

# Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status

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## Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status

Since the beginning of his second term on January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump has increased tariffs on U.S. imports from all global partners. To implement these tariffs, the President has cited authorities in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 *et seq.*) and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232, 19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). The Trump Administration has also initiated investigations under Section 232 which may result in additional sectoral tariffs. The Administration may also consider tariffs as a remedy for unfair trade practices under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301, 19 U.S.C. §§2411-20).

Since announcing these tariff actions, the Administration has been in negotiations with some partners on tariff and nontariff matters, and some trade partners have announced retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports. Between April and December 2025, the Administration released 12 joint statements regarding framework agreements with partners on tariff issues (including with the European Union, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and others) and also announced a series of temporary tariff truces with China. Negotiations with other partners are ongoing. The conclusion of ongoing talks and the implementation of agreed terms may further alter the details of the tariff actions summarized in the following tables.

This report begins with a brief summary of U.S. actions (**Table 1**). The report then outlines in more detail the tariff actions initiated by the President (**Table 2**, **Table 3**, **Table 4**, and **Table 5**), tariff-related joint statements with partners (**Table 6**), and retaliatory tariff actions initiated by foreign governments (**Table 7**) from January 20, 2025, through December 31, 2025. These tables are based on official government documents; they include the status of each action and a brief timeline.

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**Table I. Summary of U.S. Executive Tariff Actions**

January 20, 2025-December 31, 2025

Description	Country Affected	Current Tariff Rate / Status
<i>Actions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, Table 2)</i>		
Fentanyl-related	Canada	35% on most goods; 10% on potash and Canadian energy; United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) exemption.
Fentanyl & Migration	Mexico	25% on most goods; 10% on potash; USMCA exemption.
Fentanyl-related	China	10% on all goods; ended de minimis duty-free treatment.
Venezuelan Oil	Designated	25% on all goods from countries designated by the Sec. of State.
Trade Deficit/ Reciprocal	Global	10%-41%, by country of origin, on most goods (with exceptions); <i>Paused</i> : 125% on China.
Ending De Minimis Treatment	Global	Ended de minimis duty-free treatment.
Brazil's Government Policies	Brazil	40% on select goods (with exceptions).
Importing Russian Oil	India	25% on most goods (with exceptions).
<i>Actions under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232, Table 3 and Table 4)</i>		
Steel	Global	50% globally; 25% on imports from the United Kingdom (UK).
Aluminum	Global	50% globally; 25% on imports from the UK.
Automobiles & Parts	Global	25% globally; 10% for UK;* 15% for Japan, South Korea, and EU;* some USMCA exceptions.
Copper	Global	50% globally on semi-finished copper products.
Timber/Lumber	Global	10%-25% globally; 10% for UK;* 15% for Japan, South Korea, and EU.*
Trucks and Buses	Global	10% on buses globally; 25% on trucks and truck parts globally; some USMCA exceptions.
Semiconductors	TBD	Investigation initiated (April 2025).
Pharmaceuticals	TBD	Investigation initiated (April 2025).
Critical Minerals	TBD	Investigation initiated (April 2025).
Aircraft	TBD	Investigation initiated (May 2025).
Drones	TBD	Investigation initiated (July 2025).
Polysilicon	TBD	Investigation initiated (July 2025).
Wind Turbines	TBD	Investigation initiated (August 2025).
Robotics	TBD	Investigation initiated (September 2025).
Medical Equipment	TBD	Investigation initiated (September 2025).
<i>Actions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301, Table 5)</i>		
China's Semiconductor Policies	China	Investigation completed. China's policies found actionable. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) proposed no additional tariffs in 2026, and a potential rate increase in June 2027.
China's Shipping Industries	China	Investigation completed. Action of port fees and tariffs suspended.
Nicaragua's Labor Rights	Nicaragua	Investigation completed. USTR proposes tariffs beginning in 2027.

Description	Country Affected	Current Tariff Rate / Status
Brazil's Trade Practices	Brazil	Investigation initiated (July 2025).
China's Phase One Agreement Compliance	China	Investigation initiated (October 2025).
Foreign Digital Services Taxes	TBD	President directed USTR to consider renewing past investigation.
International Seafood	TBD	President directed USTR to consider a new investigation.

**Source:** CRS, compiled from official U.S. government documents. See report and tables for additional details.

**Notes:** TBD = to be determined. EU = European Union. Many 2025 tariff actions, with exceptions, are cumulative. Details may change due to bilateral trade deals not yet implemented or other policy changes. \*For UK, EU, South Korea, and Japan, auto and timber rates include most-favored nation tariffs. UK auto rates include tariff-rate quota for vehicles.

## Introduction

Since the beginning of his second term on January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump has invoked multiple legal authorities to increase tariffs on U.S. imports. Some trading partners have announced retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports. This report outlines the tariff actions initiated by the President (**Table 1**, **Table 2**, **Table 3**, **Table 4**, and **Table 5**), tariff-related joint statements with partners (**Table 6**), and retaliatory actions by foreign governments (**Table 7**) from January 20, 2025, through December 31, 2025. These tables are based on official government documents; they include the status of each action and a brief timeline.

Since January 20, 2025, the President cited authorities in two laws to impose tariffs.

- The International Emergency Economic Powers Act** (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.) authorizes the President to “regulate” certain economic transactions, including imports, in response to declared emergencies concerning certain “unusual and extraordinary” threats to national security, foreign policy, or the economy. The President invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China, after declaring “the influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs” posed a national emergency.<sup>1</sup> President Trump also invoked IEEPA to impose country specific tariffs (of 10%-41%) on global trading partners, after declaring that large and persistent trade deficits and a lack of reciprocity in trade relationships posed a national emergency.<sup>2</sup> (**Table 2** outlines these and other IEEPA tariff actions.) Multiple federal courts have ruled that the President exceeded the scope of his

<sup>1</sup> Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025, “Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border,” 90 *Federal Register* 9117, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025, “Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border,” 90 *Federal Register* 9113, February 7, 2025; Executive Order 14228 of March 3, 2025, “Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China,” 90 *Federal Register* 11463, March 7, 2025.

<sup>2</sup> Executive Order 14326 of July 31, 2025, “Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates,” 90 *Federal Register* 37963, August 6, 2025. Also see Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, “Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits,” 90 *Federal Register* 15041, April 7 2025. Note: country-specific tariffs also apply to groups of countries, namely, the European Union and its 27 member states.

authorities under IEEPA by imposing tariffs in at least some of these actions. The tariffs, however, remain in place as the Supreme Court reviews the cases.<sup>3</sup>

- **Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962** (Section 232, 19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended) authorizes the President to impose import restrictions—such as tariffs—if the Secretary of Commerce determines that a product “is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” In 2025, the President invoked Section 232 to expand existing tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and to impose tariffs on automobiles and parts, referencing determinations the Secretary of Commerce made in 2018 and 2019.<sup>4</sup> The President also imposed tariffs on copper products, trucks, and certain wood products, following determinations by the Secretary of Commerce in 2025.<sup>5</sup> There are nine ongoing investigations into imports of semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, aircraft, drones, polysilicon, wind turbines, robotics, and medical supplies and equipment (**Table 3** and **Table 4**).

The President also directed Executive Branch agencies to review various aspects of U.S. trade and economic security policy, and address any “unfair” trade practices by foreign partners.<sup>6</sup> As these reviews continue, the Administration may invoke other authorities, such as **Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974** (Section 301, 19 U.S.C. §§2411-20), to impose tariffs (**Table 5**). Section 301 authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to impose trade sanctions—such as tariffs—on foreign partners found to violate U.S. trade agreements or engage in acts that are “unjustifiable” or are “unreasonable or discriminatory” and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. During the first Trump Administration, USTR initiated six new Section 301 investigations, and announced tariffs in four of those cases.<sup>7</sup> In 2025, USTR announced tariffs on certain ship-to-shore cranes following an investigation into China’s shipping and logistics processes; however, tariffs were immediately suspended, following a U.S.-China tariff truce agreement.<sup>8</sup>

The U.S. tariff actions outlined in the following tables are for the most part cumulative—with some exceptions—meaning that tariff rates are added on top of each other and on top of other existing tariffs.<sup>9</sup> Rates can vary by product and by country of origin.

<sup>3</sup> CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11332, *Court Decisions Regarding Tariffs Imposed Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)*, by Christopher T. Zirpoli.

<sup>4</sup> Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025, “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” 90 *Federal Register* 9807, February 18, 2025; Proclamation 10896 of February 10, 2025, “Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States,” 90 *Federal Register* 9817, February 18, 2025; and Proclamation 10908 of March 26, 2025, “Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United States,” 90 *Federal Register* 14705, April 3, 2025.

<sup>5</sup> Proclamation 10962 of July 30, 2025, “Adjusting Imports of Copper Into the United States,” 90 *Federal Register* 37727, August 5, 2025.

<sup>6</sup> E.g., White House, “America First Trade Policy,” presidential memorandum of January 20, 2025, 90 *Federal Register* 8471, January 30, 2025.

<sup>7</sup> During this period, Section 301 investigations that resulted in tariffs were on: (1) China’s technology transfer and trade practices; (2) European Union subsidies on large civil aircraft; (3) France’s digital services taxes; and (4) other foreign digital services taxes. Most tariffs were later suspended (some before they went into effect), with the exception of the Section 301 tariffs on China which remain in effect.

<sup>8</sup> See USTR, “Notice of Modification and Proposed Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance,” October 16, 2025, 90 *Federal Register* 48320; USTR notice of November 13, 2025, 90 *Federal Register* 50947; and USTR, *Report on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance*, January 16, 2025, <https://perma.cc/285P-NGQT>.

<sup>9</sup> For example, on April 29, the President issued Executive Order 14289 “Addressing Certain Tariffs on Imported (continued...) ”

For additional context and CRS analysis on recent U.S. tariff actions, see CRS Report R48716, *Executive Branch Tariff Actions in the 119th Congress: CRS Products, Experts, and Points of Contact*, coordinated by Christopher A. Casey and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.

## Negotiations and Preliminary Agreements

Since announcing these tariff actions, the Trump Administration has been in negotiations with trading partners on various tariff and nontariff matters. Since April 2025, the Administration has announced a series of bilateral framework agreements with certain partners, which address select tariff issues and outline frameworks for future negotiations. In addition, the Administration has announced and extended a temporary tariff truce with China. See **Table 6** for a list of bilateral joint statements on tariff-related agreements.

The terms of the announced framework agreements vary by partner; however, many affirm a tariff rate that the United States will impose under the IEEPA trade deficit action (E.O. 14257, as amended). Some agreements also include preferential rates or country-specific exemptions for some current or potential future Section 232 actions. For example, the United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU), Japan, and South Korea agreements provide preferential rates for those countries' exports of automobiles and parts, and timber and lumber products.<sup>10</sup> Most agreements also outline a direction for continued discussions on trade, investment, and tariffs.

In addition, the United States and China have announced a series of tariff truces in 2025, as the two parties continue broader negotiations. On May 12, 2025, the United States and China announced a 90-day reduction in bilateral tariffs—after a months-long, tit-for-tat escalation in tariff rates.<sup>11</sup> Under the agreement, the United States and China reduced the tariffs imposed in April 2025 from 125% to 10% on each other's goods (other U.S.-China tariffs remain in place).<sup>12</sup> In August, the two parties extended the tariff reduction for another 90 days.<sup>13</sup> In November 2025, the two parties reached an agreement to extend the tariff reduction for one year, through

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Articles.” The order “sets out the procedure for determining which of multiple tariffs shall apply to an article when that article is subject to more than one of the actions.” The order specifically addresses the Canada and Mexico fentanyl and migration-related tariffs, the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, and the Section 232 automobile tariffs. The order explains that for certain products that are impacted by multiple tariff actions listed in the order, the “tariffs should not all have a cumulative effect (or ‘stack’ on top of one another) because the rate of duty resulting from such stacking exceeds what is necessary to achieve the intended policy goals.” The order is retroactive from March 4, 2025. The order was further amended by Proclamation 10947 of June 3, 2025 (regarding steel and aluminum imports), and by Proclamation 10962 of July 30, 2025 (regarding copper imports), which modified the procedure for determining which tariffs are to apply. Also see U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Frequently Asked Questions,” <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/trade-remedies/IEEPA-FAQ>.

<sup>10</sup> International Trade Administration (ITA), “Imports of Automobiles, Automobile Parts, Civil Aircraft and Civil Aircraft Parts From the United Kingdom Under Executive Order 14309” 90 *Federal Register* 27851, June 30, 2025; Executive Order 14345 of September 4, 2025, “Implementing the United States-Japan Agreement,” 90 *Federal Register* 43535, September 9, 2025; ITA, “Implementing Certain Tariff-Related Elements of the U.S.-EU Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade” 90 *Federal Register* 46136, September 25, 2025; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Implementing Certain Tariff-Related Elements of the U.S.-Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal,” 90 *Federal Register* 55964, December 4, 2025.

<sup>11</sup> “Joint Statement on U.S.-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva,” May 12, 2025, <https://perma.cc/SU7U-YENR>.

<sup>12</sup> For example, the United States continues to impose an additional 10% tariff on all goods from China, and continues to impose its Section 232 tariffs on all partners, including China (**Table 2** and **Table 3**). These are in addition to U.S. Section 301 tariffs, initiated in 2018, on select goods from China. Also see, CRS In Focus IF12990, *U.S.-China Tariff Actions Since 2018: An Overview*, by Karen M. Sutter.

<sup>13</sup> Executive Order 14334 of August 11, 2025, “Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Ongoing Discussions with the People’s Republic of China,” 90 *Federal Register* 39305 August 14, 2025.

November 10, 2026.<sup>14</sup> The November agreement also expanded the tariff reductions to include other tariff actions. For example, the United States agreed to reduce its fentanyl-related tariffs on China from 20% to 10%, and China agreed to remove some previously imposed retaliatory tariffs.

Some U.S. negotiations with trading partners are ongoing, including alongside the statutorily required joint review of the U.S.-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA).<sup>15</sup> The potential conclusion of ongoing or future talks and the ongoing implementation of the announced framework agreements may alter the details in the following tables.

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<sup>14</sup> Executive Order 14358 of November 4, 2025, “Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent With the Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People’s Republic of China,” 90 *Federal Register* 50729, November 7, 2025; Executive Order 14357 of November 4, 2025, “Modifying Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China,” 90 *Federal Register* 50725, November 7, 2025.

<sup>15</sup> For more on USMCA, see CRS In Focus IF10997, *U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement*, by M. Angeles Villarreal, Kyla H. Kitamura, and Danielle M. Trachtenberg.



# U.S. Tariff Actions Since January 20, 2025: Timeline and Status

**Table 2. U.S. Tariff Actions Since Jan. 20, 2025: IEEPA**

As of December 31, 2025

<b>Fentanyl-related action on goods from Canada</b> (Executive Order [E.O.] 14193, as amended)	
Countries Affected	Canada
Products Affected	All goods <i>Exception:</i> imports that claim and qualify for duty-free preference under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
Current Tariff Rates	35% for Canadian goods that do not claim or qualify for USMCA duty-free preference; 10% for energy and potash imports that do not claim or qualify for USMCA duty-free preference; 40% for goods “transshipped to evade applicable duties.”
Current Status	35% on most goods and 40% on transshipped goods, <b>effective as of August 1, 2025.</b> (Initial rate (of 25%) was effective as of March 4, before it was increased to 35% on August 1.) 10% on energy imports <b>effective as of March 4, 2025;</b> USMCA exception and 10% on potash imports <b>effective as of March 7, 2025.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feb. 1: President issues E.O. 14193 to impose a 25% tariff on most imports from Canada and 10% tariff on Canadian energy products, to go into effect February 4.</li> <li>• Feb. 3: President pauses the tariff increase until March 4.</li> <li>• Mar. 6: President proclaims exceptions for imports that claim and qualify for USMCA duty-free preference, and reduces the rate on potash imports from 25% to 10%.</li> <li>• July 31: President issues E.O. 14325 to increase rate on goods from Canada from 25% to 35%, effective Aug. 1, and a rate of 40% for goods “transshipped to evade applicable duties.”</li> </ul>
<b>Fentanyl- and migration-related action on goods from Mexico</b> (E.O. 14194, as amended)	
Countries Affected	Mexico
Products Affected	All goods <i>Exceptions:</i> Imports that claim and qualify for duty-free preference under USMCA.
Current Tariff Rates	25% for goods that do not claim or qualify for USMCA duty-free preference; 10% for potash imports that do not claim or qualify for USMCA duty-free preference.

Current Status	25% on most goods <b>effective as of March 4, 2025</b> ; USMCA exception and 10% on potash imports <b>effective as of March 7, 2025</b> .
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feb. 1: President issues E.O. 14194 to impose a 25% tariff on imports from Mexico, to go into effect February 4.</li> <li>• Feb. 3: President pauses the tariff increase until March 4.</li> <li>• Mar. 6: President proclaims exceptions for imports that claim and qualify for USMCA duty-free preference, and reduces the rate on potash imports from 25% to 10%.</li> <li>• July 12: President posts a letter to the President of Mexico on social media, announcing a 30% tariff to go into effect Aug. 1, pending negotiations.<sup>a</sup></li> <li>• July 31: President announces on social media a 90-day delay of plans to impose higher tariffs on goods from Mexico.<sup>a</sup></li> </ul>
<b>Fentanyl-related action on goods from China (E.O. 14195, as amended)</b>	
Countries Affected	China
Products Affected	All goods from China
Current Tariff Rate	10%
Current Status	<b>Effective as of February 4, 2025.</b> Tariff rate increased from 10% to 20% on March 3, and decreased to 10% on November 10.
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feb. 1: President issues E.O. 14195 to impose a 10% tariff on all goods from China, effective February 4.</li> <li>• Mar. 3: President increases tariff rate from 10% to 20%.</li> <li>• May 12: White House announces an agreement with China for a temporary reduction of other tariffs (i.e., those imposed in April under E.O. 14257 [see below]); however the agreement keeps the 20% tariffs under E.O. 14195 in place.</li> <li>• Nov. 4: President lowers the tariff rate from 20% to 10%, effective Nov. 10, following trade talks with China.</li> </ul>
<b>Venezuelan oil action on designated countries (E.O. 14245)</b>	
Countries Affected	Select countries as designated by the U.S. Secretary of State.
Products Affected	All goods from designated countries
Current Tariff Rate	25%
Current Status	<b>Effective as of April 2, 2025.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mar. 24: President issues E.O. 14245 to impose 25% tariffs on all goods from countries that import Venezuelan oil, “whether directly from Venezuela or indirectly through third parties.”</li> </ul>
<b>Trade deficit-related tariff action on global partners (E.O. 14257, as amended)</b>	
Countries Affected	Global

	<i>Exceptions: Canada and Mexico</i>
Products Affected	<p>Most products</p> <p><i>Exceptions:</i> Goods subject to current and potential Section 232 actions (e.g., steel, aluminum, automobiles and parts, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, certain consumer electronics, copper, lumber, critical minerals, polysilicon); other goods, including certain agricultural products, listed in Annex II of E.O. 14257, as amended; and certain country-specific exemptions, per bilateral agreements.</p>
Current Tariff Rate	<p>10%-41%, depending on the country of origin.</p> <p>40% for goods “transshipped to evade applicable duties.”</p>
Current Status	<p>10% global rate, <b>effective Apr. 5, 2025.</b></p> <p>10%-41% country-specific rates (Annex I of E.O. 14326, as amended), <b>effective Aug. 7, 2025</b> (or Oct. 5 for goods in transit). (Paused: 125% rate on imports from China is paused until November 10, 2026.)</p>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feb. 13: President issues “Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs” memorandum outlining a policy to reduce the trade deficit.</li> <li>• Apr. 2: President issues E.O. 14257 to impose a minimum global tariff of 10% (to be effective April 5) and higher tariffs on specific countries listed in Annex I (to be effective April 9; later paused).</li> <li>• Apr. 5: 10% global tariff goes into effect.</li> <li>• Apr. 8-9: President increases the rate on goods from China from 34% to 84% and then from 84% to 125%, effective April 10.</li> <li>• Apr. 9: Country-specific tariffs (listed in Annex I of E.O. 14257) go into effect.</li> <li>• Apr. 9: President announces a 90-day suspension of country-specific tariffs from April 10 (except for China), keeping rates at 10% for most countries.</li> <li>• Apr. 11: President excludes certain semiconductors and consumer electronics from the tariffs.</li> <li>• May 12-14: Following an agreement with China, President reduces rate on China from 125% to 10% for a 90-day period.</li> <li>• June 16: Following a U.S.-UK agreement, President exempts certain UK aircraft and parts from the tariff.</li> <li>• July 7: President extends pause on country-specific tariffs to August 1.</li> <li>• July 7-28: President posts on social media revised country-specific tariffs, to go into effect Aug. 1, pending negotiations.<sup>b</sup></li> <li>• July 2-30: President announces preliminary, nonbinding framework agreements with select countries, with adjusted tariff rates.<sup>c</sup></li> <li>• July 31: President proclaims new country-specific tariff rates (Annex I of E.O. 14326), to go into effect Aug. 7.</li> <li>• Aug. 11: President extends a temporary tariff reduction (from 125% to 10%) for goods from China to Nov. 10.</li> <li>• Aug. 21: United States and the EU issue a joint statement. The terms include a 15% tariff ceiling for EU goods and exemptions for certain EU products (unavailable natural resources (e.g., cork), aircraft and parts, and certain pharmaceuticals) on Sept. 1.</li> <li>• Sept. 4: President implements terms of the U.S.-Japan framework agreement, including a 15% tariff ceiling for goods from Japan and exemptions for certain Japanese goods (aircraft and parts, and potentially pharmaceuticals and unavailable natural resources).</li> <li>• Sept. 5: President amends the list of products exempted from the tariff action.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oct 26: Administration releases joint statements with Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam on trade and tariff issues.</li> <li>• Nov. 4: President extends a temporary tariff reduction (from 125% to 10%) for goods from China for a one-year period.</li> <li>• Nov 13: Administration releases joint statements with El Salvador, Argentina, Ecuador, and Guatemala on trade and tariff issues.</li> <li>• Nov 14: Administration publishes a U.S.-Switzerland and Liechtenstein joint statement, and reduces rates for Switzerland from 39% to a 15% ceiling.</li> <li>• Nov. 14: President excludes certain agricultural products from the tariff action.</li> <li>• Dec. 4: Administration implements certain tariff aspects of a U.S.-South Korea agreement, including a 15% tariff ceiling for South Korean goods and exemptions for aircraft and parts.</li> </ul>
<b>“De Minimis” action on low-value imports from China<sup>d</sup> (E.O. 14256, as amended)</b>	
Countries Affected	China, including Hong Kong
Products Affected	Shipments that would have qualified for duty-free de minimis treatment (valued at or under \$800) under 19 U.S.C. §1321(a)(2)(C).
Tariff Rate	“A duty equal to the effective IEEPA tariff rate” or a per package rate of \$80-\$200.
Current Status	<b>Effective as of May 2, 2025.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feb. 1: President announces the removal of de minimis duty-free treatment on low-value imports from China.</li> <li>• Feb. 5: President temporarily reinstates de minimis duty-free treatment, until “adequate systems are in place to fully and expediently process and collect tariff revenue.”</li> <li>• Apr. 2: President issues E.O. 14256 to remove de minimis treatment for low-value imports from China, effective May 2.</li> <li>• Apr. 8-9: President increases the de minimis rate for postal items from China from 30% to 90% to 120%.</li> <li>• May 12: White House announces an agreement with China for a 90-day reduction in some tariffs.</li> <li>• May 14: President reduces the postal rate on de minimis imports from China from 120% to 54%, for a 90-day period.</li> <li>• Sept. 2: The global de minimis action (E.O. 14324, listed below) supersedes Section 2 of the China-specific action (E.O. 14256).</li> </ul>
<b>“De Minimis” action on low-value imports (Global)<sup>d</sup> (E.O. 14324)</b>	
Countries Affected	Global
Products Affected	Shipments that would have qualified for duty-free de minimis treatment (valued at or under \$800) under 19 U.S.C. §1321(a)(2)(C).
Tariff Rate	“A duty equal to the effective IEEPA tariff rate” or a per package rate of \$80-\$200 depending on country of origin.
Current Status	<b>Effective as of Aug. 29, 2025.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• July 31: President suspends the de minimis exemption for all countries, and references the emergency declared in E.O. 14257 (trade deficit-related tariffs listed above).</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sept. 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issues a notice to implement the suspension of the de minimis exemption.</li> </ul>
<b>Policies, Practices, and Actions of the Government of Brazil (E.O. 14323)</b>	
Countries Affected	Brazil
Products Affected	Certain products <i>Exceptions:</i> Products subject to current or future Section 232 actions, and items in Annex I, as amended (e.g., orange juice, energy products, fertilizers, wood products, tin ore, etc.).
Tariff Rate	40%
Current Status	<b>Effective as of Aug. 6, 2025.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>July 30: President issues E.O. 14323 to impose tariff on certain goods from Brazil, citing a national emergency due to Brazil's actions regarding the prosecution of former President Bolsonaro, the regulation of online platforms, and other issues.</li> <li>Nov. 20: President excludes certain agricultural and beef products from Brazil from the tariff action.</li> </ul>
<b>Importing Russian Oil: Tariffs on India (E.O. 14329)</b>	
Countries Affected	India
Products Affected	Most products <i>Exceptions:</i> Goods subject to Section 232 actions (e.g., steel, aluminum, automobiles and parts, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, certain consumer electronics, copper, lumber, critical minerals, aircraft, trucks, drones, polysilicon) and others listed in Annex II of E.O. 14257.
Tariff Rate	25%
Current Status	<b>Effective as of Aug. 27, 2025.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aug. 6: President issues E.O. 14329, to impose a 25% tariff on select goods from India, due to its importation of Russian oil.</li> </ul>

**Source:** CRS, compiled from official U.S. Presidential documents, published in the *Federal Register* or on the White House website, or other presidential statements regarding negotiations.

**Notes:** IEEPA is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq.). Many 2025 tariff actions are cumulative (or “stack”)—with some exceptions (e.g., see E.O. 14289 of April 29, 2025, Proclamation 10947 of June 3, 2025, and Proclamation 10962 of July 30, 2025). For more on how tariffs stack, see Customs and Border Protection guidance at “International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Frequently Asked Questions,” <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/trade-remedies/IEEPA-FAQ>; and “Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Frequently Asked Questions,” <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/entry-summary/232-tariffs-aluminum-and-steel-faqs>.

- a. President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [Mexico revised rate], July 12, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/114840265771030416>; President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [Mexico, 90-day extension], President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post, July 31, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114948452793702817>.

- b. The President posted a series of letters to foreign leaders. For examples, see President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [European Union], July 12, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114840270617633946>; President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [South Korea letter], July 7, 2024, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114812856757774700>; President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [South Africa], July 7, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/114813313928083257>; President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [Thailand], July 7, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/114813877378281211>; President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [Brazil], July 9, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114825119138468153>.
- c. For example, President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [Vietnam], July 2, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114784170652465525>; “Joint Statement on Framework for United States-Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade,” July 22, 2025, <https://perma.cc/K6BR-VCMK>; President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [Philippines], July 22, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114898069194751986>; President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [South Korea], July 30, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114944494894008041>. Tariff rates later implemented in Executive Order 14326 of July 31, 2025, “Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates,” 90 *Federal Register* 37963, August 6, 2025. For a list of agreements with issued joint statements, see **Table 6**.
- d. The “de minimis” exception for imports (codified at 19 U.S.C. §1321(a)(2)(C)) allows certain low-valued imports (of \$800 or less) to be imported into the United States duty-free. Recent Presidential actions have aimed to remove the application of this exception for imports from certain countries. For more background on “de minimis” treatment for imports, see CRS Report R48380, *Imports and the Section 321 (De Minimis) Exemption: Origins, Evolution, and Use*, by Christopher A. Casey.

**Table 3. U.S. Tariff Actions Since Jan. 20, 2025: Section 232**

As of December 31, 2025

<b>Tariff Action on Steel and Aluminum</b> (Proclamations 10895 and 10896, as amended)	
Countries Affected	Global
Products Affected	Steel, aluminum, and derivative products of steel and aluminum. <i>Exemptions:</i> certain aircraft and parts from the United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU), Japan, and South Korea; and goods subject to Section 232 auto tariffs.
Current Tariff Rate	50% globally; 25% for imports from the UK
Current Status	<b>Effective as of March 12, 2025; Increase to 50%, effective as of June 4, 2025.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feb. 10: President proclaims expanded steel and aluminum tariffs, amending previously existing steel and aluminum actions.</li> <li>• Mar. 5: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) publishes implementing regulations.</li> <li>• Apr. 4: BIS modifies the list of derivative products subject to the tariffs.</li> <li>• Apr. 29: President revises if and how some tariffs (including on steel and aluminum) are to be cumulatively applied, and outlines a procedure to determine which tariffs are to apply to imports that are subject to multiple tariff actions.</li> <li>• May 2: BIS issues a regulation to consider expanding the scope of covered products.</li> <li>• June 4: President increases tariffs from 25% to 50% for all partners except the UK, which remains at 25%.</li> <li>• June 4: President modifies the procedure for how tariffs are to be cumulatively applied.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• June 16: BIS expands the list of derivative products subject to tariffs to include household appliances.</li> <li>• June 30-Dec 4: Following bilateral agreements, Administration excludes certain aircraft and parts from the UK (June 30), Japan (Sept. 4), EU (Sept. 25), and South Korea (Dec. 4) from the steel and aluminum tariffs.</li> <li>• Aug. 19: BIS further expands the list of derivative products subject to tariffs to include 407 new products.</li> </ul>
<b>Tariff Action on Automobiles and Automobile Parts</b> (Proclamation 10908, as amended)	
Countries Affected	Global
Products Affected	<p>Passenger vehicles, light trucks, and certain automobile parts</p> <p><i>Exceptions:</i> Automobile parts entering the United States under USMCA. For vehicle imports that qualify for preferential tariff treatment under USMCA, tariffs may apply only to the non-U.S. content of a product.</p>
Current Tariff Rate	25% globally; 10% on parts from the UK and 10% tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on vehicles from the UK; <sup>a</sup> 15% on imports from Japan, EU, and South Korea. <sup>b</sup>
Current Status	<p><b>Effective as of April 3, 2025, for vehicles, and May 3, 2025, for parts.</b></p> <p><b>Country-specific rates effective: June 30, 2025 (UK); September 16, 2025 (Japan); August 1, 2025 (EU); November 1, 2025 (South Korea)</b></p>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mar. 26: President proclaims a 25% tariff on imports of automobiles and parts. Tariffs are scheduled to go into effect April 3, 2025, for vehicles and no later than May 3, 2025, for parts.<sup>c</sup></li> <li>• Apr. 29: President proclaims a partial credit for parts, based on the value of a manufacturer's U.S.-built vehicle.</li> <li>• Apr. 29: President announces that some tariff actions "should not all have a cumulative effect"; specifically that imports subject to the automobile and parts tariffs are not subject to additional tariffs under the Canada and Mexico IEEPA tariffs or the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs.</li> <li>• June 16: As part of a U.S.-UK nonbinding framework agreement, the President announces a lower rate of 10% for imports from the UK and establishes a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for UK vehicles, to be effective no later than June 30.<sup>a</sup></li> <li>• July 22-30: President announces preliminary framework agreements with the EU, Japan, and South Korea, which include a rate of 15% for these partners' automotive trade.<sup>d</sup></li> <li>• Sept. 4: Following the U.S.-Japan agreement, President implements a 15% tariff for Japan's auto trade, to go into effect Sept. 16.<sup>b</sup></li> <li>• Sept. 29: Following a U.S.-EU agreement, Commerce implements a 15% rate for EU auto trade, retroactively from Aug. 1.<sup>b</sup></li> <li>• Dec. 4: Following a U.S.-South Korea agreement, Commerce implements a 15% rate for South Korean auto trade, retroactively from Nov. 1.<sup>b</sup></li> </ul>
<b>Tariff Action on Copper Products</b> (Proclamation 10962)	
Countries Affected	Global
Products Affected	Semi-finished copper products and intensive copper derivative products

	<i>Exemptions:</i> goods subject to Section 232 auto tariffs; certain aircraft and parts from Japan, EU, and South Korea.
Current Tariff Rate	50% on copper content of a covered product.
Current Status	<b>Effective as of August 1, 2025.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feb. 25: President issues E.O. 14220, directing the Secretary of Commerce to initiate an investigation into copper imports.</li> <li>• Mar. 10: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) initiates a Section 232 investigation and seeks public comment.</li> <li>• June 30: Secretary of Commerce transmits investigation report to the President.</li> <li>• July 30: President proclaims 50% tariffs on select copper products.</li> <li>• Sept. 4-Dec. 4: Following bilateral agreements, Administration excludes certain aircraft and parts from Japan (Sept. 4), EU (Sept. 25), and South Korea (Dec. 4) from the copper tariffs.</li> </ul>
<b>Tariff Action on Timber and Lumber Imports</b> (Proclamation 10976)	
Countries Affected	Global
Products Affected	Softwood lumber, certain upholstered wooden products, kitchen cabinets and vanities and parts thereof (as listed in Annex) <i>Exceptions:</i> goods subject to the Section 232 auto tariffs.
Tariff Rate	10% globally on softwood imports; 25% globally on upholstered wooden products and on kitchen cabinets and vanities. (Scheduled to increase to 30% and 50%, respectively, on Jan. 1, 2027.) Negotiated rates for covered goods: 10% for the UK, <sup>a</sup> and 15% for the EU, Japan, and South Korea. <sup>b</sup>
Current Status	<b>Effective as of October 14, 2025</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mar. 1: President issues E.O. 14223, directing the Secretary of Commerce to initiate an investigation into timber and lumber imports.</li> <li>• Mar. 13: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated an investigation on March 10 and seeks public comment.</li> <li>• July 1: Secretary of Commerce transmits investigation report to the President.</li> <li>• Sept. 29: President proclaims 10%-25% tariffs on softwood lumber, upholstered wooden products, and kitchen cabinets and vanities, to go into effect Oct. 14, and schedules tariff increases for Jan. 1, 2026. UK, EU, Japan, and South Korea products face lower rates, per previous agreements.</li> <li>• Dec. 31: President pauses scheduled rate increase until Jan. 1, 2027, for upholstered products and kitchen cabinets and vanities.</li> </ul>
<b>Tariff Action on Truck and Bus Imports</b> (Proclamation 10984)	
Countries Affected	Global
Products Affected	Medium- and heavy-duty vehicles (MHDVs) and their parts, and buses



	<i>Exemptions:</i> Parts entering the United States under USMCA. For MHDV imports that qualify for preferential tariff treatment under USMCA, tariffs may apply only to the non-U.S. content of a product.
Tariff Rate	25% on medium and heavy-duty trucks and parts; 10% on buses
Current Status	<b>Effective as of November 1, 2025</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apr. 25: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated a Section 232 investigation on April 22 and seeks public comment.</li> <li>• Late Sept: Secretary of Commerce transmits investigation report to the President.</li> <li>• Oct. 17: President proclaims 25% tariffs on medium- and heavy-duty trucks and parts and 10% tariffs on buses, effective Nov. 1.</li> </ul>

**Source:** CRS, compiled from official U.S. government documents published in the *Federal Register* and Presidential actions published on the White House website.

**Notes:** “Section 232” is Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF13006, *Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962*, by Kyla H. Kitamura, CRS Insight IN12519, *Expanded Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum*, by Kyla H. Kitamura and Keigh E. Hammond, CRS Insight IN12545, *Section 232 Automotive Tariffs: Issues for Congress*, by Kyla H. Kitamura, CRS Insight IN12614, *Section 232 National Security Tariffs on Copper Imports*, by Kyla H. Kitamura, and CRS Report R48781, *U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade: Current Issues for Congress*, by Kyla H. Kitamura and Anne A. Riddle. Many 2025 tariff actions are cumulative (or “stack”)—with some exceptions (e.g., see E.O. 14289 of April 29, 2025, Proclamation 10947 of June 3, 2025, and Proclamation 10962 of July 30, 2025). For more on how tariffs stack, see Customs and Border Protection guidance at “International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Frequently Asked Questions,” <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/trade-remedies/IEEPA-FAQ>; and “Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Frequently Asked Questions,” <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/entry-summary/232-tariffs-aluminum-and-steel-faqs>.

- a. UK-negotiated tariff rates on automobiles/parts and timber/lumber products includes any most-favored nations (MFN) tariffs.
- b. Negotiated tariff rate on automobiles/parts and timber/lumber products is 15%, inclusive of MFN tariffs, or if the MFN rate is higher than 15%, the MFN rate applies and Section 232 tariff is zero.
- c. In Feb. 2019, the Secretary of Commerce determined that certain automobile imports were being imported “in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” The President did not impose tariff at that time, but did direct the Secretary of Commerce to continue to monitor automobile imports. According to the March 2025 proclamation, the Secretary of Commerce reported to the President that, since 2019, “the national security concerns remain and have escalated.”
- d. For descriptions of preliminary agreements, see (EU): White House, “Joint Statement on a United States-European Union Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade,” August 21, 2025, <https://perma.cc/9WU5-5AHA>; White House, “Fact Sheet: The United States and European Union Reach Massive Trade Deal,” July 28, 2025, <https://perma.cc/Y5V7-9TWZ>; and European Commission, “EU-US trade deal explained,” July 28, 2025, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda\\_25\\_1930](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_25_1930). (Japan): White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Unprecedented U.S.- Japan Strategic Trade and Investment Agreement,” July 23, 2025, <https://perma.cc/B4SA-TFKG>; and Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, “Press Conference by Prime Minister ISHIBA Shigeru Regarding the Agreement Reached in the Japan-U.S. Consultation on U.S. Tariff Measures and Other Matters,” July 23, 2025, <https://perma.cc/EU3Z-WLYU>. (South Korea): President Donald J. Trump, Truth Social Post [South Korea], July 30, 2025, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114944494894008041>; and ROK Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, “(참고자료) 미주통상과, 한미 관세협상 타결, 대미 수출 불확실성 소,” [(Reference Document) Ministry of Trade, Agreement Reached on South Korea-U.S. Tariff Negotiations, Export Uncertainty to the United States Reduced], July 30, 2025.

**Table 4. Potential Tariff Actions: Section 232**

January 20, 2025-December 31, 2025

<b>Investigation into Processed Critical Minerals Imports (E.O. 14272)</b>	
Countries Affected	Potentially all countries
Products Affected	Processed critical minerals, uranium, and derivative products (including semi-finished and finished products, e.g., semiconductor wafers, electric vehicles, batteries, and smartphones)
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Under Investigation</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Apr. 15: President issues E.O. 14272 directing the Secretary of Commerce to initiate an investigation into imports of processed critical minerals and derivative products.</li><li>• Apr. 25: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated an investigation on April 22 and seeks public comment.</li></ul>
<b>Investigation into Pharmaceutical Imports (90 Federal Register 15951)</b>	
Countries Affected	Potentially all countries
Products Affected	Pharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical ingredients, and derivative products
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Under Investigation</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Apr. 16: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated a Section 232 investigation on April 1 and seeks public comment.</li></ul>
<b>Investigation into Semiconductor Imports (90 Federal Register 15950)</b>	
Countries Affected	Potentially all countries
Products Affected	Semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and their derivative products
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Under Investigation</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Apr. 16: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated a Section 232 investigation on April 1 and seeks public comment.</li></ul>
<b>Investigation into Aircraft and Engines (90 Federal Register 20273)</b>	
Countries Affected	Potentially all countries
Products Affected	Commercial aircraft, jet engines, and parts

Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Under Investigation</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May 13: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated a Section 232 investigation on May 1 and seeks public comment.</li> </ul>
<b>Investigation into Drones</b> (90 Federal Register 31958)	
Countries Affected	Potentially all countries
Products Affected	Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and their parts and components
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Under Investigation</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• July 16: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated a Section 232 investigation on July 1 and seeks public comment.</li> </ul>
<b>Investigation into Polysilicon</b> (90 Federal Register 31955)	
Countries Affected	Potentially all countries
Products Affected	Polysilicon and its derivatives
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Under Investigation</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• July 16: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated a Section 232 investigation on July 1 and seeks public comment.</li> </ul>
<b>Investigation into Wind Turbines</b> (90 Federal Register 41380)	
Countries Affected	Potentially all countries
Products Affected	Wind turbines and their parts and components
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Under Investigation</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aug. 25: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated an investigation on August 13 and seeks public comment.</li> </ul>
<b>Investigation into Robotics and Industrial Machinery</b> (90 Federal Register 46382)	
Countries Affected	Potentially all countries
Products Affected	Robotics and industrial machinery, e.g., robots and programmable, computer-controlled mechanical systems
Tariff Rate	TBD

Current Status	<b>Under Investigation</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sept. 26: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated an investigation on September 1 and seeks public comment.</li> </ul>
<b>Investigation into Medical Equipment</b> (90 <i>Federal Register</i> 46383)	
Countries Affected	Potentially all countries
Products Affected	Personal protective equipment (PPE), medical consumables (e.g., medical/surgical instruments and supplies), and medical equipment including devices
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Under Investigation</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sept. 26: BIS publishes a notice that it initiated an investigation on September 1 and seeks public comment.</li> </ul>

**Source:** CRS, compiled from official U.S. government documents published in the *Federal Register* and Presidential actions published on the White House website.

**Notes:** “Section 232” is Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). For additional information, see CRS In Focus IFI3006, *Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962*, by Kyla H. Kitamura, and BIS’s Section 232 website, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/other-areas/office-of-technology-evaluation-ote/section-232-investigations>.

### Table 5. Tariff Actions and Investigations: Section 301

January 2025-December 31, 2025

<b>China’s Semiconductor Industry</b> (89 <i>Federal Register</i> 106725) <sup>a</sup>	
Countries Affected	China
Products Affected	Semiconductors
Tariff Rate	0% initial rate.
Current Status	Investigation completed. <b>No additional tariffs in 2026, with potential increase scheduled for June 23, 2027, at a rate TBD.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mar. 11-12: U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) holds public hearings, as part of an investigation initiated in Dec. 2024.</li> <li>Dec. 29: USTR determines that China’s targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance “is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce,” and in response, sets an initial tariff level of 0% on semiconductors, to increase on June 23, 2027, “to a rate to be announced not fewer than 30 days prior to that date.”</li> </ul>
<b>China’s Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Industries</b> (E.O. 14269) <sup>b</sup>	
Countries Affected	China

Products Affected	Ship-to-shore cranes and other cargo handling equipment
Tariff Rate	No additional tariffs.
Current Status	Investigation completed. 100% tariffs and certain port fees were <b>suspended on Nov. 10, 2025, for one year.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jan. 16: USTR determines that practices in China's maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors are "unreasonable."<sup>c</sup></li> <li>Feb. 27: USTR proposes certain port fees in response to its Jan. determination and seeks public comment.</li> <li>Apr. 9: President issues E.O. 14269, which among other actions, directs USTR to consider tariffs in response to its Jan. determination on China's maritime and shipbuilding industries.</li> <li>Apr. 23: USTR proposes modifications to proposed port fees and seeks public comment on potential tariffs of 20%-100%.</li> <li>June 12: USTR further modifies proposed port fees, and notes that potential tariffs "may be addressed in a separate notice."</li> <li>Oct 16: USTR announces 100% tariffs on certain cranes and intermodal chassis, effective Nov. 9, and further modifies port fees.</li> <li>Nov. 10: USTR suspends tariffs and other actions in this investigation for one year, following a Nov. 1 U.S.-China agreement.</li> </ul>
<b>Nicaragua's Labor Practices</b> (89 Federal Register 101088)	
Countries Affected	Nicaragua
Products Affected	TBD, potentially all products.
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	Investigation completed. <b>Proposed actions under consideration.</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jan. 16: USTR holds a public hearing, as part of an investigation initiated in Dec. 2024 into Nicaragua's labor practices.</li> <li>Oct. 23: USTR determines that Nicaragua's practices related to certain labor rights are "unreasonable" and proposes to impose up to 100% tariffs on Nicaraguan products and to suspend certain free trade agreement benefits from Nicaragua.</li> </ul>
<b>Review of Brazil's Trade Practices</b> (90 Federal Register 34069) <sup>d</sup>	
Countries Affected	Brazil
Products Affected	TBD
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Investigation initiated</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>July 18: USTR publishes an notice that it initiated an investigation on July 15 into Brazil's trade practices "related to digital trade and electronic payment services; unfair, preferential tariffs; anti-corruption enforcement; intellectual property protection; ethanol market access; and illegal deforestation," and seeks public comment.</li> </ul>

<b>Review of China's Compliance with the Phase One Agreement</b> (90 <i>Federal Register</i> 48733)	
Countries Affected	China
Products Affected	TBD
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Investigation initiated</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Oct. 24: USTR initiates an investigation into China's compliance with the 2020 U.S.-China Phase One Agreement.<sup>e</sup></li> </ul>
<b>Review of Foreign Digital Services Taxes</b> (Presidential Memorandum) <sup>f</sup>	
Countries Affected	Potentially Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and others who tax digital services.
Products Affected	TBD
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Renewed investigation under consideration</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Feb. 21: President directs USTR to consider renewing a Section 301 investigation into select countries' digital services taxes (DSTs), and notes that the Administration will consider tariffs, in response to such taxes.<sup>g</sup></li> </ul>
<b>Review of International Seafood Trade Practices</b> (E.O. 14276)	
Countries Affected	Major seafood-producing nations
Products Affected	TBD
Tariff Rate	TBD
Current Status	<b>Investigation under consideration</b>
Key Dates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apr. 17: President issues E.O. 14276, which among other actions, directs USTR to "examine the relevant trade practices of major seafood-producing nations, including with regard to [illegal, unreported, and unregulated] IUU fishing and the use of forced labor in the seafood supply chain, and consider appropriate responses, including pursuing solutions through negotiations or trade enforcement authorities, such as under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974."</li> </ul>

**Source:** CRS, compiled from official U.S. government documents published in the *Federal Register* and Presidential actions published on the White House website.

**Notes:** "Section 301" is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§2411-20). For additional information see CRS In Focus IFI1346, *Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*, by Danielle M. Trachtenberg.

- a. Also see CRS In Focus IFI2958, *Section 301 and China: Mature-Node Semiconductors*, by Karen M. Sutter.
- b. Also see CRS In Focus IFI2666, *Section 301 and China: Shipping and Shipbuilding Issues*, by Karen M. Sutter.

- c. In Apr. 2024, USTR initiated a Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors, and issued its determination report on Jan. 16, 2025.
- d. Also see CRS Insight IN12613, *Section 301 Investigation into Brazil’s Acts, Policies, and Practices*, by Danielle M. Trachtenberg.
- e. Also see CRS In Focus IF12125, *Section 301 and China: The U.S.-China Phase One Trade Deal*, by Karen M. Sutter.
- f. Presidential Memorandum, “Defending American Companies and Innovators from Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties,” Feb. 21, 2025 (90 *Federal Register* 10685).
- g. In 2021, USTR conducted a previous investigation into DSTs, which resulted in the United States imposing tariffs on certain partners and later suspending the tariffs.

## Bilateral Framework Agreements

Since May 2025, the Trump Administration has announced bilateral framework agreements with certain partners, and announced a series of temporary tariff truces with China. **Table 6** lists joint materials on tariff-related agreements that have been released by the United States and its trade partners. The list includes joint statements, agreement texts, or other available joint materials.

**Table 6. Joint Materials on Tariff-Related Agreements**  
May 2025-December 2025 (Listed alphabetically by partner)

Partner(s)	Date	Joint Materials
Argentina	Nov. 13, 2025	Joint Statement on Framework for a United States-Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment
Cambodia	Oct. 26, 2025	Joint Statement on United States-Cambodia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Cambodia on Reciprocal Trade
China <sup>a</sup>	May 12, 2025	Joint Statement on U.S.-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva
	Aug. 11, 2025	Joint Statement on U.S.-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Stockholm
Ecuador	Nov. 13, 2025	Joint Statement on Framework for United States-Ecuador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade
El Salvador	Nov. 13, 2025	Joint Statement on Framework for United States-El Salvador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade
European Union <sup>b</sup>	Aug. 21, 2025	Joint Statement on a United States-European Union Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade
Guatemala	Nov. 13, 2025	Joint Statement on Framework for United States-Guatemala Agreement on Reciprocal Trade
Indonesia	July 22, 2025	Joint Statement on Framework for United States-Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade
Japan <sup>c</sup>	[Sept. 2025]	Joint Statement on the Framework Agreement between the United States and Japan on July 22, 2025

Partner(s)	Date	Joint Materials
Malaysia	Oct. 26, 2025	Joint Statement on United States-Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States of America and Malaysia on Reciprocal Trade
South Korea <sup>d</sup>	Nov. 13, 2025	Joint Fact Sheet on President Donald J. Trump’s Meeting with President Lee Jae Myung
Switzerland and Liechtenstein	Nov. 14, 2025	Joint Statement on a Framework for a United States-Switzerland-Liechtenstein Agreement on Fair, Balanced, and Reciprocal Trade
Thailand	Oct. 26, 2025	Joint Statement on a Framework for a United States-Thailand Agreement on Reciprocal Trade
United Kingdom <sup>e</sup>	May 8, 2025	General Terms for the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island Economic Prosperity Deal
Vietnam	Oct. 26, 2025	Joint Statement on a United States-Vietnam Framework for an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade

**Source:** CRS, compiled from official U.S. and foreign government documents.

**Notes:** Agreements are limited to those that are related to tariff issues. The dates listed represent the dates the joint statements or materials were released. (Many preliminary agreements were announced via social media before the official joint statements were finalized and released.) The titles are linked to the full text posted on government websites.

- a. The United States and China also met in in South Korea in October 2025 and reached an agreement, however no joint texts have been released to date. In November 2025, both parties implemented tariff reductions, citing U.S.-China trade talks.
- b. Also see CRS In Focus IFI13107, *U.S.-EU Tariffs and Trade Framework Agreement*, by Shayerah I. Akhtar.
- c. The United States and Japan announced a preliminary agreement on July 23, 2025, but did not release texts of the agreement. On September 4, 2025, U.S. President Trump issued an executive order to implement tariff aspects of the agreement (Executive Order 14345 of September 4, 2025, “Implementing the United States-Japan Agreement,” 90 *Federal Register* 43535, September 9, 2025). In September, the government of Japan released a Joint Statement referencing the September 4 U.S. executive order and including language on other terms. On September 16, 2025, the International Trade Administration, issued a notice “Implementing Certain Tariff-Related Elements of the United States-Japan Agreement,” (90 *Federal Register* 44638). Also see CRS Insight INI2608, *U.S. Tariffs and the 2025 U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement*, by Kyla H. Kitamura and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
- d. For additional context, see International Trade Administration, “Implementing Certain Tariff-Related Elements of the U.S.-Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal,” 90 *Federal Register* 55964, December 4, 2025; and CRS Insight INI2569, *U.S. Tariff Actions and U.S.-South Korea Trade*, by Liana Wong.
- e. For additional context, see CRS In Focus IFI1123, *U.S.-UK Trade Relations: Background and Select Issues*, by Shayerah I. Akhtar; Executive Order 14309 of June 16, 2025, “Implementing the General Terms of the United States of America-United Kingdom Economic Prosperity Deal,” 90 *Federal Register* 26419, June 23, 2025; and International Trade Administration, “Imports of Automobiles, Automobile Parts, Civil Aircraft and Civil Aircraft Parts From the United Kingdom Under Executive Order 14309,” 90 *Federal Register* 27851, June 30, 2025.



# Foreign Retaliation to U.S. Tariff Actions

In response to increased U.S. tariffs on trading partners, some countries implemented and/or announced retaliatory measures on U.S. exports or U.S. companies. **Table 7** lists official foreign government announcements regarding retaliatory countermeasures. Embedded links to announcements, in the original language, provide additional details regarding the types of U.S. goods targeted for retaliatory tariffs.

**Table 7. Foreign Retaliation to U.S. Tariff Actions: 2025**  
As of December 31, 2025

Country	Announced Retaliatory Measures
China	<p><b>In response to U.S. fentanyl-related tariffs</b> (E.O. 14195, as amended):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Feb. 10: China implements retaliatory tariffs (of 10-15%) on selected U.S. exports.</li> <li>• Mar. 10: China implements a second round of retaliatory tariffs (10-15%) on additional U.S. exports, in response to U.S. action to increase tariffs.</li> <li>• Feb. 2-Mar. 10: In addition to tariff actions, China also announces various nontariff actions against U.S. companies (e.g., export controls, unreliable entity designations, an import ban on Illumina’s gene sequencers, an antidumping investigation, and an antitrust investigation).</li> <li>• Nov. 5: China suspends retaliatory tariffs imposed since March 4, 2025, and agrees to remove nontariff barriers imposed since March.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>In response to the U.S. trade deficit-related tariffs</b> (E.O. 14257, as amended):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apr. 3-11: In a tit-for-tat response to U.S. actions increasing tariff rates, China increases its retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods from 34% to 84% to 125%.</li> <li>• Apr. 4-11: China announces nontariff actions (e.g., export restrictions on certain critical minerals; export controls on 12 U.S. entities; and unreliable entity designations for six U.S. companies.)</li> <li>• Apr. 12: 125% tariffs on U.S. exports to China goes into effect.</li> <li>• May 14: China agrees to reduce retaliatory tariffs from 125% to 10% for a 90-day period and to remove nontariff actions imposed since April 2. (Retaliatory tariffs in response to the U.S. fentanyl action remain in place.)</li> <li>• Aug. 12: China extends its temporary tariff reduction (from 125% to 10%) through Nov. 10, 2025.</li> <li>• Nov. 10: China extends its temporary tariff reduction (from 125% to 10%) for one year, through Nov. 10, 2026.</li> </ul>

Country	Announced Retaliatory Measures
<b>Canada</b>	<p><b>In response to U.S. tariff actions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mar. 4: In response to U.S. fentanyl-related tariffs, Canada implements retaliatory tariffs of 25% on C\$30.0 billion worth of U.S. exports, such as orange juice, peanut butter, wine, spirits, beer, coffee, appliances, apparel, footwear, motorcycles, cosmetics, and certain paper products.</li> <li>• Mar. 13: In response to U.S. Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, Canada implements 25% retaliatory tariffs on C\$29.8 billion worth of U.S. exports of steel, aluminum, and other products.</li> <li>• Apr. 9: In response to U.S. Section 232 automobile tariffs Canada implements retaliatory tariffs of 25% on U.S.-made automobiles (some exemptions for goods traded under USMCA).</li> <li>• Apr. 15: Canada's Minister of Finance announces some exemptions for automakers who continue operating in Canada.</li> <li>• May 20: Canada announces 6-month tariff relief for certain goods imported from the U.S. that are used in select Canadian industries or used to support public health, health care, public safety, and national security objectives.</li> <li>• Sept. 1: Canada removes retaliatory tariffs on C\$30.0 billion worth of goods in effect since March 4, and on C\$14.2B worth of goods in effect since March 13. Canadian retaliatory tariffs on U.S. steel, aluminum, and autos remain in place.</li> </ul>
<b>European Union (EU)</b>	<p><b>In response to U.S. tariff actions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mar. 11: EU announces plans for retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports, in response to U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs.</li> <li>• Apr. 9: EU member states vote to impose countermeasures (tariffs of 10%-20%) on U.S. exports starting on April 15.</li> <li>• Apr. 14: EU countermeasures on steel and aluminum are paused for 90 days, to allow for negotiations with the United States.</li> <li>• May 8: European Commission seeks public input on a list of U.S. goods for potential retaliatory measures.</li> <li>• July 14: EU extends its pause on implementing countermeasures through August 6.</li> <li>• July 24: EU adopts a regulation to implement countermeasures, to be effective starting Aug. 7.</li> <li>• Aug. 5: EU suspends countermeasures for six months.</li> <li>• Aug. 21: EU announces a U.S.-EU joint statement, dated Aug. 21, which includes EU intentions to eliminate tariffs on all U.S. industrial goods and provide preferential market access for certain U.S. seafood and agricultural goods.</li> </ul>

**Source:** CRS, compiled from official foreign government announcements.

**Notes:** Also see CRS Report R48548, *Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agriculture and USDA's Responses: Frequently Asked Questions*, by Benjamin Tsui and Stephanie Rosch.

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