21168, *The Peace Corps: Overview and Issues*.

<sup>44</sup> Peace Corps, *Agency Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2022, 2022*.

<sup>45</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11902, *International Financial Institutions: FY2024 Budget Request*; CRS Report R41170, *Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress*; CRS In Focus IF11361, *The World Bank*; and CRS In Focus IF10676, *The International Monetary Fund*.

<sup>46</sup> For supplemental assistance allocations, see State Department, CBJ for FY2024 Supplementary Tables, p. 12.

## The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS): Assistance Commitments

In December 2022, President Joe Biden hosted senior delegations from 49 African countries and the African Union (AU) for a three-day U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS). During the Summit, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan asserted that the Administration would work with Congress to “commit \$55 billion to Africa over the next three years.”<sup>47</sup> The Administration has released few details on the composition of the \$55 billion figure, which appears to comprise a mix of past, requested, and prospective resources for sub-Saharan and North Africa administered by a range of U.S. departments and agencies.<sup>48</sup> Aid commitments made at the 2022 ALS include

- **Food security and health workforce aid.** Among the largest financial pledges made at the ALS were President Biden’s commitments to provide “an additional \$2 billion” to address food insecurity in Africa,<sup>49</sup> and to invest \$4 billion in Africa’s health workforce by 2025 under a State Department- and USAID-led Global Health Worker Initiative.<sup>50</sup>
- **Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA).** President Biden formally announced DTA, an initiative to “expand digital access and literacy and strengthen digital enabling environments” in Africa. A White House fact sheet stated the Administration’s intention to “invest over \$350 million and facilitate over \$450 million in financing” for DTA.<sup>51</sup>
- **African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT).** The Administration unveiled ADAPT, a new initiative to “provide rapid, flexible support and assistance to governments and civil society during vulnerable yet critical political transitions.”<sup>52</sup> A White House fact sheet pledged to “invest \$75 million for this initiative to counter democratic backsliding in partnership with regional bodies, governments, and civil society in support of durable political transitions.”
- **YALI.** Vice President Kamala Harris announced the “next phase” of YALI, entailing a commitment of “\$100 million [...] to expand networking for alumni and connect them with social impact and business investors.”<sup>53</sup>

The Administration named retired Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, as Special Presidential Representative for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit

<sup>47</sup> White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” December 12, 2022.

<sup>48</sup> In a fact sheet on Summit pledges, the State Department outlines commitments by the Departments of State, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Agriculture; USAID; MCC; USADF; DFC; and the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank, among others. See State Department, “2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Overview,” last updated September 5, 2023.

<sup>49</sup> White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Closing Session on Promoting Food Security and Food Systems Resilience,” December 15, 2022. An accompanying White House fact sheet set out a pledge of “\$2.5 billion in emergency aid and medium to long-term food security assistance”; White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Africa Partnership to Promote Food Security and Resilient Food Systems,” December 15, 2022.

<sup>50</sup> White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Africa Partnership in Health Cooperation,” December 13, 2022.

<sup>51</sup> White House, “Fact Sheet: New Initiative on Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA),” December 14, 2022. The Administration requested \$20 million for DTA (then referred to as “Digital Africa”) in its FY2023 budget request.

<sup>52</sup> White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Africa Partnership in Promoting Peace, Security, and Democratic Governance,” December 15, 2022.

<sup>53</sup> White House, “Remarks by Vice President Harris at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit African and Diaspora Young Leaders Forum,” December 13, 2022. See also the YALI website at <https://yali.state.gov/>.

Implementation to oversee ALS outcomes.<sup>54</sup> To date, the Administration has not comprehensively detailed what Summit goals have been met, or how much of the \$55 billion total pledge has been allocated to which programs or activities. The FY2024 budget request for the State Department and USAID proposes new or increased funding for several aid initiatives pledged during the Summit, but at a total level far below the \$55 billion commitment—which, as noted above, appears to include a wide range of past and planned aid and other resources for sub-Saharan as well as North Africa, administered by various U.S. departments and agencies.<sup>55</sup> Several Members have expressed interest in continuing to monitor Summit outcomes.<sup>56</sup>

## The FY2024 Aid Budget Request for Africa

The Administration requested \$8.00 billion for Africa for FY2024, 0.6% more than FY2022 allocations in current (non-inflation-adjusted) dollars, and 7.3% less than FY2022 in constant (inflation-adjusted) dollars.

**Health.** Health assistance comprises 73% of the FY2024 request for Africa, at \$5.82 billion (see **Figure 7**).

Broadly consistent with past funding trends, HIV/AIDS-related assistance constitutes around 65% of the health request and nearly half of all State Department- and USAID-managed funding proposed for the region.

Malaria would continue to be the second-largest health program area in

Africa. Global health security and family planning and reproductive health would see increases compared to FY2022 allocations, alongside a large proposed cut for water and sanitation aid.

### Health Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. FY2022 Actual Allocations

**HIV/AIDS:** \$3.80 billion (-\$19 million from FY2022)  
**Malaria:** \$692 million (+\$5 million)  
**Maternal/Child Health:** \$390 million (+4 million)  
**Family Planning/Reprod. Health:** \$392 million (+\$51 million)  
**Global Health Security:** \$204 million (+\$44 million)  
**Water Supply and Sanitation:** \$117 million (-\$103 million)  
**Tuberculosis:** \$120 million (-\$7 million)  
**Nutrition:** \$113 million (+\$6 million)


<sup>54</sup> White House, “Statement: Special Presidential Representative for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Implementation,” December 15, 2022.

<sup>55</sup> State Department, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year FY2024*, 2023 (hereafter, CBJ for FY2024). Congressional consideration of FY2024 appropriations was ongoing as of October 2023.

<sup>56</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) ranking member James Risch and SFRC Africa Subcommittee ranking member Tim Scott in SFRC, *Review of the Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the U.S. Department of State*, hearing, 118<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., March 22, 2023; and letter from then-HFAC Chair Gregory Meeks to President Biden, December 21, 2022.

**Figure 7. The FY2024 Health Assistance Request for Africa, by Program Area**

\$ thousands, current U.S. dollars



**Source:** CRS graphic, based on data in State Department, CBJ for FY2024.

**Economic Growth.** Economic growth assistance for Africa would increase by nearly 40% from FY2022 allocations, to \$1.08 billion under the request. Agriculture and food security aid, channeled primarily via FTF, would increase to \$487 million and remain the largest category of U.S. economic growth assistance for Africa.

#### **Economic Growth Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. FY2022 Actual Allocations**

**Agriculture:** \$487 million (+\$76 million)  
**Trade/Investment:** \$135 million (+\$75 million)  
**Environment:** \$97 million (-\$50 million)  
**ICT Services:** \$40 million (+\$40 million)  
**Private Sector Productivity:** \$18 million (+\$17 million)  
**Workforce Development:** \$10 million (-\$1 million)  
**Modern Energy Services:** \$800,000 (-\$9 million)  
**Climate Change-Related Assistance**  
**Adaptation:** \$119 million (+\$69 million)  
**Clean Energy:** \$125 million (+\$60 million)  
**Sustainable Landscapes:** \$54 million (+29 million)

Trade and investment aid would more than double, to \$135 million, including \$100 million for Prosper Africa. The request also includes \$50 million for USAID's Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA), announced at the 2022 ALS. Environment assistance would see the largest drop of any economic growth category from FY2022, of 34%, while climate change-related aid—for adaptation, clean energy, and sustainable landscapes—would increase by 112%. The FY2024 request includes \$100 million for Power Africa.

**Peace and Security.** The FY2024 request proposes \$423 million for State Department- and USAID-administered peace and security programs in Africa, 5% less than FY2022 allocations, with decreases proposed for several program areas. As in past years, Somalia would be the single largest destination for U.S. peace and security assistance, with \$219 million proposed.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup> State Department, CBJ for FY2024, Appendix II, p. 416. The Biden Administration has again requested funding for the U.S. contribution to UNSOS under PKO, rather than CIPA (see footnote 18).

PKO would continue to be the leading vehicle for State Department- and USAID-administered security assistance for Africa, with \$261 million requested, not including globally managed programs.<sup>58</sup> The regional PKO request includes \$3 million to support a “modest” Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) program, “which is targeted against strategic competitors, including but not limited to, PRC and Russian influence in Sub-Saharan Africa and intended to address the highest needs for strategic competition in Africa.”<sup>59</sup> Djibouti is once again the only African country for which FMF is requested, with \$6 million proposed, level with FY2022 allocations.

**Peace and Security Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. FY2022 Actual Allocations**

**Strengthening Mil. Partnerships/Capabilities:** \$287 million (-\$3 million)  
**Counter-Terrorism:** \$53 million (+\$8 million)  
**Citizen Security/Law Enforcement:** \$27 million (-\$14 million)  
**Weapons Security/Explosive Remnants of War:** \$22 million (-\$5 million)  
**Conflict Mitigation/Stabilization:** \$22 million (-\$3 million)  
**Transnational Threats/Crime:** \$7 million (-\$7 million)  
**Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction:** \$2 million (-\$1 million)  
**Counter-Narcotics:** \$1 million (near flat-line)  
**Trafficking in Persons:** \$0.5 million (-\$1 million)

**DRG.** DRG aid would see the largest proportional increase of any sector, with \$436 million proposed, 61% more than FY2022 allocations. The request would boost funding across all DRG activity areas. Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, DRC, and Kenya would be the leading country recipients of DRG assistance. As part of the \$436 million proposal, in line with ALS pledges, the DRG request includes \$25 million for the African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT) initiative to support political transitions in countries yet to be publicly identified.

**DRG Aid for Africa: FY2024 Request vs. FY2022 Actual Allocations**

**Good Governance:** \$138 million (+\$60 million)  
**Civil Society:** \$119 million (+\$40 million)  
**Rule of Law:** \$79 million (+\$45 million)  
**Pol. Competition/Consensus Building:** \$40 million (+\$17 million)  
**Media and Free Flow of Information:** \$26 million (+\$2 million)  
**Human Rights:** \$24 million (+\$2 million)

**Education and Social Services.** Total education and social services funding for Africa would see a \$45 million decrease, to \$234 million. Broadly consistent with past years, DRC, Mali, Senegal, Ghana, and Malawi would be the top recipients of basic education assistance in Africa. The higher education request includes \$20 million in USAID Africa Regional funding for YALI.<sup>60</sup>

**Table 1. The FY2024 State Department and USAID Request for Africa, by Account**

\$ thousands

Account	DRG	Economic Growth	Education and Social Services	Health	Peace and Security	TOTAL
DA	376,329	1,079,895	231,956	117,198	30,454	1,835,832
ESF	41,300	6,600	2,000	-	7,700	57,600

<sup>58</sup> These include TSCTP (\$33 million in PKO requested) and GPOI (\$71 million in PKO requested), both included in the request for the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

<sup>59</sup> State Department, CBJ for FY2024, Appendix II, p. 417. According to the request, “dedicated PKO – complemented by global Countering PRC Influence Fund FMF – will enable the flexibility to choose the best account for the project in the year of appropriation given the different advantages and authorities of PKO and FMF.”

<sup>60</sup> The request includes an additional \$26 million for YALI via the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.



Account	DRG	Economic Growth	Education and Social Services	Health	Peace and Security	TOTAL
FMF	-	-	-	-	6,000	6,000
GHP – State	-	-	-	3,579,600	-	3,579,600
GHP –USAID	-	-	-	2,127,000	-	2,127,000
IMET	-	-	-	-	20,805	20,805
INCLE	18,634	-	-	-	33,266	51,900
NADR	-	-	-	-	63,850	63,850
PKO	-	-	-	-	260,558	260,558
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>436,263</b>	<b>1,086,495</b>	<b>233,956</b>	<b>5,823,798</b>	<b>422,633</b>	<b>8,003,145</b>

**Source:** State Department, *CBJ for FY2024*, Appendix II, “Operating Unit by Objective, Program Area, and Account” tables, pp. 455-484.

## Outlook and Issues for Congress

Assistance for Africa is one among several considerations for Congress in the context of the FY2024 SFOPS appropriations process. Heavily weighted toward health programs, with the balance dedicated mostly to long-standing economic development and security priorities, the Biden Administration’s FY2024 aid budget request for Africa resembles, in level and scope, recent-year allocations for the region, although it would also make several changes. For example, funding for DRG programs and most economic growth assistance (including climate change aid) would increase relative to FY2022 allocations, while funds for water and sanitation and environment programs would decline. The request also includes funding for several ALS commitments, including \$40 million for the Administration’s digital connectivity initiative, DTA, and \$25 million for ADAPT, which aims to support political transitions in the region.

Global and regional developments are likely to continue to shape Congress’s approach to U.S. assistance for Africa. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza war, for instance, have generated demands on U.S. engagement in other regions. Global competition with Russia and China has also become a justification and focus for some aid programs in Africa. Members may continue to consider whether—and with what (if any) changes—to reauthorize PEPFAR, the leading vehicle for U.S. aid for Africa in the past two decades. The 118<sup>th</sup> Congress also may help determine the future of AGOA (P.L. 106-200, as amended), which is to expire in September 2025; though not an aid program per se, AGOA directs the executive branch to conduct certain trade and investment assistance programming in Africa. Within the region, the expansion of Islamist insurgent threats in several countries and a string of military coups have prompted increased congressional scrutiny of U.S. security cooperation and counterterrorism programs.

As Congress sets its priorities for FY2024 assistance for Africa and continues to oversee U.S. programming in the region, Members may also consider a range of broader issues, including

**Scale and Balance.** Members may debate whether U.S. assistance to Africa is suitably balanced among programmatic sectors given the scope of U.S. priorities and interests in the region. Successive Administrations have articulated a diverse range of development, governance, and security objectives in Africa—for example, the Biden Administration’s Africa Strategy cites “open societies,” “democratic and security dividends,” and environmental and climate adaptation objectives as top priorities—even as U.S. assistance for the region remains largely weighted

toward health programs. Some Members and executive branch officials have advocated additional funding for other U.S. priorities, such as promoting democracy, fostering economic growth, supporting education, or strengthening security.<sup>61</sup> Others have defended the relative allocation of funding for health programs vis-à-vis other U.S. assistance for Africa, arguing, for example, that U.S. health assistance has been particularly effective or appreciated in the region.<sup>62</sup> More broadly, some Members and advocates have called for a reorientation of U.S. engagement in Africa to deemphasize assistance in favor of a greater emphasis on trade and investment to promote development in Africa.<sup>63</sup>

**Geostrategic Competition and U.S. Influence.** Amid mounting U.S. policymaker concern regarding China's and Russia's activities in Africa, some in Congress have questioned whether U.S. assistance is adequately targeted to promote U.S. influence vis-à-vis global competitors. Among other issues, some Members have voiced concern that African leaders and publics may view China's engagement more positively than that of the United States, due in part to China's record of investment in high-profile infrastructure projects in the region.<sup>64</sup> In turn, some Members have advocated for increased U.S. support for infrastructure development in the region.<sup>65</sup> Some Members have simultaneously probed the extent to which U.S. assistance is effectively addressing Russian "malign influence" in Africa, including the role of Russian private military companies in the region.<sup>66</sup> As it considers the FY2024 request, Congress might, for instance, consider what role U.S. aid might play in geostrategic competition in Africa, as well as assess the status and focus of the ongoing Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) program in the region.

**Transparency and Oversight.** Definitive accounts of U.S. aid allocated for specific African countries, or for particular programs in the region, are seldom made public and in some cases may not be readily available to Congress upon request. As Administration budget documents and congressional appropriations bills do not fully disaggregate funding by country or region, allocation data in annual State Department *Congressional Budget Justifications* may understate (in some cases, substantially) the amount of assistance allocated for Africa, or for a given African country. Obligation and disbursement data captured in the public ForeignAssistance.gov database may provide a more granular view into actual funding flows for particular countries and activities, but may not capture all global and regional program funding. Such data also are not disaggregated by year of appropriation, which may obscure policy changes or choices.

<sup>61</sup> See, e.g., remarks by then-Rep. Karen Bass in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, *FY2022 Budget and U.S.-Africa Relations*, hearing, 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., December 1, 2021. In late 2022 testimony before HFAC, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee stated that "there's a lot of money earmarked for health [programming in Africa]. Also, education. I think we would benefit from more resources in the democracy area that would help us address the issues of [democratic] backsliding" in the region. See remarks by Assistant Secretary Phee in HFAC, "Assessing the Biden Administration's U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa," 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., November 17, 2022.

<sup>62</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Sen. Mike Rounds in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, *FY2023 Budget Request for Africa*, hearing, 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., July 27, 2022.

<sup>63</sup> See, e.g., Office of Sen. Dick Durbin, "Durbin, Boozman, Inhofe, Booker, Cardin Introduce Bipartisan Bill To Increase U.S. Exports To Africa," press release accompanying introduction of S. 1022 (117<sup>th</sup> Cong.), March 25, 2021.

<sup>64</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Rep. Michael McCaul in HFAC, "The State of American Influence in 2023: Great Power Competition and Persistent Crises in an Era of Budget Constraints," 118<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., May 17, 2023; and remarks by Sen. Robert Menendez in SFRC, "Review of the FY2024 United States Agency for International Development Budget," 118<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., April 26, 2023.

<sup>65</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Sen. Chris Van Hollen in SFRC Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, "FY2023 Budget Request for Africa," hearing, 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., July 27, 2022.

<sup>66</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Sen. Rounds in SFRC Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, *FY2023 Budget Request...*, and remarks by Rep. John James in HFAC Subcommittee on Africa, *Examining the Fiscal Year 2024 State and Foreign Operations Budget Request for Africa*, hearing, 118<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., June 22, 2023.



Gaps in region- and country-level allocation data may partly reflect the preservation of flexibility in U.S. assistance programs, as in the case of humanitarian aid. At the same time, Congress has not imposed country allocation reporting requirements evenly across U.S. foreign assistance programs. For instance, while DOD “global train and equip” assistance is subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements that capture information on country and security force unit recipients and assistance to be provided, there is no analogous reporting requirement comprehensively governing State Department-administered security assistance.<sup>67</sup> Congress has acted to enhance oversight of U.S. security assistance for Africa. Section 6502 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) imposed new notification and reporting requirements associated with PKO assistance, for example.<sup>68</sup> The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program Act of 2022 (Division AA, P.L. 117-103), in addition to establishing TSCTP in statute, instituted new congressional notification and reporting requirements on funding allocated under the program.

**Restrictions on U.S. Assistance.** U.S. assistance to certain African countries is subject to legal restrictions pursuant to provisions in appropriations measures or other laws. Some provisions are country-specific, while others prohibit or condition various types of aid to any country that fails to meet certain conditions relating to governance, human rights, and other issues. Statutes establishing such conditions often accord the executive branch the discretion to designate countries for sanction or waive accompanying restrictions. Congress may continue to debate the effectiveness of such restrictions as it oversees and assesses executive branch implementation. Related laws and considerations include:

- Section 7042 (“Africa”) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Act, 2023 (Division K of P.L. 117-328), which prohibits appropriated funds from being provided to the governments of South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, with certain exceptions. In addition, Section 7042 places conditions on certain types of IMET programming for governments in Africa’s Great Lakes region.
- Section 7008 in annual SFOPS appropriations legislation (most recently, Division K of P.L. 117-328), which restricts certain U.S. assistance following a coup d’état.<sup>69</sup> As of September 2023, Section 7008 was in effect with regard to Burkina Faso (due to a coup in 2022), Guinea (2021), Mali (2020), and Sudan (1989). Congress granted authority to the executive branch to waive Section 7008 restrictions for the first time in FY2023, subject to congressional consultation and notification. Some Members continue to debate the impact and effectiveness of Section 7008, including the level of flexibility it provides to the executive branch regarding the application of restriction.
- The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA, P.L. 105-292, as amended), which sets out a list of punitive actions, including aid restrictions, to be imposed on “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPCs) whose governments engage in or tolerate “particularly severe” religious freedom violations.<sup>70</sup> Such punitive measures are subject to a waiver or referral to existing sanctions on the country. Most recently, in 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated

<sup>67</sup> On U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa and associated oversight challenges, see Testimony of Alexis Arieff, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, *U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa*, 116<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., December 16, 2019.

<sup>68</sup> Congress modified these requirements under Section 5594 of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263).

<sup>69</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11267, *Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations* and CRS Insight IN11854, *“An Epidemic of Coups” in Africa? Issues for Congress*.

<sup>70</sup> CRS In Focus IF10803, *Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy*.

Eritrea as a CPC—referring the country to existing sanctions—and placed CAR on the Special Watch List. Some Members have criticized the Biden Administration’s decision not to list Nigeria as a CPC.<sup>71</sup>

- The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance” and certain other engagement for governments that the State Department determines do not meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons, subject to a waiver.<sup>72</sup> In its 2023 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, the State Department designated Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and South Sudan as Tier 3 (worst-performing). President Biden partly waived associated assistance restrictions for all six countries.<sup>73</sup>
- The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict certain security assistance for countries in which state security forces or state-backed militia have recruited or used child soldiers.<sup>74</sup> In its 2023 TIP report, the State Department listed CAR, DRC, Eritrea, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia, and South Sudan per the CSPA. President Biden partly waived associated restrictions for CAR, DRC, and Somalia.<sup>75</sup>

The so-called “Leahy Laws” restrict individual units or members of foreign security forces who have been credibly implicated in a “gross violation of human rights” from receiving most kinds of State Department- and DOD-administered security assistance, subject to certain exceptions.<sup>76</sup> The executive branch does not regularly publicize information on which units or individuals have been prohibited from receiving U.S. assistance pursuant to these laws.

**Country Ownership.** Most U.S. aid for Africa is implemented by nongovernment or multilateral actors—such as humanitarian organizations, non-profit groups, private contractors, and U.N. agencies—rather than by African governments. Congress may thus debate the extent to which U.S. aid enables African governments to take the lead in addressing their country’s development, security, and governance challenges. Providing aid through nongovernment actors may enable the delivery of assistance in contexts where a government may be unable or unwilling to provide services, and may also help the United States better oversee the use of funds in countries where there may be a risk of diversion by the government. It may be debated, however, whether this mode of delivery adequately equips partner-country authorities to take responsibility for service provision, and whether it may limit U.S. influence or leverage with governments in recipient countries. Members also may consider the merits and status of the Biden Administration’s enhanced emphasis on increasing the share of U.S. aid that is implemented by local partners (e.g., African-led organizations) as opposed to U.S.- and other internationally based actors.<sup>77</sup>

**Possible Unintended Consequences.** Analysts and advocates have raised concerns over potential unintended consequences of U.S. aid for African countries. For instance, some critics of foreign

<sup>71</sup> In the 118<sup>th</sup> Cong., H.Res. 82 would call for Nigeria to be re-designated as a CPC, among other provisions.

<sup>72</sup> CRS In Focus IF10587, *Human Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Introduction*.

<sup>73</sup> White House, “Memorandum on Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” September 29, 2023.

<sup>74</sup> CRS In Focus IF10901, *Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions*.

<sup>75</sup> White House, “Presidential Determination and Certification With Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008,” 88 *Federal Register* 66671, September 27, 2023.

<sup>76</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10575, *Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”)*, by Michael A. Weber.

<sup>77</sup> Speech by USAID Administrator Samantha Power, November 4, 2021, available at <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/nov-4-2021-administrator-samantha-power-new-vision-global-development>.

assistance generally allege that such aid may create market distortions or dependencies.<sup>78</sup> Other commentators have argued that U.S. aid may legitimize or strengthen authoritarian regimes in the region. According to one observer, for example, PEPFAR spending in countries with autocratic governments “reduces pressure on the recipient states to deliver services, thereby creating opportunities for them to shift funds to projects that serve elite interests.”<sup>79</sup> In a response to this critique, former U.S. health officials argued that PEPFAR has had positive impacts on governance in Africa, in addition to the success it has achieved in the fight against HIV/AIDS.<sup>80</sup>

Some lawmakers have questioned whether providing security aid to governments with poor human rights records may strengthen abusive militaries and contribute to poor governance.<sup>81</sup> Amid a wave of military coups in Africa since 2020, some led by personnel who previously took part in U.S. training programs, some Members also have questioned whether U.S. training may have empowered coup leaders, or how U.S. assistance could be adjusted in light of such events.<sup>82</sup> Proponents of U.S. security assistance may contend that aspects of such engagements—such as military professionalization and related training—enhance security sector governance and civil-military relations, and may thus improve human rights practices by partner militaries.<sup>83</sup> Members continue to debate the appropriate approach to U.S. engagement with military regimes and other undemocratic governments in Africa.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> For a critical assessment of foreign assistance in Africa, see, for example, Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009).

<sup>79</sup> Jon Temin, “Fight AIDS in Africa, Not Democracy,” *American Purpose*, June 22, 2022.

<sup>80</sup> Deborah L. Birk and William R. Steiger, “Fighting AIDS in Africa Does Help Democracy,” *American Purpose*, July 25, 2022.

<sup>81</sup> See, e.g., letter from Representatives Ilhan Omar, Karen Bass, and Sara Jacobs to Secretary Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin pertaining to Cameroon, March 9, 2022; letter from Senators Cory Booker and James Risch to Secretary of State Blinken pertaining to Uganda, March 4, 2021.

<sup>82</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Rep. Sara Jacobs in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Social Impact, “Improving the United States’ Ability to Prevent and Stabilize Conflict: Global Fragility Act Implementation,” 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., May 11, 2022, remarks by Sen. Chris Van Hollen in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., March 10, 2022; and remarks by Sen. Mike Rounds in SFRC, “Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel and the U.S. Policy Response,” hearing, 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., July 12, 2022.

<sup>83</sup> For one evaluation of U.S. security assistance in Africa, see Stephen Watts et al. *Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present*, 2018.

<sup>84</sup> See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel.”

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