Text: S.Hrg. 111-701 — DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
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[Senate Hearing 111-701, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-701, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3454
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
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MARCH 10, 17; APRIL 14, 21, 2010
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 111-701 Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3454
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
__________
MARCH 10, 17; APRIL 14, 21, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-160 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Space Programs
march 10, 2010
Page
Payton, Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Programs................................................. 2
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command. 7
James, Lt. Gen. Larry D., USAF, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air
Force Space Command, and Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command...................... 15
Federici, Gary A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and
Space.......................................................... 20
Dorsett, VADM David J., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Information Dominance (N2/N6), and Director of Naval
Intelligence................................................... 21
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 25
Strategic Forces Programs
march 17, 2010
Roberts, Bradley H., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy......................... 82
Klotz, Lt. Gen. Frank G., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global
Strike Command................................................. 84
Shackelford, Lt. Gen. Mark D., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition....... 88
Alston, Maj. Gen. C. Donald, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force... 90
Scott, Maj. Gen. David J., USAF, Director, Operational Capability
Requirements, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans,
and Requirements, U.S. Air Force............................... 91
Johnson, RADM Stephen E., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
Programs, U.S. Navy............................................ 93
Strategic Forces Programs of the National Nuclear Security
Administration
april 14, 2010
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Department of Energy.................. 122
Environmental Management Funding and Funding Under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act
april 21, 2010
Triay, Hon. Ines R., Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, Department of Energy............................... 270
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Ben Nelson, Udall, and
Vitter.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Paul J.
Hubbard.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Rob
Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to
Senator Sessions; and Michael T. Wong, assistant to Senator
Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Ben Nelson. Good afternoon, and welcome to our
witnesses this afternoon.
I apologize for the delay in the start. Votes always seem
to get in the way of our regular business, and so we suffer
through that, as we must.
We have with us this afternoon: Gary Payton, Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force for Space; General Robert Kehler,
Commander of Air Force Space Command; Lieutenant General Larry
James, Commander of the 14th Air Force and the Strategic
Command Joint Functional Component Command for Space; Vice
Admiral David Dorsett, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Information Dominance; Gary Federici, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Command, Control, Computers,
Intelligence and Space; and Christina Chaplain, Director,
Acquisition and Sourcing Management, from the Government
Accountability Office (GAO).
Welcome to all of you. We appreciate your being here.
Space is an essential element of almost every military
operation. As various exercises and studies have demonstrated,
including the Shriever series of war games, space provides a
distinct and unique advantage to U.S. forces, one that they
won't operate and can't operate without. But, as that advantage
is becoming more well understood, more attention and leadership
must be paid to protect space and the assets on orbit and on
ground.
Improving Space Situational Awareness (SSA), and thus,
improving the ability to protect space systems, is a major and
welcome focus of the Air Force budget request for fiscal year
2011, and so, we look forward to working with you to sustain
this much-needed focus.
After many years of discussing broken space acquisition
programs that were years behind schedule and significantly over
budget, it appears as if these programs have finally turned a
corner. The Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system now has
three satellites on orbit, with more to come; the first of the
IIF Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, which should
launch in the next few weeks; the first Advanced Extremely High
Frequency communications satellite should launch this summer;
and there is a possibility that the Space-Based Infrared
Satellite-Geosynchronous Orbit (SBIRS-GEO) system will launch
in late 2010 or early 2011. This is all excellent news.
There are still issues. The Navy Mobile User Objective
System (MUOS) is about 2 years late, and the ultra-high
frequency (UHF) Constellation that it will replace is
increasingly fragile.
On the other hand, this week's decision to give serious
consideration to an interim augmentation capability is
positive. Launch costs have continued to increase, the space
ranges need to be modernized, and there are growing concerns
about the space industrial base. The operationally responsive
space effort continues to wrestle with the challenges of
establishing a responsive space capability, and small
businesses still have difficulty bringing their innovative
ideas to the table. Finally, the management coordination of
space is fractured; some might even suggest, broken.
I look forward to hearing some of the ideas on how to
improve that situation, as both the Air Force and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) are actively studying this
problem, as well as on all the many facets of operating in,
from, and through space.
We have quite a large panel this afternoon, a lot to cover.
So, if we can, let's begin.
My ranking member, Senator Vitter, will be with us shortly,
but all of our witnesses have prepared written statements, and
those will be included in the record, without objection.
We're ready to go. Because we have this large panel, if we
could highlight just the major issues, rather than giving a
long, formal, oral presentation, and then we'll move straight
to questions.
We'll start first with Secretary Payton.
STATEMENT OF GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.
As you mentioned, for the record, I submitted my opening
statement, and so, I will forego a verbal opening statement, in
the interest of time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Payton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gary E. Payton
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is an honor to appear before this committee as the Deputy
Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs, and to discuss our
military space activities. I support the Secretary of the Air Force
with his responsibilities as the Service Acquisition Executive for
Space Programs.
I believe the overall soundness of our Air Force space program is
best illustrated by our consecutive string of 64 successful national
security space launches over the past 10 years, most recently
demonstrated with the December 2009 launch of the third Wideband Global
Satellite Communications (SATCOM) satellite aboard a Delta IV launch
vehicle. This record is the result of a world-class team of space
professionals across our government and industry, all dedicated to the
single purpose of providing essential capabilities to our joint
warfighters and allies around the world. With superior space systems we
provide our leadership with intelligence and situational awareness that
otherwise would be impossible to collect. Space enables us to employ
military force in both irregular warfare and conventional situations--
we see the battlefield more clearly and destroy targets with greater
precision. While acknowledging the ever increasing advantages that
these space capabilities provide, we acknowledge that many of the
satellites and associated infrastructure have outlived their intended
design lives.
To ensure the availability of these systems, the military space
portion of the President's fiscal year 2011 budget submission is
focused on the continuity of key mission areas including worldwide
communication; global positioning, navigation and timing; global
missile warning; weather; and launch. Simultaneously, we are enhancing
the protection of our space capabilities through improved Space
Situational Awareness (SSA), defensive counterspace, and reconstitution
efforts. This calendar year we will bear the fruit of investments from
previous years with the planned launches of four ``first of''
operational satellites. The four ``first of'' satellites are the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) protected communications
satellite, Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite, Global
Positioning System (GPS) II-F satellite, and Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) 1 satellite.
Worldwide communication is enabled through a ubiquitous space-based
system with government and commercial platforms. Our users stretch from
the Oval Office to the mountains of Afghanistan. Using protected,
wideband, or narrowband communications, the President can command the
Nation's nuclear forces, our UAV pilots can fly Predators over Iraq and
Afghanistan from the United States, and Special Forces teams can call
for exfiltration or tactical air support.
Global positioning, navigation and timing is a free worldwide
service. It provides position accuracy down to the centimeter and time
accuracy to the nanosecond over the entire planet, 24-hours a day, 7-
days a week, and in any weather. The Department of Defense and the
Intelligence Community depend on our GPS to support a myriad of
missions and capabilities including weapon system guidance, precise
navigation, satellite positioning, and communication network timing.
The civil and commercial communities are equally reliant on GPS as the
underpinning for a vast infrastructure of services and products
including search and rescue, banking, map surveying, farming, and even
sports and leisure activities.
Global missile warning through Overhead Persistent Infra-Red
sensors is our unblinking eye ensuring that we know whenever a rocket
launches from anywhere on Earth. Our missile warning system is fast,
persistent, and accurate in determining missile launch directions. At
the strategic level, it informs leadership as they determine courses of
action to defend America and our allies, and at the tactical level our
real-time warning provides theater commanders with superior battlespace
awareness.
Weather observation and forecasting has greatly improved over the
last 4 decades primarily due to space-based environmental sensing.
Global, high resolution measurements of atmospheric temperature,
density, and humidity populate mathematic models for weather
prediction. Our warfighters need accurate, time-sensitive weather data
as a key enabler for maneuver planning, weapons employment, and
intelligence collection.
Our on-orbit assets continue to face greater threats that could
deny, damage, or destroy our access to space capabilities. We must
anticipate potential disruptions, either accidental or intentional, to
our space operations or risk losing continuity of service. As such, we
are expanding our ability to detect, identify, characterize, and
attribute threats, as well as clearly discriminate between a hostile
act and one that occurs naturally. In parallel, we are developing the
organizational, operational, and technical enablers, including command
and control systems, which will allow us to react swiftly and
decisively when threats materialize.
Congress' support has been a vital component in improving our
acquisition of space systems, maintaining continuity of service, and
charting a course for the next generation of space capabilities that
will enhance American security, freedom, and prosperity.
update on space programs
I would like to briefly discuss some of the achievements we have
had over the last year and the progress we are making with regard to
the mission areas I described earlier.
Missile Warning
For over 35 years, our legacy Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellites, in conjunction with ground based radars, have unfailingly
met the Nation's missile warning needs. This legacy constellation,
however, continues to age, while threats such as the proliferation of
theater ballistic missiles and advanced technologies continue to grow.
These threats are driving the need for increased coverage and
resolution provided by the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS).
SBIRS supports four mission areas: missile warning, missile
defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness, and is
comprised of both geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites and
highly elliptical orbit (HEO) payloads. Two HEO payloads are fully
operational and, along with the DSP constellation, continue to perform
the missile warning mission while providing increased support to the
other three mission areas. Completion of the first SBIRS GEO satellite
is planned for the end of 2010.
Our fiscal year 2011 funding request continues development and
procurement of the GEO satellites, HEO payloads, and the necessary
ground elements. This budget requests full procurement for a fourth GEO
satellite, and contains future year requests for procurement of the
fifth and sixth GEO satellites. The first GEO satellite completed
environmental testing, and we continue to work the final qualification
of flight software prior to a final integration test and delivery by
the end of this year. Our budget request also continues the
commercially hosted on-orbit Wide Field-of-View (WFOV) technology
demonstration effort. By partnering with the commercial space industry,
we will have the opportunity to conduct an early on-orbit scientific
experiment of WFOV infrared data phenomenology using a Commercially
Hosted IR Payload.
Communications
The U.S. military is a highly mobile and dispersed force that
relies heavily on wideband, protected, and narrowband satellite
communications (SATCOM) for command, control, and coordination of
forces. SATCOM enables forces to receive real-time images and video of
the battlefield, thereby accelerating decision-making from the
strategic to the tactical levels. These images and video often come
from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) controlled via SATCOM links,
allowing the UAVs to fly far beyond the line of sight and to collect
information without endangering U.S. forces.
On December 5, 2009 we successfully launched the third Wideband
Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite as part of the Department's constellation
of wideband satellites providing increased capability for effective
command and control of U.S. forces around the globe. Each individual
WGS satellite provides greater wideband capacity than the entire legacy
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) III constellation. Our
funding request continues on-orbit support for WGS 1-3, continues
production of WGS 4-6, contains full procurement for WGS 7, and advance
procurement for WGS 8.
In the protected SATCOM portfolio, we are conducting final
confidence testing of the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) satellite with a projected launch in the third quarter of 2010.
This initial AEHF launch will complete the worldwide Medium Data Rate
(MDR) ring, increasing the data-rate for low probability of intercept/
detection and anti-jam communications from tens-of-kilobytes per second
to approximately a megabyte per second. Our funding request supports
the launch and on-orbit support of AEHF 1; assembly, integration, and
test of AEHF 2-3 and the AEHF Mission Control Segment; and the
production of AEHF 4. This budget requests advance procurement for AEHF
5, and contains a future year request for procurement of AEHF 6.
While near-term satellite communication needs will be met with a
combination of military systems (WGS and AEHF) and leased commercial
SATCOM, the Air Force continues to work closely with the other
Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and the
Combatant Commands to meet the Department of Defense's future protected
and wideband communication needs. To this end, the Air Force will
investigate options to harvest technologies matured by previous
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) efforts, and
evolve the next generation MILSATCOM architecture to provide
connectivity across the spectrum of missions, to include land, air and
naval warfare; special operations; strategic nuclear operations;
strategic defense; homeland security; theater operations; and space
operations and intelligence.
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
The U.S. GPS continues to be the world standard for positioning,
navigation, and timing (PNT). As a result, GPS has been incorporated
into military, commercial, and civilian applications, to include
navigation, agriculture, banking, cartography, telecommunications, and
transportation. The current GPS constellation is robust and healthy,
consisting of 30 operational satellites.
Last year, we launched the final of 20 GPS IIR satellites, the last
8 of which were upgraded GPS IIR-M satellites with military code (M-
code) for additional anti-jam capability, and a second ``L2C'' civil
signal for increased accuracy. The GPS IIR program was started over 20
years ago, and represents one of our most successful, enduring space
acquisition programs. This year, we will launch the first GPS IIF
satellite, and 12 GPS IIF satellites will sustain the constellation
over the next 6 years. GPS IIF will continue to populate the GPS
constellation with military capability and introduce a third ``L5''
civil signal.
Moving beyond GPS IIF, GPS III will offer significant improvements
in navigation capabilities by improving interoperability and jam
resistance. The procurement of the GPS III system will occur in
multiple blocks, with the initial GPS IIIA contract awarded in May
2008. GPS IIIA includes all of the GPS IIF capability plus a 10-fold
increase in signal power, a new civil signal compatible with the
European Union's Galileo system, and a new spacecraft bus that will
support a graceful growth path to future blocks. The next generation
control segment (OCX) for GPS III contract was awarded on February 25,
2010, and is on-track to be in place to support the first GPS IIIA
launch, as well as continue to support the legacy GPS satellites.
Finally, development of Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) continues
with technology maturation of modernized receiver cards that will take
advantage of the increased capability of GPS IIIA including a stronger
and more secure M-code signal.
Weather
The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) continues to be
the Nation's workhorse for terrestrial forecasting and space
environmental sensing. DMSP Flight 18 was successfully launched in
October 2009. We have two DMSP satellites remaining with Flight 19 and
20, and they are currently undergoing a Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP) to repair, replace, and test components that have exceeded their
shelf life. Flight 19 will launch in October 2012 and Flight 20 will
launch in May 2014 or October 2016, depending on operational
requirements.
On February 1, 2010, the Executive Office of the President
restructured the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) program to assign responsibility for each of
the three planned orbits to the agency holding the majority of the
interest in that orbit. Accordingly, the Department of Commerce will
populate the afternoon orbit, the Department of Defense (DOD) will
populate the early morning orbit, and the U.S. Government will continue
to rely on capabilities from our European partners for the mid-morning
orbit. For the morning orbit, DMSP satellites will continue to ensure
weather observation capability. The DOD, in cooperation with partner
agencies, will conduct a short requirements analysis for the morning
orbit to serve as the basis to restructure the program in fiscal year
2011. While this analysis is conducted, DOD will work closely with the
civil agency partners to ensure efforts to ensure continuity of the
afternoon orbit continue productively and efficiently.
Operationally Responsive Space
ORS is focused on meeting the urgent needs of the Joint Force
Commanders using a combination of existing, ready to field, and
emergent systems. This program builds on the ``back to basics''
approach we have cultivated over the past several years by providing
enhanced mission capability through incremental blocks of small
satellites and integration of other responsive space capabilities. Key
tenets of the ORS program are to keep costs low, react rapidly to
urgent warfighter needs, and reconstitute capability in contested
environments. A clear example of these tenets is exemplified in the
first ORS operational satellite (ORS-1), scheduled to launch at the end
of 2010. It is being built for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to
monitor denied areas and will be taskable like other CENTCOM organic
airborne ISR assets.
In the fiscal year 2011 budget request, ORS will continue to
develop the enabling infrastructure of on-demand space support with
Rapid Response Space Capability, whereby plug-and-play spacecraft will
be assembled, integrated, and tested with Modular Open System
Architecture (MOSA) payloads, spacelift, satellite control, and data
dissemination capabilities. Tactical Satellite 3 (TacSat-3), launched
in May 2009, demonstrated this ``plug and play'' modular, low cost
spacecraft with a hyper-spectral imaging payload. TacSat-3 provides a
new capability for strategic and tactical reconnaissance from space,
and continues to successfully provide military utility as a technology
and test asset.
Launch
National Space policy requires assured access to space. Currently
this requirement is satisfied by the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) program consisting of the Delta IV and Atlas V launch vehicles.
The first 30 EELV launches have all been successful, and are part of
our consecutive string of 64 successful national security space
launches. Efficiencies are achieved through combined engineering,
production, and launch operations while maintaining the separate Delta
IV and Atlas V families of launch vehicles for assured access. The
fiscal year 2011 budget request funds EELV launch capability (ELC), or
infrastructure activities and ongoing support for over eight launch
services planned for 2011. In addition, we request funding for three
EELV launch vehicles which will launch in 2013. We combined the two
launch vehicle families into the United Launch Alliance (ULA),
resulting in some cost savings due to labor reductions and facility
consolidations; however, launch costs are still rising. Factors
contributing to rising launch costs are the depletion of inventory
purchased in prior years, reduced number of annual buys increasing unit
costs, and a deteriorating subcontractor business base without
commercial customers. These industrial base factors will also be
affected by the decision to replace NASA's Constellation program with a
new, more technology-focused approach to space exploration, which will
likely reduce the customer base for solid rocket motors and potentially
increase demand for liquid engines and strengthen the liquid-fuel
rocket industrial base. We have initiated several efforts to examine
the severity of these business base issues and identify potential
mitigation steps.
Space Protection
The need for increased space protection of our space assets is
paramount, and requires enhanced Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
capabilities and a legitimate battle management system. We need
improved accuracy, responsiveness, timeliness, and data integration to
support the warfighter. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request continues
development of the Joint Space Operation Center (JSpOC) Mission System
(JMS) to provide this capability and replace our aging mission systems.
The JMS program will provide a single, theater-integrated, command and
control, information technology system to allow informed and rapid
decisions with real-time, actionable SSA. An operational utility
evaluation effort will deliver the foundational infrastructure and
mission applications to deploy a services-oriented architecture (SOA)
with user defined applications
The JSpOC is our single focal point for monitoring space activity.
Over the last year, the JSpOC has transitioned the Air Force's
commercial and foreign entities (CFE) pilot effort into U.S. Strategic
Command's (USSTRATCOM) SSA sharing program. This involved growing the
capability to monitor and conduct conjunction assessments for all U.S.
Government, commercial, and foreign active satellites, over 1,000
systems. As a result, the SSA sharing program screens for collisions
daily, and has a formalized information sharing process that reports
potential conjunctions to commercial and foreign satellite owners and
operators.
The Space Fence and Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) are two
programs critical to providing increased SSA data. The Space Fence is a
three station, worldwide, radar system to detect and track smaller
sized space objects, while the SBSS satellite is an optical system to
search, detect, and track objects in earth orbit, particularly those in
geosynchronous orbit. The Space Fence replaces the Air Force Space
Surveillance System (AFSSS), and SBSS builds upon our success with the
Space Based Visible (SBV) technology demonstration. In the fiscal year
2011 budget, the industry teams working on the Space Fence program will
complete a Preliminary Design Review, and the SBSS program will conduct
on-orbit operations of the SBSS Block 10 satellite, planned to launch
this summer. Additionally, we will continue efforts toward a SBSS
follow-on by completing the acquisition strategy and conducting a full
and open competition.
Air Force Management of Space
The Secretary of the Air Force recently directed a review on
Headquarters Air Force management of space responsibilities. Since the
Air Force's last reorganization of space management following the 2001
Space Commission, events and new authorities have changed how
responsibilities were assigned. This study will assess the impact of
those changes for planning and programming, acquisition, oversight, and
coordination with other DOD components and agencies.
The Air Force Acquisition Improvement Plan serves as the strategic
framework for re-instilling excellence in space systems acquisition.
This plan focuses on workforce, requirements generation, budget
discipline, source selections, and clear lines of authority.
Additionally, the plan builds on our ``Back to Basics'' philosophy, and
leverages enduring principles from over 50 years of space acquisition
experience.
The Air Force is committed to providing the best possible
education, training, and career development to these professionals who
operate, acquire, and enable our systems. Institutions like the Air
Force Institute of Technology, Defense Acquisition University, and the
National Security Space Institute are at the forefront of our efforts
to educate and train these warriors. These organizations continue to
provide the education and training necessary to sustain the space
workforce, our most vital asset.
conclusion
Our space systems are the envy of the world. Our infrared
surveillance satellites are able to detect missile launches anywhere in
the world; no other nation can do that. Our strategic communications
systems allow the President precise and assured control over nuclear
forces in any stage of conflict, and our wideband SATCOM systems
rapidly transmit critical information between the continental United
States to our front-line forces; no one else has global, secure, anti-
jam communications. Our weather satellites allow us to accurately
predict future conditions half a world away as well as in space. Our
GPS constellation enables position knowledge down to centimeters and
timing down to nanoseconds; no one else has deployed such a capability.
These sophisticated systems make each deployed soldier, sailor, marine,
and airman safer and more capable.
In the fiscal year 2011 budget, continuity of service across our
space portfolio and improved space protection is paramount. Our `back
to basics' strategy over the recent years is demonstrating results, as
we continue toward securing the world's best space capabilities today
and ensuring the same for our Nation's future.
The space constellations and space professionals that deliver these
capabilities are our critical asymmetric advantage. We must ensure the
recapitalization and health of these constellations and continue the
professional development of our future space leaders. Delivering space
capabilities is complex, challenging, costly, yet rewarding. Although
we have faced significant challenges, we are also making significant
progress. I look forward to continuing to work with this committee and
thank you for your continued support of military space programs.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Kehler.
STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND
General Kehler. Sir, thank you for inviting us.
I will just make a couple of quick remarks.
First of all, as an airman, I have to note that, earlier
today, over in the Capitol Visitor Center, the Congressional
Gold Medal was awarded to the Women Air Force Service Pilots
(WASPs) from World War II fame. I would just note that at the
beginning of the hearing here. I'll paraphase, our Secretary of
the Air Force, Michael Donley, by saying that ``we have a
better Air Force today, because of the service that the WASPs
gave, and the groundbreaking work that they did for all of
us.''
Regarding space, it's a real pleasure for me to be
representing the 46,000 men and women of Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC). It's a mixed group of Active Duty folks, it's
Air National guardsmen, it is Air Force reservists, it is
government civilians, and it is a key contractor team. Without
that entire team, we would not be able to do the job that we
are doing.
Everything that we do in our command begins and ends with
the needs of the Joint Force commanders or the needs of the
civil population or, in the case of GPS, that's really now a
set of needs that we see from all over the world, and we take
that responsibility very, very seriously.
We like to say, around our command, that space and
cyberspace capabilities provide something important for our
Joint Forces; they provide them with the ability to see with
clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy,
strike with precision, and operate with assurance. That's a
tall order for us. It's one that we take seriously and that we
are proud to provide on behalf of the Joint Force.
The capabilities that we provide today are woven through
the fabric of the Joint Force, and they're woven through our
daily lifes. Farmers in Nebraska, of course, are, today,
navigating their fields using GPS and other space products that
they receive. This has become a way of doing business,
certainly in the United States and elsewhere around the world.
So, that means that as space is becoming more congested and
contested, we have to be more mindful of ensuring that those
capabilities are available when they're needed.
That leads us to a space protection program that we've been
very aggressive with over the last couple of years, along with
our partners at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). I
think we're making good progress there, and I'd be happy to
talk about that further as we go along.
Then, finally, I would just offer, sir, I would agree with
you completely, that we have turned some very important
corners, but there is also no question that we have some very
tough challenges ahead. I would offer my thanks to the
committee, the leadership of the committee, the members of the
committee, who have spent quite a bit of time, over the last
several years, number one, being patient with us, and number
two, doing your own homework in understanding these issues and
being very helpful as we worked our way through some tough
issues.
I look forward to your questions, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. I have to say, General Kehler, before
we go to General James, you'll have to decide whether they were
patient or acquired the appearance of patience. [Laughter.]
[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. C. Robert Kehler, USAF
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senator Vitter, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today as an airman
and as the Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
I am proud to lead and represent over 46,000 Active Duty, Air
National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (ARC) airmen,
government civilians, and contractors who deliver space and cyberspace
capabilities to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Joint Force
Commanders, and myriad other users every minute of every day. The men
and women of AFSPC accomplish their mission from ``deployed in place''
locations across all 50 States, 3 territories, and Washington DC, while
simultaneously serving from forward and deployed locations around the
globe.
We have completed an exciting and historic transitional year in
AFSPC. In May 2009, we became the Air Force's (AF) lead Major Command
(MAJCOM) for cyberspace, and in August, we established a new Numbered
Air Force, 24th Air Force, as the AF cyberspace operational component
to USSTRATCOM. In response to direction from the Secretary of Defense,
24th Air Force has been designated Air Force Cyber (AFCYBER) to become
the AF Component to U.S. Cyber Command, when approved. As we assumed
responsibility for cyberspace, we transferred responsibility for the
Nation's Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force to the new Air Force
Global Strike Command (AFGSC) in December. The Air Force's top priority
of reinvigorating our nuclear enterprise remains the number one goal of
AFSPC.
Space and cyberspace capabilities shape the American approach to
warfare, are embedded in an ever-more effective arsenal of modern
weaponry, and are threaded throughout the fabric of joint operations.
Our integrated space and cyberspace capabilities provide access,
persistence and awareness. Through networks, we put the power of a
large force in the hands of smaller forces that operate on a
distributed battlespace, across all domains and sometimes across
different continents. Space and cyberspace capabilities also enable
vital civil and commercial activities, including financial
transactions, the electrical grid, mass transit operations, personal
navigation, cellular communications, emergency services and better
farming and fishing operations.
At AFSPC, everything we do begins and ends with the Joint Force
Commanders' needs, and our measure of merit is how well we contribute
to joint operations. Our mission is to provide an integrated
constellation of space and cyberspace capabilities at the speed of
need, and our vision is to be the leading source of those capabilities
in the years to come.
the way forward
Joint Force Commanders today increasingly rely on space and
cyberspace capabilities to enable vital effects across the spectrum of
operational needs: irregular warfare, near peer competition, global
assessment, and crisis management. Whether conducting combat operations
or humanitarian relief efforts, they are facing security challenges
that are diverse and dispersed, and an operational environment that is
uncertain, contested, and changing. Emerging threats can be fleeting,
anonymous, and distributed globally; they may strike anywhere at any
time, increasingly taking advantage of the space and cyberspace
domains.
In response, AFSPC is pursuing five primary goals: reliable and
safe nuclear forces; assured combat power for the joint fight;
professionalism and expertise; modernization and sustainment; and
better acquisition.
AFSPC Goal: Guarantee a Safe, Credible, Ready Nuclear Deterrent Force
with Perfection as the Standard
The Air Force moved aggressively to reinvigorate the nuclear
enterprise by consolidating all strategic nuclear forces under the
AFGSC Commander, by aligning all nuclear weapons sustainment and
support under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, and by working to
expand our nuclear experience and expertise. The transfer of 20th Air
Force's three nuclear capable missile wings to AFGSC marked a new
chapter in the long, proud history of our nuclear deterrent force. We
remain committed to ensuring a safe, credible, ready deterrent force
with perfection as the standard. AFSPC will continue to provide
personnel, logistics, operations and fiscal support to AFGSC through
fiscal year 2010.
AFSPC Goal: Deliver Assured Combat Power to the Joint Fight
AFSPC delivers combat power that allows joint forces to navigate
with accuracy, see with clarity, communicate with certainty, strike
with precision, and operate with assurance. To do this, our airmen
acquire, launch, operate, and protect U.S. and allied spacecraft, keep
watch on adversary activity, and assure the cyberspace mission. As
Joint Force Commanders rely on AFSPC-provided capabilities, the Air
Force has requested approximately $11 billion in the Space Virtual
Major Force Program, through the fiscal year 2011 PB to field and
sustain leading-edge space capabilities. In addition, approximately $3
billion will transfer to AFSPC in fiscal year 2011 to grow cyberspace
professionals and provide integrated cyberspace capabilities to Joint
Force Commanders.
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
In 2009, we forward-deployed more than 2,500 AFSPC Airmen to
various locations around the globe in support of combat operations.
Approximately 2,100 deployed to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area
of Responsibility (AOR) in support of Operations Enduring Freedom,
Iraqi Freedom, and Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. During these
operations, 45 AFSPC airmen were awarded Bronze Stars and two received
Combat Action Medals.
Our humanitarian operations are also continuing. AFSPC is
supporting disaster relief efforts during Operation Unified Response in
Haiti. Precise GPS position and timing data, satellite communications,
and real-time weather services, for example, help the Joint and multi-
national disaster relief team with command and control, search, rescue,
and mobility operations, and they distribute sharable situational
awareness. Airmen from the 689th Combat Communications Wing, Robins
AFB, GA, established critical network and communications infrastructure
supporting thousands of humanitarian aid flights. In addition, airmen
of the 67th Network Warfare Wing from Lackland AFB, TX, are integrating
the mission critical networks of U.S. Government agencies in support of
relief efforts.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request will allow us to continue this
legacy of service by enhancing the protection of our space systems and
cyberspace networks; improving Space Situational Awareness (SSA);
assuring availability of launch; preparing to exploit new Overhead
Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities; increasing GPS navigational
accuracy, availability, and signal security; modernizing military
satellite communications (MILSATCOM); and enhancing our cyberspace
posture and operations.
Space Protection
In its first full year of existence, the Space Protection Program
(SPP) delivered a comprehensive compilation of space system
capabilities and interdependencies to our Nation's key operations
centers. This history-making ``first'' moved us closer to our goal of
integrated space system protection for military, intelligence, civil,
commercial, and allied space systems vital to our national security.
Through SPP, we have developed a future vision to assure our space
capabilities and are evaluating the architecture's effectiveness
through the Schriever War Game Series. On the strategic policy front,
SPP personnel delivered the first Space Protection Strategy, supported
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and are contributing to the
development of the new National Space Policy and Space Posture Review
(SPR).
Space Situational Awareness
In concert with the SPP initiative, we continued to improve our SSA
capability as the space domain becomes an increasingly contested,
congested and competitive environment. The collision between an Iridium
communications satellite and a Russian Cosmos communications satellite
a year ago highlights the critical need for improved SSA. To posture
our Nation for the future, AFSPC is filling critical SSA gaps with
complementary programs to enhance our capability to detect, track, and
identify smaller objects from low Earth orbit out to the geosynchronous
belt. Modernizing and sustaining existing sensors greatly contribute to
SSA capability. Complementary systems like the Space Based Space
Surveillance system, Space Fence and the Space Surveillance Telescope
(in cooperation with DARPA), will give us additional capacity to search
and track more on-orbit objects, improve our ability to predict
potential collisions, provide safety of flight, and rapidly track and
catalogue new foreign space launches.
Additionally, we are making sure that the USSTRATCOM Commander will
have better C2 and SSA capabilities by combining three programs for the
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC): Integrated Space Situational
Awareness (ISSA), Rapid Attack Identification and Reporting System
(RAIDRS) and Space C2. The effort, named ``JSpOC Mission System
(JMS),'' is under development using a streamlined requirements and
acquisition approach.
Along with implementing capability solutions, we refined our
tactics, techniques and procedures to reduce the possibility of future
collisions. Through JSpOC SSA efforts, our ability to predict
collisions increased 100 fold to include all active satellites, and now
we conduct over 1,000 assessments per day. As a result, there have
already been 56 instances where owner-operators maneuvered their
satellites to avoid possible collisions.
In addition, on 22 December 2009, we transferred the Commercial and
Foreign Entities (CFE) pilot program to USSTRATCOM, with operational
responsibility continuing at the JSpOC. Not only do we provide
conjunction analysis for capabilities critical to national security and
homeland defense, but also we expanded our services to provide
positional data to over 40,000 users and a number of partner nations.
Launch and Range Enterprise Transformation (LET)
It is our job to deliver assured space and cyberspace capabilities,
and we can only do that if we have assured access to space. We now mark
a full decade of successful national security space launches and over 7
years of successful Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) launches.
We must maintain that perfect record: launch failures are too
expensive, in money and lost capability. LET is our effort to make sure
that success will continue, and it involves four major efforts: (1)
transforming launch services acquisition, (2) upgrading range
capability, (3) fully leveraging ARC and the ANG, (4) improving
business practices to better support commercial providers.
As part of the launch services acquisition effort, we continue to
look for ways to make EELV more cost-effective by working with the NRO
and NASA for block buy opportunities. We are also defining ``new
entrant'' criteria as part of our overall approach to space launch. We
cannot neglect technology development; we are preparing a new reusable
first stage demonstration and are pursuing technology for a new
reusable rocket engine.
Launch services will also be affected by the recent announcement
cancelling NASA's Constellation program. Our initial steps will ensure
that the industrial base interdependencies between EELV and other
launch systems are considered to support a viable national launch
industrial base.
The effort to upgrade range capability has been long in coming; our
range infrastructure has been increasingly unsustainable and, unless
addressed, will impose costly delays on national security, civil, and
commercial launches alike. Our national space launch and weapon system
test and evaluation capabilities demand a flexible range architecture.
To address these demands, we are divesting redundant instrumentation
while modernizing and increasing the reliability and availability of
essential range assets. In addition, our future range design
incorporates a telemetry-based architecture with an integrated GPS
metric tracking capability.
Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
The Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to provide highly
accurate position and timing signals that enable highly precise Joint
combat operations worldwide. GPS is also a free utility serving as an
enabler for economic transactions and influencing the global economy by
more than $110 billion annually. We at AFSPC, the Air Force, and the
Department of Defense do recognize and embrace our special
responsibility to maintain GPS as the ``gold standard'' for space-based
PNT.
We continue to modernize the system and are developing and fielding
a more robust, taskable, third-generation GPS satellite which will
provide improved operational capabilities to military and civil users.
In 2009, we launched the last two GPS Block IIR-M satellites, and for
2010 we continue preparations to launch, deploy, and operate the first
GPS Block IIF satellites. For civil users, these new Block IIF
satellites will broadcast the first operational signals in the L5
frequency band, which is protected by internationally recognized
spectrum rules to ensure robust service quality for safety-of-life
applications, such as aircraft all-weather approach and landing. In
addition, we are building the first increment of eight GPS III
satellites and a new Next Generation Control Segment (OCX). Together,
GPS III and OCX will improve user collaboration, incorporate an
effects-based approach to operations, and establish a net-centric
architecture accelerating the mission application of position and
timing information.
Recognizing the joint team's constant demand for enhanced GPS
capabilities in geographically challenging areas where terrain can
degrade GPS signal coverage, we partnered with USSTRATCOM and developed
a plan called ``Expandable 24.'' This approach not only benefits
military operations in places like Afghanistan, but all GPS users
around the world, by taking advantage of the largest on-orbit GPS
constellation in history. Over the next 2 years, we will gradually
reposition GPS satellites to increase the number of satellites in view,
thereby improving availability and accuracy worldwide.
We continue to develop Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) to
exploit the features of our new GPS satellites and control segment
features. A key aspect of MGUE is the development of a common GPS
module facilitating easy integration of GPS solutions into multiple
platforms. Overall, our GPS enterprise efforts maintain the highest
service performance levels to the civil community while transforming
and modernizing GPS into a robust, taskable system tailored to meet
unique military needs in today's operational environments.
Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
The Joint Force Commanders rely on military and commercial SATCOM
(especially in austere environments) to communicate securely and
receive data, imagery, and full motion video from Remotely Piloted
Aircraft. Those services will depend heavily on our Wideband Global
SATCOM (WGS) system. Mission operations began last August with the
second WGS (WGS-2) satellite, positioned over the Southwest Asia AOR,
and it is now delivering ten times the capability that we had with the
legacy Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). Last December we
launched the third WGS (WGS-3) which is being positioned over the EUCOM
and AFRICOM AORs.
The demand for wideband MILSATCOM capability never slows, and so we
have requested $595 million to continue production of WGS-4 & 5 and
procurement of WGS-7. Later this year we expect to accept and launch
the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite, a new
system that will increase the protected communications data rate more
than 5-fold and provide more coverage opportunities than Milstar. The
end result will be enhanced national command and control satellite
networks for the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant
commanders. Meanwhile, we are evaluating the right strategies to evolve
future MILSATCOM capabilities to support COCOM requirements.
Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
Only from space can we be assured of comprehensive missile warning
and missile defense information. The first two Space Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) Highly Elliptical Orbit-1 (HEO-1) and HEO-2 payloads
provide our Nation with comprehensive missile warning and missile
defense data. This critical information in the hands of warfighters,
particularly in contested areas and where no other assets are
available, is invaluable. Furthermore, Congress added $13.8 million in
fiscal year 2010 for exploitation initiatives providing Joint Force
Commanders with advanced Battlespace Awareness and Technical
Intelligence.
While the Joint Force Commanders benefit from the advanced SBIRS
HEO detection and data exploitation efforts, we requested $530 million
for the SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) development program. As
part of our OPIR portfolio, the SBIRS GEO payload will provide enhanced
detection and data processing capabilities to the warfighter and the
Intelligence Community. Recognizing a significant achievement, the
first SBIRS GEO (GEO-1) space vehicle successfully completed Thermal
Vacuum (TVAC) testing and is undergoing subsequent flight hardware
replacement and software qualification. We look forward to final launch
readiness and delivery to meet GEO-1 launch in 2011.
Space Control
As we enter the 19th year of continuous combat operations in the
Persian Gulf, AFSPC continues to provide sustained defensive
counterspace capability to USCENTCOM. We are in our sixth year of
continuous presence in theater with Silent Sentry which provides
critical electromagnetic interference detection and geolocation tools
and highlights the need for a global capability.
As part of evolving our support to the Joint fight, we are
developing and fielding a follow-on system, RAIDRS Block 10 (RB-10).
RB-10 is integrated as part of JMS and will provide transportable
ground systems located around the world. In addition, the RB-10
capability will route SATCOM interference detection and geolocation
data to the JSpOC thereby helping us protect military communication
channels.
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
The ORS program is exploring ways in which the urgent needs of
Joint Force Commanders might usefully be addressed, and AFSPC works
with the ORS office on projects involving communications, SSA,
surveillance and reconnaissance. For example, TacSat-3 was launched on
19 May 2009, as an experimental system designed to demonstrate the
military utility of a small satellite, taskable by a tactical user in
the field to search and collect specific hyper spectral images and
downlink the results directly to deployed ground units. We are
assessing the utility of transitioning TacSat-3 to a residual DOD-
operated reconnaissance system upon completion of its experimental
period in May 2010.
Later this year another ORS satellite, the ORS-1, should begin
providing multi-spectral imagery of regions selected by ground force
commanders. Existing ground systems will process and distribute the
resulting images, and this development should also help inform a multi-
mission modular approach that might prove useful in the future.
Space Weather--National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS)
On 1 February 2010, the Executive Office of the President directed
a major restructuring of the NPOESS program, whereby procurement of the
system will no longer be joint. NOAA and NASA will take primary
responsibility for the afternoon orbit, and the Air Force will take
primary responsibility for the morning orbit. As we work through this
transition, we will continue to foster our longstanding productive
partnerships with NOAA and NASA, by sharing data, coordinating user
needs and operating satellites.
AFSPC Goal: Forge a Battle-Ready Team by Attracting, Developing and
Retaining America's Best
AFSPC will continue to be a leader in attracting, developing and
retaining Airmen and civilians with the professional skills needed to
succeed. Recognizing the critical roles of our families, we continue to
extend the wingman culture to help nurture success on the home front.
During 2010-2011, we will improve training and professional development
programs; refine career paths and take necessary steps to care for our
Airmen and their families.
Developing Airmen
Over the past year, we integrated space education and training into
mainstream Air Force processes to enhance professional development and
ensure continued sustainment. This construct equips our space
professionals with a sound foundation at Undergraduate and Initial
Qualification Training, expands their operational and strategic
perspective of space through Space 200 and 300 continuing education and
adds tailored advanced operational training at subsequent career
milestones. Our programs have now developed over 13,000 space
professionals who are experienced in today's real-world and combat
operations.
Since my last appearance before your subcommittee, we worked with
Air Education and Training Command (AETC) to restructure the National
Security Space Institute (NSSI). In essence we created two
complementary space academic organizations. The new NSSI is focused on
``graduate level'' continuing education and is now aligned under Air
University, charged with specific responsibility for Air Force-wide
Professional Continuing Education (PCE). AFSPC retained responsibility
for advanced operational system training, fundamentals courses and pre-
deployment training, now provided by the Advanced Space Operations
School (ASOpS). Together the NSSI and ASOpS are the premier focal
points for advanced space education and training, providing instruction
to 1,728 students in 2009 including students from the Air Force, Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, civil service and allied partners. This year, we
will begin construction on a $19.9 million facility housing both
schools on Peterson AFB, CO.
We are carefully crafting a similar force development approach for
our cyberspace professionals. Equipped with the vision outlined in
``The Air Force Roadmap for the Development of Cyberspace
Professionals,'' and the experience gained by our Space Professional
Development Program, we are building a parallel career development
model for cyberspace. The goal is to ensure that cyberspace
professionals have the proper academic credentials, the right training
and education and requisite experience to establish, protect and
leverage this critical domain. This year AETC will open the doors to
Undergraduate Cyber Training (UCT) courses for the newly established
Cyberspace Operations officer specialty and the Cyberspace Defense
Operations and Cyberspace Support enlisted specialties.
Missions conducted in and through the cyberspace domain will
require Airmen with specific technical education and network-savvy
aptitude. Working with academia and industry partners, we have defined
academic prerequisites for cyberspace accessions, and are addressing
the challenge in identifying and recruiting such people. To do this
right, we need effective, innovative recruiting strategies and
meaningful incentives to attract and retain cyberspace professionals.
In addition to UCT, we are working with Air University and the Air
Force Cyberspace Technical Center of Excellence to establish Cyber 200
and 300 courses along with advanced operations courses for cyberspace
professionals. Course curricula are under development and we expect to
teach classes on an interim basis in October 2010 with a permanent
approach in place in fiscal year 2012.
Families and Quality of Life
The year 2010 is the ``Year of the Air Force Family.'' In AFSPC, we
recognize the sacrifices and contributions of our families by extending
our wingman culture and emphasizing suicide prevention, safety and
family support. In addition, we are working to attract and retain our
Airmen and their families by providing quality housing and enhancing
the sense of community on our installations.
AFSPC significantly improved mission capabilities and the quality
of life for its Airmen and their families in 2009 by investing $453
million on over 700 projects to sustain and modernize facilities,
infrastructure and housing. We also executed $149 million of American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds on another 280 projects to improve
our working, living, and recreational environments. The combined $602
million was invested in areas to include housing, dormitories, a new
child development center, fitness centers, community activity centers,
launch and nuclear mission facilities; and electrical, heating/air
conditioning, water and road infrastructure. For 2010, we will invest
$118 million in MILCON projects for a child development center,
facilities construction, and key projects across AFSPC.
AFSPC Goal: Modernize and Sustain AFSPC's Enduring Missions and Mature
Emerging Missions
As the Air Force lead for cyberspace, AFSPC will provide cyberspace
capabilities that, when integrated with air and space capabilities,
enable combat effects in a new way. As we have done with our space
capabilities, we will establish a path to grow cyberspace operations,
education, training, and development. We will also identify specific
areas to draw on the combined resources of the ANG, ARC, and government
civilians. Our plan is laid out in the ``The United States Air Force
Blueprint for Cyberspace,'' which we will use in working closely with
our Joint fight partners to provide complementary capabilities. The
blueprint describes how we will align cyberspace activities and
functions, evolve and integrate these unique capabilities, and build
operational capacity. We must ensure that we can both defend against
attacks and ``fight through'' and respond to attacks, in order to
assure mission accomplishment.
The newly activated 24th Air Force serves as the Air Force's
operational cyberspace component to USSTRATCOM and is charged to
integrate, employ and present Air Force cyberspace capabilities.
Structured pursuant to direction from the Secretary of the Air Force
and Air Force Chief of Staff, the 24th Air Force achieved Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) a few weeks ago (22 January 2010).
Total Force
In 2009, AFSPC continued to leverage ARC support to AFSPC missions.
Our Total Force Integration (TFI) Strategy capitalizes on existing ARC
presence and inherent strengths of the Reserve and Guard components. As
we stood up 24th Air Force, our TFI partnerships played a key role in
our success. Across AFSPC, our ARC partnerships in satellite and launch
range operations, SSA, and battlespace awareness provide critical
continuity and surge capacity. We are also preparing to increase ARC
presence in missile warning, space control, and cyberspace operations.
Schriever War Game Series
The recurring Schriever War Game series has proven insightful in
identifying key strategic and policy issues. At the end of our fifth
Schriever War Game in March 2009, we addressed key issues involving
space deterrence, capability employment, and policy implementation and
planning with senior leaders throughout the national security
community. This war game also identified areas requiring additional
emphasis and highlighted the close relationships between space and
cyberspace capabilities, and informed our strategic development efforts
in both the QDR and SPR. We are now preparing for this year's wargame
and look forward to increased international and industry participation.
AFSPC Goal: Reengineer Acquisition to Deliver Capability at the Speed
of Need
No one doubts that we need to push relentlessly to improve
acquisition. Our vision is to provide what the Joint Force Commander
needs, when he needs it--capability at the speed of need. We have far
to go, but recent successes show that we are on the right track. As
mentioned earlier, in the past year we increased on-orbit capability
with GPS IIR-20M and 21M, DMSP-18, WGS-2, and WGS-3. We are on track to
deliver new capabilities as we have completed a GPS III Preliminary
Design Review as well as GEO-1 and AEHF SV-1 TVAC testing.
We will continue to pursue our ``back to basics'' philosophy and
block-build approach, fund to the most probable cost, increase our
acquisition workforce and expertise, improve relations with industry,
and implement strict requirements control. Our Space and Missile
Systems Center will deliver five major systems in the next 24 months
for SBIRS, AEHF, GPS IIF, ORS-1 and SBSS. The GPS III, OCX and Space
Fence development programs are on the right track.
As we reengineer acquisition processes, we are focusing efforts to
rebuild the acquisition workforce and strengthen relationships across
Industry and DOD. In an effort to recapture acquisition excellence, the
USAF implemented an Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP) to revitalize
the acquisition workforce; improve requirements generation processes;
instill budget and financial discipline; improve major systems source
selections; and establish clear lines of authority and accountability
within organizations. Overall, the AIP increases accountability at
higher leadership levels, increases communication between MAJCOMs and
between product centers and MAJCOMs.
Furthermore, we implemented a Human Capital Strategic Plan to
recruit, develop and retain acquisition expertise. As part of the
recruitment effort, we are developing and marketing a recruitment
strategy that targets individuals with the desired education,
experience, and skill sets. Taking advantage of favorable job market
conditions and expedited hiring authorities, we hired over 300 recent
college graduates.
conclusion
Space and cyberspace capabilities allow warfighting commands to
meet the challenge of protecting the American people, their livelihoods
and interests with precision at the moment of need. At AFSPC, our
vision, our mission, our job, and our dedication is to make sure those
commanders have the very best capabilities that we can humanly provide.
With the continued support of Congress, we will be able to assure that
our country will have the space and cyberspace forces it needs tomorrow
and in years to come.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
General James.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LARRY D. JAMES, USAF, COMMANDER, 14TH AIR
FORCE, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL
COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
General James. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the
opportunity to be here again this year.
As the Commander of Joint Functional Component Command
(JFCC) Space and 14th Air Force, I represent over 20,000 men
and women around the world who really are responsible for
conducting operations for all of our Department of Defense
(DOD) space systems. Whether that's satellite systems, whether
that's our missile warning systems, whether that's space
surveillance systems, or our launch systems, these are the men
and women that actually execute those operations and make sure
that we get the job done, day in and day out--as General Kehler
said, both for the military, the Joint Forces commander, and
all the civil users and other users around the world that rely
on the products we provide.
Sir, we have a great task in front of us, but these men and
women execute that mission every day, and they provide the
support that the world needs from a space perspective.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General James follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, USAF
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Vitter, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, I am honored to be here once again to appear before
you as U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) Commander of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Space (CDR JFCC SPACE) and 14th Air
Force.
It's an honor for me to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines of JFCC SPACE who operate and protect some of our Nation's
most critical systems for global communications, navigation, strategic
warning, and situational awareness. These men and women are a tireless
and innovative joint force, working hard to ensure critical space
capabilities are available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, for our
global forces. We operate in an increasingly congested and contested
environment and ensuring access to all our Department of Defense (DOD)
space capabilities for worldwide users is an absolute priority.
Today I will focus my discussion on the space operational
environment and how it.s changed over the last year. I'll describe our
priorities of Warfighter Support, Command and Control, Integration, and
Readiness and then close with a look at new challenges we see in the
months and years to come.
framing the overall environment
Space continues to be the ultimate ``high ground'' from which to
operate. Every military operation utilizes space capabilities in some
way. Whether it.s the Global Positioning System (GPS), overhead
imagery, secure communications, or meteorological reports, ground and
air commanders rely upon space capabilities constantly. However, space
is becoming an increasingly congested and contested environment. As of
1 February 2010, the operators at the
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) track approximately 21,500
objects on orbit. That is an increase of 1,700 from just last year.
There are nearly 10,000 pieces of debris, 3,700 dead satellites and
rocket pieces, and 6,800 unknown objects orbiting the Earth. Included
in these objects are over 1,100 active satellites owned by more than 60
different countries and corporations. As the environment continues to
grow in its complexity, our need for real-time space situational
awareness (SSA) is becoming more obvious. Our ground sensors are
critical elements of our Space Surveillance Network (SSN) dedicated to
watching the skies and keeping track of all space objects. Across the
globe, we have dedicated radar and optical sensors. These sensors track
thousands of objects every day and automatically upload their
observations to a computer database. These sensors cannot cover all of
the sky all the time, so to enhance coverage, we have more collateral
and contributing sensors. These sensors are used for space tracking
when not supporting in their primary mission. All orbital observations
come together in the JSpOC at Vandenberg AFB, CA, for analysis and
computational predictions.
Sensors and computers cannot discriminate between active satellites
and debris among the thousands of objects on orbit. That's where our
most crucial component of JFCC SPACE comes in--its people. There are
more than 29,000 military, civilians, and contractors conducting
operations day to day for both JFCC SPACE and 14th Air Force. Our
missions demand a continuous 24-7 focus. Members of JFCC SPACE and 14th
Air Force live and work in places such as Greenland, Diego Garcia,
Kwajalein Atoll, Guam, and Alaska. Such commitment takes the dedication
of a Total Force. JFCC SPACE is built of a cadre of marines, sailors,
soldiers, and airmen. Of the 7,500 military men and women, more than
1,100 are Air National Guard, Air Force Reserves, and Individual
Mobilization Augmentees from all Services. Of these, a relatively small
number of people, only about 300, at the JSpOC are the single DOD focal
point for monitoring all space activity.
The JSpOC maintains our SSA, provides command and control of
assigned forces, and supports all theater forces with space
capabilities as needed. SSA is the cornerstone of JSpOC activities. The
SSN central mission system is maintained and analyzed at the JSpOC by a
collection of military and civilian analysts. These individuals keep
track of what satellites are active, predict when pieces of debris or
satellites will re-enter the atmosphere, recommend when a payload can
be safely launched, and prevent potential satellite collisions. Over
the last year, we have grown our JSpOC capabilities to not only monitor
and protect DOD satellites, but monitor and conduct collision
assessments for all commercial and foreign active satellites as well.
After the COSMOS/IRIDIUM collision of 2009, we began increasing our
personnel and computing power to allow for collision screening for all
active satellites. I am proud to report that we achieved that goal
ahead of schedule and now screen for collisions daily and report
potential conjunctions to satellite owner/operators through
USSTRATCOM's SSA Sharing Program. To date, we have reported hundreds of
potential conjunctions, with more than 50 resulting in the owner
maneuvering a satellite.
While SSA is the cornerstone of our capability, our number one
priority is supporting our deployed U.S. and coalition forces. We've
provided more than 20,000 GPS accuracy predictions in the last year,
supporting resupply air drops and personnel recovery actions. Space
capabilities have aided in the recovery of 128 service men since 2003.
We've covered more than 12 air and ground missions with tailored
coverage by overhead sensors watching for hostile or insurgent activity
within a specific area of concern.
The criticality of space effects to the warfighter will continue to
be vital to our Nation's success in ongoing operations. We must protect
our space assets against intentional and unintentional acts in order to
preserve our essential space capabilities to ensure USSTRATCOM's
ability to execute and integrate operations across all lines of
operations and provide real-time, actionable data to our joint
warfighters, the combatant commanders.
jfcc space priorities
To set a clear and unambiguous vision, we established four
priorities for JFCC SPACE in late 2008: Warfighter Support, Command and
Control, Integration, and Readiness. These priorities set the vector
for all our efforts.
warfighter support
Warfighter Support is our core focus and key factor in determining
manpower requirements, technology needs, and operational processes.
From launch through operational employment to re-entry disposal, our
space capabilities are built around warfighter needs. Launch
capabilities remain the foundation of our space program. Over the last
year, we've seen a total of 27 successful launches from both Eastern
and Western Ranges. Although our launch safety record is exemplary, we
are transforming our launch operations to modernize our range safety
equipment and streamline our range footprints. Sixty percent of the
Western Range systems are being replaced or upgraded over the next 2
years and the Eastern Range command system will receive upgrades during
the next fiscal year.
JFCC SPACE directly supports warfighter requests through the JSpOC.
Recent direct support for deployed forces includes GPS accuracy,
overhead infrared, and Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM)
support. GPS is the most widely used space capability on the planet.
Our forces use GPS for everything from urban foot patrols to Predator
flights. We receive requests for GPS accuracy predictions daily through
the JSpOC. On average, we send 400 GPS accuracy predictions to forward-
deployed forces each week. To enhance coverage to all GPS users, we are
repositioning three of our GPS satellites to assist users in terrain-
challenged ground environments. The first of our new GPS IIF satellites
will launch this Spring and add new capabilities for civilian and
military users. GPS IIF will bring a civilian safety-of-life signal and
provide a more robust signal availability for military users. To ensure
warfighters understand the full capabilities and vulnerabilities of the
GPS system, the Joint Navigation Warfare Center (JNWC), a component of
JFCC SPACE, maintains an active outreach program with the Combatant
Commands (COCOMs), Services, and agencies. The JNWC ensures that
Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) considerations are included across the
spectrum of operations, to include COCOM planning, exercises, disaster
response, to full conflict.
Overhead Persistent non-Imaging Infrared (OPIR) capabilities have
grown beyond providing strategic ballistic missile warning only.
Today's OPIR can provide battlefield commanders a wider range of
situational awareness of the ground and air environments. We have
provided support to ground troops during base exfiltrations to ensure
demolition activities were successful. Overwatch of high-priority
missions can ensure threats in the area are detected and reported
before they cause a problem for the aircraft or ground commander.
Consequently, OPIR's traditional mission of ballistic missile detection
and warning has seen remarkable increases in integration with
intelligence systems. Launch information from multiple agencies flowed
into the JSpOC, where operators had direct contact with higher
headquarters. However, this operational picture is manually created by
JSpOC operators. We need a system that automatically provides this to
our operators and leaders.
Technology advancements in overhead detection continue to advance
and we are constantly finding new ways to provide better technical
intelligence to the ground commanders. The Space-Based Infra-red System
(SBIRS) in its Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) gives significant coverage
over the northern hemisphere for infrared detection and technical
intelligence gathering. We can now detect and report, in near real-
time, natural, and man-made infrared events. The quality of data
provided by SBIRS HEO is a key part in our operators. ability to
characterize launches and predict threatened areas within minutes.
SBIRS Geosynchronous (GEO) satellites will give us the ability to stare
and collect for days and weeks worldwide. We will be able to
characterize events that paint a picture for national leadership of new
foreign technology development and proliferation information. We will
be able to expand our warfighter support beyond the ballistic missile
threat to include enemy air defenses, surface to air missiles, and even
personnel recovery actions.
Information technologies have truly revolutionized our capability
to operate globally. From combat operations to humanitarian assistance,
we use MILSATCOM every day. Secure communications allows survivable,
joint communications for diplomatic travels through orders
dissemination such as Nuclear Force Command and Control. Our Integrated
Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) dissemination relies
heavily on our MILSTAR constellation that is exceeding design life
expectations. The new Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) is performing
superbly and is an outstanding replacement to our aging Defense
Satellite Communications System (DSCS) fleet. Our WGS system will have
over 10 times the capacity of our DSCS system and provides enhanced
information security. WGS gives us automatic Digital Network/automatic
Secure Voice Communications, Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System access from
space. It can also carry Defense Message System, Defense Switched
Network, Diplomatic Telecommunication Service Communications, and real-
time Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) video for ground mobile forces. WGS-
1 and WGS-2 will be joined by WGS-3 in spring 2010 after operational
checkout and acceptance.
Our priority of warfighter support stretches into the theater
itself. For each theater's Director of Space Forces (DS4), we maintain
a close and dedicated relationship to ensure they have the most
relevant information and current operational view of our space
capabilities. Quarterly DS4 conferences bring all theater DS4s together
to share tactics and insight, as well as allow them to identify new
requirements in front of the JFCC SPACE staff firsthand. Our Silent
Sentry capability has developed into a premier interference detection
tool for satellite communications. The Silent Sentry team monitors all
friendly SATCOM for unintentional interference or hostile denial
attempts. Additionally, JFCC SPACE maintains in-theater capabilities
for counter space activities directly supporting forces in harm's way.
Requested support from ground troops flows through the theater Air and
Space Operations Center to the JSpOC and execution can occur within
minutes of a request.
JFCC SPACE is forging ahead in our efforts to provide new,
operationally responsive space effects to the warfighter. We are
actively engaged with Air Force Space Command and U.S. Strategic
Command in developing the concepts and command relationships that may
allow us to transition experimental capabilities to operational use.
For example, TACSAT-3 is an experimental, hyperspectral imagery
satellite that has shown great promise in areas such as which can be
used to support ground troops. At the same time, we are supporting
DOD's Operationally Responsive Space concept development with the goal
of providing rapid replenishment of space capabilities on the order of
days to weeks, not months to years, using deploy-on-need assets. We are
working with our Service partners to finalize and field the command and
control architecture for Operationally Responsive Space-1, a purpose-
built, small spacecraft that will supply urgently-needed imagery to
USCENTCOM and other theater operators.
command and control
JSpOC Mission System (JMS) is planned to replace our aging mission
systems with a command and control information technology system
consisting of infrastructure and mission applications. It will be a
service-oriented architecture with the capability of user-defined
applications. It will be much more than just a positional catalog. We
envision a single, theater-integrated system with intelligence feeds,
communications status, integrated missile warning, and status of forces
all displayed on one operational picture. We expect it to automate much
of what we do by hand today. Instead of the human analysis required in
determining that a conjunction may occur, the system will automatically
receive updates from sensors and alert operators to potential
conjunctions. The operator will only need to confirm the conjunction
and alert the owner of the satellite. JMS will be delivered in multiple
releases, with Release 0 consisting of the initial Service-Oriented-
Architecture infrastructure, due this summer.
SSA has seen the greatest advance in operational utility in its
history over the past year. We have increased daily conjunction
screening at the JSpOC from 110 primary satellites to over 1,000. With
that increase, we have seen conjunction warning notifications increase
from 5 to up to 35 per day and our interaction with commercial and
foreign space agencies has increased likewise. Information sharing with
commercial and foreign entities is now a formalized process within JFCC
SPACE. We currently have data-sharing agreements with 16 commercial and
foreign partners. However, we still suffer from an aged and limited
sensor network to gather our most basic resource, orbital observations.
Observations from the SSN are the foundational base of all SSA. Many of
our SSN sensors operate on a one-object-at-a-time system and none of
them are networked with one another. The CONUS-based space fence can
detect and observe multiple objects at one time and contributes more to
our network than any other sensor. Additionally, we have considerable
gaps in coverage in the southern hemisphere. Objects can be un-observed
for a significant period of time while over areas such as Antarctica,
Australia, Africa, and South America. Placement of a space fence in the
southern hemisphere will improve our coverage considerably. The Space-
Based Surveillance System (SBSS) will provide additional sensing
capabilities. This sensor will operate from space, free of boundaries,
borders, or atmospheric effects to distort or obscure viewing. The
first SBSS satellite is scheduled to launch this summer and will be
operated by the 1st Space Operations Squadron in Colorado. SBSS will
revolutionize how we observe satellites. With a potential capability to
track objects much smaller in size, we will detect more objects in
orbit, re-enforcing the need for a replacement SSA analysis system such
as JMS.
integration
As space becomes even more critical to global operations and the
access to space expands, it will be more critical than ever to work
closely with friends, allies, the commercial space sector, and perhaps
all space faring nations. Integration amongst all space agencies within
the U.S. Government is essential to safe and effective operations. We
continue to improve our linkages with intelligence community partners
and build long-lasting, permanent relationships between our
organizations. We continue to strengthen an already strong relationship
with the National Reconnaissance Office through sharing facilities and
permanent liaison positions and partnering during exercises and real-
world events. We are working to create a wider relationship between the
space and intelligence communities through a data sharing and
collaborative information systems. The Joint Exploitation Fusion Cell
will fully integrate multiple intelligence sources into one database
for operators. This will allow for efficient integration of
intelligence data into our assessments and verification of operational
successes.
Coalition and commercial integration have taken significant leaps
forward over the last year. Cross-Atlantic visits to and from the
United Kingdom and France have forged significant relationships and
continue the dialog to improve coalition space operations. Australia,
Germany, and Japan have all sent delegations to tour the JSpOC and
witnessed how we accomplish our missions. Our experiences in coalition
exercises have taught us valuable lessons; most notably that threats
can come from multiple venues, so it is prudent to act together with
our allied and commercial partners. Schriever 5 Wargame impressed upon
U.S., Allied, and commercial partners on the importance of
relationships with threats in this type of integrated global domain. We
will continue to develop partnership processes in Schriever 10 this
year. Since the COSMOS/IRIDIUM collision, commercial space operators
have realized how much capability JFCC SPACE has to offer protection
for their systems. Likewise, commercial users in space maintain some of
the most accurate positional information of their own systems. It
benefits both sides to share relevant information.
JFCC Network Warfare (NW) is tasked with operating and defending
DOD networks under the command and control of U.S. Strategic Command.
Cyber and space are inherently linked as effective force multipliers
and share similarities in the non-kinetic warfare environment. Our
staffs have established continuous linkages as we operate common and
complementary capabilities supporting each other as well as global
joint forces. We fully recognize the benefits and are sharing tactics,
intelligence, and procedures. In many scenarios, capabilities JFCC
SPACE lacks, cyber forces can fulfill, and vice versa. Our
intelligence, plans, and operations divisions share information and
processes to determine where capabilities overlap and they diverge. We
have begun collaborative work on new tactics that will deliver new
capabilities to theater commanders and will continue to develop
linkages between the two components.
Integration across domains, borders, and industries requires a
significant investment by those involved. Critical to effective
integration are systems and facilities. Today the JSpOC performs its
operational mission using a converted missile assembly building. Over
50 years old and designed for an entirely different purpose, the
building presents significant challenges towards meeting our integrated
space operations mission. Successful integration with U.S. and
coalition forces, as well as commercial partners will depend upon
facilities designed specifically for space command and control.
readiness
``Perfection is our Standard.'' This is our motto within JFCC SPACE
and 14th Air Force. The readiness of our forces is a key priority.
Without adequate and ready forces, we will fall short of achieving our
goals as a joint force. Readiness includes health of the force,
training, preparedness, and compliance. Our forces must be healthy and
able to fight, trained for the fight, equipped to fight, and compliant
with the law of armed conflict and other legal and policy constraints.
Within JFCC SPACE and 14th Air Force, readiness issues exist in
training and personnel numbers. Our Operational Readiness Inspections
and Unit Compliance Inspections are the tools we use to evaluate unit
readiness and compliance levels. Within the last 2 years, all 14th Air
Force wings have been found compliant and ready, but are still lacking
in resources and training to commit to a full-time, warfighting posture
for extended periods. Every new satellite system brings new mission
requirements. Acquisition of new missions, while continuing to maintain
legacy missions, places more and more requirements on our personnel and
hardware systems. Continued modernization of our systems and efficient
use of our personnel are absolutely essential to the success of our
future operations.
challenges
We will face operational challenges in the space domain as
capabilities expand and more nations utilize space systems. Improvement
in data management will become increasingly important with the increase
in the amount of observations from SBSS. Any future sensors will create
even more additional data sources that we will have to integrate into
our mission systems. We will continue to be challenged by the
acquisition speed of new command and control systems and space
capabilities. Off-the-shelf technologies have caught, if not surpassed,
some of our own technology. We must acquire new systems, as General
Kehler has put, ``At the speed of the need''. As long as forces are
dispersed across the globe, we will have challenges with integrating
with the joint warfighter. Multiple information systems across multiple
theaters hurt efficiency and delay generation of desired effects for
forces. Common information systems and a complete, integrated
operational picture will allow commanders in direct and supporting
roles to share common battlespace awareness. Advances in space
technologies will not slow or end. Our operational environment will
continue to grow in complexity as more nations, corporations, and even
individuals place smaller and more capable satellites on orbit.
Satellites will continue to get smaller and more capable. Our sensor
network and mission systems are challenged to keep pace with the
expanding orbital environment. Finally, as we venture into discussions
with cyber forces, mission requirements will grow and our environment
will expand to include the virtual as well. In our fixed-personnel and
resource-restrained reality, we will have to find ways to operate more
efficiently and effectively.
conclusion
Space operations and needs will continue to rapidly evolve. We must
continue to search out ways to better support our forces around the
globe, especially those in harm's way. We will continue to coordinate
with other government agencies to enhance overall support, ensuring the
right effect is delivered at the right place at the right time. We will
strive to strengthen our relationships with allied space partners,
ensuring our global capabilities remain available for those requiring
them. Perfection is our standard, and you can be proud of your
soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen that I am honored to lead. I
thank the committee for your continued support as we work to preserve
our critical space capabilities for our Nation.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Federici.
STATEMENT OF GARY A. FEDERICI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS,
INTELLIGENCE, AND SPACE
Dr. Federici. Chairman Nelson, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today with Vice Admiral Jack
Dorsett to discuss our space programs and space-related
activities.
The MUOS is clearly our most critical space program. We
have had some challenges, and I think we are looking for a way
ahead. We were pleased to submit a report to you last week with
some options that may help mitigate gaps in the future and
support the on-orbit fragile Constellation.
So, thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Admiral?
STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID J. DORSETT, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE (N2/N6), AND DIRECTOR OF
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Admiral Dorsett. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity to be here, especially on behalf of the men and
women of the U.S. Navy. It's a privilege for me to be able to
testify before you today.
I want to reiterate one point for you, that I believe
you're already aware of, and that's that the U.S. Navy is
critically dependent upon space. Our ships, submarines,
aircraft operate across the farflung reaches of the globe,
often operating independently. The one thing that keeps them
tied together, I think, is space-based capabilities, whether
that's communications, the networks that support them, whether
it's the navigation and precision geolocation data that comes
from space, weather and environmental sensing information is
absolutely vital to the U.S. Navy.
Truly, when it comes down to precision weapons, we need
that detailed precision geolocation information that can only
come from space.
Our intelligence resources, also, from space, provide a
critical component of what the U.S. Navy's intelligence
organization needs. Then, ultimately, I think the need for
space to support our missile defense capabilities is on the
rise.
I have two points to make. One is regarding MUOS. Dr.
Federici has mentioned it, and you have, as well. MUOS is in
the midst of another delay. Last year, you were informed that
MUOS was going to be delayed by about 11 months. Our estimate
at this point is that the first MUOS satellite is expected to
be launched in September 2011, with an on-orbit capability of
December 2011. That's about a 10-month delay from what you were
briefed previously. We can go into details regarding what the
purpose or the reason for that delay is, if you'd like.
The other point that I'd like to make is to inform you that
we do have a mitigation plan. You've received the report from
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy this past week. We do
vigorously fund the mitigation plan. We are vigorously funding
the MUOS capability itself to ensure that we deliver the entire
capability. We are looking and working with our partners to
mitigate the challenges that we face. It has our full
attention, sir.
With that, I'm certainly prepared to take any of your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Frederici and Admiral
Dorsett follows:]
Joint Prepared by VADM David J. Dorsett, USN, and Dr. Gary A. Federici
introduction
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, we are
honored to appear before you today to address your Navy's space
activities. Navy Leadership expects to be prominent in the fields of
intelligence, cyber warfare, command and control, knowledge management
and space. By fusing these capabilities, he expects to attain command
and control overmatch against any adversary. To achieve this important
goal, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has restructured the Navy staff
to bring all Navy information-related capabilities and systems under a
single resource sponsor--Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Information
Dominance). In the information and cyberspace domain, the CNO has also
established Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet as the global operator
for many of Navy's critical mission areas, including space operations.
Our Maritime Strategy demands a flexible, interoperable, and secure
global communications capability to support the command and control
requirements of highly mobile, geographically dispersed U.S. and
coalition forces. Our satellite communications capabilities confer to
our deployed forces a decisive advantage across the spectrum of
military operations from peacetime engagements to humanitarian relief
efforts to major combat. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), which
is the next generation Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite
Communication system, is a critical element of our space architecture
and will provide more capable tactical communications to meet the
growing demands of our joint, mobile warfighters.
navy space requirements
The Navy's interests in space, however, are not limited solely to
communications. Intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, position,
navigation, timing, missile warning, meteorology and oceanography each
have significant space components. We must ensure that all of the
Navy's space equities and interests are well understood throughout the
Department of Defense (DOD) and by our interagency partners so that our
combatant commanders and Navy's operating forces have the space
capabilities they need to succeed in their missions.
The Navy is critically dependent on space to conduct not only our
wartime mission but also our core capabilities of forward presence,
deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security,
humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. A wide array of
national, joint, and commercial satellites currently provides Navy
commanders with essential worldwide support. Space capabilities are
vital to our Nation's maritime operations and are foundational to our
ability to operate in a networked and dispersed manner. These seminal
space capabilities support tactical strike, expeditionary warfare,
anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, mine warfare, special
operations, undersea warfare, ballistic missile defense, maritime
domain awareness, and information dominance missions.
The Navy's mission of ensuring the security of our citizens at home
and abroad requires a global reach and persistent presence. We must
constantly be ready to deliver on a mission of mercy or rapidly deploy
decisive combat power, while supporting a myriad of complex maritime
operations that fall between these extremes. Our ability to respond, in
concert with the other Services and coalition partners, depends on
assured space capabilities with inherent flexibility and responsiveness
to support our worldwide responsibilities.
The Navy is one of the largest `users' of space in DOD, yet we rely
on our partnership with the Air Force and the Intelligence Community
(IC) to develop and field the majority of our space systems. Future
U.S. satellite programs are now being developed that promise additional
benefit and capabilities to Navy warfighters. Due to the long lead
times involved in complex space programs, it is essential that naval
requirements and maritime missions are factored into the pre-launch
design and planned on-orbit operation of future satellite acquisitions.
Your Navy is actively engaged with key national and joint space-related
organizations to ensure current and future Navy needs in space are
identified and incorporated. Venues for this engagement include the DOD
Space Posture Review, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National
Security Space Program plans and assessments, and the Operationally
Responsive Space Executive Committee.
navy space investments
Of Navy's current fiscal contributions to space, nearly 50 percent
is dedicated to the acquisition, development and management of the UHF
Follow-On and MUOS communications satellite systems. The remainder is
predominantly apportioned to acquisition of the various satellite
receiver terminals and equipment for Navy units, and space based
navigation, oceanography, and meteorology. All these acquisitions are
consistent with DOD's High Priority Performance Goals in the
President's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget's Analytic Perspectives volume
(page 77-8).
Navy's investment in space-related Science and Technology Research
and Development has been modest--roughly 4 percent of our total space-
related funding. In this fiscally-constrained environment, investment
in projects and studies that address maritime-related capability gaps
is critical to the successful execution of our Nation's maritime
strategy. The innovations produced by the Office of Naval Research,
Naval Research Laboratory, and the OPNAV N2/N6 Technology Insertion
Branch (Navy's Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP)
entity) are vital to this effort. Our active involvement and influence
with non-Navy space-related research activities, centers and agencies
are necessary to leverage ongoing efforts that complement and support
our unique maritime challenges and requirements.
The Navy depends on space capabilities now and expects the demand
for space capabilities to grow in the future, especially for satellite
communications (SATCOM). The Navy's major space segment responsibility
to the joint community is the UHF narrowband satellite communications
constellation. Today this constellation consists of eight UHF Follow-On
satellites, two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), one Leased
Satellite (LEASAT 5), and leased capacity on SKYNET 5C. MUOS will begin
to replace these systems in 2011. Based on evolving warfighting
concepts, UHF satellite communications requirements are expected to
grow, and MUOS, as designed, will be able to support those
requirements.
mobile user objective system
MUOS, the next generation UHF satellite constellation, will consist
of four operational satellites with one on-orbit spare. MUOS will
support Unified Commands and Joint Task Force Components, DOD and non-
DOD agencies, and our allies by providing worldwide tactical narrowband
netted, point-to-point, and broadcast voice and data services in
challenging environments including double canopy foliage, urban
environments, high sea states, and all weather conditions. MUOS will
carry two distinct payloads. The legacy UHF payload will provide the
capability of a UHF Follow-On satellite, while a new UHF waveform
payload will significantly increase the number of accesses while also
increasing available throughput to the Warfighter. The dual-payload
design will allow backward compatibility with legacy UHF terminals
while providing a next generation waveform to support ``communications
on the move'' capabilities and provide disadvantaged platforms (hand
held terminals, aircraft, missiles, UAVs, remote sensors) higher data
rates per access (up to 64 kbps/access).
MUOS will be the common denominator for future command and control,
by enhancing the capability to communicate from the tactical edge to
theater headquarters. MUOS will allow more comprehensive and
coordinated support to regional engagement efforts, providing the
capability to synchronize actions with other Services and agencies.
This capability will be realized through the fielding of MUOS capable
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals and by upgrading existing
legacy UHF software programmable terminals.
delivering mobile user objective system
The timely delivery of MUOS is a high priority for Navy, and we
recognize both our responsibility and commitment to providing this
vital warfighting capability to all our DOD and IC partners. The delay
in delivery of the MUOS, coupled with the age and fragility of the
current UHF satellite constellation, has our full attention and focus.
The program has been reviewed by an ASN (RDA) directed National Review
Team, and the program has subsequently been re-baselined following the
team's recommendations.
If gaps in UHF satellite availability occur, a series of mitigation
options have been developed and can be incrementally implemented to
minimize the operational impact. One mitigation initiative that has
already been employed is a payload reconfiguration to UFO satellite
Flight 11, which increased the number of available channels. This
action was completed at no cost and with very low risk to the
spacecraft. The Navy continues to lease supplemental UHF resources from
two commercial satellites, LEASAT and SKYNET. If necessary, we are also
positioned to lease an additional channel on an Italian space-based
communications system (SICRAL).
We are also pursuing options to make more efficient use of
available satellite resources. The Integrated Waveform (IW), a software
upgrade to UHF SATCOM tactical terminals and Control System, is in
development and will optimize UHF satellite channels by doubling the
number of accesses that can be supported by a single 25 kHz channel.
DOD is also coordinating a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Australian Ministry of Defense to procure/use channels on an
Australian-hosted payload covering the Indian Ocean region, in exchange
for future use (commencing 2018) of equivalent UHF SATCOM accesses in
the Pacific Ocean Region. Finally, we are exploring the use of TACSAT-
4, an Office of Naval Research and Naval Research Laboratory led
development that supports Operationally Responsive Space Office
efforts. TACSAT-4 may provide a very limited operational capability
when it reaches on-orbit capability later this year.
environmental remote sensing
The Navy continues to address vital interests in environmental
remote sensing. In support of Undersea Warfare, we are procuring the
Geosat Follow-On (GFO) II satellite altimeter to maintain continuity in
mapping global ocean temperature profiles which provides critical input
to our global and regional ocean models. The Navy relies upon
partnerships with the Air Force and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration for its general meteorological and
oceanographic remote sensing capabilities and is involved in defining
the requirements for the DOD portion of the restructure of the National
Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System. The imagery and data
collected by these satellites are essential to our ability both to
characterize the environment and assemble vital maritime information
that provides an asymmetric advantage over our adversaries. In support
of the Navy's unique responsibility to provide precise positioning and
navigation data, we are embarking on a new program, the Joint Milli-
Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey (JMAPS), which will enable necessary
upgrades to the master star position catalogs to meet the DOD
positioning accuracy requirements into the next decade.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
The Navy applauds the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and
the National Security Agency's exploitation and dissemination of both
geospatial and signals intelligence data, as well as the National
Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) operation of the space-based sensors. A
robust architecture of SIGINT and GEOINT systems to meet current and
emerging requirements remains crucial to successful maritime
operations. While much progress has been made in improving the planning
and programming of space-based sensors, it is imperative that
replacements for older systems be funded and fielded in sufficient
quantity and capacity to sustain continuity of space-based intelligence
data throughout the maritime domain. Accordingly, we fully support the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence collaboration with
combatant commands and Services to ensure emerging requirements are
adequately supported by IC-funded future collection systems.
commercial space systems
For Navy, commercially provided systems have the ability to
augment, but not replace, national systems. These commercial
capabilities have become increasingly useful in bridging the gap
between requirements and capabilities. The Navy has utilized commercial
communication satellites since the early 1990s to augment bandwidth
requirements not satisfied by military communication satellites.
Technical advances in the commercial sector can provide opportunities
for rapid capability implementation, and are potential ``game-
changers'' in the National Security Space Strategy. The Navy continues
to work with the commercial sector to explore options to address
multiple maritime mission requirements, and we continue to field
systems, such as Commercial Broadband Satellite Program terminals, to
fully leverage available commercial capability.
space cadre
Our Navy equities, requirements, operations and management of space
resources are the responsibility of a small but agile corps of space
professionals that make the Navy's use of space possible. The Navy's
Space Cadre is comprised of approximately 1,350 Active Duty, Reserve,
and civil service personnel from all warfighter designators and
communities, and is a key component of the DOD's 15,000 military and
civilian space professionals. Part of our Total Workforce strategy is
to ensure that fully qualified Navy Space Cadre personnel are
consistently assigned to our most critical and consequential space
billets. This strategy requires the Navy to continue to recruit and
retain a talented and highly skilled workforce to fill vital space
leadership positions now and into the future. We are committed to
providing active career management and continued opportunities for Navy
Space Cadre professionals to ensure that Navy and Joint space-related
assignments complement and enhance career progression paths and
promotion opportunities while infusing naval operational expertise back
into the space community.
Approximately one third of active duty space billets and a number
of our civil service personnel are acquisition billets located
throughout the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Enterprise and at the
NRO. The Navy is fortunate to hold a key Flag-level billet within the
NRO. Rear Admiral Liz Young, who is ``triple-hatted'' as PEO Space
Systems and Commander, SPAWAR Space Field Activity, oversees the
largest concentration of Navy Space Cadre members, and provides space
systems engineering and acquisition expertise to OPNAV N2/N6 as well as
to all Navy systems commands and research centers. It is essential that
we continue to assign talented personnel to represent unique Navy
requirements for space systems in the joint acquisition processes at
the NRO and at the Air Force Space and Missile Center. As the newly
established Fleet Cyber Command and U.S. 10th Fleet reaches full
organizational maturity, they will assume a leading role in Navy's
space planning and operations.
conclusion
In closing, we would like to reiterate that space capabilities have
and will continue to be critical to our Nation's success in the
maritime domain. We now operate in a dynamic and challenging global
environment that demands increased capability and capacity to operate
in a networked but geographically dispersed fashion. Space capabilities
are no longer nice to have; they are essential.
Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today.
The continued support from Congress in general, and this subcommittee
in particular, is deeply appreciated.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Ms. Chaplain.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm focused on the acquisition side of space, and your
opening statement covered a great deal of what I was going to
say, so I'm just going to emphasize a couple of points about
the efforts that DOD is making to improve space, and what we
see are the remaining challenges.
I think a lot of credit goes to DOD for the wide range of
actions they've been taking to improve their acquisitions. They
include such things as strengthening cost estimating,
strengthening testing oversight, contractor oversight,
strengthening the requirements process, strengthening their
acquisition policy. Many of these began before the most recent
Weapons Systems Reform Act (WSRA).
But, we're not really out of the woods yet; there are still
a lot of challenges. I think reform itself will take a long
time to produce results, just because space programs take a
long time themselves. We have very few new programs on the
horizon.
Reform will also be difficult to achieve if the right bench
strength isn't there to execute space programs. This includes
technical and program experts. It has been very challenging for
DOD to address gaps in the space workforce.
Likewise, reform will be difficult if there are gaps in the
industrial base expertise, if there's lax contract management
and oversight, if there are insufficient resources for testing
new technologies, and, as you mentioned, if we can't get
innovation in the form of our small businesses into the
programs. All of these issues, we've identified before as
needing attention.
Moreover, there are still a lot of questions that need to
be resolved about how space should be best organized, led, and
supported. Studies concur that there's a need for stronger
centralized authority for space, and our own studies
consistently show space programs have difficulty coordinating
their ground, user, and space components, as well as getting
agreements on requirements that cross boundaries. Moreover,
without a central point of accountability, it may be difficult
to sustain reform efforts underway.
With that, I would like to just conclude and say, I look
forward to the questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of
Defense's (DOD) space acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions of
dollars to acquire space-based capabilities to support current military
and other government operations, as well as to enable DOD to transform
the way it collects and disseminates information. Despite the
significant investment in space, the majority of large-scale
acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems
during the past two decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of
millions and even billions of dollars and stretched schedules by years
and increased technical risks. To address the cost increases, DOD
altered its acquisitions by reducing the number of satellites it
intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of the satellites, or
terminating major space systems acquisitions. Moreover, along with the
cost increases, many space acquisitions have experienced significant
schedule delays--of as much as 8 years--resulting in potential
capability gaps in areas such as missile warning, military
communications, and weather monitoring. These problems persist.
My testimony today will focus on: (1) the status of space
acquisitions, (2) the efforts DOD is taking to address causes of
problems and increase credibility and success in its space systems
acquisitions, and (3) what remains to be done. Notably, DOD has taken
the important step of acknowledging the acquisition problems of the
past and is taking action to address them, including better management
of the acquisition process and oversight of its contractors. Moreover,
several high-risk space programs have finally resolved technical and
other obstacles and are close to begin delivering capability. However,
other space acquisition programs continue to face challenges in meeting
their cost and schedule targets and aligning the delivery of space
assets with the ground and user systems needed to support and take
advantage of new capability. Additionally, it may take years for
acquisition improvements to take root and produce benefits that will
enable DOD to realize a better return on its investment in space.
Lastly, DOD still needs to decide how to best organize, lead, and
support space activities. If it does not do so, its commitment to
reforms may not be sustainable.
space acquisition challenges persist
A longstanding problem in DOD space acquisitions is that program
and unit costs tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates,
while in some cases, the capability that was to be produced goes down.
Figures 1 and 2 reflect differences in total program and unit costs for
satellites from the time the programs officially began to their most
recent cost estimates. As figure 1 shows, in several cases, DOD has had
to cut back on quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs.
For example, two satellites and four instruments were deleted from the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) and four sensors are expected to have fewer capabilities. This
will reduce some planned capabilities for NPOESS as well as planned
coverage. The figures below reflect the total program costs developed
in fiscal year 2009. (Last year, we also compared original cost
estimates to current cost estimates for the broader portfolio of major
space acquisitions for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. However, we were
unable to perform this analysis this year because, for most of its
major weapon system programs, DOD in fiscal year 2009 did not issue
complete Selected Acquisition Reports, which contain updated yearly
program funding estimates needed to conduct the analysis.)
Several space acquisition programs are years behind schedule.
Figure 3 highlights the additional estimated months needed for programs
to deliver initial operational capabilities (IOC). These additional
months represent time not anticipated at the programs' start dates.
Generally, the further schedules slip, the more DOD is at risk of not
sustaining current capabilities. For example, according to Air Force
officials, they have requested information from the space community on
how best to address a potential gap in missile warning capabilities.
Some Acquisition Programs Have Overcome Problems and Have Satellites
Ready for Launch
DOD has made progress on several of its high-risk space programs
and is expecting significant advances in capability as a result. In
2009, DOD launched the third Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite,
broadening communications capability available to warfighters--and a
fourth WGS satellite is slated for launch in 2011. DOD also launched
two Global Positioning System (GPS) IIR-M satellites, although one has
still not been declared operational because of radio signal
transmission problems. Lastly, DOD supported the launch of a pair of
Space Tracking and Surveillance System satellites, designed to test the
tracking of ballistic missiles in support of missile defense early
missile warning missions--these suffered many delays as well. The
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program had its 31st
consecutive successful operational launch last week.
Moreover, though it has had longstanding difficulties on nearly
every space acquisition program, DOD now finds itself in a position to
possibly launch the first new satellite from four different major space
acquisition programs over the next 12 months that are expected to
significantly contribute to missions and capabilities. These include
the GPS IIF satellites, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
communications satellites, and the Space Based Space Surveillance
(SBSS) satellite--all of which struggled for years with cost and
schedule growth, technical or design problems, as well as oversight and
management weaknesses. Table 1 further describes the status of these
efforts.
One program that appears to be overcoming remaining technical
problems, but for which we are still uncertain whether it can meet its
current launch date, is the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
satellite program. The first of four geosynchronous earth-orbiting
(GEO) satellites (two sensors have already been launched on a highly
elliptical orbit) is expected to launch in December 2010 and is
expected to continue the missile warning mission with sensors that are
more capable than the satellites currently on orbit. Total cost for the
SBIRS program is currently estimated at over $13.6 billion for four GEO
satellites (and two sensors that have already been delivered and are
operational), representing an increase of about $9.2 billion over the
program's original cost, which included five GEO satellites. The most
recent program estimate developed in 2008 set December 2009 as the
launch goal for the first GEO satellite, but program officials indicate
that the first GEO launch will be delayed at least another year,
bringing the total delay to approximately 8 years. The reasons for the
delay include poor government oversight of the contractor, technical
complexities, and rework. The program continues to struggle with flight
software development, and during testing last year, officials
discovered hardware defects on the first GEO satellite, though the
program reports that they have been resolved. The launches of
subsequent GEO satellites have also slipped as a result of flight
software design issues. Program officials indicate that they again
intend to re-baseline the program to more realistic cost and schedule
estimates by mid- to late-2010. Because of the problems on SBIRS, DOD
began a follow-on system effort, now known as Third Generation Infrared
Surveillance (3GIRS), to run in parallel with the SBIRS program. For
fiscal year 2011, DOD plans to cancel the 3GIRS effort, but also plans
to provide funds under the SBIRS program for one of the 3GIRS infrared
demonstrations nearing completion.
Other Programs Still Susceptible to Cost and Schedule Overruns
While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch,
other space acquisition programs face challenges that could further
increase cost and delay targeted delivery dates. The programs that may
be susceptible to cost and schedule challenges include NPOESS, Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS), and GPS IIIA. Delays in both the NPOESS
and MUOS programs have resulted in critical potential capability gaps
for military and other government users. The GPS IIIA program was
planned with an eye toward avoiding problems that plagued the GPS IIF
program, but the schedule leaves little room for potential problems and
there is a risk that the ground system needed to operate the satellites
will not be ready when the first satellite is launched. Table 2
describes the status of these efforts in more detail.
Challenges in Aligning Space System Components
This past year we also assessed the levels at which DOD's
satellites, ground control, and user terminals were synchronized to
provide maximum benefit to the warfighter.\1\ Most space systems
consist of satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals,
though some space systems only require ground control systems to
provide capability to users. Ground control systems are generally used
to: (1) download and process data from satellite sensors and
disseminate this information to warfighters and other users; and (2)
maintain the health and status of the satellites, including steering
the satellites and ensuring that they stay in assigned orbits.
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\1\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System
Components, GAO-10-55 (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2009).
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User terminals, typically procured by the military services and
managed separately from associated satellites and ground control
systems, can range from equipment hosted on backpacks to terminals
mounted on Humvees, airborne assets, or ships. Terminals can be used to
help the warfighter determine longitude, latitude, and altitude via GPS
satellites, or securely communicate with others via AEHF satellites.
Some user terminals are not solely dedicated to delivering capability
from a specific satellite system. For example, the Joint Tactical Radio
System is the primary user terminal associated with the MUOS program,
but the system is also designed to be the next generation of tactical
radios, allowing extensive ground-to-ground communication as well.
Overall, we found the alignment of space system components proved
to be challenging to DOD. Specifically, we found that for six of DOD's
eight major space system acquisitions, DOD has not been able to align
delivery of satellites with ground control systems, user terminals, or
both. Of the eight major space system acquisitions, five systems'
ground control system efforts are optimally aligned to deliver
capability with their companion satellites, while three are not. For
the five space systems requiring user terminals, none was aligned. In
some cases, capability gaps of 4 or more years have resulted from
delays in the fielding of ground control systems or user terminals.
When space system acquisitions are not aligned, satellite capability is
available but underutilized, though in some cases, work-around efforts
can help compensate for the loss or delay of capability. Moreover, when
ground systems, user terminals, or both are not aligned with
satellites, there are significant limitations in the extent to which
the system as a whole can be independently tested and
verified.2,3
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\2\ In making determinations about whether space system
acquisitions were aligned, we examined whether there were gaps between
fielding dates of satellite capabilities compared to ground system
capabilities and whether lower percentages of user terminal types were
planned to be fielded by the space system acquisitions' planned initial
capability. Generally we considered aspects of a space acquisition
unaligned if there was a gap of years, rather than months, between the
fielding dates of significant capabilities. Regarding user terminals,
we only considered these unaligned compared to satellite capabilities
when user terminals did not meet DOD's measure of synchronization for
military satellite communications space acquisitions. This measure,
established by the U.S. Strategic Command, a primary user of DOD space
systems, asserts that 20 percent of any type of user terminal should be
fielded by a space system acquisition's initial capability date and 85
percent should be fielded by its full capability date.
\3\ It should be noted that while there are criteria for
communications satellites, there are no criteria available in DOD that
determine the optimum alignment or synchronization for the broader
portfolio of satellite programs. This is principally because of
inherent differences in satellite missions and their associated ground
and user assets, according to officials involved in space system
development as well as acquisition oversight.
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Launch Manifest Issues
Another risk facing DOD space programs for the next few years is
the potential for increased demand for certain launch vehicles. DOD is
positioned to launch a handful of satellites across missions over the
next 2 years that were originally scheduled for launch years ago. Until
recently, DOD had four launch pads on the east coast from which to
launch military satellites. In 2009, DOD launched the final two GPS
IIR-M satellites using the Delta II launch vehicle, thereby
discontinuing its use of the Delta II line and its associated launch
infrastructure. DOD now plans to launch most of its remaining
satellites using one of DOD's EELV types--Atlas V or Delta IV--from one
of two east coast launch pads. At the same time, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to use the Delta II
to launch at least three major missions before that launch vehicle is
retired. In addition, NASA is already manifesting other major missions
on the Atlas V. Given the expected increased demand for launches--many
of which are considered high priority--and the tempo of launches DOD
has achieved with EELV, it appears that the launch manifest is crowded.
As a result, if programs still struggling with technical, design, or
production issues miss their launch dates, the consequences could be
significant, as it may take many months to secure new dates. Some of
DOD's satellites are dual integrated, which means they can be launched
on either type of EELV. The Air Force deserves credit for designing the
satellites this way because it offers more flexibility in terms of
launch vehicle usage, but there are also cost and schedule implications
associated with rescheduling from one EELV type to the other. Moreover,
DOD can request its launch provider to speed up the transition time
between launches, although this would also increase costs.
Nevertheless, Air Force officials stated that they were confident that
the higher launch rates could be achieved, especially if a particular
satellite's priority increased. According to Air Force officials, they
have already begun to implement means to address these issues.
dod is taking actions to address space and weapon acquisition problems
DOD has been working to ensure that its space programs are more
executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of the
actions it is taking address root causes of problems, though it will
take time to determine whether these actions are successful and they
need to be complemented by decisions on how best to lead, organize, and
support space activities.
Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost
growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First,
on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford,
creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating,
optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and for
space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess
potentially more executable alternatives. Second, DOD has tended to
start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the
assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within
available resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused
largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs attract more
dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies.
Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology invention into
acquisition, programs experience technical problems that require large
amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover, there is no way to
accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and
build a satellite system when critical technologies planned for that
system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention.
Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements
in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of
the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD has
preferred to make fewer but heavier, larger, and more complex
satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather than larger
constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that gradually
increase in sophistication. This has stretched technology challenges
beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly increased the
complexities related to software. Programs also seek to maximize
capability on individual satellites because it is expensive to launch.
In addition, problematic implementation of an acquisition strategy
in the 1990s, known as Total System Performance Responsibility, for
space systems resulted in problems on a number of programs because it
was implemented in a manner that enabled requirements creep and poor
contractor performance--the effects of which space programs are still
addressing. We have also reported on shortfalls in resources for
testing new technologies, which coupled with less expertise and fewer
contractors available to lead development efforts, have magnified the
challenge of developing complex and intricate space systems.
Our work--which is largely based on best practices in the
commercial sector--has recommended numerous actions that can be taken
to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended
that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an
incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and
requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and
demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We
have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program
manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array
of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit
space programs. These practices are detailed in appendix I.
DOD is implementing an array of actions to reform how weapons and
space systems are acquired. For space in particular, DOD is working to
ensure critical technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition
programs begin; requirements are defined early in the process and are
stable throughout; and that system design remains stable, according to
the Director of Space and Intelligence under DOD's Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. DOD
also intends to follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition
processes versus pursuing significant leaps in capabilities involving
technology risk. The Director of Space and Intelligence also told us
that DOD is revisiting the use of military standards in its
acquisitions and providing more program and contractor oversight. The
approach described to us by the Director of Space and Intelligence
mirrors best practices identified in our reports. Moreover, some
actions--described in the table below--have already been taken to
ensure acquisitions are more knowledge-based.
Congress has also acted on a broader scale through the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which was signed into law on May 22,
2009.\4\ The goal of this new statute is to improve acquisition
outcomes in DOD, with specific emphasis on major defense acquisition
programs (MDAP) and major automated information systems. According to
the President of the United States this legislation is designed to
limit cost overruns before they spiral out of control and will
strengthen oversight and accountability by appointing officials who
will be charged with closely monitoring the weapons systems being
purchased to ensure that costs are controlled. DOD states in its 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review \5\ that the law also will substantially
improve the oversight of major weapons acquisition programs, while
helping to put MDAPs on a sound footing from the outset by addressing
program shortcomings in the early phases of the acquisition process.
DOD also states that it is undertaking a far-reaching set of reforms to
achieve these goals and to improve how DOD acquires and fields critical
capabilities for current and future wars and conflicts.
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\4\ Pub. L. No. 111-23, 123 Stat. 1704 (2009).
\5\ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C., Feb. 1, 2010).
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additional decisions on leadership, organization, and support are still
needed
The actions that the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of
Defense have been taking to address acquisition problems are good
steps. However, there are still more significant changes to processes,
policies, and support needed to ensure that reforms can take hold.
Recent studies and reviews examining the leadership, organization, and
management of national security space have all found that there is no
single authority responsible below the President and that authorities
and responsibilities are spread across the department. In fact, the
national security space enterprise comprises a wide range of government
and nongovernment organizations responsible for providing and operating
space-based capabilities serving both military and intelligence needs.
In 2008, for example, a congressionally chartered commission (known
as the Allard Commission) \6\ reported that responsibilities for
military space and intelligence programs were scattered across the
staffs of DOD organizations and the intelligence community and that it
appeared that ``no one is in charge'' of national security space. The
same year, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
reported similar concerns, focusing specifically on difficulties in
bringing together decisions that would involve both the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense.\7\ Prior studies,
including those conducted by the Defense Science Board and the
Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and
Organization (Space Commission),\8\ have identified similar problems,
both for space as a whole and for specific programs. While these
studies have made recommendations for strengthening leadership for
space acquisitions, no major changes to the leadership structure have
been made in recent years. In fact, an executive agent position within
the Air Force that was designated in 2001 in response to a Space
Commission recommendation to provide leadership has not been filled
since the last executive resigned in 2007.
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\6\ Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and
Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the
Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of
National Security Space (Alexandria, VA, July 2008).
\7\ House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on
Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture
(Washington, DC, October 2008).
\8\ Department of Defense, Report of the Commission to Assess U.S.
National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington, DC,
Jan. 11, 2001).
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Diffuse leadership has a direct impact on the space acquisition
process, primarily because it makes it difficult to hold any one person
or organization accountable for balancing needs against wants, for
resolving conflicts among the many organizations involved with space,
and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they need to be
dedicated. Many of the cost and schedule problems we identified for the
GPS IIF program, for instance, were tied in part to diffuse leadership
and organizational stovepipes, particularly with respect to DOD's
ability to coordinate delivery of space, ground, and user assets. In
fact, DOD is now facing a situation where satellites with advances in
capability will be residing for years in space without users being able
to take full advantage of them because investments and planning for
ground, user, and space components were not well-coordinated.
Congressional and DOD studies have also called for changes in the
national security space organizational structure to remove cultural
barriers to coordinating development efforts and to better incorporate
analytical and technical support from an organization that is augmented
with military and intelligence community expertise.
Finally, studies have identified insufficient numbers of
experienced space acquisition personnel and inadequate continuity of
personnel in project management positions as problems needing to be
addressed in the space community. Our own studies have identified gaps
in key technical positions, which we believed increased acquisition
risks. For instance, in a 2008 review of the EELV program, we found
that personnel shortages at the EELV program office occurred
particularly in highly specialized areas, such as avionics and launch
vehicle groups.\9\ These engineers work on issues such as reviewing
components responsible for navigation and control of the rocket.
Moreover, only half the government jobs in some key areas were
projected to be filled. These and other shortages in the EELV program
office heightened concerns about DOD's ability to effectively manage
the program using a contracting strategy for EELV that required greater
government attention to the contractor's technical, cost, and schedule
performance information. In a recent discussion with GAO, the Director
of Space and Intelligence under DOD's Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics stated that the
primary obstacle to implementing reforms in space is the lack of
``bench strength,'' primarily technical and systems engineering
expertise.
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\9\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight
Challenges, GAO-08-1039 (Washington, DC: Sept. 26, 2008).
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Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, DOD space is at a critical juncture. After more than
a decade of acquisition difficulties, which have created potential gaps
in capability, diminished DOD's ability to invest in new space systems,
and lessened DOD's credibility to deliver high-performing systems
within budget and on time, DOD is finally positioned to launch new
generations of satellites that promise vast enhancements in capability.
Moreover, recent program cancellations have alleviated competition for
funding and may have allowed DOD to focus on fixing problems and
implementing reforms rather than taking on new, complex, and
potentially higher-risk efforts. But these changes raise new questions.
Specifically, when can investments in new programs be made? How can
reforms really take hold when leadership is diffuse? How can reforms
take hold when there are still organizational barriers that prevent
effective coordination? Lastly, how can acquisitions be successful if
the right technical and programmatic expertise is not in place?
Clearly, there are many challenges ahead for space. We look forward to
working with the DOD to help ensure that these and other questions are
addressed.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
contacts and acknowledgements
For further information about this statement, please contact
Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected] Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Pubic Affairs may
be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key
contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant
Director; Greg Campbell; Rich Horiuchi; Alyssa Weir; and Peter Zwanzig.
appendix ii: scope and methodology
In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space
programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of
individual space programs, common problems affecting space system
acquisitions, and DOD's acquisition policies. We relied on our best
practices studies, which comment on the persistent problems affecting
space acquisitions, the actions DOD has been taking to address these
problems, and what remains to be done, as well as Air Force documents
addressing these problems and actions. We also relied on work performed
in support of our annual weapons system assessments, and analyzed DOD
funding estimates to assess cost increases and investment trends for
selected major space acquisition programs. The GAO work used in
preparing this statement was conducted in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
This really goes to Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Admiral
Dorsett. In 2001, the Space Commission, established in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, to
review the management and organization of space, concluded that
a number of ``disparate space activities should be promptly
merged, chains of commands adjusted, lines of communication
opened, and policies modified to achieve greater responsibility
and accountability.''
Here we are, 9 years later. Has the situation changed since
the Commission made this finding? If so, is it better or is it
worse?
I guess we start first with you, Secretary Payton.
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. A lot has changed since 2000 and
2001: establishment of the Director for National Intelligence
(DNI) and the assignment of the NRO to that Director; the
acquisition rules that were established as a result of that
2001 legislation have been changed again, and now space
programs are back under the standard, routine acquisition
policies that the rest of the Pentagon abides by.
There has been a myriad of changes since that 2001 era.
Recognizing that, Secretary Donley, back in December, asked Mr.
Rich McKinney, an experienced Air Force employee, to look at
how Air Force Headquarters should be organized, in light of all
these changes since 2001. The results of Mr. McKinney's
analysis will go to Secretary Donley in late March, early
April. Mr. McKinney has surveyed 56 people, to include Congress
and the Army, Navy, and Air Force, all across the country. So,
he has collected a wealth of data and is distilling that into
some recommendations for Secretary Donley to consider.
We are responding to all the changes that have occurred
since 2000 and 2001, and Secretary Donley will have that to
digest here, within a few weeks.
Some of the potential suggestions do include help from
Congress, and so, we will be fully open and transparent with
Congress if we decide to move down certain paths.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Kehler?
General Kehler. Sir, I would offer that, in the management
of space activities, there are two major and complementary
segments that we have to look at. One is the operational
segment, and the other is the acquisition segment.
For operations, I would say, unequivocally, we are far
better today than we were in 2001. It is clear who is in charge
of our space operations, and that begins with the President
giving the mission responsibilities to the Commander of U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) whose predecessors have
established the functional component for space. It's a joint
activity, where we have now pulled together the operational
pieces of what used to be a fragmented activity. I think that
now 6, 7, or more years of combat experience have helped hone
how we do space operations. My take on this is that, in the
operational side of this equation, we have made great strides,
and we are far better for it today.
On the acquisitions side, I think I would give us a mixed
review. In my own command, for example, AFSPC, as a result of
that committee's work in 2001, I now have a hybrid major
command in the Air Force. I have a command that has
responsibility to organize, train, and equip space forces to
give to General Chilton at STRATCOM, but I also have an
acquisition arm inside AFSPC; I'm the only one of the Air Force
major commands like that. That was done specifically so we
could pull operations and acquisition and requirements, from a
four-star perspective, all together, and to make clear where
the accountability and authorities were in all of that. So, in
that regard, I think that we have also come a long way inside
the Air Force.
The question now is, in light of the changes that Secretary
Payton mentioned, whether we are where we need to be. I think
that's where this review that Secretary Donley has begun is
good and it's timely. We'll look forward to discussing this
with the Secretary as we go forward.
Certainly, there are some places where we still have work
to do in the management area. The question is, in light of the
changes that occurred since 2001, how best to go forward. We
are participating in that study. It's focused inside the Air
Force, but, of course, it has implications for other things, as
well, and we're looking forward to that being completed.
Senator Ben Nelson. How would that relate to policy? I
understand operations. I understand acquisition. But, what
about policy, to make sure that the overall picture is complete
and all the pieces are in place, or what it takes to put all
the pieces in place? Somebody has to truly be in charge to make
all those decisions and see how each and every one of these
pieces fits together to make the picture. What would you say to
that?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir, I would offer, that is part of the
charter that Secretary Donley laid out for this comparatively
short study. How we relate to the rest of the Pentagon, to OSD,
and how we relate to the other Services is part of the scope of
that study.
Senator Ben Nelson. All right.
Admiral Dorsett?
Admiral Dorsett. Mr. Chairman, I agree with General Kehler,
that, on the operations side, there is great progress and
improvement that's been made, in terms of operational
management and oversight of space activities. But, I also
share, I think, your concern that it's not just policy, it's
not just acquisition, but it's the resources and how they are
managed across DOD. While I'm probably a little bit out of my
lane here, from my vantage point, there are a fair number of
different players, with different roles and responsibilities
across OSD, and it is not as clear to me that this is, perhaps,
necessarily, the perfect organizational alignment. Whether it's
within the secretariat of OSD itself or whether it's within the
Joint Staff, there are different players and different
organizations that have responsibilities, and it could probably
be tuned up a bit.
In terms of the Navy, I do want to bring to your attention,
within the last year, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Gary
Roughead, made a couple of significant changes that have
streamlined the Navy's focus on space and its management of
space.
In my office, the Deputy CNO for Information Dominance has
assigned one individual responsibility for space. We had
multiple flag officers on the Navy staff, previously, that had
responsibility for space.
In the fleet, he stood up the 10th fleet. The commander of
the 10th fleet, a three-star admiral, is now the one individual
who's responsible for space, operationally, for the Navy. In
the secretariat, my compatriot, Dr. Federici, has that
responsibility. So, we've streamlined our organizational
alignment, and we're already seeing the benefits of that in the
dialogue.
We have some actions to take to actually make some
additional progress. But, the alignment, organizationally, I
think, has been very positive for us.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony and service.
I apologize I was late because of other meetings.
General Kehler and Mr. Payton, I want to focus on space and
the potential impacts of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) budget changes to what you do. The
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) certainly assures our
access to space, has a remarkable success record, and is a real
workhorse. But, as we all know, assured access to space is not
cheap, and the cost is trending up. In that context, I want to
understand what you think of the decisions, just announced with
regard to NASA, to retire the Shuttle very quickly and, even
more significantly, cancel the Constellation program. How will
that affect future launch costs that you deal with? If you all
could offer your thoughts on that.
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. In fact, on February 1st, I called a
dear friend of mine, Bill Gerstenmaier, over in NASA
headquarters, and he was very open to work with the Air Force
and the entire DOD as NASA puts together their plan for the
future.
Clearly, we share an industrial base with NASA. We share an
industry workforce with NASA. That industrial base is, in many
places, not healthy. Concentrating more flights per year in the
EELV program would possibly help us in acquiring the components
of a launch vehicle. But, we have to be very careful and
understand and manage that relationship very closely, because
it would not be beneficial for either organization to have a
unique EELV for NASA applications and a unique EELV for DOD
applications. That would aid neither agency.
If EELV does become part of NASA's future, either through
government flights or commercial flights, we would have to
watch very closely any design changes, as well as any
production line changes of that sort of detail, and work very
closely with NASA to understand and make sure we both end up
with a better product.
Senator Vitter. Let me back up, because I was really
focused on something a little different.
Mr. Payton. Okay.
Senator Vitter. Maybe the more direct way to ask my
question is this. This administration wants to cancel the
Constellation program. Does that have an impact on you all,
and, if so, what is it?
Mr. Payton. Tomorrow, I have a session with several NASA
folks, and NRO folks, to understand their immediate and longer-
term future for the cancellation of Constellation and so that
we can learn what the ramifications and the ripple effect could
be. But, again, that's a relationship we intend to manage and
understand very closely, and NASA has been very cooperative
with us.
Senator Vitter. General?
General Kehler. Sir, in looking at the NASA decision, first
of all, we were asked, by the Augustine panel, to provide some
input prior to the decisions, which we did. In that assessment
that we provided before the decisions were made, we listed
almost two columns. Column one was a set of what we saw as
opportunities. As you look at the NASA decision today, the
investment that is planned there, in terms of research and
development for a new liquid engine, is a good opportunity that
we would like to collaborate with them on. We see that as a
good opportunity for the country, going forward. We see their
desire to improve the launch infrastructure--especially on the
east coast, related to the Kennedy Space Center, where we and
the Air Force join at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station--as a
benefit.
We also see an opportunity, here, with the increased demand
on commercial activities. We have said for a very long time,
that part of our ``assured access to space'' plan includes
commercial launch vendors that are viable. This pulling on
commercial, we also think is a positive thing.
There is a challenge, here, regarding solid rocket motors,
and that's the most immediate challenge that we see. The
largest demand today, on the solid rocket motor industrial
base, comes from NASA, although DOD, the Air Force, and the
Navy, as well, rely on that same industrial base for both the
land-based and the sea-based strategic deterrent, for other
launch-vehicle solid-rocket strap-ons, for example, that we
need for EELV and other things. Part of the review that's now
going on, that Mr. Payton is heading, is, in fact, drilling
down into that area of concern that we have, to find out
whether that's a real concern, or whether it is not. I can't
give you the details of that today, because what we recommended
prior to the decision was, if this is the decision that's made,
we will then have to go off and sit down and take a hard look
at what the implications will be for the industrial base. That
is where we stand today.
We don't have answers yet. What we do have is a potential
concern. Perhaps it will turn out not to be a concern, but we
don't know that yet.
Senator Vitter. Let me explore that a little bit, because I
don't understand how it wouldn't be a concern, at the end of
the day. As I understand it, for solid-rockets, there's a set
industrial base. The majority of support comes from NASA. The
minority of support comes from DOD. If that majority support
from NASA goes away, and you still need to have and depend on
that industrial base, I assume your costs go way up, absent
some other help or some other factor. Am I missing something?
Mr. Payton. I don't know, and that's the issue. That would
be an obvious concern, but I don't have facts that say that is,
in fact, what will happen. I don't know what will happen. I
think that we need to pursue the course that we are on here,
which is, we have people off studying this, working with NASA,
working with the rest of the partners that we have, to make
sure that we understand it.
Senator Vitter. Okay. Some initial estimates are that the
booster cost, because of what I'm describing, could go up as
much as 100 percent. Is that within the realm of possibility,
based on what you know now?
Mr. Payton. The information we've seen is that the
propulsion systems for our EELVs might double in price, not the
whole launch vehicle, but the propulsion which is both solid
propellant and liquid propellant rocket engines.
Senator Vitter. Okay. So, in fact, your admittedly early
estimates would confirm a 100 percent figure for that category.
Mr. Payton. For that specific part of the EELV equation.
We're also looking at different ways to buy EELVs. That could
perhaps save costs.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Mr. Payton. There's a wealth of studies that we're doing
right now to look at what an EELV should cost; a should-cost
study.
Senator Vitter. That look includes this block-buy approach?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
If I can switch gears, quickly--and you may have covered
this already, to some extent; I apologize, if you did. There is
concern about not having a designated executive agent for space
or Space Posture Review (SPR), even as we make major
investments--nearly $11 billion in fiscal year 2011. Who,
within DOD, is ultimately responsible for developing and
coordinating that sort of departmentwide space strategy?
Mr. Payton. The SPR was conducted with all elements of the
Department. It was led by the OSD that handles policy for the
SPR.
Senator Vitter. So, the entity responsible for leading it
is that office?
Mr. Payton. For the SPR, yes, sir.
Senator Vitter. When will the Secretary designate an
executive agent for space?
Mr. Payton. Secretary Donley has asked Rich McKinney, a
very experienced Air Force individual, to look at how the Air
Force should be organized, in light of many changes that have
occurred in the past decade, relative to the authorities and
responsibilities of the executive agent for space. Mr.
McKinney's report, again, will be delivered to Secretary Donley
in late March.
Senator Vitter. Okay. Compared to that timing, what's the
current status of the SPR?
Mr. Payton. There will be an interim report that comes to
Congress that, I understand, has been signed by the DOD
representative, as of today. Then the Office of the DNI also
has to sign that interim report, and then it can come over to
Congress.
Senator Vitter. Will that final version be done in time to
inform the fiscal year 2012 budget within the Department?
Mr. Payton. The interim report clearly will be. The final
summation of the SPR will not be available until after the
White House finishes a national space policy update.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Ms. Chaplain, your testimony ties diffuse leadership to
acquisition problems. What, exactly, do you mean by ``diffuse
leadership,'' and how do you think it's affecting programs?
Ms. Chaplain. In some of the programs we review, it becomes
unclear if there's a real person in charge or a single point of
authority to resolve conflicts and gaps in coordinating assets.
When we looked at the GPS program, for example, we found
disconnects between the ground segment, the space segment, and
the user terminal. Sometimes these gaps added up to years. So,
our question is, who is the person in charge to resolve these
gaps and make sure resources are dedicated to where they need
to be? We never really found that single point of
accountability. We're looking at SSA now, and some of those
questions come up again, like, who's really the point person
for SSA? It's so broad, and it covers so many organizations.
That is just what tends to happen in space, because there
are so many players. Even outside of DOD, there's an
Intelligence Community, there's NASA, there's the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)--any number of
players involved in any one project. Who's the one that brings
it all together and has a strong say in what's going on in
these programs?
I think it's echoed, in a large sense, in some of these
studies that have been done per various congressional mandates.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, if I could just hit one final topic, which is
the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS).
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure.
Senator Vitter. If I can turn to the Air Force leadership.
Did the Air Force help initiate the decision to divorce NPOESS?
What was your input into the process that led to that decision?
Mr. Payton. The Air Force participated, along with the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and NOAA and
NASA and the National Security Council (NSC), to put together
the White House decision on NPOESS.
Senator Vitter. What was that input? Was the route that was
taken--did it, in part, come from you, or was it enforced on
the Air Force?
Mr. Payton. It was a decision that OSTP made and the NSC
made, but with multiple inputs from the Air Force on
alternative future programs. If the programs stayed together,
what would the future look like? So, our job was to offer
technical advice and warfighter needs, and to offer the
potential ramifications of certain decision paths.
Senator Vitter. Did the Air Force have a fundamental
opinion whether its interests would best be served with a
divorce, or not?
Mr. Payton. We deferred that to the NSC.
Senator Vitter. What steps are being taken to ensure that
Defense recoups the technologies it has already funded?
Mr. Payton. In fact, the OSTP and the NSC sent all the
participants a letter defining the near-term immediate steps.
We helped put that letter together, and it includes harvesting
the sensor technologies and gaining access to all the
intellectual property that is necessary for future designs. So,
we will have access to all of that.
Our initial step, though, is to work with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) and do a military user requirements scrub to
determine what the best requirements are for the warfighter
that the Air Force would then design into a successor
spacecraft for our part of the weather picture that we are
responsible for, which is one of the three orbits; the Air
Force will field the systems necessary to satisfy one of the
three orbits that everybody needs.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Final question, jumping back to NASA-related issues.
Obviously, canceling the recommendation, which is not law yet,
of canceling Constellation is a major departure from the past.
Was the Air Force explicitly asked the impact on you of
canceling Constellation before the decision was made?
Mr. Payton. No, sir.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kehler. Sir, may I clarify--on the executive agent
question that you asked, just one other point?
Senator Vitter. Sure.
General Kehler. I sensed, in the question, that maybe there
is a view that there is not an executive agent today. That is
not so. The directive that implemented the Space Commission's
recommendation about an executive agent says that the Secretary
of the Air Force will be the executive agent. Then the
Secretary can delegate that to the Under Secretary. Without an
Under Secretary, we haven't delegated that authority anywhere,
but the Secretary himself is still the executive agent for
space for DOD.
He has three primary responsibilities in that job: plan,
program, and acquire. Space policy has always been under the
purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Just for
clarification.
Senator Vitter. General, my reaction to that would be, you
can have a piece of paper that says the President of the United
States is the executive agent, but that obviously wouldn't be
meaningful, given his other responsibilities. Admittedly, to a
lesser extent, my response to that would be, it's the same
problem with the Secretary of the Air Force. Do you have a
response to that?
General Kehler. No, sir. I understand exactly what you're
saying. I thought that what you were saying was that there was
not an executive agent. Technically, there is.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
Ms. Chaplain, last year the GAO issued a report that
resulted in some significant and very negative press coverage
about the health and reliability of the GPS system. Could you
update us on the GAO's assessment, now, of the GPS system?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. We're currently conducting a follow-on
review. The two programs we looked at, on the satellite side
last year, were the IIF program and the IIIA program. The IIF
program has made some progress, and it's getting ready for a
launch fairly soon.
The IIIA program is meeting its schedule currently. We
still have concerns about the compressed nature of the
schedule, and all of the very difficult activities ahead for
GPS IIIA, but it is not encountering any severe problems at
this point.
When we look at the health of the constellation, our
findings are pretty similar to last year's. One thing we
weren't discussing in last year's report, that should probably
brought out more when we talk about it this year, is some of
the options the Air Force has available to it to manage GPS if
they experience some dips in the constellation availability.
There are options that they have to get through those periods.
Our concern is, you don't want to find yourself in a state
where you're looking at those kinds of options; you want to
make sure you do everything you can to keep the program
healthy, resourced, and on track.
Senator Ben Nelson. One of the key impacts to the Air Force
looks to be the EELV upper-stage engine. The infrastructure
cost may double, as we understand it, for the Air Force,
because NASA has stopped buying these engines. Dr. Payton,
General Kehler, could you enlighten us on this?
Mr. Payton. Yes, Senator. That's part of the propulsion
doubling end cost that we have seen. We haven't experienced it
yet. It has been predicted. It's both the upper-stage engine,
called an RL-10, and the first-stage engine, called and RS-68,
on one of the EELVs.
The company that makes those two rocket engines has shrunk
its overhead, facility-wise, by 50 percent in the past few
years, but with the drawdown of the Space Shuttle main engine,
which that company also works on; and the cancellation of a
rocket engine called the J2X, which is part of the Ares launch
vehicle. If that does come about, even though they've already
reduced their overhead dramatically in the past few years, they
will still have more overhead, more facility space than they
need to produce the first-stage engine and the second-stage
engine. That's, again, part of the industrial-base
ramifications that we have to manage very tightly.
Additionally, the flight rates for the EELVs have not
materialized, due to a drawdown in commercial launch sales.
That has been part of the problem, too; just not enough rocket
engines being built compared to what the original plans were.
Senator Ben Nelson. That puts us at a disadvantage of some
sort. Is it just economic, or is it the potential of not being
able to have parts or replacement or anything that would relate
to continuity?
Mr. Payton. The first word out of my mouth, when I talk to
either the Air Force folks or the industry folks, when it comes
to launch, is reliability. We cannot afford a failure in a
launch. So, we will not do anything that sacrifices
reliability. We have, again, six studies ongoing right now, all
the way from mission assurance to detailed should-cost studies,
to look at how much manpower the industry is charging to the
EELV program. So, we have a series of six studies going on
right now to look at how we can maintain the mission assurance,
maintain the reliability, and reduce these costs that we're
seeing on the horizon.
Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Payton, the Air Force
reconfigures and uses excess strategic assets for space launch.
I understand there may be some issues arising, from a
competition perspective, with regard to the use of these
assets. Is there a way to save money, with respect to the
assets, and avoid destruction costs? Does the Air Force have a
view on this?
Mr. Payton. These rockets, that use excess Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) stages, are called Minotaurs. There
are four different sizes of Minotaur. Every time we use one, we
get Secretary of Defense approval to do that, for that very
reason. But, these launchers launch satellites that are much
smaller than what EELV rockets can launch. So, it's a different
class, a different, almost, market space, a different market
for these class of launchers, compared to EELVs.
Senator Ben Nelson. All right.
Ms. Chaplain, you mentioned in your testimony that one of
the problems facing DOD in the future is a lack of adequate
engineers and technicians with space experience. Is this a
problem not only with DOD, but is it also just a general
problem in the industry, as a whole?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes, I think it is a general problem. The one
thing to note is that NASA has some special flexibilities, in
terms of hiring people and retaining them and recruiting them,
that the DOD may not have on the space side, but, generally, in
aerospace, I think there's an increasing shortage in key
technical expertise, that everybody is dealing with.
Senator Ben Nelson. From the standpoint of the Air Force--
and perhaps from the Navy, as well--Secretary Payton and Dr.
Federici, could you give us some idea of your experience in
being able to field technically competent engineers? While we
may have it under control at the moment, or getting it under
control, what does the future hold?
Dr. Federici. Within the Navy, we have the Naval Research
Lab (NRL), and they have been in the space engineering, space
science and technology, for well over 50 years.
Senator Ben Nelson. Does that mean you're growing your own,
in effect?
Dr. Federici. We use the NRL as pretty much a pipeline to
grow engineers on the civilian side. We also have a military
cadre there, as well, that augments it.
We also have a very strong Navy element at the NRO, and we
have had that element for a long time. I believe we have about
240-plus people out there, all participating in acquisition
programs. We also hold leadership positions out there. Admiral
Liz Young is the systems engineer for the NRO. We also have
Andrew Cox, who runs their Communications Directorate. Those
are the key areas where we try to grow our people, and
especially the people in the NRO--mostly military--and a
civilian segment, as well. We try to take the military and try
to move them back to the fleet, when we can, bring them back
into space, as well, so that we always are bringing the fleet
views of space support within this technology arm of the
National Security Space Office.
Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Payton?
Mr. Payton. The Air Force has something called an
Acquisition Improvement Program for not just space, but across
the board--air and space and cyber. Part of that is hiring 900
new acquisition personnel for space itself. We've already
brought on over 50 of those 900. That 900 will spread over the
course of a few years. So, that's on one end of the spectrum,
where we're attracting into Air Force space folks who are
already skilled in space acquisition engineering.
On the other end of the spectrum, there are brand new
lieutenants. The Air Force Academy has a superb astrodynamics
department, where the cadets actually design, build, and fly
satellites. So, we're working the problem on both ends of the
career spectrum.
General Kehler. Since the Space and Missile Systems Center
(SMSC) is in AFSPC--over the last year, or a little bit more
now, we have seen a sharp increase in the number of young
people coming out of college who are interested in coming to
work at SMC, to the tune of almost 300. Now, there are reasons
for why they are there. It has to do with the economy and some
other issues, of course. But, nevertheless, that's about 300
young people that we would not have had otherwise. We believe
that--given the nature of the work that they will do there, and
the fact that many of them were interested in interning with us
before they actually came to work for us, we think that we will
retain a sufficient number of them, or a high percentage of
them. That's good news for us, and that's one of the brightest
spots that we've had in a number of years. So, that piece is
good.
I think the experience level of our program managers is
going up. We have committed to keeping some of our program
managers in place longer, for example, than we had in the past,
and I think that's paying some dividends, as well. So, working
through this Acquisition Improvement Program, I think that we
have seen some strides here. The question is whether we can
sustain that. When the Air Force presence at the NRO, as well,
which has been a very large presence over the years--we also
see more experience there, and, in fact, some additional
program management opportunities and other things out at the
NRO, as well.
The two places where we procure most of the Nation's
national security space devices--AFSPC and the NRO--have seen
some improvements over the last year or 2.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Secretary, over 80 percent of the
satellite communications in Iraq and Afghanistan are handled by
commercial satellites, and most of this capacity is purchased
on an annual basis and funded through the supplemental or
contingency operations funding. In your view, should there be a
more strategic approach to buying commercial communications?
What's the right mix of commercial and military capacity?
Perhaps, General Kehler, I would begin with you.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, there should be a more
strategic view about how to go forward. There is no question
that satellite communications is one of those places where we
rely very heavily on what commercial can provide; and, as you
say, we essentially buy it by the pound.
As we look to the future, of course, we have tended to
provide the very high-end protected communications. The Navy
does UHF for tactical and operational purposes; we've now been
launching the wideband global service satellite. But, we still
see room in the future for commercial, and one of the issues
that has been taken on in the SPR is, what that mixture should
look like as we go forward.
At the same time, we are also looking at what the
architecture should be, with the cancellation of the
Transformational Satellite System. What does that mean for the
future of protected satellite communications and this mixture?
We are back looking, again, to revalidate our requirements, so
that we can understand what that mixture should be as we look
at the future.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay. Thank you. I think that will
suffice there.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Panelists, thanks for taking time to join us today.
Welcome, General Kehler. I know you took the medium-length
journey from Colorado to join us today; and I understand that
you, in part, came to be a part of the wonderful ceremony we
had in Emancipation Hall, with the WASP pilots. It was moving
and inspirational.
My mother was a pilot. She was inspired to become a pilot
both by the example of Amelia Earhart and the WASPs. I
remember, fondly, her throwing three or four of her children,
including me, into the airplane, and off we went, in Arizona.
I'm reminded, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Vitter, when
we want to come together, it seems to be the American women
that bring us together. It was very, very inspirational to be
there today.
Let me, if I might--and, Secretary Payton, turn to you, as
well--to talk about NPOESS. I now understand we're calling it
the Joint Polar Satellite System, and that seems to be an
important step, as we move to reconfigure what we do, rename
it, as well. I've watched its progress, or lack thereof, in
some cases, both in the House of Representatives and now in the
Senate. The budget has ballooned, and the schedule was slipped.
But, I was encouraged by the President's decision to separate
the acquisition responsibilities and move away from that tri-
agency management structure that a lot of reviewers,
independent and internal, said was, in part, why we had some
troubles.
I think we have the beginnings of a workable program. I'm
going to continue to follow its progress and look to you all
for leadership in the Air Force. I'll give the Navy a pass for
the time being. But, this is so important to have this
continuity of weather and climate data.
We haven't heard a lot of detail about the direction that
we're going to take, so I'd appreciate if you'd share what you
know of the timeline, the expected requirements for the morning
orbit, and how you plan to determine them. In other words, will
the legacy capabilities of the Defense Meteorological
Satellites Program (DMSP) satellites be sufficient, or do you
need capability along the lines of the NPOESS satellites?
A lot of questions, but I'll yield time to you all to share
your thoughts.
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. Part of the stress and strain inside
the NPOESS program was a desire for both Earth science climate
data and operational weather observations to come off of the
same platform. That's difficult to do from an engineering
perspective, as well as from a sensor resolution perspective.
That's a difficult design systems engineering task. That's
really why the program was delayed as long as it was. I think,
fundamentally, that difference lies at the split of the
program. For Earth sciences, that afternoon orbit is the best
orbit for observing for Earth sciences purposes. For military
operational weather observations, the early morning orbit is
the best orbit. So that logic played into that division of
responsibilities.
We are still going through the details of what sort of
military requirements would be necessary for that morning
orbit. The JCS are doing that for us. The good news is that we
have a large workforce, both in industry and the government;
operators and acquirers that are familiar with this mission
area. We don't have a learning curve with the people who are
doing this, and so everything should be accelerated in that
regard.
Again, we're going to confirm military requirements for the
morning orbit and fold in any other Earth science requirements
that may be satisfied in that orbit. But, predominantly, the
requirements scrub will be followed by acquisition decisions
about which sensors we need, on what size platform, and then we
can do the appropriate budgeting for the fiscal year 2012
Future Years Defense Program.
General Kehler. Sir, I would just add, we have two DMSP
satellites left, and so, we have a little bit of flexibility
here. We are faced with decisions that we have to make, but we
don't have to make them today. We have to be deliberate about
how we make those decisions. I think that's what Secretary
Payton is suggesting, that we are on a pathway to make some
deliberate decisions here.
Every review panel that looked at our acquisition programs
over the last, maybe, 10 years that I've been paying really
close attention to this in leadership positions has cautioned
us against trying to do too much on any one given platform. I
think that's what Secretary Payton was just saying, as well;
these are very difficult integration issues when it comes to
that.
At this point, the thinking is that we will still have a
shared operational structure that will surround these various
weather satellites, but that the acquisition will be placed in
the right places for the right tasks. Now, it's important for
us to figure out what those ``right tasks'' are, to put in the
acquisition houses that are best set up to do those, and make
sure that we can do that in a timely way, harvesting the
technologies that have already been paid for, essentially,
through the development of the NPOESS program.
We now have to go do our homework and make sure that we
understand what best way to go forward here so that we're not
repeating any mistakes that have been laid out for us very
capably and very painfully by a lot of the acquisition reviews.
Senator Udall. Can and should we continue to ask you some
hard questions about all of this as you reconfigure and make
these decisions?
General Kehler. Absolutely, sir, absolutely. [Laughter.]
Yes, sir.
Senator Udall. I know I have the support of the chairman in
that regard.
If I might, Mr. Chairman--cut me off if my time expires--
but I had two other questions.
I'm excited about the restructuring of the National
Security Space Institute (NSSI) and the construction that will
begin to house it and the Advanced Space Operations School at
Peterson. I'm a homer in that regard, just like Senator Nelson
is for his State.
You talked, I know, in your testimony about the synergy
between space and cyber, and I know that was a part of why the
24th was located under Space Command. I'd like you to expound a
little bit more about those lessons and how you're gaining from
the synergies that are in front of us.
General Kehler. Yes, sir. First let me offer that, again,
almost 9 years ago, when the Space Commission reported that we
needed to do a better job preparing our space professionals,
one of the outputs of that was to construct what is now known
as the NSSI to do continuing education, if you will;
postgraduate-level education for our space operations people,
for our space acquisition people, for our space intelligence
people, space weather people, and others who are all now part
of that cadre of space professionals. It's a joint activity;
Navy folks come, Army folks, a handful of marines, et cetera.
We have now taken that NSSI and its continuing education, and
we've aligned that under the Air University, so that it's going
to get mature faster, we think, with a university structure
over top of it. So far, it's going well. We will, in fact,
break ground on a new building for them here in the not-too-
distant future.
The second piece, though, is advanced operational training;
and that we've aligned with the Air Force Warfare Center. That
will be done in Colorado Springs, because that's where the
expertise is. But, this is advanced operational training that
prepares our people to go forward, that prepares people for
General James and his operational activities. I'd be willing
certainly to listen to his comments on this, as well.
I think we have that aligned the right way now. I think we
have it aligned for our future. As I look over my shoulder at
the young space professionals that are coming behind us, I
think they are far better than we have ever seen before for a
lot of reasons. These are some of those reasons.
Regarding the Air Force's decision to move out on the
Secretary of Defense's direction to prepare for cyberspace
activities, yes, the Air Force has done a couple of important
things.
First is, we have decided that the major command
responsibility for cyber will be in AFSPC. We think there's a
natural relationship there, engineeringwise, technologywise,
and networkwise, where space is largely about networks. Cyber
is largely about networks, and its operational business, in our
view. So, putting it under a command like AFSPC made sense;
standing up an operational organization--24th Air Force, which
parallels General James' 14th Air Force for Space. Second is,
training the people, essentially paralleling the way we are
training space people, I think, has us on the right track for
the future.
So, all those pieces together we did based upon many of the
things that we have done for space and the success that we have
seen in doing those.
Senator Udall. General James, do you care to comment?
General James. Yes, sir. On the training aspect, as General
Kehler said, really, there are two key areas. Number one is
looking at how you grow up a space professional, and how you
get them the depth that they need to execute the mission. I
think over the last 10 years, as we've frankly been executing
combat operations around the world, we've gained a lot of
experience to know what do those space professionals have to
know in order to support those combat operations around the
globe. So, we've tailored our training to that.
The second piece, as General Kehler mentioned, is the Air
Warfare Center. We've really put into the curriculum there a
lot more thinking about how you operate in an environment where
space is absolutely essential, but it will be contested. We are
also making sure our operators understand: How do we operate in
those particular environments? What sort of experiments do we
need to do at the Warfare Center so that all of this is
relevant to the combat operation around the globe?
We're really ramping up quite quickly with the Air Warfare
Center to understand all of those implications as we send
people to Red Flags and the Warfare School and those sorts of
things. We're making a lot of progress in both of those areas.
Senator Udall. Congratulations.
I see my time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, I have another question. We can go another
round, if that works for you.
What I hear you saying is, you have outer space, you have
inner space, and the two of them are definitely linked, and
there are lessons that apply to both realms.
Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Kehler and Secretary Payton, has there been a
decision as to how the fiscal year 2010 NPOESS funds and the
fiscal year 2011 funds will be spent? I heard you say fiscal
year 2012 is where you're beginning to look, but what about
2010 and 2011?
Mr. Payton. Senator, we would suggest continuing the
industry work on the sensors and the spacecraft design and, of
course, the continuing realtime operations and algorithm
development that are going on, so that when the sensor
information comes down, the computers on the ground can digest
it. We need to continue that work for both NASA's utility and
the Air Force's utility, because the sensors that the Air Force
will need will probably be very similar to the sensors that are
under construction right now.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Kehler, do you have anything
that you would like to add?
General Kehler. No, sir. In light of the decisions, some of
it is still being worked out, and it's being spent the way
Secretary Payton says.
Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Dorsett and General Kehler, for
years the committee has challenged the Department to pull
together an integrated and funded satellite communications
architecture. This follows up on the Afghan and Iraq question.
To date, we really don't have any architecture. Given the
significant increase in the use of manned and unmanned air
systems, as publicly discussed by Secretary Gates and Secretary
Donley, does a strategic plan exist to address the associated
significant increase in satellite communications support for
these systems? Perhaps equally important, is that plan fully
funded?
Admiral Dorsett. Mr. Chairman, I'm not aware that there's a
plan, nor am I aware that it's fully funded. As I look at just
the Navy's portion of satellite-based communications, I would
say that my observation is that there's clearly a need for an
integrated DOD-wide approach to space-based communications.
As I discussed earlier about our MUOS challenges, we in the
Navy have not even necessarily taken a completely integrated
approach. The one thing that I can offer, though, is that our
CNO focus on networks, on information, and on space, is at such
a high pitch at this point that in our next budget
deliberations, he's putting great pressure on us to focus on
the networks, the communications, the flow of information. So,
we are basically ramping up our focus on this.
Across the Department, I certainly would applaud a more
integrated approach. The Navy has gone it alone, with the
communications satellite systems and programs that we've
managed previously, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Federici, I see you nodding
approval.
Dr. Federici. I agree. To answer your question from my
perspective, there is no integrated communications architect. A
lot of architecture work is ongoing in different pockets of DOD
and the NRO and elsewhere.
A lot of these architecture studies though, in my view, are
being done separate from the planning and programming and
budgeting process. Somehow, we need to develop mechanisms and
appropriate structures to bring those together, and there needs
to be somebody that's held accountable for this at a top level.
That has not been done yet.
Architecture work has been ongoing, but it's more
architecture on paper, and it doesn't translate into budget and
programs or impact programs. It doesn't necessarily have to be
a program in itself, but we really need to impact programs. It
could turn to a policy, but we can't have policies that are
unfunded mandates. We need to make sure the policy, if it's
being derived from an architecture, is then linked to programs
appropriately, and appropriately funded, as well.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Kehler?
General Kehler. I couldn't agree more. We have done a
series of individual architectures over the years for space.
What we have not done is an integrated communications
architecture, which is really what needs to be done, which is
an air, space, and terrestrial architecture that would really
pull all the pieces together. Work is underway to do such an
architecture. That's a very difficult architecture to
construct.
I can tell you that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has
looked at me recently and said--much like the CNO has looked at
his staff--and he has said: ``I want you to come back to me
with a single air, space, and terrestrial Air Force network for
one Air Force network that becomes part of the bigger
architecture.'' But, in terms of across the Department, this is
something that we know is a missing link, and something that we
need to go get after.
Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Payton, will that study that
the Secretary of the Air Force is working on be one of the
essential elements to getting the architecture across the board
for all the elements of air, terrestrial, and otherwise?
Mr. Payton. Truthfully, the first step on air, terrestrial,
and space communication requirements is being led by NII within
OSD--NII and the Joint Chiefs--J-8. They're putting together
something called a bandwidth study that looks at the total
requirements--air, space, and terrestrial.
Senator Ben Nelson. In the process of doing that, that
could be the group that puts it together, but ultimately, there
has to be somebody that will have responsibility for it. Could
we have that as a result of the Secretary's study--if I
understand what you're explaining in Secretary Donley's study?
Mr. Payton. Yes.
Senator Ben Nelson. You get both. I understand. You have to
have the architecture, then you have to have somebody that's
responsible for the policy, of seeing it through?
Mr. Payton. To execute the programs and deliver the
architecture.
Senator Ben Nelson. Execute it?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there's any
lack of desire on the part of the Services or others to have
such an architecture. This is really hard.
Senator Ben Nelson. Even if we get somebody in place, it
doesn't mean it's going to be a chip shot. Is that fair?
General Kehler. It depends on how you shoot, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ben Nelson. Some days, it's good golf. [Laughter.]
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Going back to the Air Force. Currently,
there is no funding in the Air Force budget for a technology
maturation line for overhead infrared capability. At the same
time, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has included in its
budget funds for a new infrared satellite capability for
missile tracking. The age-old question: Have the Air Force and
the MDA coordinated on the requirements and technology for the
program, to your knowledge?
Mr. Payton. No, sir. When he first got on the job, General
O'Reilly came to talk to the Air Force about his ideas about
this program called the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS).
We have to remember, though, that that program is for what they
call midcourse tracking, where the rocket has already burned
out and is now coasting through space. That is a different sort
of infrared, different mission than overhead persistent
infrared, which is looking for hot things, and globally. The
PTSS will be more geographically constrained than what we can
tolerate for the overhead persistent infrared sensor systems.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
Senator Udall, would you like to finish up with your
questions?
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just start out by thanking Dr. Federici and Admiral
Dorsett for being here.
The United States has been, is today, and will always need
to be a maritime power, so my questions to the Air Force are
not meant with any disrespect for the important roles that you
play and the way in which you let us project force.
General Kehler, you noted that approximately $3 billion
will transfer to AFSPC in fiscal year 2011 to grow cyberspace
professionals and provide integrated cyberspace capabilities to
Joint Force commanders. Could you outline how that $3 billion
breaks down?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. It's existing money, first of
all. It transferred as we pulled together cyberpieces from
around the Air Force. It's not new money that we've put in the
direction of cyber. So, first of all, it is largely to do those
things that we have been doing for quite some time. Just as the
Navy did, when they pulled together pieces of the Navy into
their new organization, we pulled, largely, our communications
and computer activities into my command and inside 24th Air
Force.
Much of what we are doing is continuing to provide those
basic network communications, computer sorts of services that
we had been doing in a scattered way throughout the Air Force,
but now we've brought focus to all of that.
The other thing that we are doing is, we're revising our
training activities to make sure that we are now building
cyberprofessionals from the beginning who have certain academic
prerequisites, who enter our training pipeline, who go through
a deliberate preparation time, much like we do with pilots or
space operations people. We are putting all of those pieces
together inside air education and training command.
We are also continuing to provide expeditionary
cyberforces, combat communications people, who go forward--some
of them are in Haiti, for example, still as we speak; others
are forward deployed in the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility, et cetera.
Then, of course, we are working on a new operations center,
which will be part of 24th Air Force, which will be our Service
component to the joint cyberspace organization--STRATCOM today.
If and when we get to U.S. Cyber Command, 24th Air Force will
be part of that. That $3 billion a year does everything from
purchasing long-haul communications that we have to purchase--
and, by the way, the demand continues to go up--through doing
our normal communications functions--deployable air traffic
control systems, all of the pieces that go with that--that
we've inherited as part of the new cyberbusiness.
Then, the new things that we're doing to be able to do the
primary responsibility, which we have for our service in cyber,
which is protecting ourselves and making sure that these
intrusions that go on, while we may not be able to prevent them
all or stop them all, that they don't impact our missions. So,
our focus has become a mission-assurance-under-duress kind of a
focus, so that we can continue to operate, even in the face of
these intrusions that go on.
Senator Udall. Two comments on those points before I turn
to General James for my last question. I would anticipate that,
much like other areas of endeavor in the civilian arenas, that
soon we will be competing--the military, that is--Federal
Government--for personnel with those who have needs to protect
their own assets in cyberspace, whether it be the banking
system or our electricity grid and a number of other areas in
which we see those sorts of threats.
I would also imagine that the ideal cyberprofessional would
be an additional asset if they spoke Russian, Chinese, Hebrew,
or French, given where some of the challenges are arising right
now.
General James, let me turn to you and talk a little bit
about SSA. SSA is obviously crucial for keeping our assets
safe. We're relying more and more on commercial capabilities to
satisfy our requirements. At the same time, those commercial
providers, I understand, need to be given access to accurate
SSA, as well. This was being done through the Commercial and
Foreign Entities (CFE) pilot program, I think, right? I
understand that has been made permanent, transferred to
STRATCOM. Can you update us on your efforts to make sure that
we have the capacity to share that information between
government and commercial satellite operators?
General James. Yes, sir. The folks that do that are out at
the Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
and that's where all the data comes in from our worldwide
sensors to make sure that we can track all the objects on orbit
and then do, essentially, what we call conjunction assessments,
which determine if one satellite is about to be hit by another
piece of debris or another satellite. Over the last year, we've
ramped up that capability. We were looking at about 110
satellites at the beginning of 2009, and now, at the end of
2009, we are really assessing over 1,100 operational satellites
to determine if there is going to be a possible collision
between that particular satellite and another satellite or a
piece of debris.
We've ramped up our capability, and that's primarily in
support of what was the CFE program, now called SSA Sharing.
So, we provide on the order of hundreds of assessments a week
to various owner-operators around the globe to determine
whether or not there is going to be a close approach.
To date, over 50 satellites--owner-operators--have elected
to maneuver their spacecraft, based on the data that we are
providing to them. That's commercial entities, that's foreign
entities--it really cuts across the gamut. That's what we have
implemented with this Space Situational Awareness Sharing
program.
We're still in the middle of determining the level of
accuracy of data we can provide, because there are certain
capacities that we want to protect. But, that's all ongoing, to
determine how we do that. But, the owner-operators around the
globe have been relying on our Joint Space Operations Center to
get them that information, and it has worked very well over the
last year.
Senator Udall. How much of that debris is from the Chinese
weather bird that they unnecessarily destroyed? Was that over a
year ago, now?
General James. It's over 2 years ago.
Senator Udall. Is it 2 years ago?
Mr. Payton. January 2007.
Senator Udall. I don't mean to sound whimsical, but I know
that was--in retrospect.
General James. The debris creation there was significant.
Senator Udall. Yes, please.
General James. I don't remember the exact numbers, but
several-percentage-point increase in the overall total of space
debris in the low Earth orbit area. So, yes, sir, we manage
that quite closely, to make sure that none of that's going to
impact our systems.
Senator Udall. Maybe that was a lesson to the world, as
unfortunate as maybe it was, that that's not necessary in the
future to show a capability. Hopefully, there are other ways to
communicate with each other.
General James. Yes, sir.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Kehler, the Air Force has
increased the budget for SSA programs. Why is this important?
What happens if this request isn't fully supported? I'd like to
know for the record how important this is so that we can
consider that.
General Kehler. Sir, as General James just said, today we
are tracking over 21,000 manmade objects in Earth orbit--
debris, active pieces, or those that have outlived their
usefulness or become dormant in some way.
While there's a great volume of space there in which they
can move, they're all traveling at a very high rate of speed,
and as space becomes more congested, it's even more important
that we understand where these objects are and what they're
doing. First, we have a responsibility to help NASA understand
for human spaceflight where this debris is and whether people
are at risk. General James' people draw an imaginary bubble, if
you will, around the International Space Station and around the
Shuttle and other human-occupied vehicles when they're flying,
to make sure that we can be very precise about what potential
threats may be, because even relatively small objects traveling
at those speeds--spacecraft, typically, are fairly fragile
devices so, it's important that we understand where these
objects are. First, for safety of flight. Second, to preserve
capability and investment. This an issue not only for national
security purposes, but for economic purposes, as well. Where we
saw the unintended collision between the Iridium satellite and
the dead Russian Cosmos satellite, we caught a glimpse of what
can happen here if space becomes more congested and we're not
able to keep pace.
Much of the SSA investment is to move us from just being
able to maintain a catalog to this term that we use, called
situational awareness, which is a dynamic understanding of what
is actually happening. Because the final reason that we need to
make sure that we understand what's happening on orbit is so
that we detect, if you will, acts that would be malicious in
some way, whether they would be done as part of a conflict in
the future or whether they would be done as part of an
unintended consequences, even from a maneuver that might go on.
With our investment, with the importance of what we do
there, with the way not only our warfighters but our economy
and others rely on what comes from space, it's very, very
important for us to have a better and better and better
awareness of what is happening in space.
Sir, I would add one more point. That also extends to
cyberspace, because there is a relationship between cyberspace
and space, and our situational awareness in cyberspace needs to
improve, as well.
Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Federici, the Navy's recent report
on UHF augmentation is a shift from the previous approaches,
and includes a revisit of commercial UHF options. This
committee has supported a more aggressive approach to
mitigation so this is a welcome development. What implications,
if any, will this decision have for the Navy's fiscal year 2011
budget? When will you be able to provide details of the
commercial options?
Dr. Federici. We have looked at several options in the
past. We're going to revisit those options. We're going to look
at some other offerings in the next few weeks. I believe we'll
want to begin something soon. We'll need to be working with
your staffs, in coordinating some of our thoughts. We really
have to work with Admiral Dorsett's staff as well on any
funding in fiscal year 2011 that may be needed once the bill is
passed. So, that's something we'll need to work with your
staffs on as well.
But, it is an option that we have on the table now. We're
going to press forward. We need to take a look at what those
options all are. We need to do the best business-case analysis
that's available, but we need to do it quickly; we need to get
something underway.
We have identified, as the report mentions, a number of
mitigation options, but, when you take all the options
together, they don't really give you a full capability of a
single UHF. We really want to now explore that option. It could
be a hosted payload, leased, or it could be a purchase. We want
to take a look at that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Dorsett, from an operational
perspective, what are your major concerns about not having
adequate UHF capability and plans to develop mitigation and
augmentation capacity? If you didn't have it, what does that do
to your operations?
Admiral Dorsett. First of all, the approach that we are
taking now, by looking at a commercially hosted payload, is the
right approach. It reduces the risk that we otherwise would
have. Last year, we made a decision that we could afford more
risk, with the additional delay on the MUOS. We made a decision
that we no longer could afford that risk.
It does come down to an issue of risk and how much
capability you're going to be able to provide to the
warfighters. We're looking at this from a joint perspective,
since we're providing this UHF capability across DOD. We're at
the point right now where we need to do additional mitigations.
I think today we're okay, but if there were to be any other
delay in MUOS, or any delays in the entire MUOS constellation,
we'd be placing the Joint Force at a level of risk that,
frankly, would not be appropriate.
So, I'm concerned about that from a warfighter's point of
view. I'm also concerned about it from the provider-of-the-
capabilities' point of view.
Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, what are your thoughts
on making the DOD UHF spectrum available to encourage
commercial investment in meeting the long-term government
communications requirements, as well? Do you have some thoughts
about how that might work?
Admiral Dorsett. I have not delved into it. I think Dr.
Federici would be better to answer that. I'd only make one
comment, and I'd say that that is part of what we're looking at
when we're looking at mitigation. You have to put that into the
calculation.
Dr. Federici. That is an area we'll need to work with ASD
NII on. I believe there's been precedent set in the past that
that has been done; I believe, with VSAT. That is something
I'll need to check, and I'll take for the record.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
[The information referred to follows]
We will continue to work with ASD NII on spectrum policies to
encourage commercial firms to invest in solutions to meet our growing
UHF spectrum warfighter communications requirements. In 1997, OSD did
allow Hughes Corporation to use our LEASAT-5 spacecraft to support a
contract with the Australian Defence Forces. We are exploring any good
ideas that the commercial sector brings forward to fulfill our UHF
communications needs. The Department will keep working with OSD to
support existing commercial use of UHF government spectrum, as
demonstrated in the attached 1997 memorandum (attached).
Dr. Federici. So, that is an issue. It's government
spectrum. We'll need to share that, subject to a number of
conditions. So, we'll look at that. We'll take that for action.
Senator Ben Nelson. All right. Thank you.
The final question is for each of you. What one thing keeps
you awake at night or disturbs you most when you look back over
all the things we have to deal with?
Secretary Payton?
Mr. Payton. One of the things that's most frustrating to me
is the space industrial base. Our costs are going up, because
the number of second- and third-tier players are getting out of
the space business. They are getting out because they cannot
compete effectively with overseas competitors for worldwide
market. So, that is increasing our costs.
I worry that eventually it may even lead to reductions in
reliability. This goes all the way from the satellite solar
arrays to batteries on satellites to propulsion systems on
satellites and on launch vehicles.
The thing that worries me routinely, constantly, is the
extra costs that we have to put out to redesign our systems for
suppliers who are no longer there, to requalify new suppliers.
That's a pervasive, difficult problem and our own export
controls are hampering our industry.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Kehler?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, there is not a single
operational or mission-related item that keeps me awake at
night. That's because, in the hands of the young folks that we
have operating these systems, they get the mission done. I
think once the mission is in their hands and the hardware is in
their hands, I don't worry about anything that is going on
operationally.
I share Secretary Payton's concern about the space
industrial base. I'm not sure that it keeps me awake at night,
but I do share his concern about the space industrial base.
What does keep me awake at night is making sure that we can
retain these marvelous young people that we have, and
especially given that this is an All-Volunteer Force. Being
able to retain the quality of people that we need is something
that I will occasionally muse about so that I can satisfy
myself that we're doing everything we possibly can to retain
them. We do largely but they are in high demand in many places.
I would add that one of the ways that we are addressing
that is by increasing the use of our Air Guard and our Air
Force reservists. Even when people decide to move on, we pat
them on the back, tell them, ``thanks for your service,'' and
we offer to hand them over to the Guard or the Reserves. We'll
have to do that with cyberprofessionals, as well. We're having
some success with that. But, I spend a fair amount of time
being concerned about retention.
Senator Ben Nelson. General James?
General James. Yes, sir. From an operational perspective,
again, as General Kehler said, I don't know if it keeps me up
at night, but it's certainly at the top of my list, and that's
understanding the expanding capabilities of all the nation
states and actors around the globe with respect to space. That
gets into the SSA component of not only tracking objects and so
on, but truly knowing what is going on in that environment.
What are these objects? What is the intent of the owner? What
are their capabilities? You have smaller satellites that are
difficult to understand what they are doing.
Getting not just tracking information, but situational
awareness, so that, ultimately, decisionmakers can make the
right decisions, should actions be required to protect our
systems or to operate our systems, is really the thing that we
need to continue to improve upon. That is not only just
sensors, like the Space Fence or the Space-Base Space
Surveillance System, but it's also the melding of the
intelligence component, because all of those things need to
play together in order to give, ultimately, that knowledge to
the decisionmakers to allow them to have that situational
awareness and make the right decisions at the right time for
the Nation.
Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Federici?
Dr. Federici. Senator, at the beginning of the session, we
talked a lot about an executive agent for space and the
Commission report, almost 9 years ago. Living in acquisition
for the almost 6 years that I have, and looking at a number of
different acquisition programs--of course the Navy has--MUOS
is, pretty much, a capital program, and a couple of small
acquisition programs. I think the organization and management
across DOD is a key issue, still. I know it's being worked;
it's on the table again. I think clarity and more transparency
would be really good things, especially for the Navy. We know
all the right offices to go to, but there are several offices
you need to work with, and it leads back to that question on
architecture that was asked earlier. The Navy really welcomes
the opportunities to participate in some of the Air Force space
programs, as well as the NRO, to participate in acquisition
programs so we can continue to grow our cadre, as well. Because
just having one small program office called MUOS is not enough
to continue to grow a large cadre. So, we welcome that
opportunity, and we would like to keep it.
Admiral Dorsett. Mr. Chairman, I'm concerned about the
rising costs of our people and our systems, especially in the
current fiscal environment and the projected fiscal
environment. In the future, when we no longer receive Oversease
Contingency Operations supplemental funds, I am concerned. I do
lose sleep over this. I lose sleep over the potential that the
Nation will not be able to afford the military that our
taxpayers expect from us. These costs are pretty tremendous,
and we're already seeing the stress as we're moving towards our
POM-12 program development, and I expect to see that pressure
increase in the future. It is a big concern of mine.
Ms. Chaplain. At GAO, of course, we're paying----
Senator Ben Nelson. I was so worried you'd say it's these
gentlemen that keep you awake at night. [Laughter.]
Ms. Chaplain. Right. [Laughter.]
Yes, they keep me awake. Of course, I'm paid to worry about
costs.
Senator Ben Nelson. Watching over us. [Laughter.]
Ms. Chaplain. I'm paid to worry about costs and schedule
for space programs, which is more on the boring side of things,
but I think these days we're worried about the outcomes of some
of these acquisition problems, and all the capability gaps that
we face, and canceled programs. Where does that leave us going
forward? How do we get from this position of being a little
behind in some areas to getting back to being ahead and making
sure we can be ahead? Do we have the right strategy and
resources to get there? When we have that discussion, I'd
personally like to see it cut across government, cut across
industry, and be very strategic.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you all. I appreciate it.
Once again, thank you for your service, and those that work
with you, day in and day out, who wear the uniform or who are
civilian, who keep us safe.
Thank you. We appreciate it.
We're adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system
1. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy has determined that the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
meteorological satellite program should be dissolved and a new approach
to weather and climate satellites adopted. As part of that program
dissolution National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) and
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will take the
afternoon orbit and the Air Force will take the early morning orbit. We
understand that NOAA and NASA have set up transition teams to begin
work on their part of this split program. What is the Air Force doing?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The Department of Defense (DOD), to
include the Air Force, NASA, and NOAA have formed a transition team to
outline the transfer of efforts from the NPOESS contract to DOD, NASA,
and NOAA management.
The Air Force will conduct a requirements review, an analysis of
alternatives (AoA), and then proceed in accordance with DOD 5200-series
guidance and the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). The
results of the requirements review and AoA will inform the acquisition
strategy and follow-on program content.
Air Force Space Command will partner with SAF/US(D), OSD, NOAA, and
NASA to ensure U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) requirements are
met.
2. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Payton, has there been a decision as to
how the fiscal year 2010 and the fiscal year 2011 NPOESS funds will be
spent?
Mr. Payton. The fiscal year 2010 funds are to ensure the continuity
in each orbit. Second flight unit copies of the instruments slated to
fly on the afternoon orbit platform following the NPOESS Preparatory
Project mission are the core focus of the NPOESS program's fiscal year
2010 effort. The current plan is to continue executing the major
efforts under the prime contract, carefully pace continued Microwave
Imager Sounder and Space Environmental Monitor-NPOESS developments, and
actively support the transition of the follow-on efforts supporting the
Joint Polar Satellite System program.
The plan for fiscal year 2011 is contingent on the transition
activities in fiscal year 2010 as well as the path forward chosen to
maintain continuity for the early morning orbit.
3. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Payton, when there is such a decision,
could you please provide the committee with a detailed breakdown for
these funds, including any termination funds?
Mr. Payton. Yes, once the agencies finalize their plans, we will be
happy to provide a detailed cost breakout.
space situational awareness
4. Senator Ben Nelson. General Kehler, the Air Force has increased
the budget for space situational awareness (SSA) programs. Why is this
important and what happens if this request is not fully supported?
General Kehler. Awareness of space is vital to preserving safety of
life for manned missions and safeguarding our national security and
commercial interest in space missions. The space domain is becoming
increasingly contested, congested, and competitive. Our need to operate
and maintain awareness in the space environment is vital to our
national security. SSA depends on being able to detect, track, and
identify objects in space. Today we track over 21,000 active space
systems; but of graver concern is the increasing number of small
objects that we are unable to detect, track, assess, and determine
intent because of the limitations of our existing capabilities.
If Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) requests for funding of the SSA
improvement plans are not supported, we unnecessarily put enormous
investments in national security, civil, commercial and international
space capabilities and services at risk. Our warfighters, our economy,
and our way of life depend on space-based services, and we expect the
dependence to grow into the future.
5. Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Dorsett, from the Navy's perspective
as both a space operator and user of space assets, how important in
your mind is this increased emphasis on SSA?
Admiral Dorsett. The Navy is critically dependent on space assets
for our warfighting and expeditionary missions. SSA is fundamental to
conducting space operations and is essential to maintaining the
advantage we enjoy in space. In today's contested and congested
environment it is paramount that we are able to attribute malicious or
hostile acts, to fully understand the space environment and the
operational effects of spectrum interference, and to ensure safety of
flight for space missions. The Navy relies on the Air Force for these
capabilities and supports all the efforts to further enhance SSA to
protect the Nation's and international community's space capabilities.
ultra-high frequency mitigation options
6. Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Dorsett, from an operational
perspective, what are your major concerns about not having adequate
ultra-high frequency (UHF) capability and the plans to develop
mitigation and augmentation capacity?
Admiral Dorsett. The Navy recognizes that tactical narrowband
communications are critical to the joint warfighter. We are committed
to maintaining the current UHF constellation and delivering Mobile User
Objective System (MUOS) as quickly as possible. We are meeting current
acquisition requirements, but not demand. Demand for UHF services is
growing every year. Acquisition programs are planned and funded to meet
requirements, not necessarily demand.
The Navy has prepared a series of mitigation options that can be
incrementally implemented to minimize the operational impact of a loss
or degradation to the current on-orbit UHF constellation. We have
already implemented a payload reconfiguration to UFO satellite Flight
11 which increased the number of available channels. This action was
completed at no cost and with very low risk to the spacecraft.
Additionally, the Navy continues to lease supplemental UHF resources
from two commercial satellites, LEASAT and SKYNET, and is leasing an
additional channel on an Italian space-based communications system
(SICRAL). We are also pursuing options to make more efficient use of
available satellite resources. The Integrated Waveform (IW), a software
upgrade to UHF SATCOM tactical terminals and control system, is in
development and will optimize UHF satellite channels by doubling the
number of accesses that can be supported by a single 25 kHz channel.
DOD is also in the process of finalizing a Memorandum of Understanding
with the Australian Ministry of Defense to procure/use channels on an
Australian-hosted payload in exchange for future use (commencing 2018)
of equivalent UHF SATCOM accesses. Finally, we plan to assess the
operational feasibility of TACSAT-4, an Office of Naval Research, Naval
Research Laboratory, and Operationally Responsive Space Office
initiative.
7. Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett, for many
years, the Navy has used the commercial LEASAT satellites to provide
the critical UHF satellite services. What are your thoughts on making
DOD UHF spectrum available to encourage commercial investment in
meeting long-term government communications requirements?
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. Navy has had success with the
LEASAT program by allowing a commercial vendor to provide UHF SATCOM
services in DOD spectrum. Due to the delay to MUOS, Navy is
investigating options for a UHF hosted payload; this approach would
also result in Navy/DOD permitting a commercial vendor to operate a
satellite that employs DOD spectrum. We are supportive of allowing
commercial investment in systems that use the DOD spectrum if it
enables DOD to satisfy military communications requirements.
operationally responsive space
8. Senator Ben Nelson. General Kehler and General James, the new
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) office is working on responding to
an urgent need of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) for additional
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability through
the ORS-1 satellite. This is important but the ORS fundamental work on
the plug and play bus and sensor development work is also important. I
am concerned that the basic work of the ORS office may be taking a back
seat to the urgent need. In addition, the out-year budgets for ORS go
down substantially. Can you explain how you will support ORS in the
future?
General Kehler. The President's budget includes significant funding
to develop the technologies to enable ORS. $78 million of the fiscal
year 2011 funding is dedicated to the basic work of the ORS office to
develop enabling capabilities. In fiscal year 2011, the capability
development funding includes Studies and Analysis, Systems Engineering
and Enabling Technologies, Radio Frequency Modular Missions #1, Rapid
Response Space Works, TacSat Planning and Launch Vehicles. The rest of
the fiscal year 2011 funding for ORS, $15.7 million, is ORS-1 funding
in response to the COCOM urgent need.
General James. We do not believe that the basic work of the ORS
office is taking a back seat to the CENTCOM urgent need. ORS essential
tasks are to: (1) develop end-to-end enabling capabilities, and (2)
respond to Joint Force Commander needs validated by TRANSCOM. AFSPC and
JFCC SPACE strongly support this parallel approach to capability
delivery for the Nation. From our perspective meeting, the CENTCOM need
is an operational priority as is balancing enabler development.
JFCC SPACE and AFSPC continue to work with the ORS Office,
TRANSCOM, Services and our coalition partners to rapidly operationalize
and balance the development of cost-effective, responsive technologies.
9. Senator Ben Nelson. General James, are you involved in the
operational military utility study for the sensor on the Tac-Sat 3
satellite, and if so, what are the early conclusions?
General James. Currently JFCC Space and AFSPC are not direct
involved in the sensor aspects of the TacSat-3 Joint Military Utility
Assessment (JMUA). We continue to maintain a close awareness of the
JMUA technical progress. The full JMUA is not complete. Current
observations are: (1) JMUA is in the data collection phase. (2) The
operations in ``routine'' modes are progressing. (3) The ``tactical''
modes allow users to task/retask, process and downlink on Space Ground
Link System and Ultra High Frequencies is ongoing. (4) The current data
is statistically insufficient for JMUA determination.
10. Senator Ben Nelson. General James, the ORS program gets the
bulk of its requirements from the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Do
you see this as still the correct approach or would you recommend any
changes?
General James. The process by which the ORS Office receives
requirements from STRATCOM is currently working. Urgent need
requirements are submitted by Joint Force Commanders, Combatant
Commands and Services. As the UCP assigned lead for DOD space mission
and advocacy, STRATCOM validates the need and directs the ORS Office
Director to lead an interagency group to develop potential solutions to
address the need. These solutions are presented to the Commander of
STRATCOM in approximately 90 days and based on the Commander's
recommendations are then presented to the Executive Agent for Space in
his oversight and Service Acquisition Executive role. So far there have
been four needs submitted to the ORS office to investigate.
11. Senator Ben Nelson. Admiral Dorsett, the Navy has also been
very involved with the ORS program. The Naval Research Lab built the
Tac-Sat 4 satellite, which will launch later this spring, and the Navy
has representatives in the ORS program office. In your view, how is
this new program doing and what should it keep doing or do differently?
Admiral Dorsett. Navy recognizes the potential of ORS to rapidly
augment, reconstitute, or replenish mission critical space capabilities
needed by the fleet. Additionally, we see value in the ORS concept to
rapidly infuse space technological innovations into operational use--
whether to support on-demand surge capabilities or reconstitute
critical existing capabilities that are degraded or lost.
I applaud the efforts of the ORS Office and its efforts to develop
a multi-tiered approach to providing warfighting capability more
rapidly at reduced costs. However, I do not support Service funding to
build and store future ``enabling capabilities'' in advance of
validated requirements. Additionally, it is difficult to fully assess
and prioritize investment strategies before the prototype ``enabling
capabilities'' are launched and operational. As the Navy's Resource
Sponsor for Space, I would desire to see a concrete demonstration of
operational value and performance of ORS ventures prior to committing
service-specific funding.
Further, while enabling capabilities ready for development and/or
rapid launch are key to ORS success, I would recommend that equal focus
and priority be placed on evaluating new and innovative approaches to
using existing, on-orbit resources to address urgent Joint Force
Commander requirements.
commercial and foreign entities
12. Senator Ben Nelson. General James, with the increased
challenging of tracking more and more space objects, and to avoid
collisions in space, the pilot commercial and foreign entities program
has become a permanent program under your STRATCOM responsibilities.
Why is this program important and what, if any, challenges have you
seen in transitioning to a permanent program?
General James. This program continues to grow in importance, and,
thanks to establishing this as a pilot program years ago, DOD and
STRATCOM are now moving the program forward to a more operational
posture. The Iridium-Cosmos collision of February 2009 revealed that no
one space-faring nation or organization is immune to the risks and
dangers of a congested space environment. Within our space surveillance
resource capabilities, proactively coordinate with both U.S. Government
and non-U.S. Government entities to take appropriate actions to avoid
conjunctions since space debris is a danger to all. Fundamentally, SSA
data sharing by TRANSCOM helps promote safety in space and confidence
building. Our SSA data sharing is an excellent example of responsible
and international cooperation. We have established a firm foundation of
responsible behavior in space. The program enables TRANSCOM to
establish sharing relationships with other owner/operators in order to
share information to support safe and responsible space operations by
all entities.
Balancing information sharing with our national security
responsibilities is a challenge. Keeping pace with, or ahead of the
international demand for SSA has proven to be one on the most
significant challenges. We have security concerns making sharing
difficult, as well as challenges of contacting various satellite
owners/operators. Currently, SSA sharing legislation requires formal
agreements. Under emergency situations, such as predicted close
approaches between satellites, we are authorized to provide
notifications and share information without agreements. We are waiting
for the delegation of authority to quickly enter into agreement with
non-U.S. Governments.
Finally, gathering, analyzing, and disseminating SSA places
significant demands on our materiel and human resources. We have
managed by updating and expanding some techniques, procedures, and
increasing resources. As we provide SSA services to entities, we are
finding that many new entities approach us for support, which will
increasingly stress our resources and we will have to manage
expectations and develop more efficient processes.
13. Senator Ben Nelson. General James, are there any changes needed
in the statutory authority for this program?
General James. The language contained in the current legislation
adequately addresses to whom the Department may provide SSA data and
services, and the restrictions that are attached. This allows the
Department to build a SSA sharing program meeting the constraints and
limitations of the U.S. Government and the needs of the entity
supported.
While a statutory change is not necessary at this time, the
requirement for a written agreement to be in place before sharing SSA
information has provided significant challenges to our ability to share
information. We have an interest in providing SSA services that support
safety of flight, yet unless it is an emergency situation, we cannot
provide such services without an agreement in place. The lack of an
agreement has precluded us from providing some requested services
directly to a customer, such as early orbit determination support.
Early orbit support provides the launch agency with information to
enable insertion of the satellite into its correct orbit, an activity
we have an interest in supporting in hopes of preventing conjunctions
between the new satellite and other objects, and for improving our own
SSA regarding the new object. We are currently reviewing internal
procedures to determine whether we can expedite requests for
information by modifying internal processes to make this data exchange
more timely and efficient. We are optimistic we can address this issue
without a need for statutory change at this time.
commercial communications satellites
14. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
and Admiral Dorsett, over 80 percent of the satellite communications
(SATCOM) in Iraq and Afghanistan are handled by commercial satellites.
Most of this capacity is purchased on an annual basis and funded
through the supplemental or contingency operations funding. In your
view, should there be a more strategic approach to buying commercial
communications and what is the right mix of commercial and military
capability?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. Assured access to SATCOM under all
conditions remains a critical capability for any warfighter. Wideband
Global SATCOM (WGS) and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) will
greatly improve our capabilities, but commercial SATCOM are still
needed to satisfy the entire demand. While supplemental or contingency
funding is primarily used today to fund commercial leases on an annual
basis, this short-term contractual model does not necessarily deliver
the best fees and terms to the DOD. We are assessing many different
commercial models, including different contractual models such as long-
term leases that would require Services to budget for commercial
services instead of relying on yearly supplemental funding. This same
study will also deliver a recommendation on the right balance between
commercial and military capabilities.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. We agree with the Air Force that
an integrated, DOD-wide approach to building a communications
architecture is needed. A holistic Joint Space Communications Layer
(JSCL) architecture, developed and assessed against current and future
space capabilities, gaps, and vulnerabilities, will be critical in
determining the right mix of commercial and military SATCOM for our
warfighters. It will be important to conduct a risk, cost, and
feasibility analysis to ensure sustainment of our MILSATCOM capability
while exploring future partnerships with industry.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
delta ii
15. Senator Udall. Secretary Payton, the Delta II rocket has been
one of the most successful launch vehicles in history for putting
commercial medium class satellites into orbit. However, the last Delta
II government launch at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB) is scheduled
for 2011. The current lease arrangement between the Air Force and NASA
has allowed for numerous launches of commercial satellites performing
national security missions. I am concerned that commercial space
companies may lose access to launch capabilities after the last
government Delta II launch at Vandenberg AFB. What assurances can you
provide that commercial companies will continue to have access to the
necessary infrastructure to put their satellites into orbit so as to
avoid being forced to launch on foreign providers?
Mr. Payton. The Air Force has responsibility for national assured
access to space. Not only is the Air Force in compliance with the
Commercial Space Launch Act, it is in the Air Force's interest to
accommodate commercial companies with access to the launch
infrastructure. As such, SpaceX has exclusive use of Space Launch
Complex-40 at Cape Canaveral AFS to support both their government and
commercial customers and the Air Force will continue to work with
United Launch Alliance to support their commercial Atlas V and Delta IV
customers at both the east and west coast launch ranges.
satellite imagery
16. Senator Udall. General Kehler, leveraging commercial satellite
imagery provides unique advantages over traditional sources. Our
military can share unclassified commercial imagery with coalition
partners, enabling maximum information awareness without compromising
security. Can you tell how your command has utilized commercial
satellite imagery to accomplish your mission?
General Kehler. Commercial imagery is ideal for coalition sharing
and in a humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) context.
While AFSPC maintains close contacts with commercial imagery consortia,
the joint force commanders are the true end-users of commercial imagery
services and gain access through DOD's lead at the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency. As you may be aware, Unified Commanders used
commercial imagery for HA/DR following the 2004 tsunami in South Asia,
recently in Haiti and Chile with the earthquakes, and domestically
during the California wildfires. In short, the burgeoning commercial
satellite imagery market can be a significant advantage for our
warfighters.
17. Senator Udall. General Kehler, do you envision mission areas
where your command will more heavily rely on space and near-space
commercial ISR capabilities?
General Kehler. AFSPC, while not a direct consumer of commercial
ISR, has a responsibility for leveraging any and all resources in an
effort to provide integrated space forces and capabilities for STRATCOM
missions. Commercial ISR capabilities are considered a viable option to
meet many of the joint and coalition imagery needs; especially since
the capabilities, timeliness, and accuracy of commercial services have
improved over the past decade.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
space strategy and acquisition difficulties
18. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, this committee has
long been concerned with the troubling space acquisition trend of
schedule delays, Nunn-McCurdy breaches, and the increasing risk of
capability gaps. What is being done to resolve the poor conditions of
space acquisitions?
Mr. Payton. Over the past decade and a half the Air Force has
attempted to adapt the changing landscape of the industrial base, the
force structure, and the increasing requirement needs of the
warfighter, resulting in increased complexity and the pursuit, in
several cases, of not yet mature technologies. To address these
challenges, the Air Force is rigorously pursuing an Acquisition
Improvement Plan (May 2009) which serves as the strategic framework for
reinstilling excellence in space systems acquisition. The Acquisition
Improvement Plan focuses on increasing the workforce; senior level
certification of warfighter requirements; using Acquisition Decision
Memorandum Cost Estimate Mean for costing; and multifunctional
independent review teams for source selections. In addition, the Air
Force is increasing accountability by establishing clear lines of
authority. This plan postures the Air Force for success in space
acquisition.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. We agree with the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) assessment that DOD has taken numerous
actions to improve the acquisition process, including strengthening the
requirements process, cost estimating, testing oversight, and
acquisition policy. Additional improvements will result from
development of a DOD-wide space architecture and close and continual
partnership and communication between related program offices.
General Kehler. We understand the past problems, have learned
valuable lessons, and have a way forward. To address acquisition, we
are guided by the Air Force's Acquisition Improvement Plan, which aims
to recapture acquisition excellence through improving the requirements
generation processes, instilling budget and financial discipline,
improving major systems source selections, and establishing clear lines
of authority and accountability within organizations. The plan also
calls for revitalization of the acquisition workforce, which we are
addressing through improved recruiting, training, and mentoring
programs for military, civilian, Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers, and System Engineering and Technical Assistance
workforce. We are also continuing our efforts to retain skilled and
experienced acquisition professionals to serve as mentors to transition
their vast knowledge and skills to their successors.
General James. I defer this question to Mr. Payton and General
Kehler.
Ms. Chaplain. We have not performed a comprehensive review of DOD's
reforms but it is clear that DOD has been working to ensure that its
space programs are more executable and produce a better return on
investment. For example, DOD is working to ensure critical technologies
are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin; requirements
are defined early in the process and are stable throughout; and that
system design remains stable. DOD also intends to follow incremental or
evolutionary acquisition processes versus pursuing significant leaps in
capabilities involving technology risk. DOD is also revisiting the use
of military standards in its acquisitions and providing more program
and contractor oversight. These and other actions identified in our
testimony address the root causes of problems, though it will take time
to determine whether these actions are successful and they need to be
complemented by decisions on how best to lead, organize, and support
space activities.
19. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, do you believe the
condition is getting better?
Mr. Payton. Yes, the Air Force Acquisition Improvement Plan will
certainly improve space acquisition. Despite past problems that have
plagued space acquisition, the Air Force is on track to deliver on
several highly anticipated programs in the next year: Space Based
Infrared System GEO-1, AEHF SV-1, Global Positioning Systems (GPSs)
IIF, ORS SV-1, and Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. Yes, I believe space acquisition
processes, program milestone reviews, and recurring schedule
assessments are adding rigor, visibility, and improved oversight to
critical space programs. The MUOS program is an excellent example,
where improved oversight allowed Navy to identify the need for a
National Review Team assessment to independently evaluate program
``health.'' Our reviews and oversight mechanisms have reinforced the
need to incorporate an ``end-to-end'' focus on program requirements,
which directly led to improved efforts at synchronizing programs (i.e.
MUOS, JTRS, and Teleport) to better provide comprehensive mission
capability. While it will take time to fully realize the effects of
changes we have made to date, the Navy is effectively moving forward in
improving our space acquisition processes.
General Kehler. The condition is definitely getting better. While
the ultimate test will be in future results, we have taken significant
steps toward addressing the acquisition issues, and we believe that our
newest efforts in accordance with the Acquisition Improvement Plan and
the WSARA will prove effective. In particular, our efforts are
providing all stakeholders, from the program manager through the PEO,
SAF, and ultimately up through DOD and Congress, with greater
visibility into technology challenges. We have also improved our
ability to balance performance requirements with the cost and schedule
risks inherent in developing and fielding new technologies.
General James. I defer this question to Mr. Payton and General
Kehler.
Ms. Chaplain. It will take more time before we will know with
greater certainty whether conditions are improving. The GPS IIIA
program is DOD's current forerunner in moving away from past practices
and getting ``back to basics.'' The GAO was buoyed by DOD's efforts not
to overreach in deciding to evolve the capabilities on GPS IIIA.
Further, DOD has continued to work to ensure that requirements remain
stable. However, these positive efforts are tempered by our concern
that DOD has developed a deployment schedule that is optimistic.
20. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what more needs to be
done?
Mr. Payton. The Air Force will continue to follow through on
bolstering the acquisition workforce and ensuring the Acquisition
Improvement Plan is a success. Once these initiatives are fully
implemented, I believe the Air Force will be on a better path to
executing space acquisition programs and will assess what additional
actions need to be taken.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. I agree with Ms. Chaplain of the
GAO that acquisition reform will be difficult to achieve with growing
gaps in space industrial base expertise, undisciplined contract
management and oversight, insufficient resourcing for testing new
technologies, and loss of innovation due to migration of small
businesses out of the space industrial base. Our space industrial base
must be protected and sustained. Additionally, we must ensure that the
development of ground systems and terminals is synchronized with the
development and on-orbit availability of our space systems, both to
fully optimize end-to-end capability to the COCOMs, and to be good
stewards of taxpayer dollars.
General Kehler. Due to the long timelines for space acquisition, we
need to remain committed to the Air Force's Acquisition Improvement
Plan principles over many years to reap dividends. Stability of
requirements, funding, and personnel are key in delivering programs as
planned. We will continue to improve processes so that stakeholders
have the necessary information to make the hard trade-offs in planning
and executing our investment portfolio to improve our warfighter
capabilities.
General James. I defer this question to Mr. Payton and General
Kehler.
Ms. Chaplain. The actions that the Air Force and Office of the
Secretary of Defense have been taking to address acquisition problems
are good steps. However, there are still more significant changes to
processes, policies, and support needed to ensure that reforms can take
hold. Recent studies and reviews examining the leadership,
organization, and management of national security space have all found
that there is no single authority responsible below the President and
that authorities and responsibilities are spread across the Department.
In fact, the national security space enterprise comprises a wide range
of government and nongovernment organizations responsible for providing
and operating space-based capabilities serving both military and
intelligence needs.
Diffuse leadership has a direct impact on the space acquisition
process, primarily because it makes it difficult to hold any one person
or organization accountable for balancing needs against wants, for
resolving conflicts among the many organizations involved with space,
and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they need to be
dedicated. Many of the cost and schedule problems we identified for the
GPS IIF program, for instance, were tied in part to diffuse leadership
and organizational stovepipes, particularly with respect to DOD's
ability to coordinate delivery of space, ground, and user assets. In
fact, DOD is now facing a situation where satellites with advances in
capability will be residing for years in space without users being able
to take full advantage of them because investments and planning for
ground, user, and space components were not well-coordinated.
Congressional and DOD studies have also called for changes in the
national security space organizational structure to remove cultural
barriers to coordinating development efforts and to better incorporate
analytical and technical support from an organization that is augmented
with military and Intelligence Community expertise.
Finally, studies have identified insufficient numbers of
experienced space acquisition personnel and inadequate continuity of
personnel in project management positions as problems needing to be
addressed in the space community. Our own studies have identified gaps
in key technical positions, which we believed increased acquisition
risks.
21. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, do you agree with the
GAO assertion that we are facing potential capability gaps in critical
areas?
Mr. Payton. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant
General James.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. Yes, I agree with the GAO. The
Navy is critically dependent upon space to conduct our wartime mission
as well as our core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea
control, power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance,
and disaster response. As one of the largest users of space, we are
concerned about capability gaps in communications, remote sensing, ISR,
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), missile warning, and
weather. To address potential capability gaps in the UHF SATCOM mission
area, the Navy has developed a multi-layer mitigation strategy that
includes commercial space augmentation options and optimization of
existing UHF ground and space-based resources.
General Kehler. The GAO has asserted in recent testimony and
reports that we are facing potential capability gaps in areas of
missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring and
GPS.
AFSPC is focused on continuing to deliver modernized MILSATCOM
capabilities to warfighters. Our third generation MILSATCOM systems,
DSCS and Milstar, are exceeding their design life and are continuing to
provide substantial capability. We are delivering our fourth generation
systems, WGS and AEHF, which will provide an order of magnitude
improvement over existing capability. Even with our recent successes,
the growing demand for MILSATCOM requires us to rely on commercial
satellite capability into the foreseeable future.
The GPS satellite constellation is extremely healthy. It is the
largest constellation providing the greatest capability in GPS history.
Since 1995, the Air Force has met or exceeded GPS performance
requirements while providing worldwide users with 24/7/365 PNT service.
In addition, STRATCOM and AFSPC recently initiated the GPS Expanded 24
deployment configuration that will further improve GPS global coverage.
While we face challenges in constellation sustainment, we have
operational measures and modernization efforts that will allow us to
maintain the required availability of 24 satellites with .95
probabilities for the foreseeable future.
General James. [Deleted.]
Ms. Chaplain. Generally, the further a satellite acquisition
delivery schedules slips, the more likely DOD is at risk of not
sustaining current capabilities. In determining whether a gap could
exist, we relied on DOD reports and testimonies, as well as our own
understanding of individual satellite constellations, launch manifests,
and requirements documents. Delays in both the NPOESS and MUOS programs
have resulted in critical potential capability gaps for military and
other government users. In addition, according to Air Force officials,
they have requested information from the space community on how best to
address a potential gap in missile warning capabilities.
22. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what capabilities are
at the highest of facing a potential capability gap?
Mr. Payton. Specific capability gaps and risks of capability gaps
in the on-orbit, operational space portfolio are classified. The Air
Force is available to provide these details in the appropriate setting
upon request.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. In our view, the space
capabilities facing the highest probability of a gap are with several
classified, noncommunication programs. Additional detail can be
provided in a classified venue. The UHF constellation has a lower
probability of capability gap than those classified programs. Current
analysis projects 70 percent predicted availability of the UFO
constellation by March 2011. We have developed and funded a mitigation
plan, including investigating the feasibility of a commercially hosted
payload approach, to minimize any operational impact to the warfighter.
General Kehler. [Deleted.]
General James. SATCOM - Military SATCOM has the greatest potential
for a capability gap. We are currently suffering an 80 percent lack of
required capability and rely on commercial SATCOM to fill the
shortfall.
[Deleted.]
Ms. Chaplain. See answer to question 21.
23. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what are we doing and
what more can be done to prevent them?
Mr. Payton. Specific capability gaps and risk of capability gaps in
the on-orbit, operational space portfolio are classified. The Air Force
is available to provide these details in the appropriate setting upon
request.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. Numerous actions have been taken
to improve the acquisition process, including strengthening the
requirements process, cost estimating, testing oversight, and
acquisition policy. Greater improvement would result from development
of a DOD-wide space architecture, a central authority to implement it,
and ongoing organizational alignments. Acquisition reform will be
challenging with growing gaps in space industrial base expertise and
loss of innovation due to migration of small businesses out of the
space industrial base. Additionally, development of ground systems and
terminals must be synchronized with the development of our space
systems in order to fully optimize end-to-end capabilities for the
warfighter.
General Kehler. [Deleted.]
General James. DMSP - A new DOD program will be constructed to
address the morning orbit requirement, leveraging existing work by
Northrop-Grumman and their subcontractors. To avoid a potential
capability gap the program is exploring a plan to optimize service life
of the remaining DMSP space vehicles and employ a Northrop-Grumman
Aerospace System (NGAS) gapfiller, with a limited sensor suite if
needed.
SATCOM - We are analyzing current operations, identifying tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and implementing improvements to
maximize satellite mission life. We are continuing to maximize our
commercial SATCOM leases in addition to launching Wideband Global
SATCOM satellites to prevent any significant SATCOM gaps.
GPS - Although the GPS constellation can operate with 32
operational satellites, the 14 AF/CC directed satellite operators at 2
SOPS to maintain all satellites on orbit with residual operational
value. These residual satellites do not provide operational capability
day-to-day but hedge against risk of satellite failures. 2 SOPS
operators are also employing tactics, techniques, and procedures that
extend the life of our satellites well beyond their design life. A
recently disposed GPS satellite was operated for 17 years or 240
percent longer than its 7.5 year design life.
[Deleted.]
Ms. Chaplain. In the short-term, DOD can stretch out legacy system
capabilities, develop gap filler satellites, or buy commercial services
to prevent capability gaps, or even employ a combination of these
solutions. For instance, managing power onboard legacy GPS satellites
can alleviate potential gaps in coverage. Regarding NPOESS, the NOAA
and NASA are to procure environmental satellites to meet NOAA
requirements, and the Air Force is to procure its own satellites to
follow the current satellites built under the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program (DMSP). According to an Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) statement, DOD's plan for deploying DMSP
satellites ensures continued weather observation capability in the
short-term, but DOD would have to start a DMSP follow-on program in the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011. At this juncture, many questions
surround DOD's strategy for moving forward. The MUOS program office is
addressing the potential capability gap by activating dual digital
receiver unit operations on a legacy satellite, leasing commercial
ultra-high-frequency SATCOM services, and examining the feasibility of
expanded digital receiver unit operations on the legacy payloads of the
MUOS satellites. Regarding early missile warning, DOD is currently
assessing proposed solutions from the space community on how best to
quickly field a missile launch detection sensor as a gap-filling
measure. In the long-term, more realistic estimations of delivery dates
and knowledge-based acquisition practices, such as proving critical
technologies before initiating large-scale programs, can prevent the
kinds of delays that have led to risks of capability gaps. A strategic
investment strategy can also ensure that programs needed to sustain
critical capabilities begin at the right time and are not cut back or
delayed in order to fund other programs.
24. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, given the Department is currently
undergoing the development of the fiscal year 2012 budget, will the
space posture review be completed in time to inform the fiscal year
2012 budget?
Mr. Payton. Yes, the final Space Posture Review will be completed
summer 2010.
evolved expendable launch vehicle
25. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) assures our access to space. This
heavy launch vehicle has a remarkable success record and is the true
workhorse for delivering our systems to space. As we all know, assured
access to space is not cheap and the cost is trending up. In addition,
I understand that decisions made within NASA to retire the shuttle and
cancel the Constellation program will significantly affect future
launch costs within DOD. Please elaborate on how NASA's change in
mission has affected the cost of EELV. If not yet determined, when will
you be able to fully assess the impact? Specifically, please explain
the potential for cost increases and the affect on the industrial base.
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. We are still examining the potential
effects of NASA's decision on launch costs and the industrial base.
Several efforts are underway within Air Force and AFSPC channels to
make and internal assessment. We expect to have a sense of the way
ahead in the summer.
26. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, given assured
access to space is a national interest, do you believe NASA should be
partially responsible for addressing the cost increases?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The Air Force and other government
agencies must work together on current and future space programs to
ensure this vital national capability. The Air Force, NASA, and NRO are
in collaboration in the areas of range revitalization, propulsion
strategy, and policy reform. We are also working to foster commercial
participation at our launch ranges as part of our overall approach to
space launch.
27. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, would a change
in EELV acquisition strategy, such as a block buy approach, help
alleviate some of these cost increases?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. Predictable demand and stability in
our buying process are the keys to implementing an effective
acquisition strategy. As part of the launch services acquisition
effort, we continue to look for ways to make EELV most cost-effective
by working with the NRO and NASA for block buy opportunities.
28. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, what are the
benefits and costs to DOD in adopting such a block buy strategy?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. The Air Force anticipates a block
buy approach would address industrial base stability issues, improve
component/part reliability, enhance cost saving opportunities on
recurring hardware through economies of scale, and reduce the
significant contract administrative burden on both the government and
the contractor. The current practice of procuring each launch service
as a discrete and servable contract action forces the prime contractor
to order single mission sets of hardware, or buy larger quantities at
their own risk. Internal Air Force program office reviews and external
reviews of the EELV acquisition approach suggest that it would be
beneficial to acquire launch services in a block buy manner that
enables the prime contractor to subcontract for economic order
quantities.
The Air Force does not anticipate any additional costs to launch
services of a block buy approach; however, when the funds would be
required may change. The Air Force and the National Reconnaissance
Office are currently conducting a joint evaluation of various
acquisition models to implement a block buy approach.
national polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system
29. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James,
as I mentioned in my opening statement, the administration took
dramatic steps in restructuring NPOESS. I have some significant
concerns with respect to the tri-agency divorce and have yet to hear
from the Air Force how they intend to cover their share of the orbits
or the overall cost implications for doing so. Does the Air Force fully
support the decision to divorce NPOESS?
Mr. Payton. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant
General James.
General Kehler. The Air Force fully supports the Executive Office
of the President decision and is working with the NOAA and NASA to
implement this decision. The decision to proceed with separately
managed acquisitions was made after a full range of ramifications was
discussed and risk mitigations identified. The Air Force will be
responsible for the early morning orbit and we are assessing options to
ensure an effective acquisition strategy.
General James. The current administration did take significant
steps in restructuring the NPOESS. However, we will continue to partner
with NASA and NOAA in those areas that have been successful in the past
as directed by the President. In particular, a shared ground system has
been highlighted as an area where our tri-agency relationship allowed
for mission success.
We are committed to the process of developing, testing, and
launching a DMSP successor as directed by the President in his fiscal
year 2011 budget. As you'll recall, the 2011 budget places sole
responsibility for DMSP's early morning orbit with DOD.
The Air Force intends to cover our share of orbits by smartly
leveraging remaining DMSP satellites (F-19/F-20) and extend the
constellation's useful life as long as possible. Vehicles F-19 and F-20
are also a part of the service life extension program (SLEP) and were
designed for extended life. Our current degradation rates for on-orbit
DMSP satellites (both SLEP and non-SLEP) provide a high confidence that
DMSP performance will exceed original design specifications.
There are some significant cost implications for the Air Force due
to NPOESS restructuring. These costs will be associated with the
development and launch of a new program to replace DMSP.
30. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James,
what is the current path forward for the Air Force?
Mr. Payton. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant
General James.
General Kehler. The Air Force, working closely with OSD, has been
an active participant on the triagency (DOD, NOAA, NASA) transition
team activities.
Specifically, the Air Force is currently examining the best way to
provide for the early morning orbit. We are taking inputs from the
warfighting community via STRATCOM, the requirements community via the
Joint Staff, and our acquisition component via Air Force Space
Command's Space and Missile Systems Center. Finally, we will take these
inputs and synchronize them with the rest of Air Force's capability
needs to arrive at a final recommendation to Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
The Air Force has options to consider for ensuring continuity of
the morning orbit. Instrumental to our plan is the existence of two
DMSP satellites currently scheduled for launch in 2012 and 2014. The
Air Force may decide to rely on DMSP for the near future and start a
new program in the fiscal year 2013-fiscal year 2014 timeframe. This
would produce a satellite ready for launch in the early 2020s. A second
option under Air Force consideration is whether or not to continue the
Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems effort to provide an NPOESS-like
satellite in the 2018 timeframe.
General James. We are committed to the process of developing,
testing, and launching a DMSP successor as directed by the President in
his fiscal year 2011 budget. As you'll recall, the 2011 budget places
sole responsibility for DMSP's early morning orbit with DOD and
afternoon orbit responsibilities to NOAA and NASA.
We will smartly employ remaining DMSP satellites (F-19/F-20) in an
effort to extend the constellation's useful life as long as possible.
Placing these remaining vehicles in the appropriate orbit will aid our
extension efforts while also avoiding coverage gaps. Vehicles F-19 and
F-20 are also part of the SLEP and were designed for extended life. Our
current degradation rates for on-orbit DMSP satellites (both SLEP and
non-SLEP) provide a high confidence in the likelihood of DMSP
performance beyond original design specifications. Ultimately, this
will allow the DOD to meet presidentially-mandated responsibilities and
avoid coverage gaps as we develop a DMSP-successor in the early morning
orbit.
31. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James,
what steps are being taken to ensure that DOD recoups the technologies
it has already funded?
Mr. Payton. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant
General James.
General Kehler. Reuse or harvesting of the NOPESS investments is
paramount to DOD and NOAA follow-on programs. There are three
categories of major developments on NPOESS; the suite of sensors, the
spacecraft system, and the ground system (downlink receipt,
transmission, algorithms, and product generation).
Of these major elements, NOAA will use the Visible Infrared Imager/
Radiometer Suits, Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS), Ozone Mapping
and Profiler Suite, Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS), and
Microwave Imager/Sounder (MIS). The analyses planned by DOD will drive
the extent to which elements DOD applies in its follow-on effort. The
solution set is broad, and DOD has not determined its needs for the
Northrop-Grumman space system or the appropriate NPOESS sensors. The
Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center is performing a technical
evaluation of the currently designed NPOESS system to inform the
upcoming AoA to determine the optimum material solution(s) for the
validated need.
General James. We are committed to being good stewards of taxpayer
funds in developing the DMSP successor as directed in the 2011
presidential budget. The DOD is performing a comprehensive review of
meteorological requirements. This review will build on existing
requirements and technologies resulting in an AoA.
32. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James,
what are the potential legal implications for negating the NPOESS
contract?
Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James. A determination to
negate and terminate the contract has not been made. In the event that
a decision is made, the Government has well-known and established
procedures already included in the contract and previously agreed upon
by both parties. We have exercised these provisions in many cases in
the past, most recently with TSAT.
If the contract termination will involve a reduction in employment
of 100 or more contractor employees, congressional notification will be
made in accordance with the DOD Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR).
Obviously, if any claims are filed by the contactor during this period,
these also will be dealt with in accordance with the FAR.
The Air Force is committed to ensure that if a determination is
made to terminate the contract, the dissolution process is managed as
efficiently and effectively as allowed by law; we understand the
process and have done it before.
bandwidth
33. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what is the current
status of the comprehensive bandwidth study?
Mr. Payton. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant
General James.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. The comprehensive bandwidth study
has been delivered to Congress.
General Kehler. Currently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration is leading the comprehensive
bandwidth study. This study is in the final stages and we anticipate
its completion and submission in May.
General James. Currently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration is leading the comprehensive
bandwidth study. I understand that the study is nearing completion and
in the final stages. I anticipate its completion and submission will be
in the late April-May timeframe.
Ms. Chaplain. We do not know the current status of the
comprehensive study, as mandated by the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2009. At this time, GAO does not have work underway
in the communications bandwidth area.
34. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, is it safe to assume
that our bandwidth needs show no sign of decreasing in the future?
Mr. Payton. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant
General James.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. The Navy depends on space
capabilities now and expects the demand for space capabilities to grow,
especially for SATCOM and the bandwidth it provides. The UHF narrowband
SATCOM constellation today consists of eight UHF Follow-On satellites,
two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), one Leased Satellite (LEASAT
5), and leased capacity on SKYNET 5C. MUOS will begin to replace these
systems in 2011. Based on evolving warfighting concepts, UHF SATCOM
requirements are expected to grow, and MUOS, as designed, will be able
to support those requirements. Commercially provided systems have the
ability to augment, but not replace, national systems. Commercial
capabilities continue to bridge the gap between requirements (demands)
and capabilities (available resources). The Navy has utilized
commercial communication satellites since the early 1970s to augment
bandwidth requirements not fully satisfied by military communication
satellites.
General Kehler. The demand for SATCOM bandwidth is continuing to
grow. One example of this growth is in the increased utilization of
unmanned aircraft systems for ISR. This increase in operational
platforms will require significantly more bandwidth to operate than is
available today. Furthermore, as the threat continues to grow in the
future, possessing enough protected communications capabilities to
counter a hostile environment becomes increasingly crucial. The exact
demand for SATCOM bandwidth necessary to operate in hostile and non-
hostile environments is identified as part of the JSCL effort.
General James. Yes, the demand for SATCOM bandwidth is continuing
to grow. For example, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review identified
the need to expand manned and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) for ISR.
This increase in operational platforms requires significantly more
bandwidth to operate than is available today. Furthermore, as the
threat continues to grow in the future, possessing enough protected
communications capabilities to counter a hostile environment becomes
increasingly crucial. The exact demand for SATCOM bandwidth necessary
to operate in hostile and non-hostile environments is identified as
part of the JSCL effort, which Air Force Space Command is a
contributor.
Ms. Chaplain. GAO does not have specific work underway in the
communications bandwidth area. However, based on our work in Iraq,
upcoming efforts in Afghanistan, as well as new wide area sensors and
hyper-spectral imaging coming on line, the demand for bandwidth is on
the increase, and not declining. The new technologies do not seem to
consider their load on bandwidth capacity.
35. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what is the
appropriate mix between DOD-provided and commercially-provided
bandwidth?
Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James. The mix of
commercial-provided and DOD-provided bandwidth is a function of the
specific capabilities required by the warfighter. Some capabilities,
such as nuclear survivability and signal protection, are currently only
provided by DOD systems. However, a significant portion of the
warfighters' demand for unprotected SATCOM can and is being provided by
commercial systems. The proper mix of capabilities versus capacity is
currently being looked at as part of the JSCL effort. We are nearing
completion with the requirements identification and validation portion
of this effort. Once the requirements are clearly defined, an AoA will
be completed that will address specific solutions, to include
commercial and DOD options, identifying the correct mix to meet the
warfighters' missions. It is expected that certain capabilities will
continue to require DOD-provided SATCOM, but a significant portion of
the overall capacity will be met commercially-provided SATCOM.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. An integrated, DOD-wide approach
to building a communications architecture will help determine what the
right mix of commercial and military SATCOM should be for our
warfighters. Bandwidth requirements continue to increase, whether in
support of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations, regional
engagement, or major combat operations. The appropriate mixture between
DOD and commercially-provided capacity will also be determined by the
nature of the operating environment (benign, congested, contested, or
denied).
Ms. Chaplain. The GAO has not been requested to do work in this
area and therefore we do not know what the mix of DOD and commercially-
provided bandwidth should be.
precision tracking space sensor
36. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, as you are
aware, this subcommittee is also responsible for oversight of ballistic
missile defense. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) fiscal year 2011
budget requests funding for a new space program called the Precision
Tracking Space Sensor (PTSS). This proposed multi-billion dollar
program must be thoughtfully planned across the Department and every
effort should be taken to ensure that the appropriate acquisition
management assessments take place for program execution. I understand
that MDA has proposed a hybrid program office model for developing and
acquiring this system and I am interested to hear if you have been
briefed on the plan. Do you support this approach?
Mr. Payton and General Kehler. We believe the PTSS hybrid program
office is a sound approach whereby MDA and the lead Service could work
side-by-side to address issues such as doctrine, training, and manning
early within the design phase. This office would address PTSS Service-
related issues early in the acquisition process, thus minimizing costs.
Incorporating Service-related issues early in the acquisition process
will also reduce sustainment costs; and once PTSS is fielded this
office will facilitate the transition and transfer of PTSS from MDA to
the lead Service.
operationally responsive space
37. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James,
as you are all well aware, this committee has been a strong proponent
of ORS. In addition, General Chilton, the Commander of STRATCOM, has
been quite vocal in increasing the responsiveness of our space
recapitalization abilities. Yet, I was surprised to see that the fiscal
year 2011 budget cuts funding for ORS by almost 25 percent. Is the Air
Force committed to the ORS model?
Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James. Yes, the Air Force
is committed to the ORS concept of responsively launching small
satellites.
The budget has been relatively stable for ORS funding. It is
approximately $100 million per fiscal year from fiscal year 2009 to
fiscal year 2011 with some exceptions for launch vehicle expenditures,
ORS-1 and congressional adds. The fiscal year 2009 funding is $135
million higher than fiscal year 2011 due to three reasons. The Air
Force reprogrammed $39 million into ORS when ORS-1 was initiated as an
urgent need in fiscal year 2009. The fiscal year 2009 funding line
contains $9 million for TacSat launch vehicle expenditures while fiscal
year 2011 doesn't require any TacSat launch vehicle funding.
Additionally, the original fiscal year 2009 request was increased by
$87 million for congressional adds (Infrared Sensor Payload
Development, Micro-Satellite Serial Manufacturing, LEONIDAS, Chip Scale
Atomic Clock, and Missile Range Safety Technology).
38. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James,
does the Air Force believe that the development of an ORS
infrastructure that facilitates rapid reconstitution and reduces the
fragility of space capabilities would greatly benefit the needs of the
warfighter?
Mr. Payton. Yes, the Air Force is continuing the development of
capabilities and Concept of Operations for rapid assembly, integration,
and test of modular spacecraft buses and payloads through the Rapid
Response Space Works. This short-notice call-up and launch will greatly
benefit the needs of the warfighter. Should on-orbit capabilities
require augmentation or replenishment, the ORS infrastructure will
deliver ``good enough to win'' solutions to the warfighter.
General Kehler. Effects provided today through space-based
platforms are no longer ``nice to have'' but a ``must have'' for the
joint warfighter. The ability to ensure these effects will be available
through phases of conflict is imperative. A responsive infrastructure
is key to delivering responsive space capabilities. The Air Force is
improving the responsiveness of the space infrastructure capability
with organic initiatives and through the ORS program. The fiscal year
2011 budget request for ORS includes funds for the development of the
Rapid Response Space Works. This facility is expected to provide the
opportunity for the Air Force to assemble, integrate, and test small
spacecraft. The capability to do so may prove useful in meeting
reconstitution and augmentation mission needs.
Outside of ORS, the Air Force is investing in the future Satellite
Operation Architecture and in the Launch Enterprise Transformation.
Both of these investments show promise of improving the responsiveness
of the entire space enterprise. Responsive infrastructure is key to the
ability to rapidly provide space capabilities to the warfighter and
improving the responsiveness of the space infrastructure will
significantly offset the inherent fragility of space systems.
General James. We believe the development of an ORS infrastructure
would benefit the needs of the warfighter. Rapid reconstitution
requires standardized plug and play technologies, availability of long-
lead, high demand/low density parts at the ready, boosters at the ready
with trained crews, and a range infrastructure that is responsive to
immediate launch demands.
ORS solutions are designed to be complementary to the large,
exquisite space systems that meet the bulk of our national military
space needs, and to the increasing use of purchased commercial space
products and services. ORS has a mix of attributes--responsiveness,
flexibility, affordability, and assuredness--that is unique, relative
to these other two approaches (U.S. Government systems and commercial
space).
To be successful at rapid reconstitution, the ORS infrastructure
must continue to exercise innovative acquisition models, concepts, and
incentives versus attempting to condense and adjust those of the
mainstream space acquisition establishment. This is essential to
ensuring rapid delivery of space capabilities to the warfighter.
39. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James,
why the reduction?
Mr. Payton. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant
General James.
General Kehler. In fiscal year 2010, $124.3 million was
appropriated for ORS. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget requests
$94 million for ORS. The $30.3 million difference is not due to a
reduction in the level of effort. The fiscal year 2010 appropriation
included $12.3 million in congressionally directed projects and $18
million for the purchase of launch vehicles. The launch vehicle expense
is not required in fiscal year 2011.
General James. The reduction in ORS funding from fiscal year 2010
and fiscal year 2011 of roughly $30 million is for two primary reasons.
The fiscal year 2010 funding line contains approximately $18 million
for launch vehicle expenditures not required in fiscal year 2011.
Additionally, the original fiscal year 2010 request was increased by
$12 million for congressional adds (Micro-Satellite Serial
Manufacturing, LEONIDAS, Rapid Small Satellite Development Test
Facilities, and Space Sensor Data Link Technology).
quality control
40. Senator Vitter. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler,
General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, contractor quality
issues have had significant impacts on major defense space programs
over the years. In your opinion, what more can be done to address
quality control?
Mr. Payton. All of our industry partners are improving their
attention to assembly procedures, workforce training, and subcontractor
management. However, this improvement is after several disconcerting
incidents have occurred across the board. The rework and repetitive
integration and test cycles required to overcome these errors create
reliability risks by undoing work that had already been validated as
successful. As a result, I would like to see better adherence to the
processes and procedures our industry partners have already developed,
published, and trained against. Following published procedures would
have prevented a number of quality incidents from occurring.
Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett. The UHF Constellation is
comprised of systems that typically last well beyond their design
lives. The satellites and their subsystems are of very good quality, so
the Navy can't comment on negative impacts from major defense space
program quality control problems. The Navy Space Systems Program Office
along with our contractors is fully engaged in utilizing numerous
quality control mechanisms that conform to industry standards. With
these efforts the Navy expects high quality systems to be built for its
UHF Constellation for years to come.
General Kehler. There are four key things we can do to address
quality control on our major defense space programs. They are: (1)
Reinvigorating government expertise in manufacturing, quality, and
software, (2) Placing upfront emphasis on quality control, (3) Holding
contractors financially accountable for their quality control errors,
and (4) Implement specifications and standards judiciously and regain
the configuration control of the system by revitalizing the
Configuration Management (CM) career field.
Good quality in our major space programs is the result of strong
and sustained emphasis and teamwork by both the government and
contractors.
General James. From my warfighter perspective, I remain concerned
with space program quality control. JFGCC SPACE is tasked to employ
space forces and we must have reliable systems to execute the mission.
We exercise risk management and use survivability and redundancy as
control measures to account for shortfalls. It is important we involve
warfighters in establishing requirements to meet specific operational
needs.
Ms. Chaplain. Our work has emphasized the benefits of gaining
knowledge about technologies, design, requirements, and other
resources, e.g. people and suppliers, before embarking on major
acquisitions. In my opinion, following a knowledge-based approach can
help reduce quality problems that we have seen on DOD space programs
because it would entail gaining more knowledge about potential
suppliers and their strengths and weaknesses. In addition to more
knowledge, DOD needs to obtain and analyze more comprehensive data
regarding prime contractors and their key suppliers which could be used
to improve quality. Further, DOD space officials have commented that
they recognize that today's workforce is smaller and less experienced
than previous workforces and the parts and the process quality issues
are a major detriment.
41. Senator Vitter. Ms. Chaplain, I understand that GAO is
conducting a comprehensive quality review on contractor quality. Could
you please share some of your preliminary thoughts?
Ms. Chaplain. I can share a few. First, contractor quality issues
are not just affecting DOD space programs. Some of the NASA and MDA
programs we have reviewed have experienced similar problems. Second,
parts quality problems can have devastating effects. The ones
experienced by GPS and AEHF satellite program added months to the
schedule and increased cost. Quality problems have also contributed to
failures in flight tests at MDA. Third, there are mechanisms in place
to address these problems and agencies are working together. The
question GAO is focused on is whether and how these can be more
effective and what additional steps government agencies involved in
space and missile defense can take to increase interagency
collaboration.
global positioning system
42. Senator Vitter. Ms. Chaplain, our hearing last year occurred
shortly after GAO issued a report about a potential gap in the GPS
constellation. During that hearing you explained that that if both the
GPS IIF and the GPS IIIA programs are executed on schedule, there is
only a 80 to 90 percent probability that the constellation will stay
above 24 satellites. You further explained that such a probability
should not be a significant cause for alarm because there are measures
that can be taken in managing the life of our current satellites. What
is the current assessment on the potential gap in GPS?
Ms. Chaplain. As I testified in front of your subcommittee in March
2010, the results of our assessment of the GPS constellation appear to
be similar to what we reported last year. Final results of this
analysis will be available this summer. Since we last reported, the GPS
IIF program has been further delayed, and we remain concerned about the
Air Force's ability to deliver GPS IIIA satellites as promised, given
that the Air Force aims to deliver them 3 years faster than the IIF
satellites.
43. Senator Vitter. Ms. Chaplain, how is the GPS IIIA program
structured in comparison to the IIF program?
Ms. Chaplain. The GPS IIIA program has been structured by the Air
Force to prevent the mistakes made on the IIF program. According to the
GPS wing, the GPS IIIA program is using an approach that emphasizes
requirements stability, upfront systems engineering, adherence to
stringent parts/materials standards, active risk management, and full
program funding. The intent of this ``back to basics'' approach is to
address the development challenges which have affected numerous recent
space acquisition programs. Furthermore, according to Air Force
officials, the IIIA contractor retained some of its workforce from the
IIR-M program and plans to incorporate a previously developed satellite
bus--efforts that reduce program risk. Table 1 identifies the key
differences in program framework for IIF and IIIA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GPS IIF GPS III
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirements.................... Addition of Not allowing an
requirements adjustment to the
after contract program to meet
award. increased or
accelerated
requirements.
Development..................... Immature Incremental
technologies. development,
while ensuring
technologies are
mature.
Oversight....................... Limited oversight More contractor
of contractor, oversight with
relaxed government
specifications presence at
and inspections, contractor
and limited facility; use of
design reviews. military
standards; and
multiple levels
of preliminary
design reviews,
with the
contractor being
held to military
standards and
deliverables
during each
review.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis based on discussion with the GPS program office and
program documentation.
44. Senator Vitter. Ms. Chaplain, if it's better positioned for
success, why do you have a concern about the schedule goals for GPS
IIIA?
Ms. Chaplain. We continue to believe the IIIA schedule is
optimistic given the program's late start, past trends in space
acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contractor. With respect to
satellite development, for example, DOD has taken significant steps to
reduce schedule risks and these should better position DOD for success
than in the past. But the delivery date is 3.5 years less than the GPS
IIF program and we have not yet seen a major satellite program in the
past decade or so that has met its original delivery date, let alone
one with an ambitious schedule. Our concerns also extend to the ground
and user components for GPS--which have a history of significant
schedule delays. To increase confidence in the schedule for delivering
the ground control system for IIIA (the next generation operational
control segment known as OCX), the GPS wing added 16 months of
development time to the effort. This means that OCX is now scheduled to
be fielded after the May 2014 launch of the first GPS IIIA satellite.
minotaur space launch vehicles
45. Senator Vitter. General Kehler, I want to ask you about the
Orbital/Suborbital Program (OSP), which allows the Air Force to use
decommissioned ballistic missile assets to build Minotaur space launch
vehicles. Minotaur has been a low-cost and reliable launch option for
the Air Force, with 16 of 16 successful missions to date. In a memo
dated October 19, 2009, you expressed a desire to use Minotaur rocket
for launching small defense payloads, saying: ``The Minotaur family of
launch vehicles provides a moderately responsive and more cost
effective small launch capability.'' Can you elaborate on the utility
of the OSP?
General Kehler. The OSP leverages our inventory of decommissioned
ballistic missiles to provide effective and low-cost small launch
capability through the Minotaur family of launch vehicles. Sustaining
OSP assures some of our emerging small launch needs can be met. OSP
does not exclude other launch vehicle providers from competing for
small launch opportunities.
46. Senator Vitter. General Kehler, for what types of applications
are Minotaurs currently used, and how does the Air Force plan to employ
them in the future?
General Kehler. The Minotaur family of launch vehicles use
decommissioned ballistic missile assets to provide an effective, low-
cost small launch capability. Minotaur launch vehicles are currently
used as targets for missile defense testing and to launch scientific
and research payloads. This year, Minotaur will launch the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency's Hypersonic Test Vehicle, the Space
Based Space Surveillance spacecraft, TacSat-4, a Space Test Program
spacecraft, and ORS-1. We expect to continue using Minotaur, as well as
other small launch vehicles, to deliver small spacecraft to orbit and
perform suborbital research missions in the future.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators E. Benjamin Nelson,
Begich, Sessions, and Vitter.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Rob
Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Sandra Luff, assistant
to Senator Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Ben Nelson. I call this subcommittee hearing to
order. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee is meeting today. Good
afternoon. Before we begin, I have one administrative
announcement. The open portion of this hearing will continue
until approximately 3:45 p.m., at which point we will recess
and immediately move to SVC 217, the Capitol Visitor Center,
where we will reconvene at 4 p.m. for a closed briefing. This
briefing will be for members and designated staff only.
We welcome all of our witnesses today to discuss strategic
and nuclear forces of the Air Force and the Navy. Appearing
before the subcommittee are: Dr. Bradley Roberts, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense
Policy; Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, Commander, Air Force
Global Strike Command (GSC); Lieutenant General Mark
Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition; Major General Donald Alston,
Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration, U.S. Air Force; Major General David J. Scott,
Director, Operational Capability Requirements, and Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, U.S. Air
Force; and Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, Director of Strategic
Systems Programs, U.S. Navy.
The new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reaffirms that the
United States must prevent and deter conflict by maintaining
both strong conventional and nuclear forces. Until such time as
the administration's goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is
achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core
mission for the Department of Defense (DOD). It will maintain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on
the United States and on our allies and partners.
Today's hearing will discuss issues associated with
maintaining the nuclear deterrent and the conventional
operations of the long-range bomber force. When we scheduled
this hearing, we had assumed that the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR), which was supposed to be submitted with the QDR and
budget request, would have been submitted as well.
Unfortunately, that's not the case, so some of the policy and
nuclear force structure decisions have not yet been announced.
Dr. Roberts, I will ask you later in this hearing to provide an
update on the NPR and when we might expect to receive it.
General Klotz, this is your first opportunity as the
Commander of the new GSC to testify before this committee, so
we look forward to hearing your plans for the new command and
how this will improve the Air Force nuclear enterprise. While
the new command has all of the Air Force nuclear-capable assets
assigned to it, I also understand that this is not exclusively
a nuclear command or an effort to recreate the old Strategic
Air Command. I'd like to understand in more detail how the
operational control of bomber aircraft will be managed, the
relationship to Air Combat Command, including how the B-1 fits
into this picture, and how the new command will influence the
requirements process for the next generation long-range strike
capability.
Keeping the bomber force flying and fully capable to serve
in its demanding conventional role is essential. All of these
aircraft are old, the B-52 being the oldest, and all need to be
modernized and maintained well into the future. The B-52s will
have been flying for 80 years when they retire around 2040
under the current plan. These aircraft have a unique capability
to sustain long loiter times to provide a broad variety of
ordnance when and where needed.
General Shackelford and General Scott, we look forward to
hearing from you how all of the bomber aircraft are performing
and the plans and funding needed to meet the mission-capable
rate goals.
Over the last 2\1/2\ years, the Air Force has taken many
actions to correct the problems that were uncovered after Labor
Day weekend 2007, when a B-52 bomber unknowingly carried
nuclear weapons across the country. General Alston, you've been
working on fixing these problems for a while. We'd like to hear
from you how you think we're doing, what the successes are, and
what you still worry about.
Admiral Johnson, the Navy has embarked on an ambitious
replacement program for the Ohio class ballistic missile
submarines. This will be a costly program that's going forward
without the benefit of an NPR. We look forward to hearing from
you about this major undertaking, including the plans, the
schedule, and the funding that will be needed.
Last week the subcommittee held a hearing on space systems.
In that hearing we had a good discussion about solid rocket
motors and other aspects of the space launch industrial base.
General Klotz and Admiral Johnson, I would like to hear your
thoughts on this industrial base, as it is the same one that
supports the ballistic missiles, and what each of you are doing
to address those concerns.
Again, welcome to all our witnesses. I'd like to note that
each of the prepared statements that we've received will be
included in the record without objection. Let me say also that
I hear there may be another vote coming, so we'll try to work
around that schedule.
Senator Vitter, would you like to give an opening statement
at this time?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAVID VITTER
Senator Vitter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll
submit my written statement for the record and just focus on
some highlights of that.
First of all, I certainly also look forward to the
administration's NPR as soon as possible. Obviously, this
discussion is a little bit partial and incomplete without it,
so we await that and await filling in major blanks as we get
that. I do believe we're at a particularly critical time and a
turning point for the DOD nuclear enterprise and we all need to
be focused on making sure that happens properly.
In that vein, I would quote the Congressional Commission on
the Strategic Posture of the United States, which said that as
the number of warheads decreases, the importance of our triad
of strategic delivery systems dramatically increases. They
rightly noted that each leg of the triad provides ``unique
contributions to stability.'' As ``the overall force shrinks,
their unique values become more prominent.'' I think this is
very important to keep our eye on.
Lastly, I would simply underscore the chairman's comments
about the position of our industrial base, particularly with
regard to solid rockets. I am very concerned, as I mentioned
here previously, about the dramatic change in course proposed
at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
what it would do to our solid rocket industrial base, which
would have, in my opinion, a major negative impact on a lot of
your capability and the costs of keeping that capability up. I
look forward to General Klotz and others' discussion of that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator David Vitter
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our
witnesses.
Today's hearing focuses on the Department's fiscal year 2011
request for the Department of Defense (DOD)-wide strategic forces
programs. The fiscal year 2011 request signifies a critical turning
point for the DOD nuclear enterprise.
With the exception of the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN(X)),
many of these funding requests are unfortunately designated by the
Department as placeholders awaiting the delayed release of the
administration's Nuclear Posture Review. Nonetheless, as noted by the
bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the
United States, as the number of warheads decreases, the importance of
our triad of strategic delivery systems dramatically increases. The
commission rightly notes that each leg of the triad provides ``unique
contributions to stability'' and as the ``overall force shrinks, their
unique values become more prominent.'' In this context, I look forward
to hearing how DOD views the future of the triad, and in light of
possible future reductions in warheads, how the Department views the
continued and heightened importance of maintaining and modernizing a
capable triad.
One of the most significant and substantial investments in delivery
vehicle modernization is the Ohio class SSBN replacement. At more than
$6 billion budgeted over the next 5 years for research and development
and an estimated 12 ships at $6-$7 billion each, the SSBN(X) is an
extraordinary yet necessary investment. Nonetheless, development and
eventual procurement cost as well as schedule must be a critical
consideration before going forward. I look forward to discussing what
steps are being taken early to ensure that requirements are
established, capabilities are affordable, and that the follow-on is
delivered both on time and within budget.
Another vital area of the nuclear enterprise supported by the
Quadrennial Defense Review and the budget request is the Next
Generation Bomber (NGB). The budget includes $200 million for the NGB
in fiscal year 2011 and a total of $1.7 billion over the next 5 years.
I fully support the administration's efforts in this area.
As for other Air Force related programs, the fiscal year 2011
budget continues funding to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives study
for a follow-on Long-Range Standoff capability and dedicates
significant resources, more than $800 million in the out-years to being
research, development, test, and evaluation for that effort. I
understand that a decision regarding the inclusion of a nuclear
capability awaits further direction from the President, and I look
forward to hearing more from our witnesses on the contributing benefit
of our current Long Range Stand-off nuclear capability, and what the
lack of a nuclear air launched cruise missile could mean for the
nuclear triad. For the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force,
the fiscal year 2011 budget requests more than $320 million to continue
the commitment of sustaining the Minuteman. This continued
reinvigoration is an essential investment to ensure the sustainment of
the ICBM force through 2030.
The Strategic Posture Commission expressed significant concern with
the dwindling solid rocket motor infrastructure, responsible for
supporting the majority of the strategic triad. Simply stated, the
commission maintains that the submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and ICBMs are not being sustained: ``There are no new missile
production programs planned for more than a decade and decisions on
follow-on ICBMs and SLBMs have not been made.'' In the meantime, we
have no other missile development programs utilizing solid fuels, all
exacerbated by the administration's decision to retire the Shuttle and
cancel the Constellation Program. As we learned during our space
posture hearing last week, the cancelation of National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) programs has ramifications that go far
beyond NASA itself and I look forward to hearing more from our
witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome our witnesses, thank them for their
service, and anticipate a fruitful discussion.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
The panel is fairly large today, as we can see, so I would
hope that each of you would highlight your comments as best you
can, having already taken your written statements into the
record. We would begin with you, Dr. Roberts.
STATEMENT OF BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY
Dr. Roberts. Thank you, sir, and thank you for the
opportunity to be here today.
Let me address directly your question about the state of
the NPR and the report of the review. The review has been under
way for 11 months following the legislative mandate and a
presidential study directive. It is wrapping up. The report
itself is nearing completion and we expect completion and
delivery here to Congress within the next few weeks at the
most. We're very much in the end game.
We do recognize the delay. We apologize for the delay, and
we regret it. But there was the need to be thorough in the
review and the need to ensure that we had official agreement at
the highest level on how to approach a balanced strategy for
reducing nuclear dangers in the 21st century.
I can report that the report itself will be organized
around five key policy objectives. The first of those is to
prevent nuclear performance and nuclear terrorism. The second
is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military
strategy. The third is to maintain effective strategic
deterrence at lower force levels. The fourth is to strengthen
regional deterrence, and assure U.S. allies and partners. The
fifth objective is to sustain a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal.
Let me highlight two of the main themes that bear on the
discussion today, two of the main findings of the review. The
first is that under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) the United States should retain the triad. This is
reflected in the fiscal year 2011 budget submission, which
reflects commitments to sustain the intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) in the manner directed by Congress, to begin the
development of the follow-on class for the Ballistic Missile
Submarine (SSBN) force, to sustain the bomber force, and to
upgrade the B-2s over the coming 5-year period.
You will also hear discussion today of a study that the
Department has underway which will bring forward results in the
next budget. It is a study of the requirements of a long-term
mix of nonnuclear strike capabilities, nonnuclear ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and bombers, and how those are
integrated in the emerging strategic environment. This is a
study that's underway and will be concluded in time to impact
the fiscal year 2012 budget.
I said that there are two themes from the NPR bearing on
today's discussion. The first is sustaining the triad under New
START. The second is to recommend a plan for sustaining the
stockpile, a plan that's consistent with the requirements of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,
the stockpile management plan described therein. In support of
this commitment, we've requested a 13 percent increase in the
National Nuclear Security Administration's fiscal year 2011
budget in order to modernize the complex, in order to
strengthen surveillance of the stockpile, and in order to
strengthen the science, technology, and engineering base in the
nuclear complex.
This budget also supports the life extension programs (LEP)
for the 76 and 61, and it allows for a follow-on LEP study for
the W-78.
I hope that in setting out these two themes from the NPR
we're helping to inform today's discussion. I look forward to
the opportunity to answer any questions you might have, but
also to come back and discuss the NPR in its entirety within a
relatively short period of time.
Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Klotz.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
General Klotz. Chairman Nelson and Ranking Member Vitter:
It's an honor to appear before you today for the first time as
the Commander of Air Force GSC. I thank you for the opportunity
to talk a little bit about the Air Force's newest major
command.
GSC has now assumed responsibility for both the ICBM and
the long-range nuclear-capable bomber force. In 16 months we've
gone from a provisional headquarters here at Bolling Air Force
Base in Washington, DC, of about 100 people, to a command
comprising over 23,000 Air Force professionals at 5 different
operational bases across the United States.
The fundamental mission of Air Force GSC is to provide for
safe, secure, and effective forces for nuclear deterrence and
for global strike, both to deter aggression against the United
States and to provide assurance to our allies. We perform this
mission with a very elite and highly professional, disciplined
team of American airmen who have a special trust and
responsibility for the most powerful weapons in our Nation's
arsenal.
The Minuteman III ICBM and the nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2
bombers have been and, most importantly, remain very important
elements and components of the U.S. Armed Forces. The ICBM with
its unmatched responsiveness and the bomber with its tremendous
flexibility provide unique and complementary capabilities to
the Nation's strategic nuclear triad.
As you rightly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the bombers of
GSC also offer critically important conventional capabilities
to the combatant commanders. Even though it's a truism that the
creation of GSC resulted largely from concerns about the state
of the Air Force nuclear enterprise, this command takes the
conventional role of the B-52 and the B-2 very, very seriously.
To that end, GSC will continue to work very closely with Air
Combat Command and the other major commands that are part of
the combat air forces to continuously develop and refine
weapons and tactics for employment of the bombers in
conventional operations.
I look forward to the opportunity to discuss these and
other issues this afternoon.
[The prepared statement of General Klotz follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, USAF
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before the Senate today for
the first time as the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Air Force's newest major
command.
Today, I would like to provide a brief update the establishment of
Global Strike Command; the enduring importance of the intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) and long-range, nuclear-capable bomber to our
national security; and the steps necessary to sustain and modernize
these forces to ensure they remain safe, secure, and effective.
command update
Upon assuming office in summer 2008, Secretary of the Air Force
Michael Donley and Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz
launched a comprehensive, multi-faceted roadmap designed to restore a
culture of compliance and rebuild the nuclear enterprise. Air Force
Global Strike Command was established as a key part of this roadmap.
This command is a visible commitment to the nuclear enterprise, clearly
aligning the ICBM and long-range, nuclear-capable bomber forces under a
single chain of command, providing focused oversight and advocacy of
the Air Force's nuclear forces.
The command was founded on the premise that as important as other
defense priorities may be, none are more important than the
responsibility for operating, maintaining, securing and supporting
nuclear weapons. For if there is one unchanging, immutable truth about
this awesome capability, it is that it demands constant and undivided
attention. This was true in the past, it is true now, and it will be
true in the future, regardless of the size or composition of the
Nation's nuclear deterrence and global strike forces.
Last year, in a speech in Prague, Czech Republic, President Obama
made this point perfectly clear. ``Make no mistake,'' he said, ``as
long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe,
secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee
that defense to our allies.'' The critical importance of this
undertaking was again underscored in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report, which states, ``Until such time as the administration's
goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved . . . [w]e will
maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack
on the United States, and on our allies and partners.''
This then is the fundamental mission of Air Force Global Strike
Command--to develop and provide safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrence and global strike forces both to deter attacks and assure
our allies. It performs this mission with an elite, highly disciplined
team of American airmen with special trust and responsibility for the
most powerful weapons in our Nation's arsenal.
Global Strike Command is being established in a methodical, step-
by-step fashion. The first step was to stand-up a provisional command
in January 2009, at Bolling Air Force Base (AFB), in Washington DC,
under the leadership of then Brigadier General Jim Kowalski, now a two-
star and the Vice Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command.
The next step took place on August 7, when General Schwartz
formally activated Air Force Global Strike Command in a ceremony at
Barksdale AFB, LA, the site of the command's permanent headquarters.
The first actual transfer of forces occurred on December 1, when
Air Force Global Strike Command assumed responsibility for the
intercontinental ballistic missile mission from Air Force Space
Command.
Under the new command arrangements, 20th Air Force, headquartered
at F.E. Warren AFB, WY and its three missile wings--at F.E. Warren AFB,
at Malmstrom AFB, MT, and at Minot AFB, ND--now fall under Air Force
Global Strike Command. On the same day, the command also took charge of
the ICBM test mission of the 576th Flight Test Squadron at Vandenberg
AFB, CA and the targeting analysis mission of the 625th Strategic
Operations Squadron at Offutt AFB, NE.
Just 6 weeks ago, on February 1, the transfer of forces to Air
Force Global Strike Command was completed as responsibility for 8th Air
Force and the long-range, nuclear-capable bomber mission was assumed
from Air Combat Command. The 8th Air Force is headquartered at
Barksdale and exercises command over the two B-52 wings, one at
Barksdale, the other at Minot, as well as the B-2 wing at Whiteman AFB,
MO.
Since last year, significant changes have also taken place within
these organizations as well. In August, 8th Air Force's assets for
cyberspace operations moved to the newly-established 24th Air Force,
headquartered in San Antonio, TX. Then in October, the remaining ``non-
bomber'' units of 8th Air Force were transferred to 9th and 12th Air
Forces. The end-result is a leaner 8th Air Force focused exclusively on
the long-range, nuclear capable bomber force.
Additionally, in September, the Air Force reactivated the 69th Bomb
Squadron to become the second operational B-52 squadron at Minot, thus
mirroring Barksdale, which already had two operational B-52 squadrons.
This move will help balance the workload between nuclear deterrence and
conventional missions--not only at Minot, but across the entire B-52
force. The new operational squadron will ultimately bring ten
additional B-52s and over 800 additional operations, maintenance, and
support personnel to Minot. The new people and jets have already begun
to arrive in a phased deployment that will be complete by this spring.
Finally, Air Force Global Strike Command will achieve full
operational capability in late summer 2010 with about 1,000 personnel
on board at the headquarters and approximately 23,000 people in the
entire command. Of special note, the command will be a fully
integrated, ``Total Force'' team--composed of Active Duty, Guard,
Reserve, Government civilians, and contractors.
air force global strike command forces
The Minuteman III ICBMs as well as the nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2
bombers have been, and most importantly remain, essential components of
the U.S. Armed Forces. Each makes important and unique contributions to
the security of the Nation, as well as the security of the Nation's
allies and friends.
Of the three legs of the strategic nuclear triad, the ICBMs are the
most responsive to national leadership. Continuously on alert and
deployed in 450 widely dispersed locations, the size and
characteristics of the overall Minuteman III force presents any
potential adversary with an almost insurmountable challenge should they
contemplate attacking the United States. Because an adversary cannot
disarm the ICBM force without nearly exhausting their own forces in the
process, and at the same time, leaving themselves vulnerable to sea-
launched ballistic missiles and bombers, they have no incentive to
strike in the first place. In this case, numbers do matter. The ICBM
contributes immeasurably to both deterrence and stability in a crisis.
While the ICBM possesses unmatched responsiveness, both in terms of
time-to-launch and time-to-target, the B-52 and B-2 bombers likewise
possess significant and complementary capabilities and remain
critically important components of the strategic nuclear triad. Their
readiness levels can be visibly ratcheted up or down to demonstrate
national intent. They can be dispersed to enhance their survivability.
If ever launched toward their targets, they can be recalled should
fast-breaking developments so dictate. They can also carry a
comparatively large number of weapons with different capabilities.
Bombers can avoid flying over sensitive areas in ways ballistic
missiles may not be able to do. Just as the various components of the
triad provide mutually reinforcing, complementary capabilities, so too
do the two different bombers, with the B-52 providing unique, unmatched
stand-off capabilities and the B-2 providing the capability to attack
heavily defended targets.
Finally, both of these bombers possess vitally important
conventional, or nonnuclear, capabilities, as they convincingly
demonstrated in the opening phases of both Operations Enduring Freedom
and Iraqi Freedom. With ever-increasing capabilities to deliver highly
precise and more effective munitions from bases in the United States or
at forward deployed locations, the bomber offers important and unique
capabilities to the combatant commander. While the creation of Global
Strike Command clearly resulted from concerns related to the overall
strength of the Air Force nuclear enterprise, the command nevertheless
takes the conventional role of the B-52 and the B-2 very seriously. To
that end, Global Strike Command will continue to work very closely with
Air Combat Command and the other members of the Combat Air Forces to
continuously develop and refine weapons and tactics for employing the
bombers in conventional operations.
sustainment and modernization
As important as the ICBM and long-range, nuclear-capable bomber are
to national security, they are aging weapon systems. The Minuteman III,
first deployed in the 1970s, is now nearly 40 years old. Moreover, much
of the infrastructure--for example, missile silos, launch control
centers, missile alert facilities, underground cables--were fielded
even earlier with previous generations of the Minuteman. The last B-52H
left the factory in 1962. The newest B-52 is older than the pilots who
fly it, and in some cases twice their age. The B-2, the Nation's most
advanced bomber, is considerably newer; but, even it is now over 20
years old.
Nevertheless, the Minuteman III and both bombers still have
significant life left in them and will be a part of the Air Force
inventory for many years to come. But, as with any aging system, each
weapon system faces chronic problems ranging from vanishing vendors for
spare parts to worn-out handling and test equipment. Additionally,
original design specifications in some cases limit the integration of
modern communications and data processing capabilities. Accordingly,
the Air Force fiscal year 2011 budget request calls for increased
funding to address sustainment and modernization, for both the missile
and the bomber force.
With respect to the Minuteman III ICBM, the Air Force is currently
in a multi-year program to refurbish or modernize practically every
inch of the Minuteman III--from the top of the nose cone to the bottom
of the first stage nozzles. All three rocket motors have been
overhauled with new propellant, the guidance system has been updated
with new electronics, the propulsion system rocket engine (or post
boost vehicle) is undergoing life extension, and the newer Peacekeeper
ICBM reentry vehicles are being deployed on a portion of the Minuteman
fleet. Meanwhile, other aspects of the weapon system have benefitted
from substantial investment. To ensure connectivity with national
command authorities, very low frequency communications equipment has
been updated and new equipment has been added to receive MILSTAR
transmissions. Communications capabilities will be further expanded to
take advantage of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite
upgrades. To enhance the survivability of the weapon system, the
missile alert and launch facilities are being equipped with new
environmental control systems, new diesel generators, new electrical
panels, and new batteries. These measures will not only extend the
service life of the missile system, but will also enhance its
maintainability and reduce the cost of ownership.
Equally important, significant steps are being taken to enhance
security in every facet of the ICBM system. Work was recently completed
on reinforcing the concrete headworks at every launch facility, and
progress continues on deploying a modified personnel access hatch
designed to ``button-up'' a missile silo faster in case of emergency.
Programs are underway to install security surveillance cameras at all
the remote launch facility sites as well as all of the alert
facilities.
However, significant work remains, particularly in the realm of
nuclear support equipment. For example, every weapon deployed to the
missile field requires a thorough checkout from the Reentry System Test
Set, which is overdue for replacement. Without it, not a single missile
can be placed on alert. Associated cabling, junction boxes, and
replacement parts are equally critical to keeping missiles on alert. As
such, it is a reminder that sustainment of test equipment, handling
equipment, and transportation equipment are very important to the
effectiveness of a weapon system. Hard work is being done to improve in
this area, and through a concerted effort with the system program
office, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, and the ICBM contractor
team, this challenge will be overcome just as many others have been
overcome over the years.
All these measures are designed to sustain the Minuteman III force
through 2020. In response to congressional direction, the Air Force is
currently exploring the steps necessary to sustain the Minuteman III
until 2030. Projections can and have been made about the potential
service life of the motors and other hardware after undergoing the
current upgrade programs; but, it's still too early to say with
confidence just how long the Minuteman weapon system will be
serviceable. The Air Force will continue to conduct a comprehensive
program to inspect missile and reentry system components for signs of
aging, and to perform periodic operational tests--both in the missile
field as well as unarmed test flights from Vandenberg AFB, CA.
The B-52 is also undergoing several programs in order to maintain
its viability through 2040. Current initiatives include incorporating
the 1760 data bus into the bomb bay to provide the capability to carry
precision weapons internally. This upgrade will provide greater
flexibility to the warfighter by practically doubling the smart weapon
carriage onboard the B-52. The Combat Network Communications Technology
acquisition program will support both nuclear and conventional
operations by upgrading the B-52 fleet with tactical data link and
voice communications capabilities. Efforts are also underway to enhance
the aircraft's capability to communicate in a secure, protected mode as
the Air Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite comes on
line. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has allocated $3.3 million
to conduct an Analysis of Alternative to replace the air-launched
cruise missile (ALCM). This effort began last summer when the Air Force
identified initial requirements to ensure the B-52 standoff weapons are
viable beyond 2020. This is not the entire list, but it illustrates the
range of B-52 programs underway.
As for the B-2, a new active electronically scanned array (AESA)
radar is currently being fielded, and the B-2 is also beginning a
modernization effort to improve the Defensive Management System on the
aircraft. This will allow the B-2 to continue operations around the
world in more advanced threat environments while decreasing the
maintenance required to operate the system. Funding will also be
increased for the Weapon System Support Center Software Integration
Laboratory, which enables testing of current as well as developmental
aircraft systems. New terminals will need to be installed on the
aircraft to enable it to communicate in secure, protected modes via the
Air Force's new Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites--a task
made more challenging by its unique low observable (LO) requirements.
Efforts are also underway to address the sustainability of aft decks
and to improve the process for maintaining the aircraft's LO
capability.
It is also worth noting that Air Force Global Strike Command has
lead command responsibilities for the venerable UH-1N Huey helicopter
that currently supports field operations and security at all three
missile bases. While this helicopter remains a serviceable aircraft,
and has been an undeniably reliable workhorse for the Air Force, thanks
to the expertise and efforts of the Air Force's helicopter squadron
leaders and contractor logistics support, the UH-1N fleet is aging and
its ability to meet post-September 11 security requirements is
constrained by cargo capacity, range and speed. It also lacks the
necessary all-weather capability to support nuclear security response
and convoy missions today.
The Air Force has initiated the acquisition process for replacement
of aging UH-1N aircraft. On February 16, General Cartwright, Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved the Common Vertical
Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) capabilities document stating the Joint
Requirement Oversight Committee's priority is the rapid fielding of the
CVLSP to meet immediate warfighter needs. The next major milestone is
for the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Global Strike
Command, and the Air Force Materiel Command's Aeronautical Systems
Center to present the acquisition strategy to senior Defense Department
leadership for review as part of the Material Development Decision.
This effort is driving toward a projected initial operation capability
of six aircraft to missile wings in fiscal year 2015. With this
acquisition, the Air Force will be increasing both crew force and the
number of aircraft that can successfully execute the mission anytime
they are called upon.
conclusion
The nuclear deterrence and global strike forces of the Air Force
remain vitally important to the Nation, as well as to the United
States' friends and allies around the world. For the men and women of
Air Force Global Strike Command that means we have an extraordinarily
important mission; noble and worthy work to perform; work that demands
the utmost in professionalism, discipline, excellence, pride and
esprit.
Everyone across America--and the world--should know and never doubt
that the senior leadership of the Air Force is extremely proud of the
airmen who currently serve in Eighth and Twentieth Air Forces, and what
they do every day. Indeed, our airmen are doing truly magnificent
work--flying sorties and performing alert duties; keeping our bombers
flying and our missiles ready; defending our flight lines and launch
facilities; deploying to Southwest Asia and Guam; supporting our
airmen, their families and retirees; and caring for our wounded
warriors. With every sortie, every alert tour, every shift, every post
and every support activity--they demonstrate over and over that they
rank among the best and brightest airmen who have ever served in the
U.S. Air Force.
As Secretary of Defense Gates noted in his remarks to the bomber
and missile personnel at Minot AFB 15 months ago, ``Handling nuclear
weapons--the most powerful and destructive instruments in the arsenal
of freedom--is a tremendous responsibility. We owe you the attention,
the people, and the resources you need to do the job right . . . .Yours
is the most sensitive mission in the entire U.S. military.''
This new command reflects the Air Force's firm and unshakable
conviction that strategic nuclear deterrence and global strike
operations require a special trust and responsibility--one that we take
very seriously. Air Force Global Strike Command will serve as a single
voice to maintain the high standards necessary in the stewardship of
our Air Force's strategic deterrent forces.
Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Shackelford.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARK D. SHACKELFORD, USAF, MILITARY
DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR
ACQUISITION
General Shackelford. Mr. Chairman and Senator Vitter: Thank
you very much for offering me the opportunity to speak with
your committee today.
Air Force Acquisition has a number of modernization
programs applicable to each of the three bombers to support our
commitment to long-term support for those bombers out into the
future. At the same time, we're doing the appropriate risk
reduction and requirements refinement for a future bomber or
long-range strike capability.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Shackelford follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Mark D. Shackelford, USAF
The Air Force continues to modernize and support its bomber fleet
with over $5.5 billion planned over the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP) in modernization and sustainment investments. The B-2, B-52 and
B-1 bombers each have programs to ensure their viability into the
future.
b-1
The B-1B Lancer has maintained an unflagging deployed presence
since September 11, 2001 in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom. During that time, the B-1 fleet and its crews have flown
more than 6,900 missions and amassed more than 70,000 combat hours. In
Operation Enduring Freedom alone, the B-1 has employed nearly 40
percent of all munitions while flying only 5 percent of all sorties.
Given the B-1's critical contributions to today's fight and its
corresponding high operations tempo, the Air Force places great
emphasis on sustaining the B-1 fleet. B-1 sustainment efforts currently
address several issues which, if left unchecked, could critically limit
aircraft availability and leave a gap in our power projection
capability. Although these modifications represent a significant
investment, they are critical to supporting our deployed combat forces
by ensuring continued B-1 availability.
The Air Force's primary B-1 modernization effort is the Fully
Integrated Data Link (FIDL). FIDL gives aircrew enhanced situational
awareness and combat effectiveness by incorporating Link-16 data link
and Joint Range Extension Beyond Line-of-Sight capabilities. FIDL also
provides the backbone infrastructure for a substantial upgrade to the
existing cockpit including modern multi-function color displays that
provide aircrew with a new level of fused data.
The Air Force continues to develop the highly successful Laptop
Controlled Targeting Pod (LCTP) modification for the B-1. Begun in 2007
as a response to a U.S. Air Forces, U.S. Central Command Urgent Need
Request and operational since 2008, LCTP provides the B-1 with
targeting pod capabilities via the Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod (ATP).
The B-1 combined with the Sniper ATP delivers an unprecedented level of
payload precision to the fight. Efforts continue to outfit the entire
B-1 fleet for Sniper operations and provide a Moving Target Kill
capability via employment of laser-guided weapons.
b-2
The B-2 Spirit Advanced Technology Bomber provides a lethal
combination of range, payload, and stealth, and remains the world's
sole long-range, low observable bomber. It is the only platform capable
of delivering 80 independently targeted 500-lb Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (GBU-38). While B-2 availability has steadily increased over
the past 5 years, in part due to enhancements in low observable
maintenance such as the highly successful Alternate High Frequency
Material program, it faces increasing pressures to upgrade avionics
originally designed over 20 years ago. The three increment Extremely
High Frequency Satellite Communications and Computer Upgrade program
(EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade) seeks first, in Increment 1, to
upgrade the Spirit's flight management computers as an enabler for
future avionics efforts. Increment 2 integrates the Family of Beyond-
line-of-sight Terminals (FAB-T) along with a low observable antenna to
provide secure, survivable strategic communication, while Increment 3
will connect the B-2 into the Global Information Grid. Increment 1 of
EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade is currently in Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) and on track to begin procurement in
fiscal year 2011 for fleet installations beginning at the end of fiscal
year 13. The Department is also investing in the B-2's Defensive
Management System to ensure continued survivability. This will allow
the B-2 to continue operations in more advanced threat environments
while decreasing the maintenance required to operate the system.
We will also replace the B-2's original radar antenna, upgrade
selected radar avionics and change the radar operating frequency as
part of the Radar Modernization Program (RMP). The Low Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) contract for the first six production radar kits was
awarded in December 2008, with the second and final full-rate buy for
the remaining seven ship sets awarded in November 2009. Seven radar
ship sets were previously procured during development and are currently
being installed in fleet aircraft. Upon delivery and installation of
the radar ship sets, the twenty aircraft
B-2 fleet will have completed its radar modernization efforts. The
developmental units will be retrofitted to the final production
configuration. Thanks in large part to congressional support, the RMP
acquisition strategy was modified to include life-of-type component
buys to avoid diminishing manufacturing source issues during the
production run.
b-52
The B-52 Stratofortress is our Nation's oldest frontline long-range
strategic bomber with the last airframe entering service in 1962. The
Air Force has invested in modernization programs to keep the platform
viable and operationally relevant. Major B-52 modernizations include
the Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT), EHF SATCOM,
Strategic Radar Replacement (SR2), and 1760 Internal Weapons Bay
Upgrade programs. CONECT provides an integrated communication and
mission management system with machine to machine datalink interfaces
for weapons delivery. The digital infrastructure provided in CONECT is
the backbone for EHF SATCOM and SR2. The EHF SATCOM program integrates
the FAB-T providing assured, survivable two-way strategic command and
control communications. The SR2 program, starting in fiscal year 2010,
integrates a modern non-developmental radar to address systemic
sustainment issues, replacing the legacy APN-166 radar. Finally, 1760
Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade provides internal J-series weapons
capability through modification of Common Strategic Rotary Launchers
and an upgrade of stores management and offensive avionics software.
Updated with modern technology the B-52 will be capable of delivering
the full complement of jointly developed weapons and will continue into
the 21st century as an important element of our Nation's defenses.
The fiscal year 2011 PB began funding for technology industrial
base sustainment in anticipation of a future long range strike (LRS)
platform program. This effort develops and demonstrates LRS
technologies and concepts in support of Air Force Global Strike and
Global Persistent Attack Concepts of Operations. This effort will
provide capability improvements in the areas of strike responsiveness,
survivability, lethality, connectivity, and affordability. The
Quadrennial Defense Review-directed LRS study will help inform and
shape the requirements for LRS.
The sustainment and modernization efforts briefly outlined above
will ensure our bomber fleet's continued ability to project global
power through enhanced combat capability and lethality, survivability,
and supportability. I wish to thank the committee for it's continued
support of the Air Force's global strike mission.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Alston.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. C. DONALD ALSTON, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF
OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S.
AIR FORCE
General Alston. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Vitter: Thank
you very much for the privilege to testify before you this
afternoon.
I have been in my position as the Assistant Chief of Staff
of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration for just the
last 15 months that the organization stood up. We stood it up
in November 2008. But actually I arrived in the position to be
working the challenges the Air Force has just a couple of days
after our event that you mentioned in your opening remarks. So
I look forward to discussing and answering your questions with
regard to the variety of initiatives that we've undertaken with
regard to process, structure, and culture in order to have the
positive impacts that are required for us to perform at the
level demanded by nuclear weapons.
I look forward to your additional questions on this.
[The prepared statement of General Alston follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. C. Donald Alston, USAF
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Air Force
strategic programs.
Twenty months ago, the Air Force began taking comprehensive action
to strengthen performance in the nuclear mission area and to determine
the long-term actions necessary to build a culture of excellence within
the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Credible and reliable nuclear
deterrence is essential for our security and that our allies and
friends, and the Air Force have a pivotal role in this vital mission
area. Air Force senior leadership continually emphasizes that there is
no mission more sensitive than safeguarding nuclear capabilities and
maintaining nuclear deterrence, and that the Air Force has a sacred
trust with the American people to safely operate, maintain and secure
nuclear weapons. The strategic plan we developed nearly a year and a
half ago provided the initial direction and framework to begin
addressing the findings and recommendations from a variety of internal
and external reports. I intend to use the six strategic objective of
our roadmap to update the committee on the initiatives underway to
support the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff's number 1
priority, which is to continue to strengthen the Air Force nuclear
enterprise.
rebuild a culture of accountability and rigourous self-assessment
dedicated to high standards of excellece in the air force nuclear
enterprise
Regardless of the size or structure of our nuclear force, every
action by every Airman must be executed with precision and reliability.
Perfection is the standard each and every time and a robust self-
assessment and inspection process to effectively uncover, analyze, and
address systemic nuclear weaknesses is an important tool in our effort
to rebuild a nuclear-aware and focused culture.
The Air Force Inspector General (IG) has implemented centralized,
independent oversight of Air Force nuclear inspections and assessments,
while preserving major command (MAJCOM) authorities and
responsibilities for training and readiness of their assigned forces.
To robust our inspection process, we have developed standardized/
centralized training for all IG team members with nuclear inspection
duties, and a MAJCOM certification program for nuclear inspection
teams. We also formed a core team of inspectors that accompany major
command inspection teams to ensure consistent application of standards.
We have also mandated an increase in no-notice inspections.
Inspection policy changes include increasing the frequency and
intensity of inspections while limiting or eliminating advanced notice.
Other changes include:
Ensuring 100 percent oversight by the Air Force
Inspection Agency of all nuclear inspections
Re-emphasizing no- and limited-notice inspections
Mandating a no-notice Limited Nuclear Survey
Inspection be executed between each full-scale Nuclear
Surety Inspection (NSI)
Increased depth and rigor of nuclear inspection activities have
enhances our ability to identify and document discrepancies as a means
to improve processes and procedures.
In the exacting world of nuclear weapons, a perfect pass rate would
not be realistic or desirable. A unit must have 750 items in 100
percent compliance with established standards in order to receive a
``satisfactory'' rating, therefore an ``unsatisfactory'' rating does
not directly translate to an inability of a unit to accomplish its
mission nor does it indicate a compromise of the safety, security and
reliability of nuclear-responsible forces. Instead, it indicates a
deviation from the extremely high standards we demand and expect in
this mission area and we are committed to finding those deviations,
determining what caused them, and correcting the deviations as a means
of enhancing our stewardship of the nuclear deterrence mission.
rebuild nuclear enterprise and codify career paths
Credible deterrence requires capable systems and competent people.
To overcome the erosion of nuclear expertise, the Air Force set forth a
path to examine education and training across the enterprise, improve
identification and tracking of nuclear experience and expertise, and
establish a force development governance construct to ensure continual,
formalized senior leadership involvement in the development of future
nuclear leaders.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Scott.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DAVID J. SCOTT, USAF, DIRECTOR,
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS, AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Scott. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member: As the
Director of Requirements for the Air Force, I work hand-in-hand
with the major commands on the requirements throughout, whether
it's from a bomber force or the fighter force, but all those
requirements. I will work directly with General Klotz on the
requirements that he has, or hand-in-hand with General
Shackelford to hand off the requirements for the acquisition.
Many of the things that you see in the beginning of the
phase of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) and the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council
are the things that we'll be working, and work the conventional
side of that. Sir, I'm looking forward to your questions also.
[The prepared statement of General Scott follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. David Scott, USAF
Good morning Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to address this committee regarding Air Force Strategic
Forces and the current conventional operations for B-52, B-1, and B-2.
All three of our long range strike platforms remain engaged in today's
fight while retaining an ability to meet future challenges. Air Force
bombers have been on rotating deployment to SWA since September 11.
The B-52 amplifies the consistent message of long range U.S.
airpower in a theater such as U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) where
distance drives decisions. Equipped with advanced targeting pods, the
B-52s can also provide real-time ISR with full motion video, enhanced
situational awareness, a demonstrable over watch presence, and
precision joint fires in support of Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
objectives. While our B-52 fleet remains heavily tasked and is
currently supporting the deployed operations on a 1-to-3 dwell, it
continues to meet a constant nuclear commitment with the nondeployed
forces.
The B-52 brings some unique maritime support capabilities to the
Pacific theater, a theater defined by the immensity of the Pacific
Ocean. In a broad ocean area surveillance or in an anti-shipping role,
the B-52 provides an important force multiplier to the fleet and Joint
Forces Air Component Commander. B-52s equipped with advanced targeting
pods and armed with joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) provide
persistence over the battle field or the fleet which significantly
contributes to the effectiveness of the joint force's ability to
respond to critical land, sea, or air threats.
The B-1 is in the ongoing fight in Afghanistan and provides long
range persistent airpower in direct support of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, U.S., and Afghan troops. The B-1 provides real-
time ISR with full motion video, enhanced situational awareness, a
demonstrable over watch presence, and precision joint fires in support
of coalition objectives. B-1s added SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pod
capability in summer 2009, to provide air crew with positive ID
capability and the ability to share video with forces on the ground.
The Air Force developed this capability--in response to a Central
Command tasking--on an accelerated 18 month timeline. This allows the
ability to combine precision targeting, precision weapons, and
persistence to the joint commander.
Demonstrating a worldwide deterrence capability with our nuclear
forces is vital to protecting both the United States and our allies.
The B-2 and B-52 are tasked to provide dedicated support to U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM). This is done via the Global Deterrence
Force; our recent reorganization of the B-52 fleet to add a fourth
active duty squadron, the 69th bomb squadron, at Minot which is
designed to optimize support for the STRATCOM mission. While deployed,
the units meet Air Tasking Order mission requirements for both ground
alert and scheduled sorties to support STRATCOM's objectives.
Air Force bombers are also currently supporting U.S. PACOM's
Continuous Bomber Presence to assure allies and support U.S. interests
in the Pacific region. Air Force bombers have been deployed to U.S.
PACOM (Andersen Air Force Base) since 2003--currently, the B-2 and B-52
cover this tasking. Each B-52 deployment brings aviators, maintainers
and support forces for what is growing from a 120-day to a 179-day
period. B-2s rotate in behind every two B-52 rotations.
U.S. PACOM deployed bombers support a variety of exercises, often
in conjunction with other Combat Air Force assets. Training missions
include local sorties, exercises, and 24-hour global power missions to
ranges in Hawaii, Alaska, and Australia. Significant exercises include
Northern Edge in the Alaskan ranges and Valiant Shield in the vicinity
of Guam. Northern Edge is an annual Air Force exercise where bombers
integrate with F-22, F-15, and F-16 fighters as wells as E-3 Airborne
Warning and Control System to conduct simulated composite force
integrated strikes against ground and air defenses. Valiant Shield was
a joint exercise with the U.S. Navy where B-2s and F-15Es exercised
with naval aviation assets from two Carrier Strike Groups
simultaneously, marking the largest mass of U.S. naval forces since the
Vietnam War.
The Air Force continues our commitment to future long-range strike
capabilities, as part of a comprehensive, phased plan to modernize and
sustain our bomber force. We will continue planned legacy bomber
sustainment and modernization to increase the conventional capabilities
of the bomber fleet.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this subcommittee. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Admiral Johnson.
STATEMENT OF RADM STEPHEN E. JOHNSON, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Strategic
Systems are impeccably supported by the Secretary of the Navy,
the Chief of Naval Operations, and by your committee in all
aspects of our program.
We have returned three SSBNs to strategic patrol in the
past 12 months. USS Alabama, Her Majesty's Ship Victorious, and
USS Alaska have all completed their demonstration and shakedown
operations and all are ready or already on strategic patrol.
Last December, it was the USS Alaska, the third of those
three SSBNs to return to strategic operations, that conducted
the 130th consecutive successful flight of the Trident II D5
missile. This record of successful flight tests is unmatched by
any other missile system in the world.
I would also like to thank the committee for its strong
support of the Ohio Replacement Program and I look forward to
our discussion today in that area.
The men and women of the Strategic Systems Program are
committed to the highest standards of safety, surety, and
reliability for our systems. We sincerely appreciate the
committee's support.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Stephen Johnson, USN
Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, distinguished members of the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear
before you to discuss our Navy's nuclear enterprise, today's force and
the efforts to ensure the continued reliability of our submarine
strategic forces, and the Ohio Class Replacement to maintain continuous
strategic deterrence.
navy nuclear enterprise
Strategic Systems Programs is impeccably supported by the Secretary
of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and by your committee in all
aspects of our program. We appreciate this strong support and remain
vigilant in executing our strategic deterrent mission. Strategic
Systems Programs continues to maintain a safe, reliable, and secure
environment for our strategic assets. We continue to focus on the
custody and accountability of the nuclear assets you have entrusted to
the Navy.
Earlier this year, the Navy took a significant step to better
define the roles and responsibilities associated with the safety and
security of our strategic weapons. The Secretary of the Navy signed an
instruction strengthening Strategic Systems Programs' role as the
program manager and technical authority for technical operations,
safety, security, and maintenance of the Navy's nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapons systems.
Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) will continue to sustain our high
standards and focus on two major areas which include; (1) fully meeting
operational and fleet support requirements and (2) recruiting and
retaining the highest quality personnel to execute our strategic
mission. I established senior executive level management for field
operations and am implementing continuous on-site evaluation. These
actions have improved the rigor applied to daily operations, increased
the level of accountability, created an environment of self-assessment,
and placed priority on implementing corrective actions. SSP has also
placed a high priority on the recruitment, development and retention of
a highly-skilled workforce. These two focus areas shape the way in
which we manage our day-to-day operations and set the culture to
sustain our strategic deterrent for the long-term. The men and women of
Strategic Systems Programs and our industry partners remain dedicated
to supporting the mission of our Sailors on strategic deterrent patrol
and our marines and sailors who are standing the watch to ensure the
security of the weapons we are entrusted with by this Nation. I would
like to take a moment to address a few of the major initiatives
underway within the Navy that address the sustainment of our sea-based
deterrent and ensure its future viability.
today's force
We have returned three SSBNs to strategic patrol in the past 12
months. USS Alabama (SSBN 731), HMS Victorious and USS Alaska (SSBN
732) have all completed Demonstration and Shakedown Operations and are
ready for or already on strategic patrol. Our 14 U.S. Navy SSBNs, 8 of
which are homeported in the Pacific and 6 in the Atlantic Fleet,
continue to provide a credible, survivable, and reliable sea-based
strategic deterrent for our national leadership.
In December, the USS Alaska (SSBN 732), the third of the three
SSBNs to return to strategic operations, conducted the 130th
consecutive successful flight test of the Trident II (D5) missile as
part of her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation. This record of
successful flight tests is unmatched by any other missile launch
system. Therefore, I am pleased to report to you that the Trident
Strategic Weapons System continues to demonstrate itself as a credible
deterrent and meet the operational requirements established for the
system almost 30 years ago.
USS Nevada (SSBN 733) will soon complete her Engineering Refueling
Overhaul, enter post availability testing, prepare for her
Demonstration and Shakedown Operation and return to the operational
cycle in spring 2011. Two more of our submarines, USS Tennesse (SSBN
734) and USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) are undergoing Engineering
Refueling Overhauls which will maintain the viability of these
platforms through the service life of the Ohio class.
The Trident II (D5) weapons system is nearing its 20th year of
deployment. We must continue to be vigilant of age-related issues to
ensure the high reliability needed for a strategic weapons system. With
the Trident II (D5) missile planned for operational deployment through
2042 to match the Ohio class hull life extension, D5 hardware will age
beyond our previous experience base and will be operational almost
twice as long as any previous sea-based strategic deterrent. Therefore
SSP has adjusted our testing to focus on older missiles in order to
best predict aging characteristics. For example, the missile
successfully fired by the USS Alaska (SSBN 732) was approximately 17
years old.
d5 life extension program
The Trident II (D5) missile service life is being extended to 2042
to match the Ohio class submarine service life. This is being
accomplished through an update to missile electronics and guidance
packages to address obsolescence and continuous production of critical
components such as rocket motors.
SSP has restructured our D5 life extension program to ensure
sufficient time for additional missile electronics design evolutions.
The flight test schedule has been realigned by a few months to allow
for data analysis and to incorporate any test changes. The initial
introduction of the D5 life extended missiles to the Fleet has shifted
from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017. This shift, which is cost
neutral until fiscal year 2013, will provide more time to ensure the
successful deployment of the life extension program, while allowing us
to continue to meet our ship-fill requirements. This modest schedule
shift will also allow SSP to better accommodate the any potential
outcomes of the Nuclear Posture Review and the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty. Ninety percent of the Trident II (D5) life extension
component procurement remains on track to support missile production.
One area of concern for the Trident II (D5) life extension program
is the decline in the Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base. The Navy is
maintaining a continuous production of solid rocket motors and should
be in production through 2023. However, we have faced significant cost
challenges as both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and Air Force demand have declined and will continue to experience
those cost increases as demand continues to shrink further in future
years.
Another key to the success of the Trident II, D5 life extension
program is the life extension of the W76, Mk4 warhead refurbishment
known as the W76-1, which we are executing in partnership with the
Department of Energy. The W76-1 refurbishment maintains the military
capability of the original W76 for approximately an additional 30
years. This program will provide the Navy with the weapons we need to
meet operational requirements throughout the Ohio service life and the
planned follow-on platform.
ohio replacement
Congress approved the first significant funding request for the
Ohio Replacement program in the fiscal year 2010 budget. Thank you for
your strong support. The Ohio Replacement will be a strategic, national
asset whose endurance and stealth will enable the Navy to provide
continuous, uninterrupted survivable strategic deterrence into the
2080s.
The Ohio Replacement Analysis of Alternatives study was completed
and is being reviewed within the Navy. It will support the Milestone A
review, which is planned for the spring 2010. The Navy's fiscal year
2011 budget provides the required research, development, test, and
evaluation investment to support the lead ship construction beginning
in fiscal year 2019.
The United States and the United Kingdom (U.K.) have maintained a
shared commitment to nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales
Agreement since April 1963. The U.S. will continue to maintain its
strong strategic relationship with the U.K. for our respective follow-
on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement. The Ohio
Replacement program includes the development of a common missile
compartment that will support both the Ohio Class Replacement and the
successor to the U.K. Vanguard Class.
nuclear weapons security
Our Marines and Navy Masters-at-Arms are providing an effective and
integrated elite security force at both of our Strategic Weapons
Facilities. The U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Protection Force Units have
been commissioned at Kings Bay, GA and Bangor, WA. These coastguardsmen
and the Navy vessels they man provide a security umbrella for our Ohio
class submarines as they deploy and return from their deterrent
patrols. They form the basis of our Trident Transit Protection System.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I
sincerely appreciate your continued support of the Navy's nuclear
enterprise. Your efforts will ensure the continued credibility,
reliability, and safety of our Trident II (D5) Weapons System and its
remarkable Trident II (D5) Missile, maintaining a record of success
unmatched by any missile system. The men and women of Strategic Systems
Programs are committed to the highest standards of safety, surety, and
reliability of this remarkable system. I thank you again for the
opportunity to appear before you today and am prepared to answer any
questions you may have.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Begich has joined us. Do you have any opening
comments you might like to make?
Senator Begich. No, I will pass, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. You'll pass? We just mentioned the SSBN
Alaska.
Senator Begich. We like that. [Laughter.]
Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Roberts, is there any particular
reason that this report is late? Is it just taking too much
time to develop it? Because the questions that come about then
are, is everything in the report in the budget or are there
things that are going to be outside the budget that will come
about as a result of this report?
Dr. Roberts. The budget that was submitted reflects the
results of the NPR and we don't expect subsequent changes. The
following years' budgets may reflect some additional
initiatives.
The delay is essentially a reflection of the fact that this
third NPR since the Cold War is more comprehensive and complex
than the prior two. The first, the 1994 NPR, was a strictly
internal DOD planning activity and set out the key theme, lead
but hedge: lead to reduce nuclear risks, but hedge against the
possibility of a Russian turn to the worse by maintaining
current force structure capability.
There was an unclassified summary of that report made
available in Powerpoint form a year or 2 after the fact, but it
was very much an internal DOD force planning exercise.
The 2001 NPR received slightly broader interagency review,
but was still essentially an internal planning DOD activity.
This NPR reflects the fact of the legislation that required a
comprehensive review of arms control strategy and an integrated
look at nonproliferation and other emerging 21st century
threats, to include nuclear terrorism. This, of course,
dovetailed with the instinct of the administration to take a
very broad look.
The legislation also mandated that this would be a DOD-led,
but interagency, review of policy, strategy, and capabilities.
So as we have moved through our work we have found a very
complex landscape. Additionally, we were given the framework of
the Prague speech and the desire to both take concrete steps to
reduce nuclear roles while at the same time maintaining not
just deterrence, but strategic stability and assurance of our
allies. Accomplishing this very broad set of objectives in a
balanced and comprehensive way has required a lot of analytical
work and a lot of debate at every level in the executive
branch.
We've learned, moreover, that our leadership wishes to be
very deliberative in moving through these discussions. We had
set two deadlines, the original deadline and a fallback
deadline, and we learned that we simply need to allow the
leadership to work its way through the issues to the point
where it's satisfied with the result. We think we're just about
at that point right now.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Klotz, you recently assumed
this command, as you indicated. How has the transition of
bombers and ICBMs gone so far and what's left to be
accomplished in that regard?
General Klotz. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My sense
is it has gone very well and the feedback I get from the airmen
at each of our bases reinforces that opinion. We have started
this whole process in a very systematic, methodical way,
beginning with a program plan that was developed by General
Alston and others in the Air Force headquarters that had
literally hundreds of action items to be completed as part of
the transfer of forces to GSC.
As soon as we stood up our headquarters on the 7th of
August, we set about as a command working through each and
every one of those steps. We established working groups with
both Air Force Space Command, from which we assumed the ICBM
mission, and with Air Combat Command, from whom we assumed the
B-52 and B-2 missions. We had working groups. We had weekly
videoteleconferences. We had periodic meetings at the two-star
level, then ultimately a meeting between myself and the
commanders of both those organizations to ensure that we had
crossed every t and dotted every i in terms of assuming those
forces.
So we did, in fact, assume the ICBMs on the 1st of December
of last year and the long-range bomber force on the 1st of
February this year. We continue to have a relationship with
both Space Command and Air Combat Command. I anticipate that
those relationships will be very intense through the end of
this fiscal year as they continue to discharge some of the
responsibilities they have from a financial point of view, and
also well into the future, particularly with Air Combat
Command, since they have the responsibility as the lead major
command for developing conventional weapons and tactics which
will apply to not only the aircraft which they have
responsibility for, but for both the B-52 and the B-2.
Senator Ben Nelson. The Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland
Air Force Base, of course, is responsible for maintaining
nuclear weapons and systems, but it's not under GSC. Is this a
good decision for it not to be under GSC?
General Klotz. I think it's a good decision, but I will
caveat that by saying we need to constantly check how we're
doing and assess the strong points of that change as well as
ways we can improve it.
Let me tell you why I think it's a good decision. To some
extent--and Admiral Johnson can talk to this in greater
detail--we've taken a page from the Navy's playbook in the
sense that they have, as I understand it, a single entity which
has responsibility for what happens inside a weapons storage
area. The technical operations that take place there are all
managed by a single group.
In many respects, it was fragmented in the Air Force
enterprise by having each wing commander or each base
responsible for the actions and activities that took place
inside the weapons storage area. We thought, given the critical
self-assessment we went through after the Minot incident, which
you mentioned, that we ought to adopt a process by which we had
a single organization responsible for activities that went on
in the weapons storage area regardless of where they were,
whether they were on a bomber base or whether they were on a
missile base, and whether they were in a missile base in North
Dakota or a missile base in Montana or Wyoming.
So, having said that, I have gone out and I visited weapons
storage areas at all of our bases. I've been very impressed
with the enthusiasm, the energy, and the sense of purpose and
seriousness on the part of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center
personnel that are operating inside the weapons storage areas.
I'm very optimistic about that, but I will caveat that by
saying we need to constantly go back and make sure that we have
it right.
Senator Ben Nelson. A final question in that area. There
was a concern that getting personnel to transfer to the new
command might be a challenge for recruiting and retention. How
has that gone thus far?
General Klotz. Quite the opposite, Mr. Chairman. I have
been very pleased that people have been signing up in large
numbers to come to Air Force GSC, both Active Duty military as
well as government civilians and contractors. I think there are
a couple of reasons for that. Many of the people who come are
those who served in Strategic Air Command or in the nuclear
enterprise for a number of years. They understand the
seriousness which the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have
placed on continuing to strengthen the nuclear enterprise. They
think that it is important, worthy, and noble work to do, and
they want to participate. So it's an opportunity for them to
come back and do that.
The other reason I think is probably a little more
esoteric, in the sense that people are motivated by the fact
that they're coming and standing up a brand new organization.
So rather than going into an organization which already exists
and fitting in and perhaps maybe improving it, they have an
opportunity to create an organization essentially from whole
cloth. A lot of people find that a very exciting prospect and
they want to be in on the ground floor and, as I said, we've
had no lack of people signing up to come and work in the
headquarters and in our units.
Senator Ben Nelson. Let's hope that continues. Thank you.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you.
Thank you, General Klotz. You didn't even mention the two
other key factors. The food and the Saints' Superbowl win
helps, too. [Laughter.]
Dr. Roberts, I was happy to hear your comments about the
nuclear triad. Given that, when will the Department make a
decision with respect to the design of the next generation
bomber and its nuclear capabilities?
Dr. Roberts. I believe that will be a consequence of the
study that's under way on this future look at conventional
strike, the future role of the bomber, and the follow-on cruise
missile. These are meant to be part and parcel of an integrated
look at strike.
Senator Vitter. How would you lay that out in terms of a
timetable with regard to the bomber after the NPR?
Dr. Roberts. For the study and the budget result? We would
expect to put forward the results of this study in the fiscal
year 2012 budget.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
General Scott. Sir, I don't want to jump in, but I'm part
of the Under Secretary of Defense study team and I can give you
timelines. We've just kicked off that particular study team.
The family of systems that they're looking at are what they
call long-range strike. Within that family of systems will be
the long-range persistent strike aircraft, the conventional
prompt global strike, and then the standoff weapons and the
standoff platforms.
In about the May timeframe, we'll start talking about it,
but it's a 1-year study that we're working with RAND on.
Senator Vitter. Okay, thank you.
General Scott. Yes, sir.
Senator Vitter. General Klotz, how important do you believe
the ICBM force is in the triad, and specifically how critical
do you think a 450-single warhead ICBM force is?
General Klotz. The ICBM, in my view, is extraordinarily
important to the triad and to our overall defense posture.
Without saying a specific number, I think the numbers really do
matter. By presenting a potential adversary with a fairly
large, complex target set that he would have to deal with
should he contemplate attacking the United States, having a
large number of ICBMs literally forces any adversary to exhaust
his entire force in an attempt to defeat it or to disarm it. In
the process, if he does that, then he's still faced with the
other two elements or components of the triad, the manned
bomber and the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM),
which will provide for continuing deterrence after that
attempt. So I think that's extraordinarily important.
The other point is that the ICBM is perhaps the most
responsive of all elements of the triad because it is land-
based. It's located in the continental United States, and there
are multiple and redundant communication paths to the launch
control centers, so a very responsive system.
By touting the strengths of the ICBM, I continue to be a
champion for the manned bomber, as you would expect the
Commander of Air Force GSC to be, but also for the SLBM because
of its tremendous survivability and power that it also brings
to the deterrent and assurance equation.
Senator Vitter. General, going back to your comments about
the ICBM, I assume you think whatever the number is, there's a
big difference between that number in a single-warhead force
versus multiple warheads, the same number of warheads. Can you
comment on the difference and what that means strategically?
General Klotz. Again, I think the key and critical point
from not only a deterrence point of view, but also from the
stability point of view, is the number of silos or delivery
systems you have, not so much the warheads. Indeed, as we were
going through the negotiations for the START II Treaty, a
treaty which, by the way, was never ratified, the assumption,
which I think continues to hold true, is that as both sides go
to lower numbers of warheads on delivery vehicles, it creates
an inherently more stable situation in a crisis.
So again, I think keeping the numbers of ICBMs at a robust
number gives you the option to reduce the number of warheads
and still provide for the stability in a crisis that we seek
through the ICBM leg of the triad.
Senator Vitter. Okay, thank you.
Admiral Johnson, last week the Air Force confirmed during
our space posture hearings that the cost of some components of
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle are likely to rise
significantly, maybe as much as 100 percent, as a result of the
administration's decision to retire the Shuttle and cancel
Constellation. How will this proposed NASA change in mission
affect the cost of Trident D5 life extension rocket motors and
what sort of gap in the industrial base does this raise the
prospect of?
Admiral Johnson. Senator, we are in low rate initial
production (LRIP) and intend to remain in LRIP for at least the
next 10 years. The change in the industrial base and the
national orders for large-diameter rocket motors cause more of
the fixed costs to fall upon the Navy's production cost. We
expect to see a rise, not of the order that you referred to in
your question, but we do expect to see a rise of 10 to 20
percent. We are working with DOD and with the two companies
involved to control those costs. But they will increase. We
have seen increases and they will continue.
On the other side of that equation, because we intend to
remain in production for the next 10 years or so, that provides
a warm industrial base for the work that comes. So I would
describe the industry as fragile. The government plays an
important role in managing that industrial base and I think
that it is manageable. The costs will go up.
Senator Vitter. For that solid rocket industrial base,
right now doesn't NASA business represent the majority for them
and DOD business represent the minority? So I guess my question
is, if in fact--and this isn't decided by Congress, that 70
percent majority business, whatever it is from NASA, just goes
away, it strikes me as a layperson that that is going to
probably cause you more than a 10 or 20 percent cost problem.
What am I missing?
Admiral Johnson. At the surface level, were we to not take
action that would exactly be the result. The difference in the
manufacturing requirement for the NASA is so much larger--even
as big as the Trident missile is, it is so much larger than
ours, I think we can control those costs by closing down
portions of the facilities and removing those costs from the
Trident program. But we cannot completely eliminate that. We
don't know exactly what those costs are going to be.
So I think there's a very valid concern. There's no doubt
our costs are going to go up. I don't think they'll double, but
there's absolutely no doubt it's going to be significant and
it's going to be a difficult cost for the Navy to absorb.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I'm going to actually follow up on what Senator Vitter just
talked about. I want to, if I can, just probe a little bit on
the costing factor, and I'm not sure who would be the best, but
I'll look to you, Rear Admiral Johnson. The estimate you give
is 10 to 20 percent. Give me an assurance in how you come to
that number? I'm new to all this, about a year and a half in
now, but I have come to the conclusion estimates aren't the
most accurate any more. No disrespect to any of the military
folks, but it seems like every meeting I go to there is an
estimate, and then I go to another meeting and the estimate's
just a little off. A little off in the military is millions and
billions.
So help me understand why you think it's only 10 to 20
percent when those fixed costs are going to be spread no matter
what? Help me understand that.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. They've already gone up once.
Senator Begich. How much did it go up last time?
Admiral Johnson. On an individual rocket motor set price,
it went up about $1.8 million per set, so that's about an 18
percent change already. I'll take that for the record and give
you an exact number so you can have it.
Senator Begich. That would be great.
[The information referred to follows:]
The cost of an individual rocket motor set has increased $1.667
million from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2010, a change of 20.48
percent. This increase was formulated using the expected negotiated
unit cost of the fiscal year 2010 Rocket Motor contract.
Admiral Johnson. So it's already gone up as I testify
before you today. Then of course, I said ``at least,'' as a
minimum, not less than 10 or 20 percent. We don't really know
the full extent at this moment. We're working on that. I don't
expect it will double yet again, but it's going to be a sizable
cost for the Navy.
Senator Begich. When you say you're working on it, is that
an internal process with the contractors to come to an
understanding or is it just an internal process that you're
coming to with your team to guesstimate what it might be?
Admiral Johnson. Strategic Systems Programs is part of an
interagency task force headed by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) Industrial Policy, that has members from all the
parties involved, and are examining that together. Congress has
requested a plan, not a study but a plan, by June. It's that
team, that interagency team that I referred to, that will
bring, I think, a credible solution forward to the committee on
time in June. That's my expectation.
My position was based on an increase already seen.
Senator Begich. That's fair.
Admiral Johnson. So I don't think I'm too far off from you
when the dust settles.
Senator Begich. To make sure I understand--and I apologize,
I wasn't here for all your folks' opening; I was still down on
the floor--are the industry folks part of that discussion or
not?
Admiral Johnson. Yes.
Senator Begich. Yes. For this June plan that's coming
forward, that's been requested?
Admiral Johnson. Yes. There's an industry role. This team
was at one of the manufacturers, ATK, in February with a group
of 16. So this is very credible work, this interagency task
force, and that lies behind some of the unwavering position,
even though I wiggled a little bit.
Senator Begich. I want to echo what I know the chair and
the ranking member talked about with the industrial base when
it comes to the rockets, that it is a concern to me also in how
we manage it. It sounds like, obviously, you see it as not only
a short-term, but a long-term concern, and how to maintain
that. The cost component is becoming a bigger issue.
You anticipate the June plan will be on time?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. Do you think the plan will be detailed
enough for us to understand the next stages, short-term and
long-term, to ensure that we have the industrial base there,
and also the resources to meet those needs?
Admiral Johnson. That level of question is really an OSD
question. Of course, it's their study and their responsibility.
But I have great confidence in this group and I don't think
they will let you down, sir.
Senator Begich. Great. Thank you very much. Again, I just
want to echo the chair. I appreciate your comments.
Let me, if I can, just ask a couple more quick questions.
I'm not sure who the right person will be to answer it, so
whoever jumps in first will be the right person. Actually, this
one's easy. This one's for, I'll specify it to General
Shackelford, if I could. That is, you talk about the Future
Years Defense Program and modernization and sustainment for the
bomber fleet, I think it's about $5 billion and some. Can you
just give me a little bit on how that investment will work to
maintain the bombers? How will that be used, if you can help me
there a little bit?
General Shackelford. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Begich. Did I pick the right person to ask?
General Shackelford. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. Okay, good.
General Shackelford. We have investments going to all three
bombers with the intent on not just sustaining the capability,
but modernizing where it's appropriate. For instance, in the B-
1 we have computer issues that we need to deal with, so we're
putting in a fully integrated data link that includes a
backbone with communications technology for a Link 16 data link
as well as the beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) capability.
This has as part of it new displays, which provide
additional information to both cockpits of the B-1, the
internal diagnostic computer that provides status of health
information to the crew, some modernization of components
within the radar, as well as in terms of a major capability
improvement the laptop-controlled targeting pod, which has been
very well received in Southwest Asia in the war, which allows
us to collect nontraditional intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance data, as well as target our Joint Direct Attack
Munition, and our Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided
weapons from the bomber itself.
Moving over to the B-2, we have the combat network
communications technology which now also provides a digital
backbone to what was a very dated infrastructure within the
aircraft itself, and allows us to do things like BLOS retasking
of the aircraft.
Similarly, as we look to the future, for now what is a
strategic nuclear-capable bomber, the extremely high frequency
(EHF) radio communication and computer mod starts out with a
new computer, because all of our bombers are common in being
maxed out on computer capacity. It starts out with that
computer mod, then moves into the integration of terminals to
talk to the newer satellite systems as they come on line over
the next several years.
We're looking at a strategic radar replacement to upgrade
what is also a fairly dated radar with the B-52. At the same
time, we're bringing on capability to use the GPS weapons out
of the internal bomb bay. We can carry them externally, but
putting them on internally and then integrating that into the
aircraft is a very, very important upgrade.
Then in the case of the B-2, the same EHF radio mod. This
one brings on a computer, it brings on a new antenna to give us
capability to talk to those satellites as they get on orbit and
we get the receivers into the bomber itself. We're also
updating the radar with a modernization program that just 2
days ago reached required assets available for four aircraft in
terms of its ability to be used by the warfighter in a
contemporary sense.
Senator Begich. Let me ask you another, to tee off of that.
I appreciate that. It gives me a little sense of what the
upgrades are. Do you think, for either one of you, the 2011
budget requests are sufficient, not only for what you're
planning here, but other needs within the bomber fleet?
General Shackelford. With respect to the modernization
program?
Senator Begich. Yes, and sustainment.
General Shackelford. I believe we're in good shape there.
There is a shortfall we're working on the B-1 side, on the
vertical situation display unit. That is fallout of previous
execution issues which have now been corrected.
Senator Begich. What's the size of that shortfall? I've run
out of time here.
General Shackelford. I'll have to get you that dollar
figure.
Senator Begich. Could you do that for the record, just so I
understand what that gap is there?
[The information referred to follows:]
The current B-1 shortfall in fiscal year 2011 3600 is $33.2
million. If not fixed before the end of April, B-1 will be at risk to
complete VSDU and FIDL flight test in fiscal year 2011.
Senator Begich. Generally you feel good, but you're
examining now to figure out how to resolve; is that a fair
statement?
General Shackelford. As we were working to keep the fully
integrated data link in that diagnostic computer on track, the
piece that we had to tap to give the funds to those was the
vertical situation display unit.
Senator Begich. It came from one to the other.
General Shackelford. Right. We didn't have sufficient funds
in the program line to cover that over the last year. We're
working on reprogramming and asking for more there.
Senator Begich. If you could show me what that is at some
point, that would be great, and just get it to us.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. We do have a vote that's being called at
3:30 p.m.
I'll be brief, Mr. Chairman. I will submit some questions
for the record.
Last year, I think, General Alston and Admiral Johnson, you
testified about Air Force test flights and that the Air Force
conducts three flight tests each year of the Minuteman III ICBM
and the Navy conducts four test flights of the Trident to
determine weapon reliability as required to meet your
estimation of the strategic command requirements. Would you
explain why that testing is necessary?
General Alston. Let me take it from the Air Force side
since that's a responsibility that now falls under Air Force
GSC. We do a lot of different tests, Senator Sessions, with the
ICBM, not just flight testing. It's part of a broad family of
testing that takes place every month at a missile wing, which
goes through annual tests of the electronic launch capabilities
associated with it.
But at the end of the day we feel we need to fly at least
three actual flights from Vandenberg and launch them out into
the Pacific Range to Kwajalein to see if it all comes
together--the command and control, the equipment, and the
missile silo, as well as the booster itself and elements of the
reentry system--to make sure that this whole system of systems
comes together.
We derive important data from the process of actually
configuring these missiles for launch, as well as data from
telemetry as the missile flies through the boost phase and
through the trajectory phase, all the way down to the reentry
phase.
We'd like to do more. I know the Department of Energy (DOE)
would clearly like us to do more tests. We talked earlier in a
response to a question from the chairman or the ranking member
that as we drive toward lower numbers of warheads that means
every time we test an ICBM we test less reentry systems. So
there is less data available for DOE.
But I don't see any substitute for actually doing a very
robust flight test program. We do not have the great advantage
of our flying Air Force in the sense that every time an
airplane takes off and goes for a flight and lands to a certain
extent you're doing an operational test of that aircraft, not a
formal test, but you're making sure all the systems work. So
for the ICBM there's no other way we can do it.
Senator Sessions. I think that makes sense to me as a
layperson looking at it, because there are so many
complexities, so many thousands of components and computer
capabilities, systems, and other things that go into this
system.
Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to highlight these facts with
respect to the annual ICBM flight testing because I want to
bring our attention to the fact that similar flight testing for
the ground-based interceptor (GBI), which is a long-range
interceptor that will be part of the National Missile Defense
system. According to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), it plans
to acquire only 22 GBIs for the purpose of flight testing. This
will be the 30 in Alaska plus the ones in California. According
to their test plans to date, 19 of the 22 are expected to be
consumed through 2019, which isn't a robust testing system, but
it's a couple of years maybe or maybe a little less.
That leaves only three GBIs in the inventory then over the
12 years from 2020 through 2032. It means I guess one flight
test every 4 years as the system has aged some. General Klotz,
while we have an assembly line up and running, might it not be
smarter to go on and add to our inventory more GBIs so that we
could maintain at least a minimum level of testing through the
next decade?
General Klotz. Senator, with respect, that's a question
really for the MDA to answer. I can tell you how the Air Force
would approach it and how the Air Force GSC approaches it. We
need sufficient assets in our Minuteman III inventory, as well
as the equipment that goes with it, to conduct a minimum of
three tests per year.
We face a particular challenge that perhaps the MDA does
not, and that is our Minuteman IIIs were first deployed in the
1970s, so one of the things that's important for us in the
testing program is not just to make sure things work, but to
see how the system ages and whether it ages gracefully or
whether there are other defects in the system, either at the
design or as a result of longevity, that we're not aware of
through ground testing.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, I guess you have the
responsible oversight of this. Do I have your assurance and can
we be assured that you will examine what appears to me to be a
gap in our capability for the kind of minimal testing that
looks to be required?
Dr. Roberts. Certainly.
Senator Sessions. We've reduced the number of GBIs being
produced dramatically, more than I think we should. But we've
done that. I guess that's a firm decision that is not likely to
be reversed. But that does suggest to me that, with fewer
systems in the ground ready to launch, we ought to be sure that
they're safe and reliable, and I hope that you will look at
that. It would be cheaper to me to complete that inventory now
than having to reconstitute an entire assembly line a decade
away.
Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
The vote has been called. I have a question, then we'll
reconvene at the Capitol Visitor Center.
General Alston, in the Air Force nuclear roadmap, which is
the strategy document for fixing the Air Force nuclear
enterprise, 10 key actions were identified. We've talked about
some of these, but I have a question about two more. The first
is to create strategic plans that address long-term nuclear
requirements--cruise missile, bomber, dual capable aircraft,
ICBM. Has that plan been developed, and would it be available
to be provided to Congress?
The second is to charge the Under Secretary of the Air
Force with ongoing broad policy and oversight responsibility
for nuclear matters. Now, we've just confirmed a new Under
Secretary here. The statutory requirement for the Under
Secretary of the Air Force and for all Service Under
Secretaries is that they shall be the chief business management
officer for their respective Services. With this change, will
the roadmap action designate the Under Secretary with oversight
and policy for nuclear matters? Will it be implemented or not,
and if it isn't, what kind of implementation might be required?
It's a long question. I'm going to have to run in a minute.
General Alston. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I think I can be
brief with these. I may have to turn and depend on Lieutenant
General Shackelford a bit. But we have, particularly over the
last year, examined through our stewardship responsibilities
what actions are appropriate with the air-launched cruise
missile, how do we get the Minuteman III to 2030, which
Congress has directed us to do, our partnership with DOE for
the LEP for the B61. We don't have responsibility for that
weapon end to end, but we do have great equities in that
particular process.
We looked at all of our platforms and our capabilities and
we found that we did not have the kind of content that good
stewardship would require. So we have begun a process that will
put a follow-on standup capability. It's now entering the JCIDS
process, the DOD requirements process, this spring, with
analysis of alternatives to commence in the fall.
We have a roadmap to get the Minuteman to 2030, which
continues to be refined. The acquisition community actually has
structured plans across the systems in order for us to
understand and more thoroughly add content as the resourcing
requirements mature.
So I would say that right now we have taken the appropriate
action that we set out to do and we've set ourselves on a
course for more improved stewardship of our strategic delivery
capabilities than where we were a year ago. I believe that's on
course.
With regard to the Under Secretary, the Under Secretary has
authority to stand in for the Secretary for all the
responsibilities that the Secretary of the Air Force has. But
we felt that for a point of emphasis in our roadmap, without
any compelling authoritative power behind it other than it
being the Air Force strategic vision for our nuclear
enterprise, and it being an expression of the Chief of Staff
and the Secretary on the courses of action and the course they
set for our Air Force with regard to the nuclear enterprise, it
was important to us to designate the Under Secretary to
emphasize the value that was seen in that position having a
specifically articulated responsibility to support the
development and stewardship of the nuclear enterprise.
That was the motivation by the Chief of Staff and the
Secretary to put that content in the roadmap, and we are
delighted that our Under Secretary is on board and able to help
us do the heavy lifting that's still required.
Senator Ben Nelson. That was short. Thank you.
We'll reconvene downstairs at the Office of Senate Security
after the vote. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
ssbn(x)
1. Senator Vitter. Admiral Johnson, during the recent full
committee Navy posture hearing, both Admiral Roughead and Secretary
Mabus stressed the importance of getting the design of the Ohio class
follow-on done properly, thoroughly, and thoughtfully. Please explain
the design process going forward, how you will prevent requirements
creep once a production decision is made, and ultimately what is being
done to ensure that the program is affordable, delivered on time, and
delivered within budget.
Admiral Johnson. The Ohio Replacement Program plans to employ a
design process similar to the successful design/build process employed
on the Virginia class SSN. This process combines the expertise of
designers, system experts, component developers, production personnel,
and operators to develop a producible design meeting system
requirements. Properly phased design efforts are essential to limit
changes during construction and to support a planned 84-month
construction period.
Detailed requirements will be refined during development and review
of the Capability Development Document. The single mission of the Ohio
replacement platform is strategic deterrence. Once the requirements for
the platform are established, any potential changes will be vetted
through the Configuration Steering Board (CSB) process. CSB reviews of
proposed requirements changes will be conducted annually, consistent
with the guidance in Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 5000.2 and
Section 814 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009. During construction, changes will be
implemented only if funds are identified and schedule impacts are
mitigated.
Affordability will be an integral part of the design process. Use
of parts common with the Virginia, Seawolf, and Ohio submarines will
reduce component development costs. Where practical, the Ohio
Replacement Program will leverage known successful systems, components,
and construction processes from the Virginia submarine program as well
as incorporating the SONAR Acoustic Rapid Commercial Off-The-Shelf
Insertion and the Common Submarine Radio Room philosophy currently used
fleet wide in the submarine force.
In addition, the Ohio Replacement Program benefits from investment
by the United Kingdom (U.K.) in the Common Missile Compartment (CMC).
The United States and the U.K. have agreed to share the Nonrecurring
Engineering (NRE) costs of designing a CMC. The U.K. will pay 12.5
percent of the total design NRE for the common compartment. To date,
the U.K. has invested over $280 million. Each nation will fund 100
percent of any design costs associated with country-unique
requirements.
2. Senator Vitter. Admiral Johnson, given the missile compartment
of the SSBN(X) is a co-development effort between the United States and
the U.K., to what extent would a British decision to only construct
three instead of four submarines have on the United States in terms of
overall cost?
Admiral Johnson. The U.S.-U.K. have agreed to share the costs
associated with NRE to design a CMC for both nations' replacement SSBN
programs. This cost share arrangement for NRE is unaffected by any
future procurement decision by the U.K. with respect to the number of
successor SSBNs they produce.
The United States has the opportunity to explore cooperative
arrangements for production in order to reduce costs for both nations.
Larger numbers of submarines, or in this case, missile compartments,
will lower costs on a per item basis. This effect is most significant
in the first few units produced. While there is a cost advantage to the
United States if the U.K. were to build four missile compartments,
savings to the United States are dominated by the first three U.K.
missile compartments built. Therefore the impact is minimal.
next generation air-launched cruise missile
3. Senator Vitter. General Shackelford, a key component to the
flexibility and credibility of the bomber force is the mix of effective
penetrating and stand-off missiles. In the past, the Air Force has
asserted that this mix is essential to the viability of this leg of the
triad and the fiscal year 2011 budget includes funding to continue the
study of the next generation air launched cruise missile (ALCOM).
Nonetheless, I understand that the decision on whether this next
generation missile will be convention or nuclear has yet to be made and
is pending the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Does the Air Force still
maintain that the bomber leg of the triad can be maintained without a
new or modernized long-range stand-off capability?
General Shackelford. I defer to my colleague, Major General Alston,
to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Alston. The Air Force recognizes that a robust long-range
strike capability is essential to strategic deterrence and that
modernizing the legacy bomber fleet, while pursuing new long-range
strike technologies, ensures a viable airborne strategic deterrent over
the long-term. Per the NPR, an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for a
follow-on ALCM will begin in the fall of 2010. The AoA results,
expected by mid-2012, will better inform the Air Force and DOD on the
best options for the long-range stand-off capability as part of the
airborne leg of the traditional nuclear triad.
next generation bomber
4. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General
Alston, and General Scott, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
made the decision to develop a follow-on bomber, and you have made it
clear that you support the development of a new bomber. However, last
April, Secretary of Defense Gates opted not to pursue a development
program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until there was a better
understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology. As part
of this effort to better understand the requirements for a new bomber,
Secretary Gates stood up a Tiger Team to do an in-depth study of long-
range strike in the new QDR. However, on reading the new QDR, on page
33, it looks like there still has not been a decision to move forward
with a new bomber program, but instead, the Department has commissioned
yet another study. What conclusions were drawn by the Tiger Team
regarding the development of a new bomber?
General Klotz. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to
address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Shackelford. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott,
to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Alston. The Tiger Team identified a mix of capabilities
that would be required of a family of systems to create the desired
deterrent effects, or successfully strike, if required. The ongoing
study is examining what mix of legacy and future platforms will be
required to present the needed capabilities.
General Scott. The Department has determined that additional
analysis is needed to fully understand how all potential long-range
strike options could contribute to the country's National Defense and
National Military Strategies and Objectives before large amounts of
funding are committed to an acquisition program. During the 2010 QDR, a
Secretary of Defense-directed Tiger Team was established to complete an
in-depth study of long-range strike--including the Long-Range Strike
Platform (LRSP) need, requirement, and technology. The team's
conclusions were supportive of pursuing a new LRSP but identified the
need for additional analysis to explore options for reducing costs and
accelerating fielding timelines. Based upon the need for additional
analysis, the Secretary of Defense chartered a subsequent study to
examine a broader array of long-range strike issues and options
including the appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities;
upgrades to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned force structure
numbers; stand-off and penetrating platform ratios; stand-off cruise
missile requirements; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) demands; airborne electronic attack requirements; and
conventional Prompt Global Strike needs. The study results will be
available in the fall of 2010.
5. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General
Alston, and General Scott, what progress has been made in conducting
the new long-range strike study required by the 2010 QDR?
General Klotz. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to
address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Shackelford. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott,
to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Alston. The RAND project for the Long-Range Strike study
identified a series of tasks to be examined in order to inform
decisions on the future size, character, and composition of U.S. forces
for detecting, locating, identifying, tracking, engaging, disrupting,
destroying, and assessing targets in adversary countries. The Air Force
is scheduled to receive a series of midterm briefs on these tasks
throughout the summer and a final brief in early fall. The study is on
track to be completed by February of next year.
General Scott. A summary of the RAND, IDA, and APL project
description for the Long-Range Strike (LRS) study directed by 2010 QDR
is listed below:
Objectives
Inform decisions bearing on future size, character,
and composition of U.S. forces for detecting, locating,
identifying, tracking, engaging, disrupting, destroying, and
assessing targets in adversary countries
Consider future adversaries with both modest and
sophisticated anti-access capabilities
Evaluate alternative future capabilities and
architectures including supporting infrastructure
Use a range of scenarios depicting theater-level
conflict in the 2020-2030 timeframe
Approach
Task 1: ID scenarios and operational objectives using
at least two MCOs in 2020-2030 with Joint Country Force
Assessment (JCOFA) threat projections and Multi-Service Force
Deployment (MSFD) scenarios
Task 2: Assess LRS system capabilities and limitations
including survivability and weapon effectiveness and
considering off-board ISR, EA, C3, MILDEC, cyber, forward
basing, AR, and PED support
Task 3: Develop at least three affordable LRS
portfolios characterized by the absence of a new bomber,
procurement of a new stand-off bomber, and the fielding of a
penetrating bomber (manned or unmanned)
Task 4: Assess the effectiveness of each LRS portfolio
with 1v1, mission, and campaign level analyses
Task 5: Examine robustness of each alternative force
structure in the face of potential threat counters to include
cost imposition of low observable (LO) versus counter LO
competition
Task 6: Examine the flexibility of each LRS portfolio
to adapt to multiple conflicts and operations across the threat
spectrum with qualitative implications of each force on future
U.S. nuclear posture
Schedule
Analytical Approach Briefing: March 2010
Midterm Brief on Tasks 1-2: May 2010
Midterm Brief on Task 3: June 2010
Midterm Brief on Task 4: July 2010
Final Briefing: September 2010
Final Report Delivered: February 2011
Conclusion
The study is on pace as described above. The scenarios, threats,
and target sets have been approved. The LRS Working Group is in the
process of defining the LRS portfolios described in Task 3.
6. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General
Alston, and General Scott, what will the three contractors (RAND, IDA,
and Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory) reportedly
hired to do analysis for this study be expected to produce?
General Klotz. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to
address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Shackelford. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott,
to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Alston. OSD has established the scope and parameters of
this study and is using interim progress checks to ensure the study
remains relevant, focused, and provides analysis necessary for
answering how to best meet the Nation's future Long-Range Strike
requirements through the optimum mix of platforms and capabilities.
General Scott. A summary of the RAND, IDA, and APL project
description for the LRS study directed by 2010 QDR is listed below:
Objectives
Inform decisions bearing on future size, character,
and composition of U.S. forces for detecting, locating,
identifying, tracking, engaging, disrupting, destroying, and
assessing targets in adversary countries
Consider future adversaries with both modest and
sophisticated anti-access capabilities
Evaluate alternative future capabilities and
architectures including supporting infrastructure
Use a range of scenarios depicting theater-level
conflict in the 2020-2030 timeframe
Approach
Task 1: ID scenarios and operational objectives using
at least two MCOs in 2020-2030 with JCOFA threat projections
and MSFD scenarios
Task 2: Assess LRS system capabilities and limitations
including survivability and weapon effectiveness and
considering off-board ISR, EA, C3, MILDEC, cyber, forward
basing, AR, and PED support
Task 3: Develop at least three affordable LRS
portfolios characterized by the absence of a new bomber,
procurement of a new stand-off bomber, and the fielding of a
penetrating bomber (manned or unmanned)
Task 4: Assess the effectiveness of each LRS portfolio
with 1v1, mission, and campaign level analyses
Task 5: Examine robustness of each alternative force
structure in the face of potential threat counters to include
cost imposition of LO versus counter LO competition
Task 6: Examine the flexibility of each LRS portfolio
to adapt to multiple conflicts and operations across the threat
spectrum with qualitative implications of each force on future
U.S. nuclear posture
Excursions
IDA with the support of the Johns Hopkins APL are on task to
provide analysis for excursions which RAND is not equipped to handle.
For example, IDA will address the LO/counter LO capabilities with
respect to a penetrating bomber versus advanced air defenses.
Schedule
Analytical Approach Briefing: March 2010
Midterm Brief on Tasks 1-2: May 2010
Midterm Brief on Task 3: June 2010
Midterm Brief on Task 4: July 2010
Final Briefing: September 2010
Final Report Delivered: February 2011
7. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General
Alston, and General Scott, can you certify that all the participants
will not have a potential conflict of interest with regards to their
work?
General Klotz. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to
address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Shackelford. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott,
to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Alston. Yes. Evaluation of the initial investigation of
conventional long-range strike options, prepared for the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) dated February 2010, has
determined RAND to be uniquely positioned to conduct this study in a
short time. The study will be conducted in an unbiased manner that will
achieve transparent results that are accessible to policymakers making
resource allocation decisions. RAND has a long history of providing
objective, independent analysis of complex problems for OSD, the Joint
Staff, the combatant commands, and all of the Services and has recently
published work detailing the development of the anti-access threat.
General Scott. All participants bring an unquestioned desire to
ensure we deliver to the Nation the best possible Long-Range Strike
solution in order to defend our country's strategic interests. The
agencies involved in this work are primarily ``think tanks'', and were
selected precisely for their work on previous studies covering all
aspects of our national defense.
8. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General
Alston, and General Scott, when do you expect this study to draw to a
close?
General Klotz. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to
address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Shackelford. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott,
to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Alston. The Secretary of Defense has tasked his study
directors to report results in September 2010.
General Scott. The Secretary of Defense has tasked his study
directors to report their results by September 2010. The entire LRS
study schedule is shown below:
Schedule
Analytical Approach Briefing: March 2010
Midterm Brief on Tasks 1-2: May 2010
Midterm Brief on Task 3: June 2010
Midterm Brief on Task 4: July 2010
Final Briefing: September 2010
Final Report Delivered: February 2011
number of bombers in fiscal years 2011-2015 force structure
9. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General
Alston, and General Scott, with regard to the Future Years Defense
Program force structure set out in the new QDR for the Air Force, the
QDR proposes five long-range strike wings with up to 96 primary mission
aircraft. According to the latest Air Force Almanac, the Air Force has
153 bomber aircraft. I understand some of these aircraft are dedicated
to testing, but over 50 aircraft for testing seems like a lot. Do you
plan on retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future?
General Klotz. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) has
responsibility for two types of long-range, nuclear-capable bombers:
the B-2 Spirit and the B-52H Stratofortress.
Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI) for the B-2 is 20, of which all 20
are combat-coded. All B-2 training and test activities employ combat-
coded aircraft.
TAI for the B-52H is 76, of which 54 are combat-coded, 18 are
training, and 4 are test.
As stated in the unclassified Fact Sheet on the 1251 Report
released by the White House Press Office on 13 April 2010, some of the
Air Force's deployable nuclear-capable bombers will be converted to
conventional-only bombers (not accountable under the treaty), and up to
60 nuclear-capable bombers will be retained. AFGSC has not recommended
retiring any B-2 or B-52 aircraft.
General Shackelford. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott,
to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Alston. The Air Force has no plans to retire any bomber
aircraft, currently retaining 96 combat-coded aircraft in its Primary
Mission Aircraft Inventory (PMAI): 36 B-1s (nonnuclear), 16 B-2s and 44
B-52s. Overall, the Air Force fields 162 TAI bombers with the
additional jets required to meet fleet training, maintenance, attrition
reserve, and testing needs. These are vital support functions for
keeping our operational edge (96 PMAI) in the highest state of
readiness.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TAI PMAI
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-1......................................................... 66 36
B-2......................................................... 20 16
B-52........................................................ 76 44
---------------------------------------------------
162 96
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Scott. The total number of bombers in the Air Force
inventory is 162 (66 B-1, 20 B-2, and 76 B-52 aircraft). 96 represents
the total number of combat coded aircraft with the difference being
made up from training, backup, attrition reserve, and test airframes.
The table below shows the breakdown by aircraft type and coding. The
attached slides show the geographic location, coding, and correct
number for each bomber in the Air Force inventory. At this time, the
Air Force has no plans to retire any of the 162 bombers currently in
the inventory.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combat Coded Attrition
Airframe Total (CC) Training (TF) Backup (BAI) Reserve (AR) Test (CB)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B-1............................................... 66 36 16 9 1 4
B-2............................................... 20 16 0 4 0 0
B-52.............................................. 76 44 16 11 2 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General
Alston, and General Scott, what are the assumptions underlying what
appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers?
General Klotz. See answer to question #9.
General Shackelford. See answer to question #9.
General Alston. The Air Force has no plans to reduce the number of
bombers. The life of the airframe, combined with operational relevancy,
is continually balanced against current and future Long-Range Strike
requirements to determine the proper force size. Additionally, we
continually evaluate the legacy and future fleet size to meet national
security priorities in a resource constrained environment.
General Scott. See answer to question #9.
qdr red team
11. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General
Alston, and General Scott, I understand Secretary Gates appointed a so-
called Red Team of retired senior officers and outside defense experts
to provide an outside assessment of the QDR. I also understand that the
Red Team reviewed the QDR's assessments and conclusions through the
summer of 2009, and submitted a memo to Secretary Gates in the fall of
2009. What did the QDR Red Team have to say about long-range strike and
the development of a next generation bomber aircraft?
General Klotz. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to
address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Shackelford. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott,
to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of
this matter.
General Alston. A10 was not involved with the QDR's Red Team
assessment and was not briefed on the results of the study.
General Scott. The QDR Red Team, led by General Mattis, Commander,
U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and Dr. Marshall, Director, Net
Assessment, was established at the request of the Secretary of Defense
to provide alternative viewpoints on recommendations generated during
the QDR. These included such areas as risk assumptions related to
future security environment challenges, force mix options, and the
force planning construct. When the Secretary of Defense appointed the
QDR Red Team, we understand he assured the panel members that their
insights would help inform his decision-making and would not be subject
to outside review, with a final memorandum going directly to him. The
Air Force was not privy to the QDR Red Team memorandum or any of the
specific recommendations put forward by the panel.
12. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General
Alston, and General Scott, what was the Red Team's assessment of the
QDR's long-range strike pronouncements?
General Klotz. AFGSC is a field command focused on the day-to-day
operations, maintenance, security, and support of its subordinate
bomber and missile units. It does not directly participate in the OSD-
led LRS Working Group for the 2010 QDR LRS Study.
General Shackelford. See answer to question #11.
General Alston. See answer to question #10.
General Scott. See answer to question #10.
nuclear weapons in europe
13. Senator Vitter. Dr. Roberts, forward deployed nuclear weapons
in Europe represent a longstanding military and political commitment to
the defense of Europe and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies. However, counter to the interests of all NATO allies, a small
coalition of European nations has called for the removal of U.S.
weapons from Europe. Will the NPR address the important role the
extended U.S. nuclear umbrella plays on nonproliferation?
Dr. Roberts. Yes. The NPR report articulates five objectives, of
which one is strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S.
allies and partners. In that context, the NPR report outlines the
elements of a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella comprised of the strategic
forces of the U.S. triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed
forward in key regions, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that could be
deployed forward quickly to meet regional contingencies. It also states
that the United States will continue to assure allies and partners of
the U.S. commitment to their security and to demonstrate this
commitment through various initiatives designed to enhance regional
security architectures.
The NPR report acknowledges that U.S. security relationships are
important not only in deterring potential threats, but also to serve
our non-proliferation goals. These relationships demonstrate to
neighboring states that their pursuit of nuclear weapons will only
undermine military or political advantages. They also reassure
nonnuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security interests can
be protected without their own nuclear deterrent capabilities.
nuclear surety inspections
14. Senator Vitter. General Alston, over the past year, we have
been informed of a number of nuclear surety inspection (NSI) failures
at a variety of units across the country. These no-notice
investigations are a critical component of the Air Force's renewed
emphasis on nuclear oversight and assess all aspects associated with
security of our nuclear forces. Noting the rigor of the standards have
increased since the incident in 2007, how do you assess the
effectiveness of the new testing regime in identifying problems?
General Alston. The extensively overhauled NSI process is resulting
in consistent and vigorous application of appropriately high standards.
The increased inspection proficiency of individual inspectors, the
volume of inspectors involved, and the increased number of no-notice or
limited notice inspection is providing for higher quality refined
assessments of performance. The level of detail derived from the NSI is
enabling better trend analysis and better targeted improvements by our
units. Major commands use discrepancies found during inspections,
combined with other assessment tools, to continually improve processes
and procedures.
15. Senator Vitter. General Alston, as you are aware, the Strategic
Posture Commission asserted that leadership was an essential element in
inspiring people to ``feel they are doing important work and are valued
for it.'' Without a dramatic change in culture, such leadership and
organizational changes are bound to fail. Is the culture changing?
General Alston. Yes, culture change is vital. We have been taking
deliberate steps to achieve the shift we're seeking.
By concentrating all our operational strategic forces under a
single commander responsible for establishing and enforcing standards
and holding leadership at all levels accountable, we set conditions for
culture change. We took equivalent action with regard to all nuclear
sustainment.
In addition to increased focus on inspections and the inspection
process, we have also taken action across the Air Force to change the
way every airman perceives the nuclear mission. We baselined every
professional military education course--officer and enlisted--and
modified or added nuclear elements to curricula as appropriate.
We updated Air Force doctrine to include a greater focus on
deterrence.
Culture change is difficult and takes time. Consistent application
of exacting standards, setting common expectations, performing every
day with precision and reliability--and validating that performance
with engaged leadership--are some of the conditions we have set to
achieve the sustained excellent results we are after.
weapons storage area
16. Senator Vitter. General Alston and General Klotz, I was
extremely pleased to learn that the Air Force made a budget request in
fiscal year 2010 to recertify the Barksdale weapons storage area (WSA),
and Congress ultimately appropriated $77 million for the project. What
are your thoughts regarding the WSA at Barksdale Air Force Base which
was decertified for nuclear storage a number of years ago?
General Alston. The Air Force is reviewing the implications of the
NPR, the New START, and the 2010 NDAA mandated 1251 Report which
suggests a range of Air Force nuclear force structure associated with
New START limits. The Air Force will continue to ensure it has
sufficient infrastructure to meet all current and future nuclear
mission requirements, to include a Barksdale WSA.
General Klotz. The WSA at Barksdale stood down in December 2007.
This action was taken as a result of planned reductions in the number
of deployed Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs) and ALCMs and, at the same
time as a means of avoiding the costs associated with bringing the
Barksdale WSA up to revised DOD security standards.
In an ideal world, reestablishing the WSA at Barksdale would
benefit the nuclear enterprise by eliminating the risks inherent in
relying upon a single WSA at Minot to support B-52H ALCM operations.
Additionally, having two WSAs would aid in maintaining a knowledgeable
and experienced WSA workforce within the larger Air Force nuclear
enterprise.
We've taken initial steps to identify needed upgrades to security
and control systems and current storage facilities to meet DOD
requirements for weapon storage. Our current estimate for a full and
complete recertification totals $108.5 million. To the best of our
knowledge, the proposal in Congress for $77 million to be appropriated
for the Barksdale WSA in fiscal year 2010 never made it into the final
bill.
Reestablishing a WSA at Barksdale must of course compete at the Air
Staff against other Air Force priorities for limited resources and
manpower.
17. Senator Vitter. General Alston, can you give me some insight as
to what scenarios and outcomes might preclude the Air Force from moving
forward with the recertification of the Barksdale WSA?
General Alston. Overall required force levels, combatant commander
requirements, and operational considerations are a few of the
considerations that will help inform a decision on taking further
action to recertify the Barksdale WSA.
18. Senator Vitter. General Klotz, how important is the
recertification of the Barksdale WSA for your mission?
General Klotz. See answer to question #16.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
nuclear arms life extension programs
19. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, with respect to the W78 Life
Extension Program (LEP), can you tell me if the NPR will take any
option--i.e., refurbishment, reuse, replacement, or a combination of
these--off the table?
Dr. Roberts. The NPR report outlines a strategy for sustaining a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear
weapons exist. Although the NPR report expresses a policy preference
for refurbishment and reuse in decisions to proceed from study to
engineering development, the laboratory directors will provide findings
associated with the full range of LEP approaches and to make a set of
recommendations based solely on their best technical assessments of the
ability of each LEP approach to meet critical stockpile management
goals.
20. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, what are the factors to consider
when establishing these guidelines for future LEP work?
Dr. Roberts. Several key principles will guide future U.S.
decisions on stockpile management. The United States:
Will not conduct nuclear tests, and will seek
ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty.
Will not develop new nuclear warheads. LEPs will use
only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and
will not support new military missions or provide for new
military capabilities.
Will study options for ensuring the safety, security,
and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis,
consistent with the congressionally mandated Stockpile
Management Program.
The full range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment
of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different
warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.
In any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead
LEPs, the United States will give strong preference to options for
refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components would be
undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could
not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President
and approved by Congress.
21. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, under what conditions would you
not consider reuse or replacement options?
Dr. Roberts. The full range of LEP approaches will be considered:
refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.
22. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, last fall, with respect to LEPs,
Secretary Gates said at an Air Force Association meeting that we needed
``in one or two cases probably new designs that will be safer and more
reliable.'' Will the NPR support the Secretary's view that in one or
two cases, new designs may be necessary?
Dr. Roberts. Secretary Gates' concern has been that the deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective. He explicitly said that his focus
was ``not about new capabilities, it is about safety, security, and
reliability.'' The NPR concludes that the United States can meet its
requirements without developing new nuclear weapons. As Secretary Gates
states in the preface to the NPR, ``The NPR calls for making much-
needed investments to rebuild America's aging nuclear infrastructure.
These investments, and the NPR's strategy for warhead life extension,
represent a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the
nuclear infrastructure and support our Nation's deterrent.''
23. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, will this include a new design
that will make current warheads, such as the W78 safer and more
reliable--and which will exercise the skills of our nuclear scientists?
Dr. Roberts. The NPR report outlines the following principles to
guide future U.S. stockpile management decisions:
The United States will not conduct nuclear testing,
and will pursue ratification and entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
The United States will not develop new nuclear
warheads. LEPs will use only nuclear components based on
previously tested designs, and will not support new military
missions or provide for new military capabilities.
The United States will study options for ensuring the
safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a
case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally-
mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range of LEP
approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing
warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads,
and replacement of nuclear components.
Changes made to the stockpile would be in line with these
principles and would remain consistent with basic design parameters by
including components that are well understood and certifiable without
underground nuclear testing.
This approach to stockpile management will enable us to protect the
human capital base--including the expertise to design, develop,
engineer, and manufacture nuclear warheads--by fostering a stockpile
management program that fully exercises these capabilities.
These principles and the stockpile sustainment strategy articulated
in the NPR support the goals of the NDAA on stockpile management
related to increasing the safety, security, and reliability of U.S.
nuclear warheads.
The nuclear weapons laboratories have been directed to explore the
full spectrum of options and in doing so will exercise the skills of
our nuclear scientists. This position is strongly supported by National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) leadership.
b61 lep
24. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, the Fiscal Year 2010 Energy and
Water Conference Report did not provide the full request for the
nonnuclear study of the proposed B61-12. How important is it that the
NNSA be able to expeditiously proceed with a nuclear and nonnuclear LEP
on the B61?
Dr. Roberts. The B61 bomb is the cornerstone of the U.S. extended
deterrence commitment to NATO and a key component of air-delivered
strategic deterrence. It is also one of the oldest warheads in the
stockpile and has components dating from the 1960s. DOD is committed to
a full (nuclear/nonnuclear) life extension of the B61 bomb and to the
provision of a nuclear capability for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
The B61 LEP study will address options to enhance surety, sustain
effectiveness, optimize the use of limited NNSA production capacity,
and reduce costs over the long-term. Life-extended B61 bombs must be
introduced into the stockpile by 2017 to avoid gaps in capability for
both B-2-delivered strategic and Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA)-delivered
non-strategic nuclear missions.
The 2017 timeline is driven by two factors:
Critical components in the B61 will reach end-of-life
starting in 2017; if not updated, aging weapons will need to be
removed from service.
U.S. F-16 DCA begin to reach end-of-life starting in
2016; a nuclear-capable JSF will replace these aircraft
beginning in 2017.
Although JSF initial operating capability has experienced a 13-
month slip, we still plan to implement JSF nuclear capability by 2017.
25. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, in an unclassified response,
what are some of the considerations that are involved with the urgency
of the LEP of the B61?
Dr. Roberts. Life-extended B61 bombs must be introduced into the
stockpile by 2017 to avoid gaps in capability for both B-2-delivered
strategic and dual-capable aircraft (DCA)-delivered non-strategic
nuclear missions.
The 2017 timeline is driven by two factors:
Critical components in the B61 will reach end-of-life
starting in 2017; if not updated, aging weapons will need to be
removed from service.
U.S. F-16 DCA begin to reach end-of-life starting in
2016; a nuclear-capable JSF will replace these aircraft
beginning in 2017.
b61 jason review
26. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, the conferees last year required
a JASON review of the ``national security and extended deterrence value
of the B61 for both strategic and tactical purposes in light of nuclear
terrorism risks and military threats.'' Are you concerned that the
mandate for this JASON study is beyond the technical capacity of JASON?
Dr. Roberts. The committee's mandate for the proposed JASON study
delves into matters of policy and strategy which are beyond the scope
of traditional JASON studies. Past JASON studies have customarily
focused on technical, not policy, issues. The JASON advisory group,
however, has the capacity for drawing in various subject matter experts
including technical and policy experts.
27. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, won't the NPR speak to these
issues and isn't that the more appropriate venue for a review of the
value of the B61?
Dr. Roberts. The B61 bomb is the cornerstone of our extended
deterrence commitment to NATO and a key component of air-delivered
strategic deterrence. It is also one of the oldest warheads in the
stockpile and has components dating from the 1960s.
To provide options to continue the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe,
the Department is committed to a full (nuclear/nonnuclear) life
extension of the B61 bomb and to the provision of a nuclear capability
for the JSF. The B61 LEP study will address options to enhance surety,
sustain effectiveness, optimize the use of limited NNSA production
capacity, and reduce costs over the long-term.
[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Ben Nelson, Reed,
Bingaman, Sessions, and Vitter.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Paul J.
Hubbard.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn A. Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Jonathan Epstein, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Rob
Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Lenwood Landrum and
Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Ben Nelson. The hearing will come to order.
Good afternoon and welcome. Our witness this afternoon,
flying solo, is Tom D'Agostino, the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
Today, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee will discuss the
defense programs at NNSA, which is responsible for maintaining
the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's stockpile
of nuclear weapons. The NNSA and the Department of Defense
(DOD) work closely together to ensure that the delivery systems
and the nuclear warheads present a reliable deterrent for the
United States. Previously, this subcommittee heard testimony
from the Military Services on the delivery systems that carry
nuclear warheads and weapons. Today, the subcommittee will
focus on the NNSA activities to maintain those nuclear warheads
and weapons without testing.
Maintaining nuclear warheads and weapons that are more than
20 years old without testing is a challenging task. Over the
years, however, NNSA has made significant investments in people
and experimental facilities, including the world's most
advanced computational capability, to maintain and sustain the
nuclear stockpile.
Today, I think many would be surprised to know that NNSA
and its scientists would tell you that they know more about the
technical physics of these weapons than their predecessors did
during the heyday of underground nuclear testing.
The challenge, however, is to use, maintain, and to pass on
to future generations the skills necessary to maintain the
nuclear weapons into the future and for as long as they're
needed. After years of surveillance work, NNSA has discovered
and repaired previously unknown manufacturing defects, and is
now focused on issues that will continue to occur with aging
warheads.
For the most part, the signs of aging are understood. High
explosives crack, wires become brittle, rubber and plastics
degrade, metals corrode, and obsolete parts must be replaced
with newer parts. Since 1992 and the development of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), the NNSA has discovered
and repaired problems that previously would have required a
nuclear test to resolve. This expanded knowledge of the
stockpile has allowed the NNSA to discover problems and
develop, implement, and verify a fix, all without testing.
All of the experimental facilities planned in the early
days of SSP are now in place. As a result, the attention is
turned to the plants and facilities that do the work to
maintain the stockpile. These facilities and plants are where
the people who make the parts, and assemble and disassemble,
work. NNSA and Congress have an obligation to make certain that
these people have a safe working environment and the tools to
efficiently carryout their mission.
New tritium facilities are in place at Savannah River Site
(SRS), and the new Uranium Storage Facility just opened at the
Y-12 site at Oak Ridge. The Kansas City plant is on track to
move to its new facility in the near future. But, there is more
work to be done. The last major facilities that are needed are
the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Oak Ridge, and the
Chemical and Metallurgical Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility
at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).
With these multibillion-dollar facilities in place, and the
new high-explosive facility at Pantex, the NNSA will be fully
capable of maintaining the nuclear weapons for as long as
they're needed. President Obama is committed to making sure,
while reducing the number of nuclear weapons, that there is a
long-term effort to build new facilities and continue the SSP
so that the deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective.
Next week, the full committee will hold a hearing on the
new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Mr. D'Agostino, you will be a
witness, as we just discussed, at that hearing. But, today
we'll focus on the work and the budget of the NNSA as it
fulfills its ongoing mission and the new missions outlined for
it in the NPR.
Your prepared statement, sir, will be included in the
record.
Senator Vitter, the ranking member, would you have some
opening remarks you'd like to make?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAVID VITTER
Senator Vitter. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'll submit my full opening statement for the record, but I
just want to highlight four points.
First of all, welcome, Mr. Administrator. Thank you for
your very important ongoing work.
This request clearly is just the first payment on what has
to be a sustained period of investment. I'm very glad that
we're finally on this course of increased investment. I think
the key is that we start it immediately, that we make sure we
start with a significant enough investment, and, most
importantly, that we make sure we stay the course, because 1 or
2 years of this investment clearly isn't going to get the job
done.
This investment is important for the safety and security of
nuclear weapons, what we have now. It's even more important if
we want to reduce the numbers of our nuclear weapons, as is
proposed in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). We
absolutely have to have this sustained period of investment for
that to be even under consideration, and I look forward to this
starting.
Mr. Administrator, I'd love for you to address if this
START is good enough? The national lab directors had argued for
much more, to begin with, about a billion dollars a year; and
so, I'm very curious about what is lost between that billion
and this $624 million, and how we'll deal with that over a full
10-year plan, or longer.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to use the opportunity to state
that I think the new NPR inappropriately limits the ability of
our complex to ensure the highest level of safety, security,
and reliability. That will be a part of the ongoing discussion,
as well. In constraining the ability to design new weapons and
exercise our full new scientific capabilities, I think we're
limiting safety. I think that limits intellectual growth;
limits new concepts, design work; and limits our ability,
therefore, to achieve maximum safety.
Finally, I want to underscore that, clearly, the B61 Life
Extension Program (LEP) is among the most significant and time-
critical funding elements of this fiscal year 2011 request.
Technology maturation for many components should have begun,
really, at least 2 years ago. The longer we wait, the tougher
that is, as a 2017 deadline continues to mount.
I look forward to hearing if any additional policy
roadblocks remain to prevent that work from moving forward on
that critical B61 LEP.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement by Senator Vitter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator David Vitter
Today's hearing focuses on the fiscal year 2011 request for the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The administration's
request takes a concerted and long overdue step forward in starting to
address the long-term needs of the nuclear weapons complex. This
request, the first payment on what must be a sustained period of
investment, should be assessed carefully to determine over the course
of this investment if enough of the near-term needs are being
adequately funded. Prior to having this request trimmed down by almost
half by the White House, the National Lab Directors originally argued
for almost a billion dollar increase and I look forward to hearing from
our witness why this budget, an increase of $624 million, more
adequately address our complex needs than the higher level of funding
requested by the laboratories.
With the recent release of the delayed Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
we now have a blueprint to assess this administrations path forward for
the nuclear weapons complex. Unfortunately the NPR constrains our the
ability to design new weapons and exercise the scientific capabilities
necessary for the development of even safer and more secure weapons,
the NPR dangerously limits intellectual growth by prohibiting new
concept design work and establishing a restrictively high bar for the
replacement of antiquated and in many cases 60-plus year old technology
existing in current weapons systems.
The physical and intellectual infrastructure, as highlighted a year
ago by the Strategic Posture Commission, is in dire shape. The fiscal
year 2011 budget dedicates significant resources to continue the design
and construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
Facility (CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-
12. Both projects are critical pillars of the future weapons complex,
but CMRR is undoubtedly a priority and I question why the budget
intends to fund both on parallel paths rather than expedite the
infrastructure necessary to the pit manufacturing mission. As for the
intellectual infrastructure, the budget allocates funding to help
stabilize the lab workforce at 2010 levels; however, given the large
downward trend of scientists over the past decade, I question if
stabilization is enough, especially given the imminent workload
increases of the B-61 Life Extension program.
The B-61 Life Extension program is arguably among the most
significant and time critical funding elements of the fiscal year 2011
request. However, I understand that the full scope of B-61 work won't
be fully defined until the completion of the 6.2A study in 2011. At the
same time, technology maturation for many components should have began
more than 2 years ago and the longer we wait to define the scope,
pressure on meeting the 2017 deadline will continue to mount. With the
release of the NPR and the affirmation by the President on the need for
a B-61 in the future, I look forward to hearing if any additional
policy roadblocks remain preventing work from moving forward on this
critical life extension program.
Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 requires a report on the plan for the nuclear weapons
stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms. The report
requires a plan and estimated budgetary requirements over a 10-year
period for enhancing the safety, security, and reliability of the
stockpile; modernizing the nuclear weapons complex; and maintaining the
delivery platforms for nuclear weapons. This bipartisan requirement is
eagerly anticipated by Congress and I look forward to hearing more from
our witness on NNSA's long-term requirements as well as when we should
receive this congressionally-mandated report.
The fiscal year 2011 budget represents a welcome and long overdue
recapitalization of the nuclear weapons complex. It is the first
installment and must be sustained at increased levels far past the 5
years outlined in the request. I thank you Mr. D'Agostino for your
leadership and your service and I look forward to a fruitful
discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Do you have some opening remarks that you'd like to make,
Mr. D'Agostino?
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman. If I could, I also have
a written statement to submit for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.
I'm pleased to appear before you today to discuss the
Department of Energy's (DOE) fiscal year 2011 budget request
for the NNSA.
When I last appeared before the subcommittee, the focus of
my testimony was the continued transformation of an outdated
Cold War nuclear weapons complex, and moving it towards a 21st-
century nuclear security enterprise, and our initial efforts in
implementing the President's nuclear security agenda.
Since that time, we've defined a portfolio of programs to
carry out the President's nuclear security agenda. Our fiscal
year 2011 request for these programs is $11.2 billion, an
increase of over 13 percent from last year. In developing this
portfolio, Secretary Chu and I worked very closely with
Secretary Gates to ensure that we remain focused on meeting DOD
requirements. This request fully supports, and is entirely
consistent with, the new nuclear strategy outlined last week in
the administration's NPR.
The NPR lays out the nuclear deterrence policies for the
next decade. For the NNSA, the impacts are significant. The NPR
documents the President's commitment to provide the NNSA the
resources required to support his nuclear security agenda and
maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear
deterrent without underground testing.
I understand there'll be a separate full committee hearing
later this month to discuss the details of the NPR. I look
forward to that hearing next week.
To summarize, the NPR provides the direction for the NNSA
to maintain the stockpile through enhanced surveillance with an
appropriate LEP for the weapons remaining in the stockpile. It
renews our commitment in human capital, the critical cadre of
scientific, technical, and engineering experts who underpin our
stockpile management work; our support for nuclear
nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions; and
recapitalizes the aging infrastructure used to support the
stockpile and conduct a full range of nuclear security
missions. Our budget request for the NNSA supports this
direction completely.
Within our overall request, weapons activities increases
nearly 10 percent, to a level of $7 billion; defense
nonproliferation increases nearly 26 percent, to a level of
$2.7 billion; and naval reactors increases more than 13
percent, to a level of $1.1 billion.
Our request can be summarized in four components that,
collectively, ensure that we implement the President's
direction: First, our request describes the NNSA's crucial role
in implementing the President's nuclear security agenda,
including his call to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials
worldwide within 4 years. The $2.7 billion request for nuclear
nonproliferation programs includes several efforts that are
directly linked to the President's agenda, including nearly
$560 million for Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure
vulnerable materials; over $1 billion for our Fissile Material
Disposition Program to permanently eliminate 68 metric tons of
surplus weapons-grade plutonium and more than 200 metric tons
of surplus highly-enriched uranium; and over $350 million for
nuclear nonproliferation verification research and development
programs to provide technical support for arms control and
nonproliferation.
The second component of our investment is in the tools and
capabilities required to effectively manage our nuclear weapons
stockpile. Because the NNSA, DOD, and the White House were all
intimately involved in the formulation of the NPR from the
start, much of the early analysis enabled NNSA to formulate a
budget request that already responds to many of the
recommendations in the recently released NPR. We concluded very
early on that maintaining the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the enduring deterrent would require increased
investments to strengthen an aging physical infrastructure and
to help sustain a depleting technical human capital base. Our
request includes more than $7 billion to ensure the
capabilities required to complete ongoing life extension work;
to strengthen the science, technology, engineering base; and to
reinvest in the scientists, technicians, and engineers who
carry out the entire NNSA mission.
These activities are consistent with the new Stockpile
Management Program (SMP) responsibilities, outlined in the 2010
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and are consistent
with the path forward, outlined in the NPR. As Vice President
Biden highlighted in a recent speech, ``We need to continue to
invest in a modern, sustainable infrastructure that supports
the full range of NNSA's mission, not just stockpile
stewardship.'' He stated, ``This investment is not only
consistent with our nonproliferation agenda, but essential to
it.'' There is a bipartisan consensus that now is the time to
make these investments to provide the foundation for future
U.S. security, as noted by Senator Sam Nunn and Secretaries
George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, and William Perry last January.
This leads me to the third component: our investment in
recapitalizing our infrastructure and deterrent capability into
a 21st-century nuclear security enterprise. As the Vice
President also said last month, ``Some of the facilities we use
to handle uranium and plutonium date back to the days when the
world's great powers were led by Truman, Churchill, and Stalin.
The signs of age and decay are becoming more apparent every
day.''
So, our request includes specific funds to continue the
design of the UPF at the Y-12 facility, and the construction of
the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
Facility at Los Alamos. The naval reactors request includes
funds to address the Ohio-class replacement, including a new
reactor plant, and our need to refuel one of our land-based
prototypes to provide a platform to demonstrate the
manufacturability of the Ohio replacement core, and to
realistically test systems and components.
Mr. Chairman, investing now in a modern, sustainable
nuclear security enterprise is the right thing to do. The
investment will support the full range of nuclear security
missions, including stockpile stewardship, nuclear
nonproliferation, arms control, treaty verification,
counterterrorism, nuclear forensics, and emergency management,
along with naval nuclear propulsion.
Finally, the fourth component, and one that ties all our
missions together, is our commitment to aggressive management
reform across the NNSA. With increased resources provided by
Congress comes increased responsibility on our part to be
effective stewards of the taxpayers' money and to ensure that
the NNSA is an efficient and cost-effective enterprise. We take
this responsibility very seriously. We initiated a zero-based
security review to implement greater security efficiencies and
drive down costs, while sustaining and even improving our
security capabilities. Our supply-chain management center has
already saved taxpayers more than $130 million, largely through
eSourcing and combining purchasing across our enterprise.
Last month, I announced the new contracting and acquisition
strategy that includes, among other items, an initiative to
consolidate site operations at Y-12 National Security Complex
and the Pantex Plant into a single contract, with the option
for the phase-in of the SRS tritium operations. The proposed
single-contract award will further strengthen our ability to
achieve the ambitious goals set by the President in his budget
request, and is consistent with my vision to move forward to a
fully integrated and interdependent enterprise that will
enhance mission performance, reduce cost, and strengthen
private-sector partnerships. While many of the details still
need to be worked out, we believe these efforts can save the
taxpayers more than $895 million over the next decade.
Finally, NNSA's leadership team stresses performance and
financial accountability at all levels of our organization. In
2009, our program met or exceeded 95 percent of the performance
objectives. We continue to reduce the percentage of carryover,
uncosted, uncommitted balances in several of our
nonproliferation programs.
Mr. Chairman, these investments made to date in the nuclear
security enterprise provide the tools to address a broad array
of nuclear security challenges. However, we must continue to
cultivate the talents of our people to use these tools
effectively, because our dedicated workforce is ultimately, in
the end, the key to our success.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino
Thank you for the opportunity to present the fiscal year 2011
President's budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). This budget request will allow the NNSA to meet
its commitments to the American people to provide for nuclear
deterrence, to reduce nuclear dangers around the world, and to provide
the capabilities to address the broader national security challenges of
the 21st century.
At this time last year, the focus of NNSA efforts was the
continuing transformation of the Cold War-era weapons complex to a 21st
century Nuclear Security Enterprise, and transformation of the
composition and size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
Simultaneously, we were in the very early stages of defining the
efforts necessary to address the President's policy statements on
securing the most vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide.
During the first 15 months of the Obama administration, we have
been fully engaged with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Interagency on the Nuclear Posture Review, and with the Department of
State on a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Agreement and a
broad menu of nonproliferation agreements with our international
partners.
NNSA efforts this past year defined a portfolio of programs to meet
the President's nuclear security agenda for the future. The fiscal year
2011 President's budget request for this portfolio is $11.2 billion, an
increase of more than 13 percent from last year. In the development of
this portfolio, Secretary of Energy Chu and NNSA Administrator
D'Agostino worked closely with Secretary of Defense Gates and other DOD
officials to ensure that we remain focused on meeting the DOD's
requirements. As a result, the budget request for Weapons Activities
increases nearly 10 percent to a level of $7 billion; Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation increases nearly 26 percent to a level of $2.7
billion; Naval Reactors increases more than 13 percent to a level of
$1.1 billion; and, the request for Federal oversight and staff included
in the Office of the Administrator account increases by 6.5 percent to
a level of nearly $450 million. NNSA's budget request also includes
associated outyear projections in a Future Years Nuclear Security
Program (FYNSP) that identifies resources needed to meet the continuing
requirements for significant long term investments in the Nuclear
Security Enterprise deliverables, capabilities, and infrastructure.
The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request for the NNSA can be
summarized in four core components that, collectively, ensure that the
NNSA implements the President's overall nuclear security agenda,
introduced in his April 2009 Prague speech, re-enforced during the
State of the Union Address on January 27, 2010, and embodied in the
Nuclear Posture Review.
implementing the president's nuclear security vision
The budget request highlights NNSA's crucial role in implementing
President Obama's nuclear security vision, including his call for an
international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around
the world within 4 years. The request for these efforts is $2.7 billion
(an increase of 25.8 percent over the current year). Key
nonproliferation programs reflect significant increases from last year,
including;
Nearly $560 million for the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (an increase of 68 percent over the current year) to
secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within 4
years, and to provide a comprehensive approach to deny
terrorist access to nuclear and radiological materials at
civilian sites worldwide;
Over $1 billion for our Fissile Materials Disposition
program (an increase of 47 percent over the current year) for
construction of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility
and the Waste Solidification Building, design of the Pit
Disassembly and Conversion Facility, and meeting our commitment
to support Russian plutonium disposition activities;
More than $590 million for Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting and Second Line of Defense activities
to accelerate securing nuclear materials in the Former Soviet
Union and other Asian states, as well as worldwide efforts to
deter, detect, and respond to nuclear smuggling events; and,
Over $350 million for the Nonproliferation and
Verification Research and Development programs (an increase of
10 percent over the current year) to provide the key technical
support for the President's arms control and nonproliferation
agenda.
managing the nuclear weapons stockpile
Based on a preliminary analysis of the draft Nuclear Posture
Review, the Department concluded that maintaining the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing--
especially at lower stockpile numbers--requires increased investments
to strengthen an aging physical infrastructure and to sustain a
depleting technical human capital base across the Nuclear Security
Enterprise. As such, we are requesting more than $7 billion (an
increase of 9.8 percent over the current year) in the Weapons
Activities appropriation to:
Ensure the capabilities required for stockpile
management and for the completion of ongoing Life Extension
Programs are available;
Strengthen the Science, Technology, and Engineering
base capabilities that underpin stockpile stewardship, without
nuclear testing, as well as all other NNSA nuclear security
activities; and,
Reinvest in the scientists, technicians, and engineers
who perform the mission across the Nuclear Security Enterprise.
The President's budget request is consistent with the principles of
the Stockpile Management Program outlined by Congress in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
recapitalizing our nuclear infrastructure and deterrent capability
These increases represent an investment in transforming our
outdated nuclear weapons complex into a 21st century Nuclear Security
Enterprise. This request includes funds to continue the design of the
Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 facility; the design and
construction of the replacement for the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory; and,
conceptual design for the recapitalization of Naval Reactor's Expended
Core Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory. Investing in a modern,
sustainable nuclear security infrastructure supports the full range of
NNSA's nuclear security missions, including:
Stockpile stewardship;
Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament;
Arms control treaty monitoring;
Nuclear forensics;
Counterterrorism and emergency response; and,
the nuclear Navy.
Additionally, the request supports the recent Department of Defense
decision to recapitalize the sea-based strategic deterrent. The Ohio-
class ballistic submarines, the most survivable leg of the Nation's
strategic deterrent, are reaching the end of their operational life.
The request will enable Naval Reactors to continue reactor plant design
and development efforts begun in 2010 for procurement of long-lead
reactor plant components in 2017, in support of Navy procurement of the
first Ohio-class submarine replacement in 2019. Providing the Ohio-
class replacement a life-of-the-ship reactor core will require
substantial advances in manufacturing technology to provide a new
cladding and a new fuel system. The request also supports the refueling
of a land based prototype reactor, providing a cost effective test
platform for these new technologies.
Continuing NNSA Management Reforms. With the increased resources
provided by Congress comes an increased responsibility to be effective
stewards of the taxpayer's money. NNSA will continue to promote
proactive, sound management reforms that save money, improve the way we
do business, and increase efficiency. Following are a few of the
efforts already underway:
A Zero-Based Security Review initiative has led to
efficiencies in our site security programs, helping drive down
those costs while sustaining core physical security
capabilities.
An Enterprise Re-engineering Team is implementing
ideas for improving the way NNSA does business, such as:
A Supply Chain Management Center has already saved the
taxpayers more than $130 million since its inception in 2007
and is expanding its focus. Two key elements of the Center are:
eSourcing--an electronic sealed-bidding and
reverse auction function; and,
Strategic Sourcing--where our Management and
Operating contractors use their combined purchasing
power to negotiate multi-site commodity contracts with
vendors.
A moratorium on new, NNSA-initiated Reviews and re-
direction of those resources to improve Contractor Management
Systems and operations and oversight across the Nuclear
Security Enterprise.
Issuing new NNSA Operating Principles to guide the
priorities and decision processes of entities that perform NNSA
work consistently across the Nuclear Security Enterprise.
Applying a new performance-based model, best business
practices, and lessons-learned across the Nuclear Security
Enterprise. The model, pioneered at our Kansas City Plant,
provides greater contractor flexibility and accountability;
better focused, risk-based oversight; eliminates redundant and
non-value-added reviews; and, improves efficiencies and
availability of Federal and contractor resources to support the
full scope of NNSA missions.
Reducing contractor expenses through
renegotiation of health and dental plans, using common
contracts for administration and supplies, and
converting plant shifts for five 8-hour days to four
10-hour day shifts.
Retaining the critical Federal workforce
Piloting for the Department a 5-year Office of
Personnel Management Demonstration Project on Pay-for-
Performance and Pay Banding to test new Human Resource
concepts to recruit and retain a high caliber staff by
providing faster pay progression for high-performing
employees, and to build on the workforce planning
system to better identify competency needs and gaps.
Conducting a Future Leaders Program and
sponsoring Historically Black Colleges and
Universities, Hispanic Serving Institutions, Native
American Serving Institutions, and other intern and
fellowship programs to bring into government the best
and brightest talent in science, engineering, business,
and other technical positions to ensure that when our
aging workforce retires, it is replaced with competent,
well-trained, and experienced professionals to carry on
the mission work of the NNSA.
Finally, NNSA continues to emphasize performance and financial
accountability at all levels of our operations. NNSA needs to assure
the committee and the taxpayers that the we are an excellent steward of
the programs and funds Congress entrusts to us to carry out the
President's nuclear security vision. In 2009, NNSA met 95 percent of
its stated program performance objectives, and, over the past 2 years,
NNSA successfully executed consecutive, large annual funding increases
in several of our nonproliferation programs while reducing uncosted,
uncomitted balances. We are ready to meet the challenge of executing
the additional program increases supported by the fiscal year 2011
President's budget request. Our Federal and contractor staff and our
contracting processes are in place to initiate immediately the
increased mission work both in the U.S. and abroad. The NNSA will be a
leader in successful program and financial execution for the Department
of Energy and for the U.S. Government.
The NNSA is not operating on a ``business-as-usual'' basis. The
budget request represents a comprehensive approach to ensuring the
nuclear security of our Nation. NNSA will ensure that our strategic
posture, our nuclear weapons stockpile, and our infrastructure, along
with our nonproliferation, arms control, emergency response,
counterterrorism, and naval propulsion programs, are melded into one
comprehensive, forward-looking strategy that protects America and its
allies.
Maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile is the core work in the
NNSA. However, the science, technology, and engineering capabilities,
which enable the core work, must also continue to focus on providing a
sound foundation for ongoing nonproliferation and other threat
reduction programs. The investment in nuclear security is providing the
tools that can tackle a broad array of national security and energy
challenges and in other realms. NNSA now has the tools, but must
continue to cultivate the talents of the people to use them
effectively.
The NNSA is developing the next generation of scientists,
engineers, and technicians required to meet our enduring deterrence
requirements as well as the critical work in nonproliferation, nuclear
counterterrorism, and forensics. People are ultimately our most
important resource. We are working closely with our national
laboratories to develop and retain the necessary cadre of the best and
the brightest to successfully carry out all of our technically
challenging programs into the foreseeable future.
Following are more detailed descriptions of each of the four
specific NNSA appropriations.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Bingaman, do you have some opening remarks you
might want to make?
Senator Bingaman. I'll just wait for questions, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
You mentioned the NPR, and it supports the decision, in the
New START, to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile to 1,500
deployed nuclear weapons. It's a reduction from the maximum of
2,200 deployed nuclear weapons allowed under the Moscow Treaty,
but this number doesn't represent the size of the total
stockpile, which is considerably larger than the number of
deployed weapons. What is your understanding of the impact that
the NPR and START will have on the total stockpile size?
Mr. D'Agostino. The total stockpile size is a size that
includes, as you described, sir, the operationally deployed
warheads and a reserves stockpile--a classified number, at this
point--to essentially backup the operationally deployed
warheads. Because we do have to do maintenance, it requires a
bit of movement back and forth. Also, as part of that, because
we hadn't been actively involved--and this is that phase we're
entering into, is this active LEP management--we hadn't been as
actively involved in that. Now that we have a defined and clear
path forward, DOD will be looking at whether or not, and by how
much, we ought to be looking at the reserve stockpile and
changing the size of that. Decisions on that point have not yet
been made, because as we note, the NPR was just released last
week. So we want to phase those in as we move forward.
Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, will you be able to, as
far as you know right now, retire and disassemble more nuclear
warheads than previously scheduled? Or will it have any impact
on that?
Mr. D'Agostino. In addition to the operationally deployed
and reserve stockpile, there are a set of warheads in a
dismantlement queue. Our last report that we provided, about 2
years ago to Congress, laid out an accelerated dismantlement
path for those warheads, and for that third queue to be taken
apart. We're proceeding on marching down that plan that we had
laid out 2 years ago. It's a fairly aggressive plan.
The question that has to come to play, that we will be
looking at as we develop our fiscal year 2012 budgets in the
out-years, is whether it makes sense to take another bite and
try to even go faster taking down that retired set of warheads,
or are those resources better spent on taking care of the
warheads that we have right now? That's an ongoing discussion,
right now, that I'm having with DOD. We're looking at various
options on that, but we remain committed to taking apart all
those warheads in that retirement queue by 2022. Granted,
that's 12 years from now, but we are talking about a number of
warheads, and they are nuclear warheads, so we want to make
sure that we don't rush. Safety's the most important thing,
from my standpoint.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now, there are different categories of
nondeployed warheads. Some are active, reserve, and some are
inactive, while some are in line, waiting for dismantlement.
Can you tell us the current categories of these nondeployed
warheads? Will the category or will the situation change under
NPR?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think the NPR allows us to look at
changing the situation. I don't have the details on how it
would change, at this point. It's important that there are a
couple of things happening at the same time. One is extending
the lives and actively getting into finishing the W76 warhead
and doing the design work and costing studies needed for the
B61 warhead. That's incredibly important. As we move forward in
that, we'll be in the position to look at whether we should
accelerate our retirement of the retired warheads and/or
whether we should move those warheads that are in the active
and inactive reserve into the retirement category. Those are
decisions made by DOD, they're advised upon by my organization,
particularly since we look very closely at which warhead
systems are reaching their end of life, and in what manner, and
what sequence we ought to be taking these apart.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now, in terms of the categories, can
you outline the nature of each category?
Mr. D'Agostino. The categories, right now, are
operationally deployed strategic warheads; an active and
inactive reserve set of warheads to back up the operationally
deployed warheads; and the third queue are the retired
warheads, warheads that are being retired, but they're awaiting
dismantlement. There's a significant number of warheads there,
and we have to balance our resources between taking care of the
stockpile and retiring warheads.
Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, even though you can't
talk about the classified total number of these nondeployed
warheads, will we be able to handle the maintenance
requirements of each of those warheads?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, very much so. What the NPR allows us
to do is provide certainty in the work plan. Where we are right
now is translating the broad NPR requirements into very
specific 20-year plans. We have a document called the
Requirements Planning Document (RPD) and the Program and
Planning Document (PPD). These are the detailed documents that
say what warhead gets worked on at what time sequence. So, the
fact that we have this type of certainty, that we are going to
work on the W76, finish the production of the W76; we are
proposing to actively engage in the full B61 LEP, including the
nuclear life extension; and that we are going to start
studying--this is more from a laboratory side--what we might
and what are the best approaches to dealing with the W78
warhead--that certainty allows us to allocate resources at the
Pantex plant and the Y-12 plant, which are the hands-on people
on the warhead components, with some degree of certainty.
Senator Ben Nelson. In connection with the Pantex
operation, the budgets for those operations are down from
fiscal year 2010 levels, at a time when Pantex will be
conducting full-rate production of the W76 life extension and
will be increasing the dismantlement rate, even though you say
that perhaps things will be delayed on some dismantlement. Why
is the budget down? It looks to me like maybe the operation
tempo is up, but the budget's down. It's not that I want
budgets up, but I want to make certain that they're correlated.
Mr. D'Agostino. Right. The budget we asked for, for the
NNSA overall, allows us to do the work at the Pantex plant.
There's an element in the President's budget request where we
take, early on, and we allocate resources to each of the sites.
Because of final questions on how much goes through what
particular site, there is an element of the President's request
called the headquarters account. Essentially, it's the Defense
Program's General Harencak, who's sitting behind me--as the
requirements become better defined, we allocate those resources
out to the sites.
Since we're talking about next year's budget, there are
still resources to be allocated out to take care of any
reductions or perceived reductions at the site. Obviously we
don't spend the money in headquarters so that money gets spent
at our laboratories and production plants.
I wanted also to clarify my comment on the accelerated
dismantlement rate. We submitted a plan to Congress, in a
classified report, that we accelerated our dismantlement rates
from the 2006 levels. So, now we are currently operating on the
plan we submitted to you, sir, 2 years ago. We aren't going to
accelerate on top of that plan, unless we have the freed-up
resource at our plants to do that.
Senator Ben Nelson. In terms of Pantex and the operations,
are you satisfied that you have enough financial resources in
the budget to be able to do what the plan is?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. I'm satisfied.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Administrator, thanks again for your service.
As I noted briefly in my opening statement, the center
directors seem to have suggested a level above what we're
looking at for fiscal year 2011. We're looking at an increase
of $624 million. My understanding is, they suggested an
increase of $1 to $1.2 billion. What's the difference? What are
we not doing in this request? How do you anticipate meeting
those needs in the future?
Mr. D'Agostino. When we worked the internal budget process
last year, I asked for input, broadly. Defense Programs runs
that input process. About this time last year, we received
feedback that said, ``Yes, in order to do, broadly, the kind of
work we think that might happen''--this is before, by the way,
we knew what the requirements actually were--``we think, on the
order of about a billion-plus is needed.'' This is, again, just
as a reminder, without any real requirements. As the year
progressed last year, and the NPR was moving through its paces,
the requirements became clearer. My staff and I were very aware
that the requirements were happening, but because the NPR is
drafted within the Federal Government and doesn't involve a
broad range of people outside of our laboratories, our labs and
plants don't become aware of all of those requirements. So, I
can take their input and work it down.
Additionally, early on what we had were what I would call
power-point level of quality, with respect to budget input.
But, what we had, as the year progressed last year, was a
greater level of clarity on what it actually takes to do
maintenance, build buildings, do work on the stockpile and as
the stockpile requirements came through. So, I took a look at
that request against the power-point-quality level of request,
and applied their actual requirements to that. That brought
that number down into our internal budget process. The
resources we have, and the increases we have in the President's
budget, are exactly what I feel is needed in order to satisfy
the requirements.
I've talked to our folks at the labs and plants. They
understand that. They agree with me, that what we have right
now is what we need. Will folks always want more money? I
think, early on, it's hard to find a program manager that
doesn't want increased resources.
A final and very important filter, frankly, from my
standpoint, is our ability to appropriately execute the
resources to get the job done. The layout that we have before
us here, is what I feel is a significant increase, and it's
what is required to get the job done.
Senator Vitter. Okay. Certainly, Mr. Administrator, I
assume you agree that this project has to be sustained over
many years. We have asked for, in the authorization language, a
10-year plan about this. When do you expect that we'll get that
plan, in significant detail?
Mr. D'Agostino. This is the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program Plan?
Senator Vitter. Right.
Mr. D'Agostino. We are working on that plan. It's going to
be a 10-year plan. It will indicate, to the best of our
ability, the 10-year program stream that we will need. We
expect to get that plan to the Hill in early May, if not by the
1st of May, which is what my target is. My internal target is
to get that up by the first, but it's certainly within the next
few weeks, sir.
Senator Vitter. Okay. I know it's not finalized yet, but
can you describe, roughly, what you think the funding line over
time of that plan will look like? Obviously, we have a
significant increase proposed here. Over those next 10 years,
what would you expect that proposal to look like, in terms of
dollars?
Mr. D'Agostino. As you said, sir, the plan is not final,
and I actually haven't seen the tables. But, I will point out
that the program we have in front of the committee today takes
the--just the weapons activities account--I'm setting aside
nuclear nonproliferation, for the time being--but, just the
weapons activities grows, as you pointed out--it starts at $7
billion in fiscal year 2011, and it grows to $7.6 billion in
fiscal year 2015. From that standpoint alone, I expect--because
the out-years will be deep into the actual construction of
these large facilities at Los Alamos and Y-12, and we'll be
into the work on the actual stockpile, the B61 warhead--will be
in the production of that--that the increase will continue on
into the out-years, years 6 through 10.
But, I want to caveat, I haven't seen the budget tables
yet. It's my best expectation, at this point, that we'll see
that increase continue. But, we will also, in parallel,
continue to drive down and look at cost efficiencies, as I
described in my oral opening remarks.
Senator Vitter. Okay. In my statement, I highlighted the
B61 life extension. I know the fiscal year 2010 Appropriations
bill did not fully fund your request for that. In unclassified
terms, could you please share why that project is urgently
needed, and the complexities associated with the plan, and why
future delays imposed by Congress would be particularly
detrimental?
Mr. D'Agostino. Certainly. The B61 warhead is one of our
oldest warheads in the stockpile, from a design standpoint and
actual warheads in the stockpile. As General Chilton has
pointed out in the past, as I've pointed out in the past, we
have components in that warhead that have vacuum tubes. They
are pretty hard to make these days. It could be hard to find
somebody that actually has them. We can't continue to operate
in this manner, where we're replacing things with vacuum tubes.
Neutron generators and power supplies and the radar,
essentially, are components that have to be addressed in this
warhead.
Also, I think, importantly, the work on this warhead will
provide our first real opportunity to actually increase the
safety and security of that warhead, and put 21st century
safety and security into that warhead. So, when we work on
warheads from now on, I'd like to be in the position of saying,
``We made it safer. We made it more secure. We increased the
reliability to ensure that we would stay very far away from
ever having to conduct an underground test.''
Senator Vitter. Okay. Once we are beyond the B61 scope of
work, do you anticipate a significant sort of recalculation of
necessary fiscal year 2012-and-beyond funding?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think it's important to note that the
work that we are proposing in the fiscal year 2011 request--
whether we're talking about our major capital projects, the
uranium and plutonium facilities that we're proposing, or
whether we're talking actually about work on the stockpile
itself--a good part of this work is work in the design phase or
in the, what we call, defining the cost, scope, and schedule,
because these are defined activities; they have a beginning, a
middle, and an end. For these types of projects, we will be
establishing performance baselines. In other words, the
Government's commitment, or the executive branch's commitment,
to saying, ``I'm going to deliver such-and-such, by a certain
date, for a certain dollar amount, on a certain dollar
stream.'' We expect for our two large facilities and the B61
warhead to be in that performance baseline decision point in
fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013. At that point, those are
the numbers that I want to lock in and commit to from a
multiple-year standpoint, and will lock in and commit to
getting the job done for those projects.
We have to expect increases and decreases and adjustments
in our program as we have a better understanding of what it
takes to do a design.
If I could just add a little bit more to that. We know that
there have been some important changes in DOE lately, with
Secretary Chu and with Deputy Secretary Poneman on approaches
to large projects. In particular, one I want to point out for
large capital projects is making sure that we know what we're
going to build before we start building it. It's this idea of
getting very close to finishing the design work before
committing to a performance baseline. On these large
facilities, particularly the capital projects, our goal is to
get to 90 percent of design prior to construction, pouring
concrete in the ground, and then finding out. Because that way
we're assured, we have a much greater confidence that we know
what a project costs and how long it will take.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Bingaman?
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much.
Tom, thank you for your service.
You testified to this subcommittee, last year, that the Los
Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSC) was an important tool to
help maintain the stockpile. I wanted to be sure that's still
your view.
Mr. D'Agostino. It's absolutely my view that the LANSC
provides the important experimental data that we need to help
validate our codes, as well as help our scientists. It helps us
in the basic science area as it well helps us in the energy
area as we look at nuclear energy and being able to have
materials that can handle neutron flux environments well.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you. Let me ask about the CMRR
Facility. The budget you've given us doesn't have in it any
cost estimates. I guess your statement, just a few minutes ago,
related to this. When would we expect to have firm cost
estimates and completion dates for that project?
Mr. D'Agostino. I expect, in calendar year 2012--whether it
bridges into fiscal year 2012 or 2013--I'd have to double
check. It's going to take us a good year and a half more of
design work to be confident. I think the most important thing
is our desire to get DOE's reputation back on track, with
respect to large facilities. We do have programs in DOE that do
well in this, and what we've learned is that getting the design
work largely completed, or getting it to around the 80 to 90
percent level is what it takes in order to do that. So, we're
going to work on that approach here for these two facilities.
My expectation is about the 2012 timeframe to get that done. If
it takes longer though, sir, I'm willing to push back the
performance baseline by a year in order to make sure I know
what we're asking for. I think, in the long run, that will be
the right thing to do.
Senator Bingaman. Has the decision been made as to whether
that CMRR Facility will manufacture plutonium pits?
Mr. D'Agostino. I don't think there's any decision needed,
sir. Here's how I would describe that. The plutonium pits are
manufactured in a building called PF4. It's a building at Los
Alamos that was brought up in the 1980s. It's 20, 25 years old.
We're in the midst of upgrading that facility, working on the
ventilation systems and the power systems and the like. The
CMRR Facility will do a couple of things for us. It will do the
materials characterization work that we need to characterize
plutonium material for nuclear forensics work and for the
stockpile. It will do the analytical chemistry that's needed to
do the surveillance work on the stockpile, which means if we
take a stockpile pit, we take a little sample of that, and we
send it over to the CMRR facility so that analysis can be done,
so we can understand the aging of that warhead. Finally, there
will be a component of this facility that will include storage.
One of the things that we found that we're having problems with
is making sure that we have the adequate and appropriate
storage for all of our material. So, it will provide those
three functions. We will not make pits in the CMRR Facility.
We'll make them in the existing older facility.
Senator Bingaman. As I understand it, the Defense Nuclear
Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) has criticized the PF4 facility
for its safety envelope under a worst-case accident scenario.
Does NNSA have a campaign to reduce or remove plutonium from
that facility to deal with that?
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, we absolutely have a campaign to
do that. We have a campaign to do a couple of things. One, the
concern of the DNFSB is a concern of mine in that the analysis
was an unbounded analysis. That said, if the facility was
completely full of plutonium, and all the worst things
happened, then we would have a release. What we have done since
then is taken a look at how much material is actually in the
building, versus the building filled up to the rafters with
plutonium. That reduced the risk to the public by a factor of
15, so that's a significant reduction. We're still not
satisfied with that reduction.
What we're doing, even though the risk has been reduced by
a factor of 15, is packaging and taking material out, and we've
incentivized the laboratory to accelerate its packaging. Item
two is, we've reduced the amount of--what we call fire loading,
material in the building that could catch fire, because the
accident was a fire accident. The building breaks open, there's
a fire, and then the wind carries everything out. If we reduce
the amount of fire-loaded material and add fire upgrades, that
also causes the risk to the public to go down.
We're moving material out; we've reduced the fire loading;
and we're also putting in some--not ventilation adjustments,
but, in essence, doors that will close automatically, to reduce
the risk even further. I'm confident that the right steps are
being taken.
Senator Bingaman. Let me ask about the scientific and
engineering complex that has been considered there at Los
Alamos. I believe your budget proposes to cancel that. This was
intended to house many of the scientists at the lab in a single
facility. What is the plan for a facility of this sort? Is
there an alternative course that you plan to follow?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. I would characterize it slightly
differently, if I could, sir. We canceled the approach that the
lab was proposing to the Federal Government, which was a third-
party-financed approach which we felt did not meet the
requirements. First of all, it did not meet the requirements
that we had laid out, with the administration, and it did not
meet the Office of Management and Budget requirements for
third-party financing. So, we're working with the laboratory,
right now, on a different approach. We do need, frankly, a
place to put our scientists at the laboratory. We don't have
the solution yet. The Defense Programs organization hasn't
closed on that particular approach yet. I don't have anything I
can say right now to you, sir. But, I'll be glad, once we close
on that approach, to communicate back to you, once we close on
what that may be.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I may have some questions to submit in
writing, but thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson. They will be received.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Mr. D'Agostino, we appreciate your being with us today.
One of the things that is really crucial to the START
ratification process is the commitment, that we believe is
there, to modernize the nuclear weapons program. It's part of
our 2010 Defense bill, and it says, ``Must have a plan to
modernize U.S. nuclear deterrent and estimated budget
requirements over 10 years.''
I was just going to tell you that there are a lot of
concerns about this treaty. I don't think it's critical to our
national defense, and I will try to be cooperative so people
can celebrate all these meetings and signing all these
documents. It makes them feel good. But, we need to know
whether or not you have the money and the plan in place to
modernize the arsenal. If it's not there, I think Senator
Lieberman was quoted as saying that he didn't think the treaty
could be ratified. I guess I see there is $5 billion for the
first 5 years, but what kind of plan is there for the second?
Are we backloading the funding here to sometime when some new
administration would have to come up with the money, not the
one that's signing this treaty? To put it all bluntly.
[Laughter.]
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, the fiscal year 2011 budget is not
just a budget for 1 year. Within the program that we've
submitted, we have a 5-year lookahead. The program does go up
significantly from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015.
We do owe you a 10-year plan to describe what years 6, 7, 8, 9,
and 10 look like, as well. Our commitment is to get that plan
to you. I believe that what's not needed is a 1-year step-up,
which, frankly, we do have a significant increase from fiscal
year 2010 to fiscal year 2011, but it has to be a long-term
commitment that crosses administrations and crosses Congresses
and the like. That's our approach, sir.
Senator Sessions. I understand that. But you testified last
summer that, ``We anticipate that identified funding levels for
the out-years may not be sufficient to meet the post-NPR
stockpile requirements, including science-based stewardship,
recapitalization of the aging plutonium and highly-enriched
uranium facilities.'' Do you still stand by that?
Mr. D'Agostino. No, I stand by the President's budget. Last
summer, I didn't know where we were going to end up with the
year. What we have here is a plan that does what the NPR asked
for. The NPR lays out broad requirements, we've submitted a
program and budget that has a very significant set of well-
understood work for the next decade on working on the nuclear
weapons themselves.
Senator Sessions. But, you haven't identified, yet, the
funding for the out-years, that's correct. Yes or no?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. I've identified funding for the next 5
years, but I haven't----
Senator Sessions. The next 5 years. Excuse me.
Mr. D'Agostino. For the years 6 through 10, I have that
plan in place. I haven't gotten it out in public yet.
Senator Sessions. Will it call for more spending per year,
in years 6 through 10 than 1 through 5?
Mr. D'Agostino. I haven't seen the details of the plan yet,
or the tables. We don't have approval on the tables. My
expectation is that, because we will be entering into the
construction phase of some of these facilities, that the $7.6
billion that we have in year 5 will continue, appropriately, to
increase to reflect that.
Senator Sessions. Where does $7.6 billion come from?
Mr. D'Agostino. That's the amount of money in our weapons
activities account in fiscal year 2015. Right now, our weapons
account has $7 billion in fiscal year 2011, that $7 billion
increases to $7.6 over a 5-year period.
Senator Sessions. But, you have a new responsibility, a big
new responsibility. I thought you were getting $1 billion a
year from the Secretary of Defense to do the New START plan to
modernize?
Mr. D'Agostino. I gave you the total number, sir, which is
an element of that, is the resources provided by DOD.
Senator Sessions. You're cutting other expenditures within
the account?
Mr. D'Agostino. I'm trying to drive efficiencies, because
this is not just a matter of getting more money, it's making
sure the resources we have in our base account are spent well.
Senator Sessions. I couldn't agree more about that. But
this $5 billion for this project in the first 5 years, as I
understand it, is that about $1 billion a year you plan to
apply? Or does it ramp up over the 5 years?
Mr. D'Agostino. Since, I haven't seen my years 6, 7, 8, 9,
and 10, I can't give you a solid answer to that. But very
shortly, you'll be getting the 10-year plan and we will have
that level of detail for you.
Senator Sessions. I just want to say, I learned something
here, when I first came to the Senate, President Clinton had a
lot of increases in the defense budget in the out-years, and I
realized he's going to be out of office, but he wasn't spending
his money this year to get it started. So, I'm trying to make
the point that this is not going to be a pleasant process if
you don't have us really good numbers that we can believe in,
and with credibility, and a real commitment is there to improve
our stockpile.
With regard to the W78 and W88, it seems that the NPR
raises the bar to make it more difficult to recommend
improvements or replacement options. Why would we constrict
ourselves in the options that we would have to make the arsenal
safer and more reliable?
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, I don't believe we are
constricting ourselves. After taking a look at the NPR, the lab
directors feel that the NPR provides them the flexibility they
need in order to maintain the stockpile, including the W78 and
the W88.
Senator Sessions. They work for you guys, and they pretty
much follow orders. But, I'm going to ask you again, do the
restrictions that are included in any way weaken the options
that might be available in the future as we work to replace and
modernize these weapons systems?
Mr. D'Agostino. I believe the NPR does not provide any
restrictions to modernize. So, there's no impact, there's
flexibility for the lab directors to study all types of
approaches to do life extensions on the warheads. The NPR is
real clear on that, sir.
Senator Sessions. All right. We'll review that.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. I would just note, if you want to save
some money, you have $6 billion in cleanup money, is that
correct, in your budget?
Mr. D'Agostino. In the DOE budget, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Another $6 billion of stimulus money for
cleanups, that's $12 billion. That right? Counting the money
that was in the stimulus bill?
Mr. D'Agostino. I'm more confident on the environment
management work money. I don't keep track of the stimulus
money.
Senator Sessions. If you want to look for a place to save
money, I suggest that $12 billion would be a good place to
start and that you have plenty of money to modernize our
nuclear arsenal. Otherwise, we may not have a treaty to sign.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Director.
Just in a general question--we have a challenge of
modernizing our nuclear stockpile in both deployed and
stockpile weapons, et cetera. Is there any significant
difference, in terms of the status of ground-based, air-
launched, or sea-launched systems, in terms of their
modernization or their status?
Mr. D'Agostino. I can answer part of that.
Senator Reed. Yes.
Mr. D'Agostino. It's probably better addressed to DOD.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. D'Agostino. General Chilton and Mr. Miller will be
here, I think, next week.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Mr. D'Agostino. My sense is, from the sea-launch
standpoint, for example, I--because I'm a former submarine
officer, I keep track of the trends----
Senator Reed. I know there was something I liked about you.
[Laughter.]
Mr. D'Agostino. We do have work that we have in our program
request to do the design work on the follow-on Ohio-class
submarine core.
Senator Reed. Right.
Mr. D'Agostino. An element of that, obviously, is the
replacement of the Ohio-class submarine. There is significant
work and discussions underway within Strategic Systems Program
organization on how we best move forward on that Trident
replacement submarine. There's a general understanding that
this is the most survivable leg of our deterrent, and there's a
commitment to work with the Navy on getting this piece done. My
element of the budget, as I described earlier, is over a $100-
million increase in the naval propulsion program just to do
that work on the Ohio-class submarine replacement, as well as
refuel the reactor core on the prototype facility.
From a submarine standpoint, I'm confident. But, I'll have
to leave it to my colleagues in DOD to deal with the other part
of your question, sir.
Senator Reed. Very good. You are already beginning to
undertake the work for the design of the new reactor system for
the follow-on to Ohio.
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely, sir. This budget gets this
going in high gear.
Senator Reed. One of the other aspects of the naval system
is that their spent fuel is currently stored in the water basin
up at naval reactors facilities in Idaho Falls, and the
facility is 50 years old. It's been described to me as a design
that is not the most modern.
Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
Senator Reed. I don't want to denigrate it, but it's a
swimming pool with--am I getting too far off the point here?
Mr. D'Agostino. Getting pretty close, sir.
Senator Reed. Swimming pool with material in it.
Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
Senator Reed. So, what are we going to do to recapitalize
that, in terms of the disposition of the fuel?
Mr. D'Agostino. The facility you're referring to is the
Expended Core Facility, ECF, for short. This is a facility
that's done great work for the Nation. It's a facility that is
in need of upgrading. Just like our plutonium and uranium
facilities, which were there in the 1950s, and were designed to
1950s standards and the like, as we take a look at the work
that we anticipate out into the future, with cores coming out,
we know this facility is not going to be able to cut it. So we
have $40 million requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget on
the ECF. We're going to be working with the Office of
Management and Budget. Once we establish the performance
baseline again--is to make sure that those out-year funds are
there to support this activity.
Senator Reed. You might have covered this already. But,
what opportunity did you have to participate and observe this
week's summit meetings?
Mr. D'Agostino. I was intimately involved with it. Because
it was a nuclear security summit, our folks in the NNSA were
actively involved in the workups to this.
Senator Reed. Yes.
Mr. D'Agostino. It's taken almost a year, frankly, worth of
effort in securing commitments from other nations to protect
their material, to repatriate highly-enriched uranium or
plutonium that either United States or Russia had provided; and
to convert research reactor cores from highly-enriched uranium
to low-enriched uranium. Starting on Sunday, it culminated with
a set of bilateral meetings, and Monday, with our counterparts
from other nations, and then the summit yesterday, where we
actually secured commitments and received agreement on a
integrated work plan. My organization was actively involved. I
was there for the last 3 days.
We're quite excited about this many countries that are
interested in dealing with this global problem, and addressing
it in a very systematic way. Being an engineer, I like to see
things follow a certain work plan, with requirements and our
goal is to have an agreed work plan and meet regularly and
report back up to our presidents regularly on how we're doing.
Two years from now, we'll have another opportunity to ask the
world, ``Did we do what we said we were going to do?'' I think
that's very important, that followup.
Senator Reed. This integrated work plan encompasses all of
the nations that participated?
Mr. D'Agostino. All of the nations, and possibly more. Some
nations have a lot less to do than others. Obviously the United
States and Russia have a fair burden and moral obligation as
well as programmatic obligation to do this work. But, you've
probably heard the announcements about Ukraine agreeing to give
up the material they have and allowing us to bring that back to
Russia; and agreements with Canada, as well, on bringing back
U.S. material. We have secured agreements from various nations
to allow us to put security upgrades in their facilities, put
radiation detectors in their seaports, and have them take over
that responsibility, and agree to sustain that. It was,
frankly, remarkable.
The last piece of it, which is something that many on the
committee know about, is an agreement by Russia and the United
States to sign the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement.
This, unfortunately, had been in negotiation, I'm afraid to
say, for 10 years. We finally got it signed, and it's an
important part--that way, what we'll do is get the
International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that both nations,
the United States and Russia, will be eliminating 68 metric
tons of plutonium, plus a couple of hundred metric tons of
highly-enriched uranium to go with that. So, it's quite a set
of days. We're quite happy with that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Mr. D'Agostino. Thanks.
Senator Reed. Thanks for your testimony.
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
You heard my colleagues from the other side raising
questions about adequate financing and funding for the job that
is going to be required as part of the New START. Based on what
you now know, certainly with the current budget, years 1
through 5, do you believe that there's adequate funding for the
United States to fulfill our obligations under the Treaty as it
relates to the nuclear arsenal?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do believe that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is it your opinion on years 6 through
10, based on what you know at the present time and what you
will be submitting as part of the 10-year plan, that there will
be plans for adequate funding in those out-years, as well?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Our goal is to put
together that 10-year plan to describe the work, as we
understand it today.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
Mr. D'Agostino. In recognizing that, as our project
baselines are established, my goal is that those project
baselines--as this plan is dynamic, change from year to year,
and those project plan numbers get inserted into this plan.
Senator Ben Nelson. There is no effort, as far as you're
concerned, that the front-end funding is light, inadequate, or
is a smaller number than it should be, in anticipation that the
out-years would be funded at a higher level. In other words, so
that the funding should be adequate for each and every one of
those years, based on the budgeting process that we have as
part of Congress.
Mr. D'Agostino. That's right, sir. We put forward a program
that meets the requirements and is executable. It doesn't make
sense for the executive branch to put together a political
budget, because, in the end, what we're trying to do is get the
job done, and get it done in a way that best uses the
taxpayers' dollars and meets the requirements. That's what we
have in our budget submission, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. You don't believe that partisanship or
any kind of political pressure is being placed on this
budgeting process, as far as you're concerned?
Mr. D'Agostino. Not as far as I'm concerned. I was
intimately involved in putting this budget together, and
received great support in doing so. In understanding that we
needed to recapitalize our infrastructure, we needed to
increase our resources in the science area, and that we needed
to work on the stockpile. Sir, that's what we have before us.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay, thank you. In connection with
some facilities modernization efforts, there've always been
people saying that the current facilities, in many instances,
are in shambles; that they're not current, they're not up-to-
date, they're not state-of-the-art, but that does not seem to
be borne out by the facts, because you have, over the last
several years, increased the level of facilities management
during these recent years. Maybe you can tell us a little bit
about some of the things that you've done so far on some of the
facilities, recognizing that I think there are two major
facilities that are going to have to have more than some work
done on them.
Mr. D'Agostino. Right, certainly, absolutely, sir. We've
done a significant amount, as you pointed out. I'll give you
some quick examples.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure.
Mr. D'Agostino. At Sandia, for example, we've done work on
a facility called the Microsystems Engineering Science
Application facility. This is a facility that was critically
important. It added on to an older facility, called the
Microelectronics Development Laboratory. But, this facility, we
knew we needed it, because, as components were getting smaller,
we knew that we could pack more capability into a smaller size.
When we're talking about nuclear warhead designs, size and
weight are huge factors in the equation. So, that facility was
up and running, supported by and authorized by Congress within
the last 10 years.
Additionally, within the last 10 years, we built a facility
called the Tritium Extraction Facility. This facility was
vitally important to reestablishing the Nation's capability to
produce and extract tritium for use in the deterrent, also
vitally important, something that could get done.
We've saved the hardest for last, if I could put it one
way.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure.
Mr. D'Agostino. The hard work is the uranium and plutonium
work. These are the last two big facilities that have to get
done. They are multibillion-dollar facilities. I won't kid you,
sir, these are expensive. But, at the same time, we were trying
to get as much out of what we had. Now we're at the point where
we have to recapitalize those. But, just as with any large
operation, any organization needs a recapitalization budget to
replace buildings as they get old. We expect that to continue
on, at the couple-of-hundred-million-dollar-per-year level.
Finally, one last point, if I could. Up at LANL, which had
a very old administration building, it was the center building.
It was one of the very first structures that went up in the
early days of the Cold War. That facility was torn down and
replaced with a new modern structure at LANL.
We are turning the enterprise around. But, we are now left
with our big jobs, and that's what we have to get done over the
next 10 years.
Senator Ben Nelson. In connection with the two new
facilities, what portion of the design would be complete before
construction starts?
Mr. D'Agostino. My goal is to get design as close to 90
percent as possible before construction starts. The reason why
I can't give you an exact number now is, it's hard for me to
look out in the future and find out, ``Should I wait another
year and spend another X-million dollars to get that last 5
percent? Or do I have enough now to go on? Does that last 5
percent really matter with respect to performing a baseline?''
But, our goal is to get into this 80- to 95-percent range on
complete design before we start asking for increased resources
from you, sir, and other committees, on the actual construction
itself.
Senator Ben Nelson. Are you planning to get any kind of an
independent cost estimate (ICE) of these facilities before you
start making budget requests for significant amounts of money?
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely. DOE recently--I would say,
within the last 2 months, put out a new policy on project
management. The new policy had a couple of key elements to it.
One, I've just alluded to, which is this idea of doing as much
design work before you commit to the construction. The second
one is ICEs at each of the critical decision points. In the
past, we would only do this ICE at one of the major critical
decision points. We're going to do them at each of the four
critical decision points. The third element is making sure that
we have qualified project managers, and the right number of
them on each of the projects. There's an algorithm that's been
developed, and an approach and a desire to make sure we have
enough project managers on the project.
There are a couple of others, but for the sake of brevity,
we could submit those details for the record, if you'd like. Or
I could provide a copy of that.
Senator Ben Nelson. I think that would be helpful.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
As a result of the Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) residing on the GAO's High Risk List for
Project Management Execution, the Department conducted a Root Cause
Analysis (RCA) with resultant Corrective Action Plan (CAP-July 2008).
The participants in this RCA were all experienced, senior members of
the Department. The second most significant root cause of project
failures was determined to be the lack of Federal staff (both contract
professionals and project professionals) assigned to the project
management team. The corrective action for this particular item
resulted in the development of an algorithm by the Office of
Engineering and Construction Management (OECM) that when used would
predict the necessary Federal staffing levels. This model was based
upon a similar model utilized by NavFac. Although the Federal project
staff can be supplemented with contractor personnel, there remain
certain ``inherently Federal'' functions that must be executed by
Federal staff and cannot be allocated to contractors.
After conducting a review of this model, NNSA adopted additional
criteria into the algorithm that more closely reflected the actual
staffing methodologies used within NNSA and the complexities of NNSA
projects, as compared to a linear $/FTE concept suggested by the
original OECM model. NNSA then utilized the model to predict the
necessary staffing levels of the five largest NNSA projects. The
model's predictions were closely aligned to the Federal Project
Director's staffing plans. The results indicated that NNSA had a
staffing deficit on these five projects in fiscal year 2012. Further
decisions regarding the funds to support the Federal Project staffing
have been deferred until the fiscal year 2013 budget formulation.
To address the immediate needs of Chemical Metallurgy Research
building Replacement project and Uranium Processing Facility project,
NA-10 has assigned a senior Federal Project Director to establish a HQ
Project Support Office which will provide oversight of all activities
for these critical projects. Additional NA-10 staff have been assigned
to work under this FPD's direction.
NNSA is committed to the overall improvement of project management
within NNSA and the eventual, near-term removal of NNSA from the GAO's
High Risk List. As such, NNSA will continue development of the
logistics necessary to obtain the additional required staff to support
these critical NNSA projects.
Senator Ben Nelson. One of the concerns about the treaty is
whether we are going to be in a position to be able to do
everything we need to do, as well as everything else that's
required as part of the overall operations of the facilities?
Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is there any concern on your part about
your ability to build these two facilities simultaneously?
Mr. D'Agostino. No. They're in two different geographic
locations. The key will be sticking to our principles, our
project management principles; making sure we spend more time
up front on the design; working with the DNFSB; ensuring that
we have the safety built into these designs; and the thinking
is done upfront, instead of trying to backfit features in after
the design is starting to lock itself down. So, I think we
have--the DNFSB and the NNSA go back and forth on these things,
and appropriately so. But, the good news is, we're having
fairly significant amount of dialogue on these facilities with
the DNFSB. I wouldn't have it any other way. I think it's very
important to get that independent input.
Senator Ben Nelson. Congress has required your agency to
have a net reduction in square feet at each site. Now, in
tearing down some of the old excess facilities and to budget
for the decommissioning and demolition (D&D) for each old
building that a new one would replace, are you in a position to
where you think that you're going to have a net reduction in
square footage, but at the same time be able to handle the
ongoing operations? Apparently you've not funded the D&D
processes in recent budgets.
So, two questions. One, are you going to be able to get
there with the reduction in square feet, but still have enough
to do what needs to be done? How are you going to be able to
fund the D&D costs?
Mr. D'Agostino. Okay. Yes, we will be able to have square-
foot reductions. Early on, when we looked about the shift from
going from an old Cold War nuclear weapons complex to a 21st
century national security enterprise, we felt that we could
take 9 million square feet out of the enterprise. That number
probably doesn't mean anything, except if I put it into
context. We have 36 million square feet of space, and we
believe we can take 9 million square feet down as we
consolidate our functions, which we want to do with this
plutonium and uranium, as we get into smaller more modern
facilities. We believe we can take it down to 9 million square
feet.
Another element, which is not a matter of taking square--
saying you've moved out of the old buildings, or the old
buildings have to come down. We're working with Dr. Triay. At
Y-12, for example, we're doing a consolidation of highly-
enriched uranium, and we've completed the movement of all the
highly-enriched uranium that was spread out in that Y-12 valley
into this new facility that we've just built, this highly-
enriched uranium materials facility. That will allow us,
ultimately, to take that 150 acres of highly secure space,
shift the fence to--only have 75 acres of space that we're
protecting, and all that work that's outside now is available
for the Environmental Management (EM) organization. Senator
Sessions talked about this AARA money, that $6 billion. That
money will be used to take down those facilities.
Senator Ben Nelson. I see.
Mr. D'Agostino. We don't have, at this point, every single
square foot being taken down. We don't have the details of that
plan yet. But, for the most part, we're working the EM
organization to help us out on that.
Senator Ben Nelson. As the new facilities are being built,
is your budget adequate for facilities maintenance? In other
words, so we don't end up with significant deferred maintenance
that's not covered within a budget, but obviously it's a cost
that will come due at some point in the future, and usually
when there's no money available to take care of it. Are you
planning for that, budgetwise, as well?
Mr. D'Agostino. In an ideal world, you'd always want to do
more maintenance. What we're trying to do is balance the
tradeoff between taking facilities down and stopping
maintenance; anticipating which facilities, and stopping
maintenance on those facilities, and reallocating the resources
to the fewer sets of facilities that we have right now.
I have a separate office that looks into this. The numbers
vary from site to site. I'm comfortable with fiscal year 2011.
This is a challenge that General Harencak is working on at the
Pantex plant, for example, right now. We're trying to solve a
small facilities maintenance problem there. But, at the same
time, we feel that overall in fiscal year 2011, we're okay.
I'll have to get back to you with an answer on the out years.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
During the construction of replacement facilities, National Nuclear
Security Administration balances the amount of maintenance and
operational funding it provides for an existing capability until the
replacement becomes available. This balance considers the inherent
risks of meeting the mission requirements as well as the safety of
continued operations in existing facilities, while attempting to
minimize unnecessary expenses.
The Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program
provides the funding necessary to maintain the operations, and to
reduce the risk of their continued operations. This RTBF funding is
provided to the weapon sites in three categories; namely, operations,
risk reduction, and transformation. All sites are provided RTBF funding
in each of these categories, however the risk reduction category
continues to be a priority at Y-12 and Los Alamos National Laboratory
in order to provide for safe and compliant operations of the existing
facilities, while Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and Chemical and
Metallurgical Research Replacement (CMRR) are constructed. RTBF support
is critical to the sites' ability to manage risk in the hazardous
Uranium and Plutonium facilities.
Support for risk reduction is included in the Future Years Nuclear
Security Plan targets and in the case of HEU and Pu facilities,
additional funding through line item projects is also provided to
further reduce the risk, namely 9212 NFRR and TA-55 Risk Reduction. It
is vital that support for RTBF operations, risk reduction, and line
item projects continues until the startup and operation of UPF and CMRR
is complete.
Senator Ben Nelson. The NPR states that the United States
will ``study options for ensuring the safety, security, and
reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis.'' Have
you established criteria that will be used to evaluate each
warhead, on a case-by-case basis, to ensure the safety,
security, and reliability of those nuclear warheads?
Mr. D'Agostino. Sir, we'll take each warhead one at a time.
The criteria we use is our surveillance data that we get out of
taking the warheads apart and looking at them and finding out
what components need to be replaced. When there's the right
subset of work that has to be done, the decision gets made. We
have pretty good sense about how the next 10 years look in this
area. It's not like there are go/no-go points on each of these
particular points, but, essentially, it's a conglomeration of,
``We know when you're going to need to work on the organic
materials in this warhead, and we're going to have to replace
the neutron generator by this date. How about if we combine
these two together and work on that as a joint life
extension.'' So, it's a little dynamic from that standpoint,
but the next 10 years worth of work is fairly well clear.
Finish the W76 production; work on the B61, the neutron
generators, the power supplies, and the like; work on the
radar; work on the nuclear explosive package to get the safety
and security in it; and then we know we're going to have to
touch the W78, for reasons that are better off discussed in
either a closed session or in a classified report for the
record.
Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, some warheads, as I
understand it, don't have all the safety features that were
identified by the Drell panel back in the 1990s. Is there a
plan to incorporate, let's say, all of the safety features in
each warhead and weapon? Will this require any new pit designs
or existing pits to be remanufactured or reused?
Mr. D'Agostino. Let me start with saying that our warheads
are safe and secure now. As you accurately said, depending on
which warhead we're talking about, if it's one of our newer
warhead designs and we've had the opportunity to put more
modern safety and security in it, we've done so.
What we hope to do, particularly with the B61 warhead, is
make adjustments that will allow us to make sure we continue to
use insensitive high explosives, and make sure that we put the
right kind of 21st century security into those warheads. Some
of them may require a modification to a pit; because we have a
number of pits available, some of them may allow us to reuse
pits that we've had before.
What the NPR allows us to do, which is very important for
our lab directors and our scientific workforce, is, it allows
us to study the full range of options, whether it's refurbish
the existing one, reuse something that we've used before, or
replace a component, because we think that's the best way to
get 21st century safety and security--we have the flexibility
to study all of those and present to the President and
Congress, and get authorization from the President and
Congress, to move down any one of those particular tracks.
Senator Ben Nelson. There's always the question of having
adequately trained and skilled staff. Can you give us some idea
of how that is working for DOE? Are you encountering
difficulties? If so, are you able to overcome those
difficulties so that we keep adequate skilled staff?
Mr. D'Agostino. We've come a long way in a year, Mr.
Chairman. A year ago, there was a lot of uncertainty within my
organization as to what the future held. In fact, you can go
back further than a year, because there was a general view that
we did not have a bipartisan consensus on the deterrent. We, of
course, have a lot of very smart, capable folks that had plenty
of options. In many cases, they took those options and left the
organization.
But, there is a solid group of dedicated people left.
They're very excited about the plan that the President has laid
out, because they believe that it's not only the right plan,
but they believe that's a plan that can be sustained over time.
That's the most important thing, is clarity in the work that's
laid out before us. Frankly, I believe America is safer now,
with clarity in the NPR, than we were before, because our
workforce believes that the country cares about this.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
Mr. D'Agostino. Not just the stockpile, sir, but also the
nonproliferation and counterterrorism work and the like.
Senator Ben Nelson. There is something about clarity, isn't
there?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is there any question I haven't asked
you that I should? [Laughter.]
Mr. D'Agostino. I felt I've answered a lot of questions,
but----[Laughter.]
--I'll be glad to take some more for the record, if that
would help.
Senator Ben Nelson. Let me check and see if we----
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
Senator Ben Nelson. Oh, this is the toughest one, I guess.
[Laughter.]
The NPR states that the United States will not develop new
nuclear warheads, and that the LEPs will not support new
military missions. In this context, what is your understanding
of the word ``new''? How does this fit with the statutory
definition of ``new"? There are some differences there, so
perhaps you can help us understand that.
Mr. D'Agostino. In my view, new nuclear warheads are
warheads that are not based on previously-tested designs, or
are warheads that provide a new military capability; for
example, an enhanced electromagnetic pulse warhead, or a
neutron bomb, or what has been euphemistically thrown around,
the term ``bunker-buster,'' or a warhead that's designed to
defeat chemical or biological agents. Those are new military
capabilities. Our approach is to be very consistent with the
NDAA 2010, which talked about the SMP, which said, ``Extend the
life of existing warheads; ensure their safety, security, and
reliability; to ensure that the stockpile can be extended
without underground testing; to ensure that it provides an
opportunity to reduce the size of the stockpile or reduce the
numbers of different types of warheads; and to ensure that we
prevent an accidental detonation or deliberate unauthorized use
of a warhead,'' all within the current mission functions of the
existing stockpile.
This is very consistent, frankly, I believe, with the
language of the 2003 NDAA, and what we looked at is to be new
military capabilities to come to the front. It's my view that
there was a desire on the part of Congress that you wanted to
be aware of any work that was going on to enhance military
capabilities. But, the language is very clear; it did not apply
to life extensions.
So, the approach we've laid out is a life extension
approach, consistent with the SMP, which does not bring in new
military capabilities, and it ensures us confidence of using
the underground test data.
Senator Ben Nelson. So, it's really tied to additional
missions, or something that changes significantly what the
prior mission would have been with existing weapons, is that
fair to say?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. That's right. I would add from a
technical standpoint, that I have the underground test bar that
I want to make sure I cross over each time. It also includes
designs that are not based on previously tested designs. So, it
would be both for me, but, at the bare minimum, for sure, the
mission piece.
Senator Ben Nelson. ``New'' is more tied to change than
mission or design or capabilities, is that accurate, as well?
If you expand a capability, would that create something new?
Mr. D'Agostino. For example, taking a warhead that we have,
that might currently be at X kilotons, and now making it 2X or
3X. I don't want to put words in General Chilton's mouth, but
he and I testified earlier this morning, and he described it
from that standpoint, that the stockpile he has right now is
what he needs to meet the current and expected future mission
requirements. I believe, of course, he would be in a position
next week to be able to describe that in a little bit more
detail.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure. That would be an appropriate
place for us to bring it up again.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. I thank you very much for your patience
and your testimony and responding to the questions. Obviously,
the whole area of the treaty will be discussed even in more
detail, and there may be different ideas, it appears, about how
to pursue this. I thank you for enlightening us with your
answers today, and I look forward to seeing you next week.
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Bingaman
b-61
1. Senator Bingaman. Mr. D'Agostino, in response to the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) is proposing to undertake a life extension of the B-61 gravity
bomb. My understanding is that for this year the effort will examine
principally the non-nuclear components. Do you anticipate looking at
the nuclear warhead and are the cost estimates reflective of that?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. The fiscal year 2011 budget request for the
B61 addresses the necessary funding to develop and assess nuclear and
non-nuclear life extension options and pursue technology maturation
initiatives that enable a first production unit date in fiscal year
2017. The nuclear warhead scope is a critical element of the fiscal
year 2011 study effort because it allows the development of life
extension options to meet military requirements including extending the
service life, implementation of enhanced safety features, and
consolidation of four B61 weapon-types (B61-3, -4, -7, and -10) into a
single weapon-type.
While the fiscal year 2010 B61 study scope is currently limited to
non-nuclear options, we have requested funding authorization to expand
the study to include nuclear life extension options. This request is
consistent with the planning and requirements contained in the fiscal
year 2011 B61 budget request.
2. Senator Bingaman. Mr. D'Agostino, you list out-year cost
estimates of the B-61 gravity bomb totaling approximately $1.68
billion. Does that estimate include only the weapons labs or the cost
to assemble the refurbished weapon?
Mr. D'Agostino. The B61 funding profile contained in the budget
request includes only engineering and production development activities
through fiscal year 2015 at the national laboratories and production
plants. War reserve production activities at the plants will not begin
until fiscal year 2016 and will continue through fiscal year 2021.
Total program costs are being developed as part of the B61 Phase 6.2/2A
Study and will be reported to Congress as part of the Nuclear Weapon
Council authorization of Phase 6.3 in fiscal year 2012.
w-78
3. Senator Bingaman. Mr. D'Agostino, for fiscal year 2011 you are
proposing to initiate a study on the Minuteman III W-78 warhead. Will
it be a life extension program (LEP) of the existing warhead or will it
consider different designs within the same military performance
envelope?
Mr. D'Agostino. In fiscal year 2011, the NNSA and the Department of
Defense (DOD) will initiate a W78 Life Extension Phase 6.1 Concept
Assessment Study. This study will carefully consider all options and
will identify safety, security, and use control requirements as well as
military priorities. As recommended in the NPR, this study will
consider the possibility of using the resulting warhead on multiple
platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead types in the nuclear
weapons stockpile.
aging facilities
4. Senator Bingaman. Mr. D'Agostino, do you support replacing the
aging facilities for the NNSA service center at Kirtland Air Force Base
that houses over 1,000 NNSA employees? If so, how?
Mr. D'Agostino. Requirements for the NNSA service center and other
DOE staff located in Albuquerque have been under consideration for
several years. At present, NNSA is working to finalize requirements and
assess options for best meeting them. These requirements encompass, for
example, the number of potential occupants for the space, and any
special capabilities or requirements needed for the space. Acquisition
approaches may be considered, and these may include line item
construction by NNSA, construction by GSA and lease by NNSA, or
construction by a third party and lease by NNSA.
For fiscal year 2011, you will note on page 34 of the fiscal year
2011 budget request, Office of the Administrator--under the Other
Related Expenses bullet, we highlight the increase for maintenance
funding and additional local leased space to maintain the viability of
the current NNSA service center complex.
5. Senator Bingaman. Mr. D'Agostino, the budget for the
nonproliferation verification research and development account is flat
if not declining from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2015. This is a
critical program to develop new nuclear material sensors and satellites
to detect detonations. Can you explain why this is?
Mr. D'Agostino. The increase in funding from fiscal year 2010 to
fiscal year 2011 supports and focuses this programmatic activity on key
administration nonproliferation and arms control priorities. For
example, a new capability will be created at the Nevada Test Site for
testing and evaluation of new technologies that will ultimately support
U.S. capabilities to monitor international treaties and cooperative
agreements, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Funding requirements for fiscal years 2012-2015 are being
reevaluated as part of the fiscal years 2012-2016 budget process, which
will consider the requirements for the new NTS capability. Any
necessary revisions to the out-year budget requirements will be
included in the fiscal year 2012 President's budget. Using the unique
facilities and scientific skills of NNSA and the DOE national
laboratories and plants, in partnership with industry and academia, the
research and development program conducts research and development that
supports nonproliferation mission requirements necessary to close
technology gaps identified through close interaction with NNSA and
other U.S. Government agencies and programs. This program meets unique
challenges and plays an important role in the Federal Government by
developing new technologies applicable to nonproliferation, homeland
security, and national security needs.
The research and development program's contribution is two-fold.
First, it includes research, development, production, and delivery of
space- and ground-based sensors to detect nuclear detonations. Second,
the program leads the nonproliferation community's long-term research
and development efforts in advancing next generation detection
capabilities to detect foreign nuclear materials and weapons production
facilities and processes.
6. Senator Bingaman. Mr. D'Agostino, can you provide a total cost
estimate for the construction of the three mixed oxide (MOX) facilities
under the elimination of weapons grade plutonium program?
Mr. D'Agostino. The Fissile Materials Disposition program is
responsible for the construction of the facilities that will be used to
dispose of surplus U.S. plutonium: (1) the MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facility (MFFF); (2) the Waste Solidification Building (WSB); and (3)
the Pit Disassembly and Conversion (PDC) Project. The MFFF and the WSB
are baselined projects, with the MFFF scheduled to begin operations in
October 2016 and the WSB scheduled to begin operations in September
2013 to support MFFF cold start-up. The PDC Project is not yet
baselined and the out-year funding associated with PDC should be
regarded as a planning estimate that will be refined and validated when
the Project Performance Baseline is approved (Critical Decision-2).
Through fiscal year 2010, the total appropriated funding for all
three construction projects is $3.5 billion. The approved MFFF total
project cost (TPC) through fiscal year 2016 is $4.8 billion and the
approved WSB TPC through fiscal year 2013 is $344 million. The funding
profile in the table below corresponds to the funding profile given in
the fiscal year 2011 request for the three projects.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through Fiscal Year
Fiscal ------------------------------------------------------- Future Total
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Funding
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MOX OPC......................................................... 179,298 30,000 97,035 246,669 230,697 91,603 5,999 881,301
WSB OPC......................................................... 29,481 21,500 28,000 21,143 100,124
PDC OPC......................................................... 335,586 112,999 30,141 44,992 41,143 35,441 TBD TBD
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, OPC.................................................... 544,365 164,499 155,176 312,804 271,840 127,044 TBD TBD
========================================================================================================================================================
MOX TEC......................................................... 2,518,827 475,788 385,172 322,802 109,661 125,773 37,805 3,975,828
WSB TEC......................................................... 169,749 57,000 12,927 4,655 244,331
PDC TEC......................................................... 302,491 80,000 158,000 200,000 200,000 157,000 TBD TBD
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, TEC.................................................... 2,991,067 612,788 556,099 527,457 309,661 282,773 TBD TBD
========================================================================================================================================================
MOX TPC......................................................... 2,698,125 505,788 482,207 569,471 340,358 217,376 43,804 4,857,129
WSB TPC......................................................... 199,230 78,500 40,927 25,798 344,455
PDC TPC......................................................... 63,8077 192,999 188,141 244,992 241,143 192,441 TBD TBD
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, TPC.................................................... 3,535,432 777,287 711,275 840,261 581,501 409,817 TBD TBD
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPC - Other Project Cost; TEC - Total Estimated Cost; TPC - Total Project Cost (OPC + TEC)
MOX and WSB funding profiles support their approved baselines; PDC are preliminary estimates in the out-years since the project is not baselined.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
exercising the workforce with new designs
7. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Secretary of Defense Gates
told the Air Force Association on September 16, 2009, that larger
investments in modernizing our nuclear infrastructure are necessary,
including LEPs for our nuclear warheads, ``and in one or two cases
probably new designs that will be safer and more reliable.'' New
designs were deemed necessary by the Strategic Posture Commission not
only to improve safety, security, and reliability of our warheads, but
also to exercise the scientific workforce. Why are new designs
important?
Mr. D'Agostino. The laboratory directors and I agree that our
nuclear arsenal can be maintained into the indefinite future through
LEPs. To improve the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear
arsenal, the NNSA plans to upgrade limited life components (LLC) and
materials, and incorporate more surety--safety, security, and use
control--technology, whenever possible, through LEPs. LLC reaching
their end-of-life will be upgraded with, hopefully, LLC that have
longer expected lifetimes to reduce the number of times someone needs
to touch a weapon. Certain materials will be upgraded with more
attainable materials. The full range of LEP approaches will be
considered on a weapon-by-weapon basis. The NPR states, ``In any
decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the
United States will give strong preference to options for refurbishment
or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken only if
critical Stockpile Management Program goals could not be otherwise met,
and if specifically authorized by the President and [funding is]
approved by Congress.'' In addition, active LEPs, such as the B61 LEP,
further exercise the full spectrum of development work, from advanced
and exploratory concepts through product realization, and develop the
critical intuition, judgment, and confidence present only in
experienced scientists and engineers who have applied their skills to
real nuclear weapons design and development work. This work is
essential to attracting and retaining the scientists and engineers
necessary to sustain the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
8. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, do new designs imply new
military capabilities or new warheads which must be tested?
Mr. D'Agostino. No. As stated in the NPR, LEPs will use only
nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not
support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.
9. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, is the replacement approach
necessary for new designs, or can this be done through reuse?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NPR directs that the full range of approaches
be considered when studying weapon system life extension options.
First, while we may develop a modification or alteration for an
existing weapon, there will be no new nuclear component designs. If we
retain a weapon's nuclear component designs, we consider that
refurbishment. If we replace a weapon's current nuclear components with
those originally designed for a different weapon system, we consider
that reuse. If we replace a weapon's current nuclear components with
nuclear components based on tested, but never fielded, designs, we
consider that replacement. The full range of options will be considered
during weapon LEPs. The intent of all life extension options is to
maintain the current military characteristics while making the weapon
safer, more secure, and more reliable.
risks of an aging nuclear stockpile
10. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, in June 2009, in response to
a question for the record, you told this committee that: ``We incur
more risk each year as the stockpile ages, crucial skills erode, and
historic underground test data becomes less relevant. The recent Perry-
Schlesinger Report indicates that in order to keep a vital skills base
we will need to evolve the legacy stockpile by demonstrating the
capability to field modern warheads that have no new military
capabilities. We have not fielded a modern warhead in 2 decades, and
critical skills are deteriorating.'' Are you still of the view that we
incur more risk each year as the stockpile ages?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NPR and the President's budget for fiscal year
2011, which was formulated to begin executing against the NPR policy
direction, address the concern to which I spoke last year. The NNSA
Science, Technology, and Engineering (ST&E) capabilities must be strong
to sustain the Nation's nuclear deterrent. As the stockpile decreases
in size, the role of ST&E in deterrence increases in importance. Our
capabilities enable us to annually assess the stockpile, to resolve
significant finding investigations (discovered departures from design
and/or manufacturing specifications), to extend nuclear weapon
lifetimes, to assess other nations' nuclear capabilities, and to
dismantle retired weapons. The renewed sense of urgency created by this
administration, combined with the very challenging technical program,
create an environment that attracts highly-trained and motivated
personnel. The rejuvenation of our scientists and engineers can be
achieved through vigorous engagement of ST&E capabilities with
sustainable programs, including LEPs, and an increased level of
investment. The NNSA path forward will serve to attract, maintain, and
manage the necessary Federal and contractor workforce to sustain
nuclear deterrence, as well as other nuclear and energy security
missions. This path sustains capabilities that also contribute to
broader energy and security concerns and supporting U.S. leadership in
ST&E.
11. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, how does the administration
ameliorate this situation in its fiscal year 2011 budget request?
Mr. D'Agostino. The Defense Programs fiscal year 2011 budget
request increased investments in the nuclear infrastructure and a
highly skilled workforce to ensure the long-term safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. Specifically, the request
includes an additional investment of $320 million for stockpile
activities such as LEPs, advanced certification and plutonium
sustainment, and $241 million for construction activities for the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility, the Uranium
Processing Facility, and High Explosive Pressing Facility. These
amounts are in addition to funding that is traditionally considered to
be within the base program. These additional funds will support skilled
scientific, technical, and engineering workers who will work on the
various stockpile and construction programs and who will enable Defense
Programs to accomplish its mission and meet its deliverables to DOD.
12. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, will the administration
evolve the legacy stockpile by demonstrating the capability to field
modern warheads that have no new military capabilities?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, the United States will sustain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear stockpile through LEPs, a process that will
provide no new military characteristics and will not require
underground nuclear testing. The administration is fully committed to
funding this stockpile sustainment effort. NNSA and their laboratories
work with DOD to develop a preferred life extension approach which is
then presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council. A full range of
technical approaches will be considered for each warhead undergoing
life extension, including incorporating safety and security
enhancements.
[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT FUNDING AND FUNDING UNDER THE AMERICAN
RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators E. Benjamin Nelson and
Bingaman.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jonathan Epstein, assistant to
Senator Bingaman; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator
Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Ben Nelson. This subcommittee hearing will come to
order. I apologize for the delay. Votes seem to get in the way
of the rest of our work. But we're starting nevertheless.
I'm sorry my ranking member, Senator Vitter, is not going
to be able to join us today. So I will fly solo here.
Good afternoon, Dr. Triay, and welcome. We're pleased to
have you here. This afternoon the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces meets to discuss the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Environmental Management (EM) program budget request for fiscal
year 2011 and the progress that has been made in implementing
the $6 billion received under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act.
With us we have Dr. Inez Triay, the Assistant Secretary of
Energy for Environmental Management.
Cleaning up the vast quantities of radioactive and
hazardous waste and contamination which are the result of the
Cold War nuclear weapons and materials production programs is
an expensive and daunting task. This cleanup effort has been
ongoing for 20 years and will most probably require another 40
years to complete, ironically about the same length as the Cold
War itself. This effort is hugely expensive and technically
challenging, with over $110 billion spent to date and
approximately another $250 billion or so left to go.
With President Obama's decision in the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, more
facilities will fall to the Office of Environmental Management
to clean up and tear down.
Dr. Triay, you have a difficult job with many complex
challenges facing you, not the least of which is the
management, treatment, and disposition of the highly
radioactive waste in the tanks at the DOE's Hanford, Savannah
River, and Idaho facilities. Construction of the waste
treatment plant at Hanford to deal with the 55 million gallons
of waste stored at that site continues to be difficult as there
are many unresolved technical and safety issues associated with
the construction of the facility.
The additional funds in the budget request dedicated to
accelerating the design of the plant are certainly needed. But
this committee wants to ensure that the technical and
operational safety issues are resolved so that additional
redesign is not needed again at some time in the future. This
plan has been plagued by repeated changes in requirements and
design, which has resulted in high concurrency in design and
construction, all of which is factored into the increased cost
of the project over the years.
I recognize that the problems with this facility long
predate your tenure as Assistant Secretary, Dr. Triay. But as
you know all too well, you get to fix them. Last year, shortly
after your confirmation this subcommittee held a hearing on
your plans to implement the $6 billion in Recovery Act funding.
According to the DOE Inspector General, implementation of this
effort is now behind schedule.
On the other hand, it's more important that these funds be
spent wisely rather than quickly to really accelerate the
cleanup efforts and to reduce overall program costs. If these
funds help to substantially reduce the projected $250 billion
or more necessary in future cleanup costs, then this money is
being well spent.
We look forward to your report on the projects and the
progress of this effort as well. Obviously, there's a lot to
discuss, so I want to keep my opening remarks short.
Dr. Triay, your prepared statement will be included in the
record and you may begin.
STATEMENT OF HON. INES R. TRIAY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. Triay. Thank you very much, Chairman Nelson. Good
afternoon to you and the members of the subcommittee, Senator
Bingaman. I am pleased to be here today and to address your
questions regarding the Office of EM's fiscal year 2011 budget
request.
EM's mission is to complete the legacy environmental
cleanup left by the Cold War in a safe, secure, and compliant
manner. I am very pleased that we are able to present to
Congress a budget that positions the program to be fully
compliant with our regulatory commitments and supports reducing
the risks associated with one of our highest environmental risk
activities, tank waste, as well as achieve footprint reduction
across the legacy cleanup complex. My goal remains to complete
quality cleanup work safely, on schedule, and within cost, in
order to deliver demonstrated value to the American taxpayer.
EM cleanup objectives will continue to be advanced in
fiscal year 2011 by the infusion of $6 billion from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Through April
2010, the Office of Environmental Management has obligated $5.6
billion and spent $1.7 billion respectively leading to
thousands of jobs created and/or saved at our sites.
In fiscal year 2011, EM will continue to draw on the $6
billion of Recovery Act funds to advance key cleanup goals.
Recovery Act funds allow EM to meet all of our regulatory
compliance requirements in fiscal year 2011. This funding has
also allowed EM to leverage base program dollars, enabling the
reduction of our operating footprint from 900 square miles to
approximately 540 square miles by the end of fiscal year 2011.
This is a 40 percent reduction which will position the program
to advance forward the ultimate goal of a 90 percent reduction
by the end of fiscal year 2015.
We are also able to accelerate the legacy cleanup at
Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Separations Process
Research Unit in New York, and the Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center in California into fiscal year 2011 with Recovery Act
funding.
This budget request strikes a balance between maintaining
support for EM's core commitments and programs, while
strengthening investments in activities needed to ensure the
long-term success of our cleanup mission. This budget request
significantly increases EM's investments in science and
technology areas that are critical to our long-term success.
Specifically, this request targets $60 million in funding
to Hanford's Office of River Protection to use in developing
and deploying new technologies for treating tank waste. This
funding is needed to address near-term technical risks that
have been identified, but is also needed to leverage and bring
forward new technologies that could help us mitigate the life
cycle cleanup of these wastes.
EM will also continue to strengthen and deploy groundwater
and decontamination and decommissioning cleanup technologies.
Specifically, we will continue the development of an integrated
high-performance computer modeling capability for waste
degradation and contaminant release. This state-of-the-art
scientific tool will enable robust and standardized assessments
of performance and risk for cleanup and closure activities.
This tool will also help us better estimate cleanup time and
cost and reduce uncertainties.
The request also provides an additional $50 million to
accelerate the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at
Hanford, boosting the budget for the plant to $740 million in
fiscal year 2011. The additional funding will be used to
accelerate completion of the design for the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant. Prior to design completion, it is
critical that technical issues are addressed and incorporated
in a timely manner. Our intent is to mitigate these risks early
and get the design matured to 90 or 100 percent.
The fiscal year 2011 request makes a significant investment
in the decontamination and the decommissioning of the
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant located in Ohio. This
investment enables EM to accelerate the cleanup of the
Portsmouth site by 15 to 20 years, leading to a significant
reduction in the duration and cost of the cleanup.
Now that I have given an overview of our fiscal year budget
request, I would like to take a few moments to discuss some of
the areas I will be focusing on as the program moves forward.
EM continues to adhere to a Safety First culture that
integrates environment, safety, and health requirements and
controls into all work activities. Our first priority continues
to be the health and safety of our employees and the
communities surrounding our cleanup sites. It is my duty to
ensure that our workers go home as healthy as they came to
work.
Under my leadership, the program has embarked upon a
Journey to Excellence. We have developed a new business model
which provides a solid management base for EM to become an
excellent high-performing organization. This implementation is
key to performing our cleanup mission effectively and
efficiently. A key component in this process is the alignment
and understanding of headquarters and field operational roles
and responsibilities. Toward that end, our management's
attention will continue to focus on improving project
performance, aligning project and contract management,
streamlining the acquisition process, and continuing our very
strong performance in awarding cleanup work to small
businesses.
We will continue to conduct construction project reviews.
These reviews examine all aspects of a construction project,
including project management, technology, and engineering.
These reviews assess the progress of each of our major projects
and determine their overall health and ability to meet cost and
schedule goals. These reviews are scheduled approximately every
6 to 9 months and are conducted to provide EM leadership the
ability to proactively reduce project risk so that issues and
solutions can be identified early, rather than react once
problems are realized.
With these improvements, we are confident that the EM
program can succeed in its mission. Chairman Nelson and members
of the subcommittee, I look forward to addressing your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Triay follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Ines Triay
Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, and members
of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to answer your
questions on the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM).
program status
In fiscal year 2011, EM will continue to build on over 20 years of
cleanup progress and will focus on investments to sustain risk
reduction and strengthen technology. EM has made substantial progress
in nearly every area of nuclear waste cleanup, including stabilizing
and consolidating high-risk material such as tank waste and surplus
special nuclear material (SNM). Progress also includes the near
completion of transferring spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from wet to dry
storage and disposing of large quantities of transuranic (TRU) waste,
low-level waste (LLW), and mixed low-level waste (MLLW). Much work
remains but demonstrable progress has been made.
EM will continue to seek ways to maximize reduction of
environmental, safety, and health risks in a safe, secure, compliant,
and cost-effective manner. The current EM life-cycle cost (LCC)
estimate range, which covers the period of 1997 through completion, is
$275 to $329 billion. This includes $82 billion in actual costs from
1997 through 2009, and an additional estimate of $193 to $247 billion
to complete EM's remaining mission.
EM is analyzing its project plans to further optimize the program.
This strategic planning effort will concentrate on the technical,
programmatic, and performance challenges facing the cleanup projects.
It is focused on footprint reduction and near-term completions to
reduce monitoring and maintenance costs and on alternative approaches
to disposition tank waste and surplus SNM and SNF.
EM cleanup objectives will continue to be advanced in fiscal year
2011 by the infusion of $6 billion from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). Through April 2010, EM has
obligated $5.6 billion and spent $1.7 billion, respectively leading to
thousands of jobs created and/or saved at the EM sites. The Recovery
Act funding is being used to further drive the EM footprint reduction
of 40 percent by September 2011, removal of 2 million tons of mill
tailings at the Moab site, accelerate by 7 years the disposition of
legacy TRU waste inventories at 11 sites, and build out the
infrastructure needed to support high-level waste processing
operations. EM will use Recovery Act funding to accelerate legacy
cleanup completion at three small sites: the Brookhaven National
Laboratory and Separations Process Research Unit in New York; and the
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in California. EM will continue to
build on its success in utilizing small businesses to advance its
cleanup objectives. In fiscal year 2009, EM obligated $697 million of
Recovery Act funding and $1.6 billion of base program funding for a
total of $2.3 billion awarded to small businesses.
program strategies
EM continues to adhere to a ``Safety First'' culture that
integrates environment, safety, and health requirements and controls
into all work activities. EM's goal is to keep our employees, the
public, our stakeholders, and the States where cleanup sites are
located safe from radioactive and hazardous materials contamination. EM
plans to continue improving safety performance by further integrating
safety into all work activities and by incorporating requirements and
controls into every project, with the goal of achieving zero accidents
or incidents.
EM's vision is to complete quality work safely, on schedule, and
within cost in order to deliver demonstrated value to the American
taxpayer. EM is introducing a new Business Model/Approach to achieve
this vision. In addition to the safety performance goal, mentioned
above, EM's new approach includes improving Project Management through
restructuring the project portfolio, adapting the Office of Science
construction project review model to EM projects, establishing
performance metrics for EM operating projects, aligning project and
contract management, and streamlining the acquisition process. EM is
aligning Headquarters and Field Operations in order to streamline
decisionmaking and improve efficiency. We plan to utilize science and
technology to optimize the efficiency of tank waste, surplus SNM, SNF,
and groundwater treatment and disposition. Through these changes, EM
plans to achieve excellence in management and leadership with the
objective of making EM the employer of choice in the Federal
Government.
EM will continue to conduct construction project reviews. These
reviews examine all aspects of a construction project, including
project management, technology, design, engineering, safety,
environment, security, and quality assurance. The process relies on
expert knowledge and experience of world-class engineers, scientists,
and managers sourced from Federal staff, DOE contractors, engineering
firms, national laboratories, and the academic community. These reviews
assess the progress of each of its major projects and determine their
overall health and ability to meet cost and schedule goals. Scheduled
approximately every 6 to 9 months, these reviews are intended to reduce
the risk of project failure by identifying existing and potential
concerns in a timely manner. In fiscal year 2009, all five major
construction projects were reviewed with the findings ranging from
technical to financial. In fiscal year 2010, EM plans to conduct up to
10 reviews of its major projects and other capital asset projects, as
needed, to follow up on previous findings and continue to assess the
ability of the project to meet its scope, schedule, and cost
objectives. As such, these reviews will provide EM leadership an
``early warning'' of possible problems so that corrections can be made.
highlights of fiscal year 2011 request
EM's overarching goal is to complete the cleanup of the legacy of
the Cold War in a safe, secure, and compliant manner, on schedule and
within budget. EM will continue to pursue its cleanup objectives and
regulatory commitments, overlaying risk reduction and best business
practices. In fiscal year 2011, EM is well positioned to meet its
regulatory compliance milestones.
In fiscal year 2011, EM intends to reduce its operation footprint
from 900 square miles to approximately 540 square miles, a 40 percent
reduction, with the goal of achieving a 90 percent reduction by 2015.
In fiscal year 2011, EM will also complete the legacy cleanup at
Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Separations Process Research
Unit in New York, and at the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center
and Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in California.
EM's cleanup priorities have not changed and we remain committed
to:
Activities to maintain safe, secure, and compliant
operations within the EM complex
Radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and
disposal
SNF storage, receipt, and disposition
SNM consolidation, processing, and disposition
High priority groundwater remediation
TRU waste and MLLW/LLW disposition
Soil and groundwater remediation
Excess facilities decontamination and decommissioning
(D&D)
EM's fiscal year 2011 budget request funds radioactive liquid tank
waste activities that are a large part of the cleanup challenge EM
faces at its Hanford, Savannah River, and Idaho sites allowing the
program to progress on its tank waste retrieval commitments and fund
construction on tank waste treatment facilities. The request also
targets $60 million in funding for Hanford's Office of River Protection
to invest in developing technology that can be inserted into the
project's schedule that can yield significant cost savings and reduce
the period of execution. Specifically, this funding will be utilized to
solve near-term technical risks that have been identified and used to
leverage and bring forth new technologies by focusing on such critical
areas as: waste chemistry issues associated with characterization and
separation; and advanced retrieval technologies. EM will continue to
coordinate with the DOE Office of Science, national laboratories, and
other Federal and private organizations to address technology gaps in
tank waste processing technologies.
The request also provides an additional $50 million to accelerate
completion of the design of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization
Plant (WTP) at Hanford--boosting the budget for the plant in fiscal
year 2011 to $740 million. This funding will enable the acceleration of
design and focus on mitigating project risks early and getting the
design matured to 90 or 100 percent as quickly as possible.
EM will also continue to strengthen and deploy groundwater and D&D
cleanup technologies as they are vital to the long-term success of our
mission. Specifically, EM will continue the development of an
integrated, high-performance computer modeling capability for waste
degradation and contaminant release. This state-of-the-art scientific
tool will enable robust and standardized assessments of performance and
risk for EM cleanup and closure activities. This tool will also help EM
better estimate cleanup time and costs, and reduce uncertainties and
risks associated with subsurface contaminant behavior and transport
processes.
fiscal year 2011 budget request
The Department's fiscal year 2011 budget request for EM is $6.05
billion, of which $5.59 billion is for defense environmental cleanup
activities. Examples of planned activities and milestones for fiscal
year 2011 by site-specific categories are:
IDAHO
[Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2009 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2011
Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriation Recovery Act Request Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$489,239........................ $467,875.......... $411,168.......... $469,168.......... $412,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Complete construction and readiness testing in
preparation for startup of operations of the Sodium Bearing
WasteFacility.
The Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Project supports DOE's EM
mission of safely storing and treating liquid radioactive wastes. This
project will treat approximately 900,000 gallons of sodium bearing
waste stored in tanks that are 35 to 45 years old. The treatment of
this waste will enable EM to meet the Notice of Noncompliance-Consent
Order Modification to cease use of the Tank Farm Facility by December
31, 2012. In fiscal year 2011, the Sodium Bearing Waste facility
construction and readiness testing will be complete.
Ship CH-TRU waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP), and dispose of MLLW and LLW, as required in the
1995Idaho Settlement Agreement.
During fiscal year 2011, 5,700 cubic meters of CH-TRU waste will be
shipped to WIPP for disposal. In addition, 2,050 cubic meters of MLLW/
LLW will be shipped for disposal by September 2011.
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
[Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2009 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2011
Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriation Recovery Act Request Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$226,082........................ $211,775.......... $191,938.......... $199,438.......... $200,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continue characterization and certification of TRU
waste for shipment to WIPP.
The Solid Waste Stabilization and Disposition Project is comprised
of the treatment, storage, and disposal of legacy TRU waste and MLLW
generated between 1970 and 1999 at Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL). The end-state of this project is the safe disposal of legacy
waste at LANL. In fiscal year 2011, LANL plans to package 2,000 drum
equivalents of TRU waste for disposition, support of up to 3 shipments
a week to WIPP, and disposition up to 300 cubic meters of LLW.
Maintain soil and water remediation.
The LANL Soil and Water Remediation Project scope includes
identification, investigation, and remediation of chemical and/or
radiological contamination attributable to past Laboratory operations
and practices. The remaining scope of the project includes
characterization, monitoring, and protection of the surface and ground
water at the Laboratory and approximately 860 Potential Release Sites
left to be investigated, remediated or closed by evaluation and
assessment of human health and ecological risks. In fiscal year 2011,
activities include completion of characterization activities for Upper
Canada del Buey, Two Mile, and Canyon de Valle Aggregate Areas.
OAK RIDGE
[Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2009 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2011
Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriation Recovery Act Request Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$498,688........................ $755,110.......... $411,168.......... $436,168.......... $450,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continue design for construction of annex and Building
3019 modifications for the Uranium-233 (U-233) down-blending
process.
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory maintains the Department's
inventory of U-233 which is currently stored in Building 3019. The
fiscal year 2011 funding request will support the completion of 90
percent design for construction of annex and building 3019
modifications in preparation for future disposal. Benefits include
reducing safeguards and security requirements and eliminating long-term
worker safety and criticality concerns.
RICHLAND
[Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2009 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2011
Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriation Recovery Act Request Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1,057,496...................... $1,634,500........ $993,503.......... $1,080,503........ $1,041,822
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continue remediation and facility D&D within the River
Corridor.
In fiscal year 2011, cleanup activities in the River Corridor
include: complete excavation of 3 of 5 100-H burial grounds; complete
22 interim remedial actions at the 100 B/C Area; complete disposition
of 8 facilities; and initiate interim safe storage of the 105-KE
Reactor and D4 100K Area facilities. These efforts will assist in
reducing the Richland site footprint by up to 40 percent in 2011.
Maintain base operations to treat and dispose of LLW,
MLLW, and TRU waste, as well as, ship CH-TRU waste to WIPP for
disposal.
In fiscal year 2011, activities include: provide core management
and base operations to store, treat, and disposition LLW, MLLW, and TRU
waste at the Central Waste Complex and manage off-site commercial MLLW
waste treatment/disposal contracts; provide base operations of disposal
trenches for Hanford's MLLW; provide the base operations necessary to
store and treat MLLW and TRU waste at the T Plant Complex; and to ship
up to 1,825 cubic meters of CH-TRU waste.
RIVER PROTECTION
[Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2009 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2011
Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriation Recovery Act Request Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1,009,043...................... $326,035.......... $1,098,000........ $1,098,000........ $1,158,178
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manage the tank farms in a safe and compliant manner
until closure.
The radioactive waste stored in the Hanford tanks was produced as
part of the Nation's defense program. In order to protect the Columbia
River, the waste must be removed and processed to a form suitable for
disposal and the tanks stabilized. To accomplish these goals, in fiscal
year 2011, activities include: complete two 242-A Evaporator Campaigns
for space management; complete retrieval of two C-Farm Single-Shell
Tanks; complete removal of six hose-in-hose transfer lines; initiate C-
200 Closure Demonstration Project; and continue to perform single-shell
tank integrity evaluations.
Continue construction of the WTP complex.
WTP is critical to the completion of the Hanford tank waste program
by providing the primary treatment capability to immobilize (vitrify)
the radioactive tank waste at the Hanford Site. The WTP complex
includes five major facilities: Pretreatment Facility, High-Level Waste
Facility, Low-Activity Waste Facility, Analytical Laboratory, and the
Balance of Facilities. In fiscal year 2011, activities include:
complete vessel upgrades for three spent resin collection and
dewatering vessels to incorporate revised seismic assessment criteria
at the Pretreatment Facility; complete civil engineering design (Title
II) and Architectural design at the High-Level Waste Facility; complete
80 percent of bulk process piping installation and 65 percent of bulk
conduit installation at the Low-Activity Waste Facility; complete 90
percent of bulk piping installation at the Analytical Laboratory; and
accept delivery of the Anhydrous Ammonia System at the Balance of
Facilities.
SAVANNAH RIVER SITE
[Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2009 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2011
Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriation Recovery Act Request Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1,361,479...................... $1,615,400........ $1,342,013........ $1,342,013........ $1,349,863
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continue consolidation and disposition of SNM.
The receipt, storage, and disposition of materials at SRS allows
for de-inventory and shutdown of facilities at other DOE complex sites,
providing substantial risk reduction and significant mortgage reduction
savings to the Department. In fiscal year 2011, activities include: SRS
continue to receive weapons grade surplus non-pit plutonium from LANL
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; develop a program to reduce
the risk to personnel and the environment by reducing the residual
plutonium-238 contamination in the F Area Materials Storage Facility
(235-F); continue processing nuclear materials as well as purchase of
cold chemicals and other materials for operations of H Canyon and HB
Line; support L to H shipments to H Canyon; and perform H Canyon/HB
Line infrastructure upgrades.
Reduce radioactive liquid waste.
The mission of the tank waste program at SRS is to safely and
efficiently treat, stabilize, and dispose of approximately 37 million
gallons of legacy radioactive waste currently stored in 49 underground
storage tanks. In fiscal year 2011, activities include: continue
operation of interim salt processing facilities; support H Canyon
receipts of newly generated waste; continue operation of the Defense
Waste Processing Facility and complete 297 canisters of glass waste;
continue construction of the Salt Waste Processing Facility; continue
saltstone production and disposal operations as well as vault
construction; and support Tank 48 Return to Service Project.
WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT
[Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2009 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2010 Fiscal Year 2011
Fiscal Year 2009 Appropriation Recovery Act Request Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$236,785........................ $172,375.......... $224,981.......... $234,981.......... $225,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operate WIPP in a safe and compliant manner and
dispose of CH and remote-handled (RH) TRU waste from 27 DOE
sites.
WIPP in Carlsbad, NM, is the Nation's only mined geologic
repository for the permanent disposal of defense-generated TRU waste.
In fiscal year 2011, the budget request supports maintaining an average
shipping capability of 21 CH and 5 RH-TRU waste shipments per week. In
addition WIPP will increase characterization efforts at TRU waste
generator sites to increase inventory of shippable waste and increase
WIPP's efficiency.
conclusion
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, and members of the
subcommittee, I am honored to be here today representing the Office of
Environmental Management. My program continues to pursue its cleanup
objectives within the overall framework of achieving the greatest risk
reduction benefit per radioactive content and overlaying regulatory
compliance commitments and best business practices to maximize cleanup
progress. We do that by continuing to address our highest priority
cleanup activities in fiscal year 2011 while using Recovery Act funding
to continue making progress on the twin goals of life-cycle cost
management and footprint reduction. We are also integrating other
equally important strategies into the cleanup activities so that we may
complete quality work safely, on schedule and within cost thereby
delivering demonstrated value to the American taxpayer.
I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
I apologize for overlooking my colleague Senator Bingaman
and giving him an opportunity to make an opening statement.
Senator Bingaman. I was just here to ask questions, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. As a matter of seeking forgiveness, let
me ask you to start with the questions.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you. I'm glad to be here and I
welcome Dr. Inez Triay. She's someone we claim in New Mexico.
She got started at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) as a
scientist and then worked as field director for DOE down at
Carlsbad at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) there. So
she has a lot of friends and strong admirers in New Mexico.
Let me just ask a few questions, first about Los Alamos and
then about the WIPP project, if I could. We have this consent
order that's resulted from litigation with the State of New
Mexico there in Los Alamos with regard to environmental
cleanup. What is the annual budget that's needed in your view
to meet the milestones that are set out in that consent order?
Is what we have in this budget adequate to do that? Do we need
to add additional money? What's your thought on that?
Dr. Triay. The LANL cleanup program obtained about $211
million of Recovery Act funds, and in addition the President
has requested about $200 million for 2011. We are poised to
meet all of our compliance milestones in 2011, and in addition
Secretary Chu has called for a 45-day review, Senator Bingaman,
of how we are delivering the cleanup work at Los Alamos. The
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Act mandates
that we essentially have no one from DOE directing NNSA
officials or contractors. So we believe that there are
opportunities for becoming more efficient and more effective
when we do this 45-day review.
We intend to brief you, your office, thoroughly on this. We
know that you're extremely interested in finding those
efficiencies and at the same time making sure that we have all
the resources that are needed at Los Alamos in order to meet
those compliance milestones. So we will be looking forward to
that interaction in about 45 days from now.
Senator Bingaman. On this issue of NNSA's authority and
your efforts to accomplish the requirements that you have for
EM there, would it make more sense to have a separate EM
contract for the cleanup work at Los Alamos, instead of having
to go through the NNSA to try to get them to get this done?
Dr. Triay. In this 45-day review that Secretary Chu has
called for, one of the things that is going to be looked at is
exactly that type of question. So we are going to be looking at
all options when it comes to how to effectively streamline the
operation.
I offer, however, that for the Recovery Act we are
performing cleanup with the construct that we have now, with
the NNSA contractor in charge of the cleanup, and we have been
able to within the Recovery Act construct be very efficient
when it comes to the cleanup of Technical Area-21, the old
plutonium facility at Los Alamos that is right there at the
center of the main town of Los Alamos.
So we are going to take those lessons learned. We are going
to take the lessons that we have learned over the many years
that we have been working between NNSA and EM as fully
partnered and we are going to come up with recommendations to
the Secretary that are shared between EM and NNSA and fully
brief you on the deliberations, as well as the recommendations.
Senator Bingaman. There has been a lot of interest and
concern there in northern New Mexico about this issue of
possible contamination of water. I gather your office has been
working with the Buckman Diversion that the City of Santa Fe is
part of to put proper monitoring in place on that issue. Could
you describe that briefly?
Dr. Triay. Yes. The NNSA is crafting a memo of agreement
and the EM Office is fully participating. We believe that the
early detection of contaminants is essential with respect to
this particular diversion project. We are very committed to
working hand in glove with NNSA and with the State of New
Mexico. We understand the huge importance of this effort and we
believe that early detection is the way to press forward. So
we're very committed to finishing that memo of agreement and
moving forward with the funding necessary for that early
detection.
Senator Bingaman. I had a few questions on the WIPP
project. Should I do those now as well?
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure.
Senator Bingaman. My understanding is that the WIPP
operations in fiscal year 2011 have asked for an additional $7
million to maintain current disposal operations. That's a
figure I was given. Do you have any estimates as to what is
required in order to maintain current operations there? I know
they're proceeding with the disposal of waste at WIPP at a
faster rate than was originally thought or planned for. I'd
just be interested in any thoughts you have as to whether
they're able to maintain that rate under the budget you've
proposed?
Dr. Triay. The WIPP project obtained Recovery Act funds, I
believe $172 million, in addition to the President's request
for fiscal year 2011. I think that, with respect to the
throughput of waste, we are going to be able to meet all of the
needs of the complex and be able to meet our compliance
milestones, which are not for the WIPP, but that plant allows
places like Idaho National Laboratory, like Savannah River
Site, to meet the compliance milestones that they have.
As always, we work very closely with our WIPP to try to
integrate all of the needs of the complex and what are the
throughputs that we can actually achieve. Because you are so
knowledgeable on the WIPP operation, by increasing the
throughput we get to economies of scale at the WIPP site. The
more throughput of waste we have into the WIPP, the less the
cost per unit per cubic meters disposed of becomes. So we are
always coming up with strategic initiatives to try to increase
that throughput. But between the Recovery Act and the
President's request, we believe that all of the compliance
milestones in the complex can be appropriately addressed in the
area of transuranic wastes.
Senator Bingaman. Let me ask one other question on WIPP. I
understand that there's been some detection of rising levels of
carbon tetra chloride from the waste drums that are disposed of
at WIPP. I was wondering if you've reached a determination as
to whether that poses any hazard, if there are measures being
taken to compensate for that or deal with that problem?
Dr. Triay. I'm happy to discuss this. We have been working
with the New Mexico Environment Department and some of the
levels of the organics, which are carbon tetrachloride, are
elevated as a result of the waste that comes from Idaho. What
we have done is we have instituted three measures. One of them
is exactly as you described, which is to take measurements
before the workers enter the different areas in the repository
where there could be elevated organic levels.
The other two measures involve mitigation. One of them
deals with filtering of the actual waste, installing filters in
the containers that have the actual waste that comes from
Idaho, to ensure that in moving forward we don't continue to
increase the levels of organics in the repository.
The third one is that we have actually installed a
filtration unit in the repository itself. We have been working
with the New Mexico Environment Department because recently the
Environmental Protection Agency changed some of the risk
factors associated with carbon tetrachloride. Having said that,
we are completely committed, Senator Bingaman, to make sure
that these levels of organics do not pose any threat to our
workers or to the public or the environment. So we are working
very closely with the New Mexico Environment Department and we
expect that these mitigations that we have put in place will
actually address any potential issues.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank
you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
EM received $6 billion from the Recovery Act funding, as I
mentioned in my opening remarks. As you indicate in your
testimony, $1.7 billion has been spent. My understanding is
that you'll have until the end of 2011 to spend these funds. I
assume there's a plan. Will you tell us what the plan is and
will all the funds be necessary in the cleanup, or is it
possible some of them might be returned to the Treasury?
Dr. Triay. We have a substantial amount of work that has
been designated for the Recovery Act. We believe that we are on
track for our internal goal of spending the Recovery Act
dollars by the end of 2011. We funded all of our projects to 80
percent confidence.
We intend to reduce the footprint of the entire EM complex
by 40 percent by 2011. At the end of the day, the EM program
that essentially involves the cleanup of 50 years of nuclear
weapons production is a huge liability to the Federal
Government and to your efforts. We believe that the investment
of the Recovery Act is going to reduce that ultimate liability.
For instance, with the Recovery Act we have identified $4
billion of reductions in life-cycle costs. In addition to that,
we have identified over $3 billion of cost avoidance moving
forward. So the return on investment of the Recovery Act if you
look at the amount of money that has been invested versus the
amount of money that could be saved and avoided in terms of
expenditures moving forward is on the order of 120 percent
return on investment.
We have been able to train workers and get them to work
fast. We have 5,600 workers that are direct contractors. We
have subcontractors from those prime contractors to DOE, and
overall we have 9,200 workers. In the Recovery Act, we are
going to be able to dramatically reduce the decontamination and
decommissioning activities moving forward in this program,
clean up soils and groundwaters, be able to dispose of
transuranic and low-level waste, and ultimately reduce the
contaminated areas of the EM cleanup dramatically by 2011.
So I would submit that, based on the rate of expenditure,
based on the amount of jobs that have been created and the
amount of progress that we have already made and intend to
make, this is a very good investment for the taxpayer.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
The goal of the stimulus funding was to accelerate the
cleanup by dealing with the so-called shovel-ready projects
that had not already been funded. In addition, it was to
provide for jobs, and what I hear you saying is 9,200 workers.
Last year I think the testimony was that you expected that
there might be in the order of 13,000 contractors' jobs. Is
that 9,200 the top number or is there still a possibility that
there might be more with the expenditures in 2011?
Dr. Triay. The way these jobs are counted, we count the
actual employees that are working directly in prime contracts
to DOE. Those in turn hire other subcontractors, and if you add
those 2, that's the 9,200.
In addition to that, the EM program utilizes a lot of
materials, for instance the containers that we use for shipping
waste to the WIPP that are manufactured in Carlsbad, NM. When
you actually look at all of the individuals that have benefited
from being part of the Recovery Act, our count is 16,000
employees that have been part of these efforts, which then
would include vendors such as the individuals that are
manufacturing the containers that we use to ship the waste to
WIPP, individuals that are providing the cement for some of the
activities that are going on in South Carolina in terms of
decontaminating, decommissioning, and dealing with reactors in
South Carolina.
When you count all of that, we have been able to
substantiate 16,000 individuals actually benefiting from the
Recovery Act. I would like to point out, if you allow me, that
when we talk about subcontractors or vendors, the Recovery Act
in the EM program truly has been a success story when it comes
to small business. In 2009, between the base program and the
Recovery Act, as well as the small businesses, the small
business awards that came from our prime contractors, we
awarded $2.5 billion to small businesses in fiscal year 2009.
We counted what that meant. It's that over 20 percent of
the dollars spent in 2009 went indeed to small businesses and
were spent by small businesses. So I just point out that in
terms of economic stimulus, I believe that we have good facts
to show for the $1.7 billion that we have spent.
Senator Ben Nelson. Very good.
The original estimate was that about 60 percent of the
funding would go to the Savannah River and Hanford sites. Is
this still the plan?
Dr. Triay. Yes. Hanford receives $1.9 billion and Savannah
River $1.6 billion, respectively.
Senator Ben Nelson. Are there any issues, technical or
otherwise, that might interfere with Hanford or Savannah?
Dr. Triay. The work at Hanford and Savannah River overall
is going extremely well. At Hanford we have committed to a goal
of 40 percent reduction and a dramatic reduction of the
facilities that are contaminated with radioactivity, waste
disposal, as well as soils and groundwater decontamination. If
anything, our internal goals now surpass that 40 percent
footprint reduction.
At Savannah River, there is the same type of commitment to
footprint reduction. Actually, at the beginning, we had some
problems with the Savannah River Site, but the Recovery Act
portfolio has been turned around and right now our internal
goal for Savannah River footprint reduction is well over 60
percent, even though the official commitment is 40 percent
footprint reduction by 2011. We think that we can do better
than that.
At Savannah River, as a matter of fact, one of the main
activities that we think that we can accomplish is the
reduction of the amount of transuranic wastes that we have
stored at the facility. We are going to be able to dispose of
most of the transuranic waste from this large site, Savannah
River, at the WIPP by the end of 2011.
Senator Ben Nelson. The National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 directed the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to report periodically on the Recovery Act cleanup
efforts. These briefings will be provided every 120 days, with
the next one due at the end of April. The last one was at the
end of December 2009. Each site was to have a Recovery Act
coordinator to monitor execution of the projects. In December,
according to the GAO, Savannah River did not have one of these
site coordinators. Do you know whether they do now?
Dr. Triay. Yes, they do. What was done at Savannah River
Site, instead of having a site coordinator, was that
Headquarters deployed one of our senior executives to the
Savannah River Site in order to address the project management
issues that were encountered in the Savannah River Site
Recovery Act portfolio at the beginning of the program. Now
those project management issues have been addressed. We have
implemented all of the corrective actions that the Office of
Engineering and Construction Management oversees with respect
to project management in the Recovery Act projects. One of the
Federal project directors at the site, certified at the highest
level of certification, has taken over the Recovery Act
projects, and in addition to that we have been able to deploy a
site coordinator to the Savannah River Site.
Senator Ben Nelson. GAO also reported that these Recovery
Act projects were going to be defined as either capital or non-
capital assets. What's the definition for each type of project,
beyond a capital asset being a project above $20 million?
Dr. Triay. What we noticed in the EM program was that we
had whole entire programs, projects, and that we needed to
restructure the portfolio, which in fact was something that
Deputy Secretary Poneman encouraged in his last memo on project
management to all of the departmental elements.
The capital projects are essentially construction projects
when we actually are building a particular facility. Cleanup
projects are projects where we are not building a particular
facility, but instead we're performing cleanup operations that
then in turn modify the status of a particular facility. For
instance, removing fixtures from a facility that is
contaminated and sending that contaminated material to a
landfill, as well as ultimately demolishing the facility.
Essentially, it goes to the amount of assets that DOE has. For
that reason, even though we're not building anything, we
actually still count that as part of the project management
portfolio that is part of DOE Order 413.
Senator Ben Nelson. In their December review, GAO
identified some potential issues that could impact success. I'd
like to go through each of these issues and see if any of these
have been in fact a problem. Number one, do sites have
sufficient personnel to manage and oversee contracts for
Recovery Act projects? I guess part of the answer would be when
you're ahead of schedule, doing better than you thought, that
would be the case. But overall do the sites have adequate
personnel?
Dr. Triay. We always struggle with the amount of Federal
staff and to achieve that right balance when it comes to the
amount of staffing. Some years ago, as a result of a National
Academy of Public Administration report, the EM Office
increased the Federal staff significantly, by about 300 Federal
employees. So we think that we are poised to move forward with
the Recovery Act as well as the base activities. Like you point
out, our Recovery Act work is going very well, but we have
added coordinators to all of the sites and those coordinators
are trying to streamline the decisionmaking, the
communications, between the site and headquarters. We think
that that is probably a model that allows us to operate with
less Federal staff moving forward.
Senator Ben Nelson. With the influx of newly hired workers
there, is it possible to sufficiently train them to work safely
in hazardous environments?
Dr. Triay. We have chosen the portfolio of the Recovery Act
carefully to choose the type of activities where we have proven
technologies with an established regulatory framework and a
track record of training workers that come from construction,
the construction field, training workers that come from
different trades, into being able to work in the field of
nuclear activities and in facilities that are heavily
contaminated with radioactivity.
Our safety record continues to be extremely solid and very
robust. We have been actually encouraged by the interest that
the existing workers have taken to train the new workers that
are coming in to work on Recovery Act. So we have proven that
the training, the work control, the integrated safety
management approaches that we use in the EM program allow for
an influx of workers and to maintain our safety record.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now, can the existing disposal sites
accommodate the newly created waste from Recovery Act projects,
such as the demolitions and what have you?
Dr. Triay. Absolutely. We have one Federal facility for
low-level waste and that is the Nevada Test Site, and we have
two commercial facilities for low-level waste. We heavily use
Energy Solutions in Utah and what Energy Solutions tells me is
that they can get better economies of scale if we actually send
even more waste than what we're sending now.
So I believe that the commercial facilities as well as the
Federal facilities are adequate, and have adequate capacity to
deal with the amount of waste that we have identified for
disposal.
With respect to the WIPP, I think that you heard Senator
Bingaman asking me whether we even needed more resources to try
to maintain the amount of throughput that we have achieved in
2010 with the Recovery Act. So this is not a matter of lack of
capability at the WIPP, which is for transuranic wastes, or for
the facilities that are utilized for disposal of low-level
waste.
Senator Ben Nelson. Are you encountering any challenges
with local or State environmental regulatory agreements that
might delay complete projects? I heard Senator Bingaman ask
about the lawsuit. Will this involve delay or in some way
impede your progress?
Dr. Triay. The case that Senator Bingaman was referring to
actually was resolved. There was potential litigation, and we
resolved that lawsuit with the fence-to-fence cleanup
compliance order at LANL. We actually have worked
collaboratively with the regulators. Our regulators meet with
us often, not only at the site level, but also at the
headquarters level. They have been cooperative. They are
extremely interested in facilitating our Recovery Act
activities.
The portfolio itself was chosen for activities that have a
well-established regulatory framework under the compliance
agreements that were already part of the EM program and that
have been negotiated and that had clear milestones. So I
believe that the regulatory framework for the Recovery Act
activities allows us to complete all the work in the portfolio,
and we even have projects if some of the projects that we are
moving forward with have some of the contingencies associated
with them available for further effort. Even those projects
also have a well-established regulatory framework that we can
use to move forward.
Senator Ben Nelson. In the January 2009 report to Congress,
the cost to complete the balance of DOE's cleanup program based
on projects that had been identified by that time was somewhere
between $250 to $300 billion. Since that time, President Obama
has issued the NPR, wherein he's committed to modernizing the
nuclear weapons complex, the last two and the hardest, most
expensive and complicated of the old facilities, and building
some new facilities as well.
In addition, we note that the fiscal year 2010 budget
request doesn't include any out-years funding. So really the
question I have is, is that $250 billion number inclusive of
what has been proposed in the latest budget, or are we looking
at $250 to $300 billion for what was known in 2009 and
everything being discussed in 2010 or in the President's
comments about replacement, was that on top of the number?
Dr. Triay. About a year and a half ago, the EM program sent
a report to Congress on excess facilities that had already been
identified that were not currently part of the EM portfolio.
The Recovery Act has allowed us to move forward with the
decontamination and decommissioning of some of those excess
facilities. But the price tag associated with those excess
facilities was on the order of $5 to $9 billion, and that was
not fully included in the life-cycle costs of the EM program
because those were not facilities that were officially part of
the EM portfolio.
The Recovery Act has allowed a lot of the work that needs
to occur on those excess facilities, and maybe some of
the work at Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, at
LANL, and other places to move forward. But the bottom line is
that the excess facilities as a result of the future needs of
the complex is indeed a number that always appears to be in
some amount of flux, because the weapons complex moves forward
identifying different facilities that now need to be part of
the EM portfolio. That happens in a very interactive manner.
But I think we have a good handle on the amount of effort
that those excess facilities will require moving forward, and
we have shared that with Congress in our report. In addition to
that, we've worked very closely with NNSA to try to identify
what else they might need in terms of excess facilities as we
move forward with our portfolio in EM.
Senator Ben Nelson. But at the end of the day, is it still
going to be in the range of $250 billion or $300 billion, with
all the adjustments? I realize this is dynamic, but obviously
I'm concerned about what the moving parts and the changes can
mean to the total projected figure.
Dr. Triay. I hate to commit that it's going to be less, but
I would like to offer the following. We have been extremely
concerned about that life-cycle cost and we have been looking
at investments that can actually significantly lower that life-
cycle cost. So like I was saying, for the Recovery Act
investments we see return on investment that is on the order of
120 percent. What that means is that the life-cycle cost will
be reduced next year when we send our life-cycle cost to
Congress as a result of the investment in the Recovery Act.
So even if some of the additional facilities that were not
in the life-cycle costs come in, my intent is for the life-
cycle cost to still be less than the life-cycle costs that you
have delineated, even with the additional efforts of the excess
facilities coming in. Not only the investments of Recovery Act,
but in addition I talked about the investment in technology
development and in particular in the area of tank wastes at the
Savannah River Site and at the Hanford Site. We believe that
with some of those investments that we have made and are making
in the technology development portfolio, we can actually
significantly reduce the life-cycle costs of the tank wastes by
tens of billions of dollars and reduce the period of execution
by decades.
My intent is to not only accept those excess facilities as
they need to come into the EM cleanup program, but work on the
portfolio that I do have now so that that life-cycle cost
decreases as a result of these investments that we're making
now in Recovery Act as well as in technology development for
the tank waste. That is my objective. I know that that is the
objective of DOE. We know that this liability weighs large in
your defense portfolio.
Senator Ben Nelson. I know you'll do your best, and I
suspect you know I'll be asking you the same question next
year.
Dr. Triay. I'm counting on it.
Senator Ben Nelson. To see if there have been any changes
that would modify that number.
Dr. Triay. Very good, absolutely.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
The January 2009 report identified a number of enforceable
milestones at several sites that were at risk of not being met.
Will the recovery funds and the rest of the funds allow any of
these milestones to be met that probably weren't going to be
achieved according to that 2009 report?
Dr. Triay. Absolutely. The Recovery Act has been
instrumental in changing those facts. In fiscal year 2009, we
completed successfully 72 out of 74 major milestones.
Essentially, over 95 percent of the milestones were met. In
fiscal years 2010 and 2011, we have on the order of the same
amount of milestones and we intend to meet and complete
successfully 100 percent of them.
Senator Ben Nelson. Then can you, for the record, provide a
list of those that have been achieved, as well as those that
have yet to be accomplished?
Dr. Triay. I would be happy to. As a matter of fact, the EM
program decided to publish the milestones, the upcoming
milestones, and the success that we have in meeting them on the
web site, so that we can have meaningful dialogue with our
colleagues that were concerned about exactly how many
milestones are we meeting, how are we completing our efforts.
So we would be happy to provide that for the record.
Senator Ben Nelson. Very good.
The statute that required that January 2009 report also
directed the GAO to review the report. GAO completed its review
and submitted its report in June. The GAO had several issues
with respect to the report, but I'd like to just highlight a
couple of them.
The report was supposed to include an assessment of whether
legislative changes or clarifications would improve or
accelerate cleanup. The report did not address this
requirement, as the report was submitted shortly before
President Obama took office and this section was deferred to
the new administration.
In the year that you've been the Assistant Secretary, have
you had an opportunity to make such an assessment, and if you
did what are your results?
Dr. Triay. We have made assessments in terms of what could
be changed moving forward, and during the current tenure of the
administration we actually have been sharing that within the EM
program and we would be ready to start vetting that through the
entire DOE. The situation was at that time, for the reasons
that you describe, we felt that to get ahead of the new
administration was something that was not useful for the EM
program to do in this particular report.
But we always complete analysis of the things that could be
improved, things that could be considered, deliberations that
we could make in a very, very complex regulatory framework, and
we are always ready and prepared for those kinds of
deliberations within the Department and ultimately within the
administration.
Senator Ben Nelson. The report was also supposed to list
the major mandatory milestones and if those milestones were not
going to be met to identify the reason. For example, was it a
technical or a financial reason. This element wasn't addressed.
Do you have some information for the record on that that you
would submit?
Dr. Triay. Absolutely, I'd be happy to do so.
[The information referred to follows:]
Most of Environmental Management's (EM) cleanup is performed under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act through Federal Facility Agreements and under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act through various consent and compliance
orders. EM's overall record of meeting regulatory milestones exceeds 90
percent. EM is committed to meeting its regulatory obligations and is
taking a number of steps to expand and improve the tools used to
monitor and track regulatory compliance. The enforceable milestones at
risk table, below, was produced in January 2009. Our more recent
analysis of the 24 milestones in the table with commitment dates
through September 30, 2011, shows that 4 have been met, one was
partially met, and 19 have been renegotiated since the table was
developed. One of the four milestones that was met and the partially
met milestone were accomplished due to the availability of American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding. The 19 that were renegotiated
were at the Hanford site and were changed in consultation with our
regulators to reflect mutual understandings of alterations in cleanup
priorities, and the technical and sequencing complexities inherent in
our environmental cleanup work.
The web address for our compliance performance as measured by
environmental agreement milestones met is: http://www.em.doe.gov/Pages/
CompliancePerformance.aspx.
At that location, we post the past five quarters of Environmental
Management's (EM) ``Environmental Compliance Scorecard.'' Those
scorecards show that, for fiscal year 2010, EM met 95 percent of its
141 major enforceable agreement milestones due.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
There's a significant quantity of uranium-233 stored at Oak
Ridge. The material has special security and safety
requirements for storage, but it's also potentially useful for
medical isotopes to treat cancer. In May 2008 a DOE Inspector
General report recommended that the material be retained.
Nevertheless, EM is now tasked with disposing of the material.
The budget request seeks funding for design in 2011, with the
assumption that construction on the disposition facility will
begin in 2012 and will cost between $400 and $500 million to
build.
Is there any effort in DOE to revisit the decision on
disposition of the uranium-233?
Dr. Triay. We're always poised to revisit that decision.
This is an area that, with my work at Los Alamos, I've always
understood the concerns of the Inspector General. At the time
of the report of the Inspector General, we encouraged our
colleagues in the Office of Science, in the Office of Nuclear
Energy, to ask again from their cadre of experts, as well as
private industry, to see whether there was need for this
particular material and to see whether our plans were
appropriate.
Even after that last Inspector General report, we were
informed by our colleagues in the Office of Science, the Office
of Nuclear Energy, that normally have under their purview the
radioisotopes that need to be utilized not only in the
Department, but also in private industry, that there was no
interest in retaining this material and that we should move
forward expeditiously to disposition of it. They pointed out to
us that the security costs associated with the facility where
these materials were, actually adds a liability to the
portfolio of the Office of Science.
So I understand the value of radioisotopes, having worked
so many years in the Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division of
LANL. But from what we can ascertain as a result of this
particular last analysis that was performed when that Inspector
General report was issued, there is no value to this material
at this moment, and we were asked to move forward with the
disposition of this material.
Senator Ben Nelson. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board (DNFSB) has raised a number of nuclear safety concerns
about the efforts to redesign the waste treatment plant at
Hanford. I understand that the basis of the concern is the need
to technically understand the operational safety ramifications
of the proposed changes. I also understand that there is
progress between EM and DNFSB in resolving the changes,
including the safety of the pulse-jet mixers.
What's the schedule to resolve these issues and does the
DNFSB have all the documentation that it has requested?
Dr. Triay. There are two main areas, the pulse-jet mixers
as well as the hydrogen generated in pipes and ancillary
vessels. With respect to the pulse-jet mixers, we have a
commitment for finishing addressing all the remaining issues by
June 30. What we have done in that area is come up with a path
forward that addresses some of the concerns that the DNFSB has
had in terms of accumulation of waste in some of the vessels of
the waste treatment plant by, in addition to completing the
testing that we committed to completing, also making sure that
we have the capability at the waste treatment plant to look
into the vessels and make sure that accumulation is not
occurring and, when it is occurring, a capability to move the
waste out of those vessels and into smaller vessels, where it
has been proven that effective mixing can indeed occur.
So we believe that we can work effectively with the DNFSB
to address the remaining issues associated with mixing of the
waste at the waste treatment plant.
With respect to the hydrogen generation pipes and ancillary
vessels, the DNFSB and the Department have discussed the
chartering of a group of experts, that actually has been
chartered, to look at exactly how we are applying the code
dealing with potential hydrogen behavior in these pipes and
vessels. The group of experts' work is coming to resolution and
we expect to be able to sit down with the DNFSB and make
absolutely certain that they have all of their questions
answered.
We are confident that we're going to be able to do just
that and that we're going to be able to assure the DNFSB that
indeed this fast forward results in safe operations of the
waste treatment plant after it starts treating waste.
Senator Ben Nelson. The DNFSB also was worried that the
process to assess hazards at the Hanford tank farm and the
operating procedures are too complex or unexecutable, which can
result in ad hoc changes. Do we have a schedule in place to
resolve these issues?
Dr. Triay. Absolutely. The field manager of the Office of
River Protection is an expert herself on nuclear safety and she
has taken an extremely active interest in addressing the issues
that the DNFSB has laid out. We have a contractor at the tank
farm at Hanford that is the same contractor that has operated
the tank farms at the Savannah River Site for many years. So
this gives us a unique opportunity to have the same type of
procedures and protocols that were used at the tank farms at
the Savannah River Site now adapted to the Hanford tank farms.
The Savannah River Site tank farms have been operated safely
for many, many years, even when we are actually encapsulating
the waste already in glass form and we have vitrified a lot of
the waste in the tank farms.
So based on that, I am confident that we're going to be
able to address the issues presented by the DNFSB. Both the
contractor as well as the Federal staff are very committed to
effective, efficient, and prompt attention to these issues
pointed out by the DNFSB.
Senator Ben Nelson. The EM program as well as other parts
of DOE has had to supplement some underfunded pension funds.
It's been particularly true at Savannah River Site. Do you see
a need to add more money to these funds in fiscal years 2010 or
2011?
Dr. Triay. I'm sorry?
Senator Ben Nelson. It's a matter of underfunding. In the
past the EM program has had to supplement underfunded pension
plans, in other words put more money in to bring them up to the
required level.
Dr. Triay. We actually, in the Department, have looked at
the policy that was promulgated in order to fund pensions, and
in 2010 and 2011, we intend to fund the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) minimum as long as the fund doesn't
fall below 60 percent. I believe that right now, both in 2010
and 2011, we have an appropriate amount of funding delineated
in our budget in order to meet the policy of the Department to
fund to the ERISA minimum. So the funding request of 2011 is
sufficient. The pension plan will be funded to the requirements
mandated by law, and in 2010 we actually intend to look at
exactly how much funding was designated for pensions, and we
are going to be looking at that within the Department to make
sure that we put all of the funding that we have to optimal use
in 2010. No underfunding in 2011.
Senator Ben Nelson. I urge you to be sure and do that,
because any pattern of underfunding only mortgages the future
further. So we'd rather have current requirements currently met
and not have to make up underfunding at a later date. It's a
budgetary nightmare, because it will come due.
Dr. Triay. Absolutely.
Senator Ben Nelson. You mentioned vitrified high-level
waste. That's the question of what to do without Yucca
Mountain. While the question is being studied for location, in
the interim will additional storage facilities have to be
constructed at any of the current sites?
Dr. Triay. In our portfolio for the EM program, we
considered that the waste was going to be stored, after it was
encapsulated, in glass for decades. So far, we see minimal
impact as a result of a potential delay for moving forward with
an ultimate disposal for the high-level waste that is going to
be generated as a result of vitrification.
Also, borosilicate glass is an international standard for
extreme protection of human health and the environment. So we
think that continuing to encapsulate our high-level waste in
glass is a robust path forward within the deliberations that
the Blue Ribbon Commission will entertain.
Senator Ben Nelson. That concludes my questions. Is there
anything that you would like to add to what you've already said
in your statement and the answers to the questions?
Dr. Triay. Thank you for the opportunity. What I would like
to add, sometimes it's not as clear the type of work that the
EM program does to facilitate, to allow some of the critical
activities of the NNSA portfolio. For instance, when it comes
to nonproliferation activities both domestic and international,
it is the work of the EM program that in great measure allows
the work of the NNSA for things that need to happen in order to
secure nuclear materials.
We in the EM program are responsible for the consolidation
of all of the plutonium from NNSA sites, as well as EM sites.
We in the EM program are responsible for the consolidation of
highly-enriched uranium fuel that comes from international
efforts to reduce the nuclear proliferation issues. Recently we
celebrated the fuel that came from Chile, and indeed that fuel
is stored at the Savannah River Site under the purview of the
EM program activities.
All of the highly-enriched uranium, all of the uranium
disposition as well as plutonium disposition activities are
funded by the EM efforts working on the defense portfolio for
the country. Our WIPP is the only deep geologic repository that
is operational and that takes all of the waste associated with
the activities related to anything that we do in the NNSA
portfolio associated with plutonium.
So thank you for the opportunity to point out that our work
really facilitates in great measure important work of the NNSA
sites.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, doctor. We appreciate your
testimony.
Thank you so much. With that, we're adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Bingaman
environmental cleanup
1. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, Los Alamos is a National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) site and the NNSA directs the cleanup
operations there. Does this pose a difficulty for you?
Dr. Triay. The budgeting for and accountability of legacy
environmental cleanup activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) resides within the Office of Environmental Management (EM).
However, section 3220 of the NNSA Act, 50 U.S.C. Section 2410,
prohibits NNSA employees from being directed by Department of Energy
(DOE) officers or employees. As a result, the EM program has the
accountability for cleanup activities at LANL without the authority to
direct the work. This arrangement has presented management challenges,
and EM and NNSA are currently collaborating in the development of
recommendations to improve cleanup performance at LANL. The EM program
has demonstrated the benefits of clear lines of authority and
accountability for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
cleanup activities at LANL and could be used as a model for the other
cleanup work at the laboratory.
2. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, would having a separate EM contract
for cleanup at Los Alamos be desirable?
Dr. Triay. Yes.
3. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, I understand that most of the
stimulus funds will be used to clean up the old plutonium
operations facility at Los Alamos or TA-21. Will you need
additional funds in the Los Alamos cleanup budget to continue this
effort?
Dr. Triay. TA-21 is a Los Alamos Recovery Act project and is
currently scheduled to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2011.
4. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, the NNSA fiscal year 2011 budget
request lists the demolition and decontamination of the old Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Replacement facility between $200 to $350
million. Do you think this is accurate and will you be directly
responsible for it?
Dr. Triay. My understanding of the NNSA fiscal year 2011 request
for the old CMR facility is based upon the initial preconceptual cost
estimate range. No, the Office of EM will not be responsible for this
portion of the work at CMR, instead it will be the NNSA's
responsibility.
5. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, are you aware of any analyses or
experiments being conducted by DOE EM at the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant (WIPP) that are directed to high level waste disposition in salt
formations?
Dr. Triay. No, there are no analyses or experiments being conducted
by the Office of EM at the WIPP that are directed to high level waste
disposition in salt formations.
6. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, what activities does the EM program
conduct that support the mission of the NNSA?
Dr. Triay. The Office of EM supports critical nonproliferation
consistent with the NNSA mission. Specifically EM activities in support
of the NNSA mission include operations of:
Savannah River Site's L-Basin, which stores highly-
enriched uranium, including most recently fresh fuel received
from Chile by the NNSA and transported to Savannah River for
disposition by EM;
K-Area at Savannah River Site, which stores plutonium
from around the NNSA complex;
H-Canyon at Savannah River Site, the only facility in
the United States capable of processing plutonium and uranium
for disposition; and
The WIPP, the world's only deep geologic repository,
for disposal of sealed sources and plutonium
7. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, how many EM sites has EM cleaned
up?
Dr. Triay. The Office of EM has completed 88 of 107 sites at the
end of fiscal year 2009. We project that we will complete 5 more sites;
1 in fiscal year 2010 and 4 by the end of fiscal year 2011, bringing
the total to 93 of 107 sites.
8. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, how many sites remain?
Dr. Triay. The Office of EM had 19 sites remaining as of the end of
fiscal year 2009. We project that we will complete 5 more sites,
bringing the remaining total down to 14 sites by the end of fiscal year
2011.
9. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, will EM meet its milestones at WIPP
and Los Alamos?
Dr. Triay. The State of New Mexico is proposed to receive a total
of $417 million in fiscal year 2011 funding for defense environmental
cleanup, not including safeguards and security or program direction
funding. With these funding levels, the WIPP and NNSA's site at LANL
will be able to complete all milestones.
american recovery and reinvestment act
10. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, what additional work is taking
place at Los Alamos as a result of ARRA funding?
Dr. Triay. The Office of EM is spending more than $210 million on
additional cleanup work at Los Alamos, much of it for soil and
groundwater remediation as well as for deactivation and decommissioning
of radioactive facilities. Cleanup of TA-21 is a Los Alamos Recovery
Act project and is currently scheduled to be completed by the end of
fiscal year 2011.
11. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Triay, how many jobs have been created as
a result of ARRA funding?
Dr. Triay. As of June 30, 2010, the Office of EM has created or
saved more than 10,495 jobs directly funded by the Recovery Act.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
