Text: S.Hrg. 115-365 — S. Hrg. 115-365 EXAMINING WARRANTLESS SMARTPHONE SEARCHES AT THE BORDER
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[Senate Hearing 115-365]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-365
EXAMINING WARRANTLESS SMARTPHONE SEARCHES AT THE BORDER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL SPENDING
OVERSIGHT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
JULY 11, 2018
Available via http://www.Govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
31-483 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
RAND PAUL, Kentucky HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
STEVE DAINES, Montana DOUG JONES, Alabama
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Margaret E. Daum, Minority Staff Director
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Bonni E. Dinerstein, Hearing Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL SPENDING OVERSIGHT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
RAND PAUL, Kentucky, Chairman
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
JOHN HOEVEN, Montana DOUG JONES, Alabama
Greg McNeill, Staff Director
Zachary Schram, Minority Staff Director
Kate Kielceski, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
Senator Paul................................................. 1
Senator Peters............................................... 2
Senator Wyden................................................ 12
Senator Jones................................................ 13
Senator Paul................................................. 21
Senator Peters............................................... 23
Wednesday, July 11 2018
Laura K. Donohue, J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center.......................................... 4
Neema Singh Guliani, Senior Legislative Counsel, Washington
Legislative Office, American Civil Liberties Union............. 6
Matthew Feeney, Director, Project on Emerging Technologies, Cato
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Donohue, Laura K. J.D., Ph.D.:
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 60
Guliani, Neema Singh:
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Letters referenced by Senator Peters............................. 68
Statement submitted for the Record from Customs and Border
EXAMINING WARRANTLESS SMARTPHONE SEARCHES AT THE BORDER
WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2018
Subcommittee on Federal Spending,
Oversight and Emergency Management,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Rand Paul,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Paul, Peters, Harris, and Jones.
Also present: Senator Wyden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. I call to order this hearing of the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on
Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management. I have to
read it because the title of our Committee is so long, I cannot
Today we will be discussing the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and its
application to 21st Century technology at the U.S. border.
Early last year, reports began to surface about travelers
having their phones confiscated and searched by U.S. border
authorities for no obvious reason and without a warrant or even
much of an explanation. These searches have targeted a National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) engineer, a former
captain in the U.S. Air Force, a Wall Street Journal reporter,
a government security contractor, and numerous other U.S.
These searches are not just running a phone through an X-
ray machine or a metal detector. Customs officials demand that
these travelers unlock their phones so that the contents can be
searched. If they refused, these travelers were threatened and
interrogated. One man was handcuffed while another was
physically restrained in a chokehold while government agents
picked his phone out of his pocket. Yet another, the NASA
engineer, was told that he was not allowed to leave until he
gave his password to customs officials.
Two ironies here: (1), the engineer was enrolled in the
Border Patrol's Trusted Traveler Program, which strikes me as
false advertising; and, (2), the phone in question was a
Some may be asking, What about the Fourth Amendment
protection against warrantless searches? Does this not extend
to U.S. citizens at the border? Actually, the courts have held
there is something of a gray area at the border, which, by the
way, includes international airports and seaports. Customs
officials may conduct routine searches of luggage or other
containers without a warrant under what some refer to as ``the
border search exception to the Fourth Amendment.'' This so-
called exception has historically been used to ensure that no
weapons, drugs, or other prohibited items, cargo, or persons
are entering the country. I think that most Americans could
agree that it is reasonable to let customs officials search
suitcases for contraband. What is unreasonable is that
government lawyers want you to believe that there is no
difference between a suitcase and a smartphone.
I disagree, and here again I think most Americans would,
too. Physical contraband cannot enter the country unless it is
smuggled in. But this is not the case for electronic property.
Anything a Border Patrol Agent can find in the contents of your
cell phone could enter the country through the Internet without
the physical phone ever coming close to the United States. But
it is all the more troubling when you consider what the
government is gaining access to. Smartphones can reveal
virtually everything about a person--their movements, habits,
relationships, health, faith, and finances, all in a single,
easy-to-use, and archived interface. Indeed, I think for many
of us today, searching our smartphone would prove to be much
more intrusive than even a search of our homes.
This same sentiment has been echoed in recent Supreme Court
decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment and digital data. In a
unanimous opinion in a 2014 case involving cell phone searches
incidental to arrest, Riley v. California, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote, ``Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and
qualitative sense from other objects that a person may
possess.'' Searching a person's smartphone or other electronic
device is fundamentally different than searching their suitcase
or their car, and I believe as legal challenges to these
searches reach the Supreme Court, they will agree.
We have an esteemed panel of witnesses here today who will
discuss the history of border searches, the appropriateness of
using this authority to search smartphones, and what actions
Congress should take to address this issue.
At this time I would like to recognize Ranking Member
Peters for his opening remarks. Senator Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS\1\
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing today. I appreciate your continued willingness to work
in a bipartisan way to take on tough questions about our core
values as Americans, our rights and responsibilities as
citizens, and our role in the centuries long fight to ensure
equal protection under the laws.
\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the
Appendix on page 21.
The problem we are exploring today requires us to examine
detailed policy directives and puzzle over how 18th Century
words fit to a 21st Century technology. The details are
important undoubtedly, but at its core this hearing is about
the liberties guaranteed to us by the Constitution. It is about
our freedom to travel, our right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure. It is about our right to be
treated equally under the law without regard to race, national
origin, or religion.
The Fourth Amendment states clearly, and I quote from the
amendment, ``The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.''
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) asserts that the
Fourth Amendment does not require a CBP officer to obtain a
warrant or even have individualized suspicion before searching
a smartphone or directing travelers to unlock their devices for
official inspection. Today's witnesses, like most of the courts
that have considered this question, disagree.
This issue is of particular significance to those of us who
live in Michigan. Michigan shares hundreds of miles of
international border with Ontario, Canada, including the
Ambassador Bridge, one of North America's busiest border
crossings. Most importantly, Michigan is home to a large and
extremely vibrant and patriotic Arab and Muslim American
community, and community leaders tell me that they feel
unfairly targeted by CBP.
I have heard countless stories of my constituents returning
from family vacations, medical conferences, work trips, you
name it, and being singled out for additional screening, being
required to turn over phones and computers, provide their
passwords, and wait for hours while their devices are searched.
Some constituents have reported being asked about their views
on politics or foreign affairs.
CBP says that travelers can file complaints if they feel
that they have been mistreated, but my constituents fear that
complaining will cause them further targeting. And who among
us, tired from travel and eager to return home to family, would
not feel very vulnerable in this situation?
One of my constituents described his perceived targeting as
a ``backdoor travel ban.'' The fear of unfair treatment and the
profound inconvenience of repeated and prolonged searches
creates an immense disincentive to travel. It hurts families.
It impacts commerce. We can do better, and we have to do
Under the Constitution, Arab and Muslim American citizens
are entitled to the same liberty, the same privacy, and the
same freedom of movement that I am entitled to. CBP plays a
central role in securing our future and protecting our national
security. It is critical that they have the tools that they
need to succeed, but it is no less critical that those tools
adhere to the Constitution in their design and application and
that no law-abiding American is unfairly singled out.
Just over the last few days, I have received several
heartfelt letters describing unfair and unconstitutional
treatment and asking for congressional intervention. Mr.
Chairman, I ask that letters from the Arab American Institute,
the Arab American Civil Rights League, the Arab American Anti-
Discrimination Committee, and the Electronic Privacy
Information Center be entered into the record.\1\
\1\ The letters referenced by Senator Peters appear in the Appendix
on page 66.
Senator Paul. Without objection.
Senator Peters. Congress should weigh in and establish
clear constitutional rules and a means for ensuring that they
are applied equitably. I am grateful that Senator Paul with
Senators Wyden, Leahy, and Daines have taken the lead in
identifying a path forward, and I hope this hearing goes a long
way in making that path available.
Senator Paul. Thank you, Senator Peters.
First, I would like to begin by noting that we may have
some Senators who are not on this Committee here today, and I
would like to ask unanimous consent to allow them to fully
participate in the hearing, provided Members of the
Subcommittee be given deference in order of recognition.
Next, I would like to remind the witnesses that the written
testimony they have submitted will be included in the record
and to keep your opening remarks to around 5 minutes. Let us
Laura Donohue is a professor of law at Georgetown Law and
the director of Georgetown's Center on National Security and
the Law, as well as the director of the Center on Privacy and
Technology. She has written extensively on privacy,
surveillance, national security, and emerging technologies, and
enjoys the distinction of having been appointed as one of the
five Friends of the Court to the U.S. Federal Intelligence
Surveillance Court, positions which were newly created by the
2015 USA Freedom Act.
I would also note that she serves as a reporter for the
American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section Task Force
on border searches of electronic devices, so she is
extraordinarily well versed on the topic of the hearing today.
Welcome, Professor Donohue.
TESTIMONY OF LAURA K. DONOHUE, J.D., PH.D.,\2\ PROFESSOR OF
LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
Ms. Donohue. Thank you very much. Chairman Paul, Ranking
Member Peters, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify at today's hearing.
\2\ The prepared statement of Ms. Donohue appears in the Appendix
on page 24.
The border search of electronic devices is rapidly
increasing. In 2015 CBP examined 8,500 devices. The number more
than doubled the following year before soaring in 2017 to more
than 30,000 searches. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) in turn searched just over 4,400 cell phones in 2015. In
2016 it searched 23,000 devices.
As Chairman Paul noted, the Supreme Court in Riley v.
California recognized that these devices ``implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a wallet
or a purse.'' Even the term ``cell phone'' is misleading. The
Court noted many of these devices are, in fact, mini computers
that happen to be used as a telephone. They have an immense
storage capacity and can hold millions of pages of text,
thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.
In contrast, most people do not lug around every piece of
mail they have received for the past several months, every
picture they have taken, and every article or book that they
The type of information is different than that uncovered in
a luggage search: medical records, location information,
political beliefs, religious convictions, and relationship
details for decades, in fact, more information than can be
ascertained from the search of your home.
The Executive Branch is divided on how it addresses border
searches. As Ranking Member Peters pointed out, CBP's January
2018 guidelines allow for searches without any suspicion
whatsoever. This means that the Executive Branch could seize
the phones, iPads, and laptops of every Member of this
Committee, those of your staff, your spouses, and your children
whenever entering or leaving the United States without any
suspicion of wrongdoing. There are no statutory limits on who
can see this information, how long it can be kept, or how it
can be used. And there is no special protection provided for
sensitive materials, political materials, client-attorney
privilege, trade secrets, medical information, or materials
otherwise privileged under the law.
For advanced forensic searches, officers must merely meet a
standard of reasonable suspicion of illegal activities or
national security concerns. No probable cause is required. The
equivalent immigration directive has not been updated since
2012. Like its counterpart, it pertains to any item containing
electronic or digital information. But unlike its counterpart,
ICE authorizes agents to search, detain, seize, retain, and
share aliens' electronic devices and information with or
without individualized suspicion. At any point during a border
search, electronic devices or copies may be detained for
further review, either on or offsite. They can be kept for 30
days and extended at 15-day intervals thereafter.
CBP claims the plenary authority to conduct searches and
inspections of persons and merchandise crossing our Nation's
borders. The government is right that this border search power
derives from U.S. sovereignty. As I note in my written remarks,
courts have for decades recognized that this power resides in
Article I and Article II. But the Founders did not end the
Constitution there. The Constitution also protects rights. And
as Chairman Paul recognized when he introduced the Protecting
Data at the Border Act, innovation does not render the Fourth
Three Supreme Court cases now recognize the heightened
privacy interest at stake. Riley dealt specifically with mobile
telephones. In the 2012 case of United States v. Jones, five
Justices, the so-called shadow majority, adopted the view that
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
whole of their physical movements. This past month, the
Carpenter Court built on Jones. Chief Justice Roberts writing
for the majority looked at just one type of information that is
located on mobile telephones, noting six elements that make it
different from other kinds of records, namely, that it is
specific; it is retroactive; it is extensive, going back
multiple years; it is precise; it is deeply revealing; and it
is easy, cheap, and efficient to access.
Mobile phone data is different in kind than other kinds of
records, and it is different in kind than what we pack for a
trip to, say, Australia. Lower courts, unclear about how to
think about electronic border search post-Riley, Jones, and now
Carpenter are reaching disparate and deeply concerning
conclusions. I would be happy to discuss these further during
In addition to the Fourth Amendment issues, as I note in my
written remarks, there are important First Amendment issues of
freedom of speech and religion and association; there are Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination and due process concerns; and
there are Sixth Amendment right to counsel issues on the table.
I look forward to the discussion. Thank you.
Senator Paul. Thank you.
Our next witness will be Neema Singh Guliani, who is senior
legislative counsel with the American Civil Liberties Union's
(ACLU) Washington Legislative Office, specializing in
surveillance, privacy, and national security issues. She was
previously on staff at the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and Department of Agriculture and I think is very
familiar with the type of oversight work we are doing here
today from her time as investigative counsel with the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee.
Welcome, Ms. Guliani.
TESTIMONY OF NEEMA SINGH GULIANI,\1\ SENIOR LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL, WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE OFFICE, AMERICAN CIVIL
Ms. Guliani. Thank you. Chairman Paul, Ranking Member
Peters, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today and thank you for your leadership
on this important issue.
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Guliani appears in the Appendix
on page 49.
Each year, tens of thousands of individuals are subject to
invasive and often humiliating searches of their electronic
devices at the border without a warrant based on probable
cause. One of these individuals is Diane Maye, a former Air
Force captain and current professor of homeland security and
global conflict issues. She is also a plaintiff in an ongoing
case brought by the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier
In June 2017 Professor Maye was traveling to Miami when she
was detained by CBP officers upon arrival. She was escorted
into a small room, where CBP officers seized her smartphone and
her laptop. Because she had no meaningful choice, Professor
Maye unlocked both devices and watched as officers searched her
laptop and later as they confiscated her unlocked phone for
approximately 2 hours.
In describing her experience, Professor Maye has said, ``I
felt humiliated and violated. This was my life, and a border
officer held it in the palm of his hand.''
In yet another case, Ghassan and Nadia Alasaad, who are
also plaintiffs in the same case, were returning from a family
vacation when their entire family was detained by CBP,
including their ill 11-year-old daughter. Upon arrival, they
were directed to secondary inspection where CBP officers
questioned Mr. Alasaad and searched through his unlocked phone.
The CBP officers later requested that Ms. Alasaad turn over her
cell phone password.
The couple refused, in particular because Ms. Alasaad wears
a headscarf in accordance with her religious beliefs and her
cell phone contained pictures of her without her headscarf,
which she did not want CBP officers, particularly male
officers, to view. The CBP officers explained that failure to
turn over the password and comply would result in Ms. Alasaad's
phone being confiscated. Because they had no meaningful choice,
the Alasaads provided the password.
There are countless other examples, many which raise the
additional concern that individuals are being improperly
targeted based on their religion, political beliefs, or other
impermissible factors. As Professor Donohue noted in her
earlier remarks, the number of these searches has soared to
over 30,000 in 2017, representing a 3\1/2\ time increase from
DHS violates the Constitution by engaging in these
warrantless device searches, wrongly arguing that they fall
under the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. These searches do not comport with the
Fourth Amendment, as recent Supreme Court jurisprudence makes
The Supreme Court's unanimous Riley decision made clear
that traditional exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement do not automatically extend to searches of digital
devices. In its decision, the Court highlighted the volume and
sensitivity of information stored on these devices, noting that
it would allow someone to reconstruct the sum of an
individual's private life. This term, in Carpenter, a case
argued by the ACLU, the Supreme Court also ruled that
historical cell phone location information was subject to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Similar information can
often be gleaned from a device search.
Indeed, several courts have rejected the government's claim
that the border search exception places no limit on device
searches at the border. The Fourth Circuit has recognized that
a forensic search of an electronic device at the border
requires some level of individualized suspicion, though it
declined to address whether a warrant or probable cause is
As this issue is litigated, however, thousands continue to
have their rights violated. That is why it is important that
Congress swiftly pass legislation, including the Protecting
Data at the Border Act, sponsored by Senator Paul, Senator
Wyden, and others. Congress should make clear that a warrant is
required for all searches of the content of electronic devices,
that travelers are not under an obligation to unlock or provide
device passwords, and that individuals cannot be unreasonably
detained for failing to consent to a search or unlock their
Until such legislation is passed, Congress should press CBP
to release new guidance that contains the following four
One, the guidance should require a warrant in any case
where the government seeks to search the content of a device.
Current policy requires no suspicion for so-called basic
searches and only reasonable suspicion for advanced searches.
Two, the guidance should narrow the permissible purposes of
the search. CBP should be prohibited from conducting searches
at the request of or to assist other agencies. The guidance
should also not allow suspicionless searches when there is
vague so-called national security concerns. Such language is
vague, could be interpreted as applying in cases where an
individual poses no imminent threat, and increases the
likelihood of discriminatory and arbitrary application.
Three, the guidance should be amended to make crystal clear
that travelers are not obligated to turn over their device
passwords, and it should prohibit unreasonably detaining
individuals for failure to take such action.
And, finally, the CBP guidance should apply to all DHS
components, including ICE, which maintains its 2009 policy
which has even fewer protections.
Again, thank you for your leadership on this issue, and I
look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Senator Paul. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony.
Our next witness is Matthew Feeney. He is the director of
Cato Institute's Project on Emerging Technologies where he
focuses on the intersection of new technologies and civil
liberties. He was previously an assistant editor at Reason.com
and a writer at The American Conservative and the Institute of
Welcome, Mr. Feeney.
TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW FEENEY,\1\ DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, CATO INSTITUTE
Mr. Feeney. Thank you, Chairman Paul, Ranking Member
Peters, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today about an important topic
that I think should concern every American.
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Feeney appears in the Appendix on
In Riley v. California the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
that searches of cell phones implicate privacy concerns beyond
those associated with searches of wallets, cigarette packs, and
other everyday items. Writing the Riley majority opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts stated that the government's claim that the
search of a cell phone and the search of a wallet are
``materially indistinguishable'' is ``like saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
Roberts was correct. Our cell phones contain troves of
revealing information about our personal relationships,
careers, religious affiliations, and hobbies. It is no
exaggeration to say that unfettered access to a cell phone
allows investigators to uncover details about almost every
intimate communication and relationship associated with the
owner of that cell phone. Officials with access to cell phones
can easily view photos, calendars, email accounts, social media
postings, and other revealing data. Riley's holding that police
need a warrant to search phones belonging to arrested persons
recognizes the privacy interests American adults have in the
content of cell phones.
Despite Riley, as we have already discussed, cell phones
and other electronic devices enjoy reduced protections at the
border, thanks to the Fourth Amendment's border exception. The
Supreme Court has yet to consider constitutionality of
warrantless searches of electronic devices at the border;
however, Congress can extend the Riley standard to the border
Although the warrantless search of electronic devices
affect a minority of travelers, the number of these searches
has been increasing, almost 60 percent between fiscal year (FY)
2016 and fiscal year 2017.
A 2009 CBP directive on electronic device searches stated,
``In the course of a border search, with or without
individualized suspicion, an officer may examine electronic
devices and may review and analyze the information encountered
at the border.''
A 2018 directive improved the 2009 directive, but not
enough. The latest directive distinguishes between ``Basic''
and ``Advanced'' searches. Under current DHS policy, a search
of an electronic device that does not involve an officer
connecting the device to external investigatory equipment is a
Basic search. Basic searches do not require suspicion, which is
required for so-called Advanced searches. The new directive
includes a worrying provision that allows officers to examine a
phone with external equipment if there is a ``national security
concern.'' This is especially worrying because the directive
notes that ``the presence of an individual on a government-
operated and government-vetted terrorist watch list'' creates
reasonable suspicion. Government watch lists, however, do not
only include terrorists. Officials have placed law-abiding
Americans on watch lists designed to prevent dangerous people
The 2018 directive also requires travelers to unlock their
phones. CBP officers have compelled American citizens to unlock
and hand over their phones, even after being told that the
phone contained sensitive data, such as those belonging to
NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
According to the latest directive, officers conducting a
search must either have the travelers disable network
connectivity or disable the connection themselves by, for
example, putting the phone into airplane mode. But these
policies are of little reassurance to travelers. Even in
airplane mode, cell phones contain revealing information. Text
messages, emails, photos, browsing histories, videos, and
calendars are still available to officers examining a cell
phone in airplane mode. In addition, cell phones in airplane
mode do not conceal apps that the cell phone owners may use.
You hardly need to have a phone connected to a network to
uncover information about someone who has downloaded the Muslim
Pro, Coinbase, or Tinder apps.
Current DHS policy does not do enough to protect travelers'
civil liberties. However, bills proposed by the Chairman as
well as Senator Leahy do improve the CBP 2018 directive. A
welcome provision of the Senator Wyden and Senator Paul bill is
the warrant requirement for cell phone searches. The Leahy bill
would also improve the status quo by requiring increased
transparency. DHS has not published figures showing how many of
these warrantless searches have contributed to terrorism or
child pornography-related convictions. Such data would be
welcome, as it would allow the public to better assess the
efficiency of warrantless searches that endanger their privacy.
As has been discussed, some of the U.S. courts of appeals
have considered questions concerning the standard of suspicion
that should be necessary; however, as things stand, there is no
consensus. Until the Supreme Court addresses this issue,
lawmakers can provide CBP with requirements that go beyond the
unsatisfying directive issued by the Department of Homeland
Again, thank you for your attention to this important
matter and for the opportunity to testify before you. I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
Senator Paul. Thank you very much. I thank all of you for
When I first heard about this and I heard that it would be
possible that an American citizen could leave the country and
come back and be denied entry into their own country unless
they give their password up, I was horrified by this. I very
quickly called my colleague Ron Wyden and said, ``We have to do
something about this.'' There are an array of people on both
sides of the aisle who I think want to fix this.
The first question I have is a little more tricky and goes
to the fine point of things and may not bring us all into an
agreement. But there is sometimes a debate over who the
Constitution applies to. I think most people who read the
Constitution realize it applies to everybody in the United
States, all persons, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, you get
a trial whether you are here legally, illegally, whatever your
status is, you get a lawyer, a jury trial.
It is a little bit different maybe at the border, and I
think I could allow for a little bit of difference between
citizens and U.S. persons and maybe those who are visiting.
That is the question I throw out to you. For example, one of
the gentlemen who had his phone taken was in the Trusted
Traveler Program. Frankly, once you get in that program, if it
is worth what it is supposed to be worth, you probably should
be going through security much more easily than other people.
Maybe somebody who is not in the Trusted Traveler Program might
get searched more often, randomly or otherwise, and there might
be different thresholds for people based a little bit maybe on
citizenship and U.S. personhood versus someone who bought his
or her ticket yesterday and is coming from an area where there
is a lot of terrorism. Could we ask more questions at a lower
level or would we have a warrant requirement for everybody?
And so I would throw that question out to the panel on
citizenship, whether the rules have to be exactly the same or
at the border we might have a gradation based on citizenship
Ms. Donohue. Yes, thank you. I would distinguish here
between law and policy. So as a matter of constitutional law,
the Fourth Amendment--in 1990 Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled in
a case called Verdugo-Urquidez that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to non-citizens who lack a substantial connection to
the United States. And the reasoning that he had in that case,
as well as Kennedy's concurrence in that case, which is
slightly different from Chief Justice Rehnquist, but his
reasoning was that the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, as Ranking Member
Peters quoted us the Fourth Amendment, it is the same people
that are the people in the Constitution; therefore, the Fourth
Amendment does not apply. And this might explain the difference
between CBP's provisions, which come from a customs background
applied as to U.S. persons, as opposed to immigration
provisions in Title 19, which apply then to aliens and non-U.S.
With that said, in the last hearing that you had on this in
2017, there was a really interesting discussion, and at that
point Senator McCaskill noted that if she were visiting another
country and was asked at that point to turn over your social
media password, your mobile phones, all of your records, that
this could cause significant foreign affairs and national
security concerns. So she said, ``If my family was traveling to
the United Kingdom and they told me we would have to answer
questions about my beliefs, we would not go.'' This will have a
profound impact on our standing in the world, a profound impact
on the nature of our alliances around the world, and a profound
impact on our national security.
So while as a matter of law many of these--there might be a
line to be drawn, and that I am happy to speak to as a
constitutional law person, but as a matter of policy, that is
something that Congress would have to take on board.
Senator Paul. Right, and I think the one response I would
have to that is that while you have to have scrutiny and you
want protection, you also want to find ways that make the
United States a friendly place to visit. That is why I am
actually a big believer in some of the Trusted Traveler
Programs, the frequent flyer programs. Let us try to do
background scrutiny on people so they can go through the
airports much easier and they do not feel oppressed. You could
be from any country in the world. If you have gone through the
process and we have screened you, I think we could get that. I
really think we need to extend the Trusted Traveler Program to
the whole world, and even the countries where we are so-called
banning people now. Let people go through who are legitimate
businessmen and businesswomen or academics or physicians or
whatever that have legitimate reasons. I think we could
probably obviate some of the problems we have, because you are
right, who would want to go to a country where they are going
to take your cell phone from you? But, on the other hand, we do
have to worry about people coming here who might attack us.
I think without question American citizens and U.S. persons
should be protected by the Fourth Amendment when they come back
Did either of you want to----
Ms. Guliani. I think there are strong arguments in favor of
applying a warrant standard to U.S. persons and non-U.S.
persons. In addition to the reciprocity issue, how we treat
non-U.S. persons when they arrive here is how we may be treated
abroad. We have to recognize that the searches of these devices
implicate not just the privacy of the person who owns that
phone, but potentially thousands of others, their family
members, their associates. When you are talking about, let us
say, business travelers, they may have emails and other content
that implicates the privacy of individuals inside the United
So we are talking about an enormous privacy violation, and
we are talking about searches that at the outset are really
quite attenuated from searching for contraband, like you might
do in luggage, or admissibility. For that reason, I think the
right policy outcome is a strong standard that applies to both
U.S. citizens as well as travelers.
Mr. Feeney. I suppose it is difficult for me to give an
unbiased opinion on this given I became an American citizen
deliberately and happily after, well, retaining my British
citizenship. I would note that I think the proposed legislation
proposed by Senator Wyden, the Chairman, and Senator Leahy are
all improvements on the status quo. But I think that what Neema
and Laura mentioned is right, that maybe purely in the foreign
policy realm, that it is good for our foreign policy to extend
protections because we should be wary of how American citizens
will be treated when they travel abroad.
Senator Paul. Thank you for those responses. I have a
family urgency I have to get to, so Senator Peters has agreed
to take over. Before I leave, though, I want to thank Senator
Wyden for coming. It is not very often that a Senator comes to
a Committee they are not on, and I appreciate his support on
this issue and actually coming to a Committee that he is not
even obligated to come to.
With that, I am going to turn the gavel over to Senator
Senator Peters [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
will actually recognize Senator Wyden. I know you have a busy
schedule, and the last thing you needed was another Committee
to come to, but we appreciate that you are here because I know
this is an issue you are passionate about, and you have the
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WYDEN
Senator Wyden. Well, Senator Peters, thank you for your
thoughtfulness. Thank you, Senator Jones, for giving me the
opportunity, and also to the majority that arranged for me to
come. I know this is unorthodox, and being unorthodox has
characterized my life. [Laughter.]
I thank you all for it.
Just one question so I do not impose too much on my
colleagues. From the very beginning, what we tried to tap into
was the zeitgeist of the times, and the zeitgeist of the times
seems to be picking up, for example, that digital is truly
different. That is how John Roberts puts it. The Carpenter case
was certainly a step in the right direction, really looking to
some of the privacy issues surrounding geolocation questions,
and I remember from my Intelligence Committee days, we
established that you had privacy rights overseas, if you were a
soldier, and certainly constitutional rights should not stop
automatically. They should not just disappear at the border.
So for my one question, Ms. Guliani, let me ask you about
the government waiting until a person gets to the border zone.
When you think about this concept, the question is whether it
could be used as an end run around the warrant process. And all
our bills, metadata, the bill as it relates to border searches,
we have always had this, I think, very generous emergency
exception so that if the government really thinks the security
and safety of the American people is at stake, you can move
quickly, then come back and settle up later on the warrant
process. But to actually have an end run around the warrant
process is something completely different, and what you would
have is just the opposite of my saying you ought to have an
emergency process when something looks serious, the government
does not have much to go on, probably does not have enough to
get a warrant, so the government waits until the person gets in
the border zone, then asks another agency, maybe CBP, to grab
the devices for searches.
Now, in our bill we require reporting on instances like
this in addition to requiring a warrant. Does anybody know how
often these kinds of searches take place by agencies, like ICE
would be an example?
Ms. Guliani. We have reporting by CBP which has put out
numbers that shows a dramatic increase in border searches. But
I think what your remarks sort of touch on is a bigger problem:
one, the weaknesses in the guidance in allowing these
warrantless searches; the fact that the guidance does not
prohibit them from being used for general law enforcement
purposes as an end run around the Constitution. For example,
the guidance does not prohibit searches performed at the
request or to assist other law enforcement agencies, which is a
major problem. And there is also, I think, a question about
oversight and compliance even with the limited protections in
that guidance. How do we know that a lot of the restrictions in
that guidance are really being followed by the agency? The fact
is that there is not a lot of comfort that that is happening.
Senator Wyden. I appreciate the way in which you have
tackled this over the years, keeping the focus on the
substance, and we have talked to Mr. McAleenan about exactly
some of those kinds of concerns, and some of those may be
possible to address administratively as well as by statute.
Senator Peters, Senator Jones, I thank you both for your
courtesy, and I look forward to working with you both on this
and many other matters in the days ahead.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Senator Wyden, and thank you for
your leadership on this issue and other issues related to
privacy and constitutional protections. We appreciate it.
Senator Jones, you are recognized.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONES
Senator Jones. Thank you, Senator Peters.
This is always a tough issue for someone who has been both
a prosecutor and a defense lawyer, because I have been on both
sides of the aisle, I recognize that. Of course, I think that
also made me a better lawyer to understand when I could see
both sides of this.
I am curious, Ms. Donohue. There are people who say the
counter to the argument is that given the nature of a border
crossing--and I mean at a port of entry (POE)--that you could
really never get probable cause to go to a magistrate, to
select--absent an extraordinary--somebody coming in with a sign
hanging around their neck saying, ``I am a dangerous person,''
you could really never get enough information to get a warrant
to search a phone. What is your response to that for folks that
are coming in? They are just travelers, they are coming in.
What would it take to get past that probable cause standard?
Ms. Donohue. Yes, thank you for the question. There are a
number of cases where the courts have actually said they had
probable cause in order to examine the phone. So even post-
Riley we see cases that have come forward. There is one that
came out of the Fourth Circuit, for instance, United States v.
Kolsuz, and in that the court said that the forensic border
search of a mobile device was non-routine; it required
individualized suspicion. But it did not reach what level of
individualized suspicion was required, whether it was regular
individualized suspicion or some sort of probable cause,
because they said in that case probable cause was present.
Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit there is a case, United
States v. Molina-Isidoro. The court said once again some level
of individualized suspicion is necessary, but in this case they
had probable cause in order to search the device. And there are
many cases like that where the courts have come forward and
said, ``Well, they actually had probable cause.'' It tends to
be where there is some--one of two things has happened. Either
they have found criminal items in the suitcase, for instance.
In one case it was firearms parts that were illegally being
exported out of the country. That was probable cause to search
the phone. In other cases it might be a text hit on the
Treasury system or some other hit when they run a name through
a database. Then that satisfies probable cause depending on the
information that comes up. I think that there is an empirical
counter to that.
The one thing I would mention, however, is the history of
this is this was actually to raise revenue for the United
States, and that was the history from England, and I wrote
about this--they are in the written remarks, the history of
this. This has never been used as a general law enforcement
power, and that is partly to prevent it from becoming an end
run around the Fourth Amendment. This is specifically for
customs issues and post-World War II, certain other items that
might be carried in the mails like child pornography and the
So there are limits on the types of things that they can
search for at the border, and that is probably why the border
Senator Jones. Let me follow up on that with you and
probably Ms. Guliani. You mentioned contraband. That is what
people normally think. You go through customs. They look at
your suitcase to see if you are bringing in Cuban cigars, those
kinds of things. Can't you bring in contraband on your cell
Ms. Donohue. Child pornography has been the way that this
is presented most readily at the border, and the way that they
have actually found that is just by searching the cell phone
when they have reasonable suspicion, usually from some sort of
a hit, a lower level hit on one of the systems that they can
check when somebody comes across the border. That seems to be
the level. There are some plans that have been used. There was
a computer facility that was going to be built in Iran, and
they found some plans that were actually on the cell phone. I
guess one could consider that a form of contraband of a sort,
but it tends to be really in the child pornography area that we
have seen cell phones used, which raises the difficult issue as
a prosecutor. Should you be able to just upload it to the cloud
and pull it down on the other side? And what do we do for those
types of cases?
Senator Jones. Sure.
Ms. Donohue. And there I would suggest the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). When the law came down,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act can be used when the
primary aim is criminal in nature, and we have surveillance
provisions that are addressing those types of criminal
Senator Jones. Do any of you have an issue with a border
agent being able, I say an agent, a customs agent, for whatever
reason just kind of randomly saying, OK, you are number 14 in
line, sorry, we are going to go look through your suitcases? Is
anybody going to have a problem with that? That happens. Nobody
has a problem with that? All right. I am getting silence, so I
am going to assume that nobody has a problem.
I have a question. I hate to dumb this down a little bit,
but this is a tough topic. I mean, it really is. So if in that
suitcase there is a three-ring binder like the one I have here,
is it OK for the agents to look through that binder?
Ms. Guliani. I think the distinction when we are talking
about electronic devices is sort of twofold. One is just the
quantity and the types of information we are talking about.
Senator Jones. Why does that make a difference? I am not
challenging you. I am just asking you for the record. Why does
that make a difference because of the quantity as opposed to
the thickness of the binder?
Ms. Guliani. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the types
of information on an electronic device are different. We are
talking about medical information, information about your
religious beliefs, your political affiliation. You are talking
about quantity and types of information that are extraordinary
sensitive. It would be the equivalent of somebody arriving at
the border not just with a suitcase, but maybe an entire house
full of papers. That just does not happen. I think that we are
really in a different realm when we are talking about digital
searches of data.
And then when we look at sort of the purposes underlying
border searches, looking for contraband, determining
admissibility, these types of searches are quite attenuated.
Even in the child pornography context, there is not particular
evidence that suggests that the border is an area where there
is increased risk of that. Child pornography certainly is a
problem, but it is something that individuals use the Internet
for. If you have that exception, what you are essentially
saying is, because of this one issue that there is no evidence
is more prevalent at the border, we are going to open up every
single individual to a search that is incredibly invasive,
often humiliating, often scary and frightening for the people
who are put in that position. That seems to me to swallow the
Senator Jones. All right. Thank you. I think I am about out
of time. Let me say I think this is a really tough issue, and I
agree with all of you, because the one thing that troubles me
more than anything about this issue is the potential for
profiling and targeting in a bad way. With all due respect to
you all, the issue of the invasive search is an issue for me
but not as much for me as it is targeting people with last
names that raise an eyebrow. I think that is a real issue. As a
prosecutor you can take anything anybody says and say, ``Oh,
here it is,'' whether they answer fast, whether they answer
slow, whether they hesitate, whether they do not. There are
just so many ways you can read into it the way you want to read
into it, and so the profiling is an issue that I am really kind
of focusing on, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Senator Jones.
Actually, I will pick up on the profiling comment. In my
opening comments I mentioned the fact that we have a vibrant
Arab American/Muslim American community in Detroit, and it is
exactly that concern that I hear regularly from the community,
that folks can pretty much plan on spending more time at the
airport coming and going based on the fact that they are part
of that community. What are you hearing out there? Is this
real? And how do we deal with it?
Ms. Guliani. I think we have heard a series of disturbing
complaints. In a complaint that was received by the Knight
Institute through a FOIA request, there was a report of an
individual who in the same encounter they had their device
searched, they were asked about their political affiliation,
their religious beliefs, and who they gave charitable
contributions to. I think these types of complaints raise the
concern that individuals are being inappropriately targeted
because of their religion or how they look, and that, frankly,
is one of the reasons a warrant requirement is so important.
Whether your device is searched and whether you are held should
not be the result of a whim by a particular officer. It should
be subject to strict judicial oversight. The fact that there is
no warrant really allows and enables that type of
discriminatory targeting in a way that raises significant
Senator Peters. Mr. Feeney, the CBP's current rules include
instructions for any data that is collected to be destroyed if
the data does not provide probable cause. For anyone whose
smartphone or laptop has been seized, searched, or returned by
the CBP, how sure can we be that the data collected is truly
deleted and is no longer accessible either to those authorities
or any other government agency?
Mr. Feeney. Well, I think that there is a certain point at
which you trust that CBP are adhering to their own policies.
There are, of course, audits that will oversee that kind of
The worry, of course, though, is that some U.S. citizens
might not take that policy as reassurance enough. One of the
cases that was mentioned was of this NASA engineer who had his
travel interrupted and his phone searched, and afterwards he
did make changes to the phone and his social media profiles.
And I do not think that is much of a surprise.
The guarantee that non-relevant data is destroyed is really
important, but, frankly, even with CBP saying that they will do
it, I imagine it will still change the behavior of American
citizens who are stopped at the border because I think knowing
that your phone has gone to a back room and has been examined
by officers will prompt some change of behavior, and we should
not be that surprised by that.
Senator Peters. Yes, Ms. Donohue?
Ms. Donohue. Yes, I just wanted to note that leaving it to
CBP and ICE to police themselves, to come up with their own
regulations, is quite dangerous. This was actually exactly the
proposal that was put forward in Riley. The government argued
to the Court that we should be able to come up with our own
regulations for how to deal with cloud technologies and mobile
phones. The Court replied, saying, ``The Founders did not fight
a revolution to gain the right to government agency
protocols.'' It was a really profound point that the Court had,
which is this is about rights, and those rights should be
statutorily guaranteed, and they are constitutionally
guaranteed. They should not be left up to the whim of an
organization or an agency in terms of their regulations.
Ms. Guliani. Right, and this is absolutely an area where
there needs to be more oversight. We do not know to what extent
CBP complies with its own limited protections that are in its
policy. When it comes to data retention, I think there does
need to be independent auditing, compliance reviews done by
independence entities to make sure that even what is in those
policies is being followed.
Senator Peters. You mentioned the cloud. I just want to be
sure that I understand what we are dealing with here. If you
access the device, what was being stored on the device, that
does not mean--or does it--that once you get into the phone,
then you access cloud storage that an individual may have,
which, of course, opens up more than a house. That is a whole
building full of materials. Is there a limit to this? What are
we talking about?
Ms. Donohue. For ICE there is not. For CBP it is in their
regulations. As of January of this year, they now say that you
have to put the phone in airplane mode while you are examining
it. But that has been as a regulatory matter, not as a
Senator Peters. That is back to your point, that we are
counting on them to do that, and it would be better for us to
look at that legislatively to prevent that from happening. ICE
does not have to do that, though.
Ms. Donohue. Right, ICE has no limits in their regulation
Ms. Guliani. I think that is part of the problem. We have a
CBP policy. It does not extend to all of DHS. So ICE is still
bound by its 2009 policy, which has even less protections.
Again, I think the cloud issue raises another area where there
needs to be more oversight. I am sure you have heard stories,
as we have heard, of individuals who say, look, information in
the cloud was accessed during these searches, whether that was
before the change or after the change, and it certainly is an
area where there needs to be more rigorous oversight to ensure
that policy is being followed.
Senator Peters. Mr. Feeney.
Mr. Feeney. I would only mention, as I mentioned in my
remarks, putting a phone into airplane mode is actually not as
big a privacy protection as I think a lot of people believe it
is. Most of the intimate details on someone's phone are still
accessible to a phone in airplane mode, including emails, text
messages, browsing histories, and photos.
Senator Peters. Right. Now, we have been discussing
searches right at the port of entry or right at the border, but
the Border Patrol is also authorized to set up checkpoints and
patrols within 100 miles of international borders and coasts.
Being from the State of Michigan, we have a lot of
international border, as I mentioned. If you go 100 miles from
that border, it is a pretty good chunk of the State. In fact, I
think the ACLU says the entire State. I am not sure the
geography works for that, but, nevertheless, it is a
Talk to me a little bit about those authorizations and
things that we should be concerned about.
Ms. Guliani. When it comes to device searches, it has
primarily been done at ports of entry. Were CBP to do it in the
interior, I think it would be unconstitutional. But I share
your concern. I think that we have long been concerned about
this 100-mile zone where CBP asserts its authority to conduct
stops and to conduct searches without a probable cause warrant.
We have heard stories from individuals who live in that
100-mile zone who report being stopped by officers, undergoing
often humiliating experiences, really expressing consternation
that they are Americans living in America and they are being
subject to this kind of treatment by their own government.
Senator Peters. Ms. Donohue.
Ms. Donohue. Thank you. I would add a couple of things.
First is the fleeing felon exception. We all know this is an
exception to the warrant requirement for the home, and it goes
back centuries, into English law.
Similarly, the way that we have thought about customs
border authorities historically through the United States'
history has been that as somebody crosses the border, it is
almost like the fleeing felon, like you have this extended
border as they extend into the interior. The reason for this is
because illegal goods put on vehicles or vessels could be
transported somewhere else. There is this exception idea that
when that item is on that car and it is being shipped somewhere
else, that illegal item that is undutied or illegally brought
into the United States, then you can chase it. That is a very
different determination than whether you can go through
somebody's home. I would really distinguish between those two.
In addition, there are special home protections even away
from the border. Within those 100 miles, ICE cannot just go
onto anybody's farm; they cannot go onto open agriculture land.
They need a warrant in order to do so because of the privacies
of life, because of what individuals living there would be
exposing to the government unwillingly or unwittingly perhaps.
I think on both counts, both in terms of comparing it to
the fleeing felon and the reason why we have this customs
border exception as well as looking at the protections afforded
the home, I think it would be an invalid exercise of the border
search authority within that 100 miles.
Senator Peters. All right. Thank you.
One of the proposals before us includes requirements that
the government collect specific statistics about the people
whose electronic devices they are searching or seizing, noting
age, sex, country of origin, citizenship, or immigration
status, ethnicity and race of any traveler subjected to
electronic device searches or seizures, as well as the number
of travelers whose devices were searched and seized. I have
heard some conflicting opinions about this from folks in
Michigan and people representing communities that feel
particularly targeted by these practices, with some arguing
that knowing these statistics would help identify
discrimination, but others arguing that this information could
be potentially misused.
My question is: Where do you fall in that debate? Mr.
Feeney, from your perspective as a researcher on these issues,
what kinds of data should be useful for the government to
collect about people stopped, searched, or detained by the
Border Patrol? In what instances should that data be collected
by the government, if at all?
Mr. Feeney. I think that DHS should publish not only the
number of these searches but also the suspicion they had for
the searches. I do not object to the age, citizenship, or--I
suppose citizenship status, of course, there is a whole host of
data demographics that I do not object to being revealed. I
take the point that there is a worry about this data being
misused. But the most important data that I would like to see
more transparency with is the number of times this authority
has actually led to or been involved with cases that have
convictions. It is not clear how efficient this authority is. I
think it is interesting that when DHS spokespeople have been
before committees such as this, they have not been particularly
forthcoming about the number of times that this authority--
actually, at least convictions, that is the most interesting
data point. I would welcome there being more data associated
with the citizenship, age, sex of the people affected by these
searches, as long as, of course, their names are withheld.
Senator Peters. Right. Ms. Guliani.
Ms. Guliani. Similarly, we share your concern that these
searches may be used to target people inappropriately. I think
data could help to get at that point and reveal the extent to
which particular travelers are targeted. But bottom line, the
reason we have these concerns, the reason there is this problem
is because CBP's policy allows searches either with no
suspicion for a basic search or with only reasonable suspicion
for advanced searches. What really needs to happen is a warrant
requirement so that there is judicial oversight to protect
against that type of discriminatory application.
Ms. Donohue. I agree with my colleagues, but I would have
First Amendment concerns about collecting that kind of
information from individual travelers.
I would also like to add on a point that Senator Wyden
raised, my concern about a lot of this is it is becoming an end
run around the Fourth Amendment, and we actually do have cases
on the record where agents have come forward and said, ``Yes, I
could have actually done something while this person was in the
country, but I knew that when they crossed the border, I would
have just had much broader powers.'' They wait for people to
travel in order to conduct these searches. I would be
interested in the type of information that would reveal that
kind of activity, which I think is particularly pernicious and
In addition, I guess one other thing that I want to mention
is the circuits are split right now. We have not had even
application of Riley to the border search exception, and so the
Eleventh Circuit just issued an opinion where it said that
there is no individualized suspicion required whatsoever at the
border. This is not at all a settled issue, and I think it is
particularly important for Congress to step forward and weigh
Senator Peters. Right. Well, thank you. I would like to
thank our witnesses for your testimony today as well as your
work in this very important issue. I think you will find there
is quite a bit of interest to Members of this Committee to
continue to work with you and to continue to work on this
Seeing no one else here to ask any questions, I am going to
close the hearing, and I am going to remind everyone that the
record will remain open until July 25 at the close of business
for Members to submit additional questions or comments to our
witnesses. With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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