Text: S.Hrg. 115-674 — DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM, CYBERSECURITY
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[Senate Hearing 115-674, Part 8]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-674, Pt. 8
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
MARCH 13, 2018
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 115-674, Pt. 8
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
MARCH 13, 2018
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41-250 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
TED CRUZ, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
BEN SASSE, Nebraska GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota, BILL NELSON, Florida
Chairman CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
C O N T E N T S
MARCH 13, 2018
Cyber Posture.................................................... 1
Nakasone, Lieutenant General Paul M., USA, Commanding General, 4
United States Army Cyber Command.
Gilday, Vice Admiral Michael M., USN, Commander, United States 11
Fleet Cyber Command, and Commander, United States Tenth Fleet.
Reynolds, Major General Loretta E., USMC, Commander, Marine 22
Forces Cyberspace Command.
Weggeman, Major General Christopher P., USAF, Commander, Twenty- 30
Fourth Air Force, and Commander, Air Forces Cyber.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2019 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 2018
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Committee on Armed Services,
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in
Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mike
Rounds (presiding) chairman of the subcommittee.
Members present: Senators Rounds, Sasse, Nelson, McCaskill,
Gillibrand, and Reed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE ROUNDS
Senator Rounds. The Cybersecurity Subcommittee meets today
to receive testimony on the Cyber Posture of each branch of our
Armed Forces, from Vice Admiral Michael Gilday, Commander,
Fleet Cyber Command; Lieutenant General Paul Nakasone,
Commander, Army Cyber Command, and nominee to be the next
Commander of the United States Cyber Command, and Director of
the National Security Agency; Major General Loretta Reynolds,
Commander, Marine Forces Cyber Command; and Major General
Christopher Weggeman, Commander, Air Force Cyber.
At the conclusion of Ranking Member Nelson's remarks, we
will ask our witnesses to make their opening statements. After
that, we'll give each of our members 5 minutes to ask questions
of our witnesses.
As we approach full operational capability later this year,
maturation of the Cyber Mission Force continues at an
impressive pace. According to Admiral Rogers' testimony a
couple of weeks ago, we are on pace to reach that milestone
earlier than planned. This, along with the many other advances
we see as the Department takes what was once a niche capability
and transforms it into a multifaceted warfighting discipline,
is the result of your hard work. We thank you for your
Despite the successes, however, challenges remain as your
focus now shifts from building a first-of-its-kind force to
sustaining one. In particular, that sustainment will require a
robust pipeline of talent ready to take the reins as soldiers
and civilians move to other disciplines, are promoted, or
separate from the military to take cyber jobs in the private
Last year, we heard about the 127 Air Force cyber officers
who, after completing their tour on the Cyber Mission Force,
departed the Cyber Mission Force. We understand that was an
isolated incident and that each of the Services has enhanced
its focus on how it manages it force. Just recently, the Marine
Corps announced that it was creating a cyberspace occupational
field to address some of these challenges. I think we all
expect this to be a perpetual challenge, and we look forward to
hearing how you are working together, sharing ideas, and
pursuing creative approaches to make certain that we develop
the bench strength that we require.
When it comes to providing the cyberweapons that the force
will need to deter and defend its cyberspace, there, too, is
significant room for improvement. As we heard from Admiral
Rogers a couple of weeks ago, we are not where we need to be.
Numerous niche capabilities exist today; however, across the
enterprise, the capabilities for training and conducting
operations are in the earlier stages of development and won't
be delivered for some time. The force will undoubtedly be
hollow in the near term, and it is incumbent upon each of you
to deliver those fundamental tools and capabilities as quickly
as possible to make certain that the impressive gains you have
made in training the force are not lost because of this lack of
cyberweapons. We have been largely critical of the Department
regarding this failure in the past, but we do see progress.
The fiscal year 2019 budget requests included $1.8 billion
for the manning, training, and equipping of the Cyber Mission
Force. The Army and the Air Force requested approximately $700
million each in fiscal year 2019. The Navy request, however,
was only $318 million and is less than half the request of its
peers. Both the Army and the Air Force have committed to
developing foundational capabilities, like the Army's
persistent cyber training environment and the Air Force's
unified platform. We look forward to hearing more from the Navy
and the Marine Corps as to why, legitimately, their funding
requirements are substantially less than the other Services.
I think our hearing would be incomplete without some
discussion of the Services' offensive and defensive cyber
capabilities. Of particular interest to me is the Services'
offensive capabilities in the context of the report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Deterrence, which was
published in February 2017, just over a year ago. As we know,
that report notes the importance of a strong cyber deterrent
for the next 10 years, a period during which we will not have
the defensive capability to defeat our peer adversaries'
offensive capabilities. I would be interested in how the
Services are focusing to meet that challenge and policy
issues--policy issues--that may be inhibiting their ability to
Finally, I would like to know how the Services assess their
capabilities to provide support to civil authorities.
Let me close by expressing our gratitude to the witnesses.
Yes, issues do remain, but the progress made in the past 8
years is a testament to the advocacy and leadership of each of
you and your predecessors. Thank you again for your service and
your willingness to appear today before our subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to hit three issues for you all to contemplate and
to respond to.
The first is just how disorganized the Department of
Defense is when it comes to information warfare or information
operations. Officially, doctrine recognizes that information
operations include cyber, psychological, electronic, and public
affairs. There's even an organization called Joint Information
Warfare Center, and at the level of the Military Services
represented here today, there is some integration of all of
these elements. But, above that level, these elements are all
dispersed. Cyber Command doesn't have the responsibility for
information operations, which, these days, are conducted
largely through cyberspace, and information operations and
electronic warfare are the responsibility of still other parts
of the Department. Now, why does this matter? Because Russia's
information operations troops conduct both technical and
cognitive operations in an integrated way. We conduct
information operations in support of commanders at the tactical
level. Putin and other adversaries are coming at us at the
strategic level in so-called peacetime. I'm afraid that we are
ceding the playing field. I look forward to you all giving us
your answers to this.
The second issue is the slow pace of progress in equipping
the cyber units that we have built. We've manned and trained
our cyber units, but we still lack basic joint capabilities for
command and control, the clandestine network infrastructure
needed to maneuver our forces in cyberspace, and the tools and
weapons that they need.
The third issue is: we have to squarely face the reluctance
to use military cyber units to respond to attacks against us,
to confront Russian hackers and trolls, to harass North Korean
operators who attack Sony, and to disrupt ISIS [Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria] Internet operations outside areas of
declared hostilities. We're not conducting our own information
operations to defend against and to deter acts--attacks and
acts on us and our allies.
This is not just about Russia. It's about differing views
among all the parts of our Government about what constitutes
traditional military activities. We have to change this. Our
forces can't just watch our adversaries in cyberspace. I
applaud General Weggeman for stating, in his prepared comments,
and I quote, ``We must challenge outmoded concepts of
sovereignty, attribution, and intelligence gain/loss
calculations which overly constrain our ability to achieve
cyberspace superiority,'' end of quote.
We're all concerned about these threats, but that concern
has not yet been matched by action. I want to hear what each of
you think, and I realize, as stated to us by the four-star
Commander of Cyber Command, he hasn't been given the direction.
So, I understand the constraints that you have. But, we've got
to get this out on the table. I hope we can start today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Senator Nelson. I think you do a
good lead-in to a lot of not just the capabilities that we've
got, but to the policy issues we have to address, as well.
I'm not sure how you would like to proceed, or in what
order you would like to proceed. If there is a preference, I
would allow our witnesses to make that determination.
Lieutenant General Nakasone, have you--would you care to
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, USA,
COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY CYBER COMMAND
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Rounds--Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Nelson, and
members of the subcommittee, it's honor--it's an honor to be
here, alongside my joint teammates, representing U.S. Army
My testimony today focuses on the progress Army Cyber
Command has made since May 2017, when I last sat before this
Today, the Army's 41 Active Cyber Mission Force Teams are
fully operational, on mission, equipped, and delivering
capabilities to joint and Army commanders in contingency
operations across the globe. With the initial build of the Army
Cyber Mission Force complete, our cyber is now focused on
sustaining and measure readiness and building the Army's 21
Reserve component teams. All 21 Reserve component teams, which
are now part of the Cyber Mission Force, will reach initial
operational capability by 30 September 2022, and full
operational capability by 30 September 2024.
We continue to make our networks more secure and more
dependable through convergence, modernization, and
standardization. A key priority is updating Army computers to a
more secure operating system, a system known as Windows 10.
Over the past 12 months, the Army has already upgraded over 95
percent of its approximately one million computers.
Regarding training, the Army Cyber Center of Excellence is
now teaching all cohorts from all components and preparing to
integrate the electronic warfare force into the cyber career
field. The Army also continues to guide program management for
the joint persistent cyber training environment. We are
leveraging existing infrastructure and resources to integrate
the best government off-the-shelf and commercial off-the-shelf
solutions. Construction on the Army Cyber Command Headquarters
Complex at Fort Gordon continues and is taking shape,
transforming the Fort Gordon region into a cyberspace hub for
the Army and the Nation.
Thanks to congressional support, Army talent management
initiatives are also paying off. We will soon have the Army's
first direct commissioned cyber officers, and our civilian
cyber operators will have a new career management field. We are
also incentivizing soldiers through expanded use of the
assignment incentive pay and special duty assignment pay.
Partnerships remain critical to our efforts. We are
leveraging the private sector, the academic community, and the
key allies to rapidly develop and deliver new capabilities to
the joint force and our Army.
In the future, the Army will require sustained investment
in science and technology to capitalize on the advancements in
artificial intelligence and other innovative capabilities. We
also need to pursue force structure and capabilities at the
Army corps level and below to ensure we have the tactical
capabilities our pilot initiatives have shown.
Today, the Army is driving hard to lay the groundwork for
the future force. With Congress' support, we will continue to
build upon our momentum to deliver a formidable cyber force to
our warfighting commanders.
Mr. Chairman, I would request my written testimony be
entered into the official record, and I'm happy to answer the
[The prepared statement of General Nakasone follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Paul M. Nakasone
Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I want to thank you for your continued support of U.S.
Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) and our efforts operationalizing
cyberspace for the Army in support of our warfighting commanders. It's
an honor for me to represent the extraordinary soldiers and Army
civilians of ARCYBER and the entire Army Cyber Enterprise. My testimony
focuses on the Army's ongoing progress and key milestones the Army has
reached since I last testified before this subcommittee in May 2017.
Army Cyber Command's mission is to direct and conduct integrated
electronic warfare, information and cyberspace operations as
authorized, or directed, to ensure freedom of action in and through
cyberspace and the information environment, and to deny the same to our
adversaries. Our operational units include: the Joint Force
Headquarters-Cyber (Army); the Network Enterprise Technology Command
(NETCOM); the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade (Cyber); the 1st
Information Operations Command; and the Army Cyber Protection Brigade.
To be successful in our challenging mission, we closely partner
with the other members of the Army Cyber Enterprise, which include the
Army Cyber Center of Excellence (Cyber COE); the Army Cyber Directorate
within the Headquarters Department of the Army (DAMO-CY); and the Army
Cyber Institute at West Point (ACI). Together, the Army Cyber
Enterprise has made significant progress, operationally and
institutionally, in preparing the Army for the future fight.
Operationally, ARCYBER achieved a significant milestone in
September 2017 when all 41 Army Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams became
fully-operational, a year ahead of U.S. Cyber Command's (USCYBERCOM's)
mandate. These teams were put on-mission as soon as they became
available. In addition to these 41 Active component teams, the Army is
building 21 Reserve component (RC) teams trained to the same Joint
standards and integrated into a Total Force team. Last August, the
first Army National Guard (ARNG) Cyber task force--Task Force Echo--
assumed a critical mission for USCYBERCOM to engineer, install,
operate, and maintain critical network infrastructure.
Today, the Army's Total Cyber Force is in the real-world fight 24/
7--against near-peer adversaries, ISIS, and other global threats. Since
last May, ARCYBER has provided support to Army commanders, with special
emphasis on the Pacific theater, to ensure select networks, systems and
data are protected and secure. Army cyber forces have also supported
the Joint force as an integral part of Joint Task Force ARES (JTF-
ARES), a JTF that I'm privileged to lead that has been countering ISIS'
use of cyberspace as a domain to spread messages and coordinate combat
activity. The work of JTF-ARES has been an important part of the
coordinated multi-domain military campaign that helped defeat ISIS on
the ground in Iraq and Syria.
Institutionally, the Army Cyber Center of Excellence has made
significant progress developing the cyber workforce. In August, the
first class of enlisted cyber operators graduated the Army Cyber
School. The Cyber School is now training all soldier cohorts (officers,
warrant officers, and enlisted members) from all three force components
(Active, Guard, and Reserve). The first Reserve component soldiers
graduated from the Cyber School in fiscal year 2017.
The Army invests approximately $1.9 billion annually to fund the
cyber workforce, operational units, and operate and maintain the Army
portion of the DOD information network (DODIN). Investments into our
cyber capabilities remain a top priority and we are continually
refining our requirements, and improving resourcing and acquisition
processes to ensure that they are agile enough to rapidly translate
innovative concepts into realized capabilities.
Building on the Army's operational and institutional momentum,
ARCYBER has pursued three mutually supported priorities: aggressively
operate and defend our networks, data, and weapons systems; deliver
effects against our adversaries; and design, build, and deliver
integrated capabilities for the future fight. The following narrative
describes the Army Cyberspace Enterprise's accomplishments across these
priorities encompassing the areas of Operations, Readiness, Resources,
Training, and Partnering.
Cyberspace operations encompass three interrelated mission areas:
Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) operations, Defensive
Cyberspace Operations (DCO), and Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO).
Army DODIN operations, which include building, operating, defending,
and maintaining the Army's portion of the DODIN, is our most complex
mission because it underpins essential Army functions from mission
command to business operations. Most cyberspace operations are
defensive. Army Cyber Command's five Regional Cyber Centers (RCCs)
provide enterprise-level defensive cyberspace operations and DODIN
Operations support to our Network Enterprise Centers, including local
information technology services. We are currently standardizing our
RCCs to ensure effective and efficient alignment of missions, tasks,
manning, structure, and tools. Additional efforts to improve our
network defense include ``Bug Bounty'' exercises and the Vulnerability
Disclosure Program that partners us with industry to use the best
ethical hackers to identify and fix previously unknown vulnerabilities
in Army networks.
The 20 Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) of our Army Cyber Protection
Brigade (CPB) conduct Active Defensive Cyberspace Operations and are
invaluable in thwarting adversary actions that threaten critical Army
and DOD networks and systems. Our CPTs deploy worldwide with mobile
capabilities within hours of notification to protect and defend the
Army's critical infrastructure, platforms, weapons systems, and data,
supporting both national requirements and Joint and Army commanders.
Offensive Cyberspace Operations are cyberspace operations intended
to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.
The Army Cyber Mission Forces execute OCO using the same process of
delegation of authority that governs conventional military combat
operations, descending from the President, to the Secretary of Defense,
to Combatant Commands and United States Cyber Command. The Army also
has 21 OCO teams that are aligned in support of five Operational
Commands: Cyber Command, Central Command, European Command, Pacific
Command and Africa Command.
Readiness is the Army's number one priority. Once Army Cyber
Command (ARCYBER) completed the build of all 41 Army Active Component
Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams in September 2017, we transitioned from
building cyber capacity to maintaining ready cyber forces. To do this,
we are moving to a sustainable readiness model that will ensure our
cyber forces are resilient and set conditions for multi-domain battle.
Currently, we are investing $750 million into our Cyber Mission Forces.
To ensure our forces are ready to meet this challenge, the Army has
funded a new cyberspace operations facility at Fort Gordon that will
provide a cutting edge operational headquarters for both offensive and
defensive operations. This facility is currently under construction, to
be delivered in fiscal year 2020.
In addition to the proper facilities, ready cyber forces also
require a firing platform, operational infrastructure, and access. To
address these needs, the Army has built a rapid capability development
network, and has adopted an operational platform that soldiers will use
for training at the Cyber Center of Excellence and for operations upon
graduation. Operational infrastructure provides the team's access to
the cyberspace domain (Internet). A cyberspace capability is a device,
computer program, or technique, including any combination of software,
firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through
cyberspace. The cyberspace capability is what enables the operator to
create effects in and through cyberspace targeting specified systems or
devices. The ability of a trained cyber team to bring each of these
technological capabilities to bear on a target is the true measure of
readiness, and it is something that we are working every day to
ARCYBER is also working closely with the team developing the
Persistent Cyber Training Environment (PCTE). When fielded, this system
will provide an environment to train cyber operators both individually
and collectively. The system will also be used to replicate various
network environments that can be used to conduct mission rehearsals.
Sustainable readiness is not just focused on the Active component,
it relies on the Total Army cyber force. The Army is building 21
Reserve component (RC) Cyber Mission Force teams, including 10 U.S.
Army Reserve (USAR) teams and 11 Army National Guard (ARNG) teams,
bringing the strength of the Total Army cyber force to 62 teams in
total. These RC teams will be trained to the same Joint standard as the
Active Duty Force.
Over the last 10 months, we have made progress closing gaps in
timing, resourcing, and mission alignment to ensure these Army teams
are effectively integrated into the DOD Cyber Mission Force (CMF). The
ARNG is scheduled to have one CPT reach Initial Operational Capability
in fiscal year 2018 and the USAR plans for two CPTs to reach Initial
Operating Capability in fiscal year 2018. The Cyber COE continues to
resource training for the RC teams, conducting transfer panels to
transition existing soldiers into the Cyber branch as well as
allocating seats for training at the Cyber School. Once the teams are
manned, they will be fielded the same equipment as Active component
teams. All 21 Reserve component CPTs will reach Initial Operating
Capability by 30 September 2022 will be fully operational by 30
Network readiness is a critical component of overall Army
readiness. We invest approximately $400 million annually into network
readiness. The Army currently measures network compliance with policy,
regulation, and law through the Cybersecurity Scorecard, Command Cyber
Readiness Inspections (CCRI), and Command Cyber Operational Readiness
Inspections (CCORI). To assist Army units in improving their network
readiness, ARCYBER conducts staff assistance visits prior to
inspections. During 2017, every organization that received a staff
assistance visit improved their scorecard measurement by an average of
15 points during the CCRI. The number of unit networks that failed to
pass a CCRI dropped from 23 to three. Thus far, in 2018, we have had no
failures. Additionally, ARCYBER has placed a renewed emphasis and
commitment on the integration of the ARNG networks.
Making our networks more defensible is the main thrust of our
priority to, ``aggressively operate and defend our networks, data, and
weapons systems,'' designed to harden and modernize our networks and
conduct defensive cyberspace operations. The Army is systematically
improving its defensive posture with architecture modernization efforts
that reduce attack surface area, improve bandwidth and reliability, and
fortify our long-standing, but ever-critical perimeter defense
A key priority has been upgrading Army computers to a more secure
operating system, Windows 10 (WIN10). The Army recently achieved a
major milestone with 95 percent of its approximately one million
computers already upgraded. In order to stay ahead of the cyber threat,
the Army is moving to an ``as a service'' approach for DODIN services
and capabilities, while maintaining operational oversight. These
efforts include endpoint management and security, Army Enterprise Data
Centers, and cloud services.
Endpoint management security, network convergence, and cyber
analytics are enhancing our situational awareness, enabling us to see
and defend DOD networks and giving us unprecedented levels of DODIN/
Defensive Cyberspace Operations integration to better enable the
warfighter while defeating cyber threats. Big Data analytics are
foundational to improving cyber readiness and resiliency. The Army is
using data analytics to improve our situational understanding of our
networks--to see not only adversary activity, but also ourselves; and
using this information as part of a risk management strategy to inform
our cybersecurity decision making. The Army is developing an analytic
framework for conducting advanced cyber defense that begins with
continuous monitoring of the cyber operational environment.
We are also continuing modernization efforts designed to improve
the Army's ability to defend its networks; achieve greater
standardization and interoperability; and dispose of older, less secure
systems. Network modernization efforts include: Joint Regional Security
Stack (JRSS) migration, Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) upgrades,
and Installation Campus Area Network (ICAN) upgrades.
Network modernization efforts are also allowing us to increase
bandwidth significantly, critical to moving toward a cloud-based and
virtualized architecture. In the near future, the Army will use
private, public, and hybrid clouds that will store and protect data in
centralized repositories, improving data access and enabling global
availability. As part of this effort, the Army is consolidating its
data centers to enhance security and cost efficiencies. Reducing the
Army's data center inventory will enable the follow-on transition to a
long-term end state of four continental U.S. Army Enterprise Data
Additionally, as directed in the Section 1647 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2016, the Army's
Cyberspace Operational Resiliency Assessment-Platform (CORA-P) program
is evaluating the cyber vulnerabilities of major weapon systems. We are
currently assessing 13 of 24 high priority systems. In response to
Section 1650 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2017, the Army is developing a
plan to evaluate cyber vulnerabilities in the critical infrastructure
of 27 Army installations.
The Army is on pace to man, train, and equip Total Army cyber
forces to meet current and future threats. Readiness of the total force
requires that our investments in cyber ensure that Active and Reserve
forces are trained and equipped to common standards. People remain our
most critical resource. Annually, ARCYBER spends $585 million to
compensate its civilian workforce. Over the past 12 months we have
devoted tremendous effort to ensure we can recruit, develop, employ and
retain the talented workforce we need to accomplish our mission. We are
also increasing our presence at key hiring fairs and participating in a
number of existing internship programs. In addition, over the last
three months we began exercising the direct hiring authority granted by
Congress, which enables us to make on-the-spot tentative job offers at
hiring fairs. All of these efforts should enable us to bring on
hundreds of new civilian employees this year.
The Army has also begun conducting a Direct Commissioning pilot
program, pursuant to the authority Congress gave us in Section 509 of
the NDAA for fiscal year 2017, which will commission civilians directly
into the Army as 1st Lieutenants. To date, over one hundred people have
applied for direct commissioning, though unfortunately most have been
unqualified based on age, education or experience. There are currently
two candidates who will likely attend initial training in May 2018.
Initial indications from the first two iterations of the Direct
Commissioning pilot are that legal limits on constructive credit for
cyber officers are preventing more qualified candidates from applying
for the program.
Since I last testified, the Army has expanded two key compensation
programs for cyber soldiers. Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) is designed
to encourage officers, warrant officers and enlisted soldiers to
volunteer, train, and perform Cyber Mission Force work roles that are
otherwise difficult to fill. Currently, ARCYBER has 1,850 eligible
positions tied to AIP and the Army has budgeted approximately $1.6
million annually to compensate soldiers who fill those roles.
Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP) is designed to compensate
enlisted soldiers assigned to duties designated as extremely difficult
or that involve an unusual degree of military skill. Currently, ARCYBER
has 1,245 eligible enlisted soldier positions tied to SDAP and the Army
has budgeted approximately $108k annually to compensate those soldiers.
Both programs will incentivize soldiers for the unique talents and
skill sets that are required to execute the Army's overall cyber
mission, and improve the readiness of the Cyber Mission Force.
In addition to monetary compensation, the Army also offers cyber
soldiers the opportunity to participate in Training With Industry
(TWI), or attend graduate school through the Advanced Civil Schooling
program. ARCYBER also has the flexibility to detail some of our
talented staff to the Defense Digital Service. These opportunities
enable our soldiers to learn from industry, improve their education,
and address some of the Department's toughest technological problems.
arcyber move to fort gordon, georgia
Today, ARCYBER headquarters is split-based at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia; Fort Meade, Maryland; and Fort Gordon, Georgia. Within four
years, the ARCYBER headquarters will consolidate at Fort Gordon. As our
Command transitions to Fort Gordon, the $180 million construction
projects for our state-of-the-art headquarters is well underway, thanks
to Congressional support. The new facilities will support more than
1,300 cyber soldiers and civilian employees, and are projected to be
ready for occupation in summer 2020. Army Cyber Command is expected to
be fully operational at Fort Gordon by 2022. With the addition of the
ARCYBER headquarters, the Augusta, Georgia region will become a center
of gravity for U.S. Army cyberspace operations, providing a unified and
consolidated operational and institutional home.
limited acquisition authority
Following the establishment of USCYBERCOM and ARCYBER, both DOD and
the Army recognized the need to find creative ways to maintain a
competitive advantage in cyberspace. As it became apparent that speed
and agility were critical in cyberspace, the Army needed to reduce the
time and cost necessary to buy, test, and field new platforms and
application technologies through the normal acquisition process. The
Army subsequently initiated several innovative approaches designed to
develop and deliver cyber capabilities more quickly, in order to keep
ahead of our adversaries. This included granting ARCYBER Limited
Acquisition Authority in August 2017, enabling us to meet the ``need of
speed'' demanded in cyberspace operations. ARCYBER is using its Limited
Acquisition Authority to wisely invest its resources in the most
innovative and cutting-edge items that can rapidly benefit our force.
We will likely leverage rapid contracting mechanisms such as Other
Transaction Authority through partners like DIUx.
The Army Cyber Center of Excellence (Cyber COE) located at Fort
Gordon, Georgia, provides training, force modernization, and career
management for the Army's Cyber, Signal, and Electronic Warfare
specialties. The Signal School provides trained soldiers to the
operational force to conduct Department of Defense Information Network
(DODIN) operations and cybersecurity. They train on average over 11,000
soldiers per year across 17 Military Occupational Specialties. Signal
Soldiers install, operate, and maintain the Army's portion of the
DODIN. The Signal School is aggressively pursuing a change to their
training model that will provide all Signal Soldiers a common
foundation in networking fundamentals in support of DODIN operations.
Established in 2014, the U.S. Army Cyber School trains Army Cyber
Branch Soldiers and cyber personnel from the other Services. The Cyber
School provides training in offensive cyberspace operations and
defensive cyberspace operations at Fort Gordon, GA, and electronic
warfare at Fort Sill, OK. The first class of Army Cyber Branch
lieutenants graduated in May 2016; the first class of cyber warrant
officers graduated in March 2017; and the first class of new cyber
enlisted recruits graduated in August 2017. Additionally, the Cyber
School has trained 101 sister Service personnel and 68 Army Civilians.
The Cyber School trained a total of 151 Cyber Branch soldiers during
fiscal year 2016 and another 305 soldiers during fiscal year 2017. The
Cyber School has established all courses necessary to meet anticipated
training requirements for over 900 soldiers annually to meet natural
career progression and replacement of Cyber Branch Soldiers.
In addition to the Cyber School training, our Cyber Protection
Brigade has developed ``Cyber Gunnery Tables,'' similar in concept to
the gunnery tables of maneuver branches, to ensure our Cyber Protection
Team operators can effectively employ their DCO system. A Cyber
Protection Team's DCO system enables the team to maneuver on Army
networks to find, fix, and destroy enemy capabilities. These tables
define the tasks that individuals, crews, and mission elements must
master in order to effectively conduct DCO--Internal Defense Measures
on the CPTs DCO system. They provide structured, methodical, and
foundational training for individuals and teams. These gunnery tables
also serve as training and readiness validation events, certifying that
a crew has the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to participate
in collective exercises as part of a mission element. They also provide
a metrics-based assessment to objectively determine individual and crew
readiness. Further, our teams use challenging competition-type
exercises, such as Cyber Stakes, where individuals and teams can
demonstrate their technical aptitude and sharpen their skills.
Additionally, the Cyber School is working several initiatives
specifically directed at integrating Army Reserve component (RC) cyber
forces. For example, in fiscal year 2017 the Cyber School conducted
three Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) providing a total of 316 training
seats; throughout fiscal year 2018 they will conduct seven MTTs, and
they are prepared to support a minimum of seven MTTs in fiscal year
2019. These MTTs train approximately 30 students per iteration and are
held at venues convenient to the Reserve component units. The Cyber COE
has also conducted eight Cyber Branch Transfer/Reclassification panels
and numerous off-cycle assessment panels for Reserve component
applicants, selecting 470 soldiers from the Reserve component for
transfer into the cyber branch. The Cyber COE is also working within
the Army to ensure the Reserve component can build personnel capacity
and meet FOC training requirements without negatively impacting unit
The Persistent Cyber Training Environment (PCTE) will provide high
quality scenarios and event management to all four Services and
USCYBERCOM, delivering a virtual environment that will enable training
and mission rehearsals for squads, mission elements, and teams. The
acquisition strategy for PCTE is to leverage existing infrastructure,
transportation, and range resources, and to integrate the best
government off-the-shelf and commercial off-the-shelf solutions. The
program office is currently building cloud capacity that will host the
Persistent Cyber Training Environment. Through incremental
developments, the Army is creating low fidelity prototype training
environments and leveraging the Service cyber components and DOD cyber
ranges to develop high fidelity environments. Through a series of Cyber
Innovation Challenges, two in progress to date, the program office will
leverage industry and existing cyber training capabilities to refine
event management and training management.
Since 2015, the Army's Cyber Electro Magnetic Activities (CEMA)
Support to Corps and Below (CSCB) pilot has been integrated into nine
rotations at the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTCs), helping Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs) integrate CEMA, which spans offensive and defensive
cyberspace, electronic warfare, and information operations into a BCT's
operations process. This pilot has helped BCTs leverage CEMA to
understand their unit's footprint in the cyberspace domain and in the
electromagnetic spectrum, and to better deliver cyberspace effects and
conduct electronic warfare in support of their operations. The pilot
has also helped the BCTs to maximize the role of the organic Electronic
Warfare Section and identified the best methods of leveraging the new
Expeditionary CEMA Team concept under the proposed Cyberspace Warfare
Support Battalion (CWSB).
The lessons learned through our CSCB initiative have been valuable
and put to direct use. Today, our cyber forces are supporting
operational units in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Korea, and Europe. We're
equipping and training units with new tools, giving them a marked
advantage over the adversary. We're also supporting training for the
new Security Force Assistance Brigade, providing expeditionary and
remote OCO, DCO, Electronic Warfare, and Information Operations.
ARCYBER is helping shape the CEMA capabilities of the Army's Multi-
Domain Task Force initiative and lessons learned are being applied to
global contingency operations. We continue to support the training of
Brigade Combat Teams, helping build-out a contested and congested
cyberspace domain and Electro Magnetic Spectrum infrastructure at
Combat Training Centers and replicating real near-peer threats.
In our headquarters we often say that cyber is a team sport. Since
I last testified, we have partnered closely with the Defense Digital
Service (DDS) on a number of important projects. We have worked closely
with DDS to conduct a bug bounty on one of the Army's key logistics
systems to identify and resolve vulnerabilities before our adversaries
could find and exploit them. Additionally, we have partnered with them
to pilot a new training program at the Cyber Center of Excellence for
enlisted cyber soldiers. The intent of this pilot program is to shorten
the training time for recruits. If recruits demonstrate the necessary
skills, they can proceed more quickly through the training program.
This more dynamic training format would enable many of the recruits
with a computer science background to complete what was a six-month
training program in as little as 12 weeks.
We have also partnered with the DDS to create tiger teams composed
of DDS personnel and ARCYBER soldiers. One such team developed a
counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) capability that can be used by
battlefield commanders. Finally, Army Cyber Command has collaborated
with DDS to develop an outpost at Fort Gordon, by the summer of 2018,
which will facilitate identifying top technical talent to support the
rapid development of solutions to top cyber threats.
Army Cyber Command is also closely partnered with Defense
Innovation Unit--Experimental (DIUx). We meet monthly to share and
collaborate on problem statements and commercial solutions that could
address Army operational gaps and needs. Several projects sponsored by
DIUx are under evaluation by ARCYBER for Defensive and Offensive Cyber
Operations capabilities. In particular, we are assessing specialized
software as a solution to endpoint threat detection/interrogation. We
have also coordinated with DIUx for problem statements relating to
Advanced Sensors and Machine Learning.
Key partners and allies bring unique capabilities, skills and
approaches to the cyberspace operational environment. Each nation has
benefited from our partnerships through information sharing and
operational collaboration. Maintaining and improving these
relationships will be critical to operational success regardless of the
The Army Cyber Enterprise has made significant progress throughout
The Army's 41 Active Cyber Mission Force teams are fully
operational, on-mission, and delivering unprecedented capabilities to
our combatant and Army commanders every day.
We are continuing to make our networks more secure and
more defendable through modernization and consolidation.
The Army Cyber Center of Excellence is now training all
cohorts and all components, and preparing to integrate the Electronic
Warfare force into the cyber career field.
Construction on the Army Cyber headquarters complex at
Fort Gordon, Georgia is taking shape, and will transform the Fort
Gordon region into a cyberspace hub for the Army and the Nation.
Our investments in soldiers and civilians through
innovative talent management initiatives are paying off.
The Army is driving hard to lay the groundwork for the future
force. We are moving toward developing a sustainable readiness model
for the Total Army cyber force; building an in-house development
capability; and organizing an expeditionary CEMA force. Every day our
people are innovating and adapting, positively impacting the way we
organize, train, and equip the Army cyber force, enabling us to stay
ahead of our adversaries and to ensure the Army is ready to fight and
win. With the continued support of Congress, the Army will continue to
build upon this tremendous momentum to deliver an elite cyber force to
our warfighting commanders.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Lieutenant General
All of your complete messages or reports will be entered
into the record, without objection.
Vice Admiral Gilday.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES FLEET CYBER COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
Vice Admiral Gilday. Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member
Nelson, Senator Sasse, good afternoon. On behalf of the sailors
and the civilians of Fleet Cyber Command, it's an honor to be
here with my joint teammates, and I thank you for the
opportunity to appear. I also want to thank you for your
leadership and for your support in helping to keep our Nation
secure in this complex domain of cyberspace.
Since appearing before this committee last year, and like
my fellow cyber component commanders, I have continued to
observe an upward trend in the capacity, the capabilities, the
sophistication, and the persistence of cyberthreats against our
networks. Cyberspace intersects every one of our Navy's
missions, and it requires an adaptive approach to counter the
Navy's approach for offensive and defensive cyber can
really be summarized in three broad areas: first, modernizing
our existing networks; second, by investing in new technologies
and partnerships; and lastly, by carefully managing our talent.
First, we are modernizing and defending our networks by
implementing our cyber resilience strategy, focused on
hardening our network infrastructure and reducing its attack
surface. We're in the fifth year of this ongoing effort.
Further, we have extended our defensive posture to include
deploying defensive cyber teams with our carrier strike groups
and our amphibious readiness groups.
Second, we are investing in new technologies and
partnerships for the offense and the defense through a series
of initiatives, including transitioning to cloud-based
technologies. At the same time, we are investing in
improvements to defend and to gain better situational awareness
deep inside our networks. We are leveraging the data sciences
through the Navy's new Digital Warfare Office, and
collaborating with industry and academia to apply new
technologies, like machine learning and artificial
intelligence. We continue to mature partnerships with a host of
allies and partners. We have established two new commands, one
for doctrine development and the other for training, both
improving the integration of cyberspace and electronic warfare
into fleet operations.
Third, we're committed to growing and sustaining our talent
base. Now that all 40 Navy cyber teams have reached full
operational capability, we are focused, as Admiral--as General
Nakasone said, on sustaining a mission-ready force. We are
meeting, and in some cases exceeding, accession and retention
goals for both officers and enlisted, as well as expanding our
direct-commission cyber warrant officer and cyber warfare
engineer programs to capitalize on our technical talent. We're
improving the ways we integrate cyber talent from the Reserve
force, and we are implementing the DOD's [Department of
Defense] new Cyber Excepted Service Program for our civilian
teammates. We are improving virtual training capabilities for
all of our cyber teams, and we are building a new cyber center
at the United States Naval Academy and offering graduate
degrees for both officers and enlisted at the Naval
Lastly, I still believe we have much room to grow. In
particular, we need to continue to seek improvements in how we
recruit, how we train, how we retain, how we reward, how we
fight, all the while ensuring that our forces are equipped to
compete and defeat the adversary.
Mr. Chairman, Senators, thank you for the opportunity to be
here this afternoon. I take the points from your opening
remarks, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Gilday follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Michael M. Gilday
Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Nelson and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of the men and
women of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, U.S. Tenth Fleet, and the United
States Navy. It is an honor and privilege to represent the outstanding
sailors and civilians who comprise our U.S. Fleet Cyber/U.S. Tenth
Fleet team, and I appreciate this opportunity to update you on how our
Navy's cyberspace operations are evolving to remain competitive in
today's strategic environment.
As discussed by the National Defense Strategy, great-power
competition has reemerged as the central challenge to U.S. security and
prosperity. It will probably come as no surprise to this committee that
our adversaries often act within the ``gray zone,'' heavily relying on
asymmetric methods such as cyberspace and information operations to
undermine our national interests.
Over the past four years, as the Commander of U.S. Fleet Cyber
Command and as the former Director of Operations for U.S. Cyber
Command, I have observed first-hand how the United States is threatened
by cyber-attacks every day; the threat to the U.S. Navy is certainly no
different. Our ability to command and control our forces relies upon
cyberspace. Virtually every operation aboard a Navy ship-navigation,
engineering, communications and weapons employment--rests on the secure
and reliable transfer of and confidence in our data. Operating in the
maritime environment does not shield us from the threats inside of the
cyberspace domain, and our competitors know this. The cyberspace domain
is a great capability leveler due to the low cost of entry for
adversaries who desire to achieve an effect against us. With
interconnectedness and pervasiveness increasing due to the Internet of
Things, this environment will only become more complex and contested.
Beyond today's threats, our current technological advantages are
not preordained. We are in an unprecedented age of exponentially
accelerating technology and a convergence of technologies that brings
dynamic and innovative capabilities. The technological race is on for
Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Quantum Computing as the
world's most powerful militaries strive to become the leader in these
areas. Maintaining our role as a global superpower requires us to
develop and evolve our cyber capabilities quickly to dominate in this
technologically advanced environment.
In the same fashion that the historic U.S. Tenth Fleet from World
War II enabled the prosecution of the U-Boat threat and ensured access
to the shipping lanes of the Atlantic, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command and the
modern U.S. Tenth Fleet exists today to enable, anticipate and
prosecute cyberspace threats and ensure our Navy networks supporting
our most critical missions are protected and ready.
Since its establishment on January 29, 2010, U.S. Fleet cyber
Command [U.S. Tenth Fleet has grown into an operational force comprised
of more than 16,000 Active Duty sailors, Reserve component sailors and
civilians assigned to 29 Active Duty and 29 Reserve commands around the
globe. U.S. Fleet Cyber Command reports directly to the Chief of Naval
Operations as an Echelon II command and is responsible for operating
and securing Navy Enterprise networks, defending all Navy networks,
operating our global telecommunications architecture, and providing
cryptology, signals intelligence (SIGINT), cyberspace, and space
warfighting capabilities to support Fleet Commanders and Combatant
Commanders. With distinct, but overlapping mission sets, U.S. Fleet
Cyber Command serves as the Navy Component Command to U.S. Cyber
Command for cyberspace operations, the Navy's Service Cryptologic
Component Commander under the National Security Agency/Central Security
Service and the Navy's component for space under U.S. Strategic
Headquartered in Fort Meade, Maryland., U.S. Fleet Cyber Command
exercises operational control of globally-deployed Cyber Mission Forces
(CMF) through a task force structure aligned to the U.S. Tenth Fleet.
U.S. Fleet Cyber Command is also designated as the Joint Force
Headquarters-Cyber aligned to U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern
Command for the development, oversight, planning and execution of full
spectrum cyberspace operations aligned with other traditional
warfighting lines of operations.
In 2015, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command released its Strategic Plan: 2015
to 2020, which identified five goals critical to deliver on our
responsibilities by leveraging our strengths and shrinking the Navy's
cyber-attack surface to cyber adversaries, which I will detail
throughout this statement. Across the wide-ranging responsibilities,
our five goals are:
l. Operate the Network as a Warfighting Platform: Defend Navy
networks, communications and space systems, ensure availability and,
when necessary, fight through them to achieve operational objectives.
2. Conduct Tailored Signals Intelligence: Meet the evolving SIGINT
needs of Navy commands, including intelligence support to cyber.
3. Deliver Warfighting Effects Through Cyberspace: Advance our
effects delivery capabilities to support a full spectrum of operations,
including cyber, electromagnetic maneuver, and information operations.
4. Create Shared Cyber Situational Awareness: Create a shareable
cyber common operating picture that evolves to full, immediate
awareness of our network and everything that happens on it.
5. Establish and mature Navy's Cyber Mission Forces: Stand up 40
highly expert CMF Teams and plan for the sustainability of these teams
We, the Navy and U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet, have
made significant progress towards these goals, continue to develop
organizationally and evolve to outpace competitors. On behalf of the
warfighters of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, I thank you again for
opportunity to discuss the Navy's progress in cyberspace and our course
operate the network as a warfighting platform
The Navy, like other DOD and government entities, faces enormous
challenges in cyberspace. Foreign governments and non-state actors use
cyberspace operations as an integral part of their national and
military strategies. Adversaries take advantage of publicly available
cyber tools so nefarious actors can quickly identify vulnerabilities in
software and hardware to exploit high priority targets.
In May 2017, a cyber-attack known as WannaCry spread ransomware
rapidly and indiscriminately across the world. The malware encrypted
and rendered useless hundreds of thousands of computers in hospitals,
schools, homes, and businesses in over 150 countries. In June 2017,
numerous commercial ships transiting coastal waters in the Black Sea
reported having their GPS systems ``spoofed,'' so that their locations
were reported inside Russian territorial waters, as opposed to being in
These examples demonstrate we operate in an increasingly contested
cyber environment where information is the fuel of decision making and
protecting that information and our mechanisms for Assured Command and
Control (C2) are critical to successful maritime operations. Loss of
this information, or lack of confidence in the veracity of the
information we see, not only degrades our confidence and effectiveness
of our C2, it also leads to loss of intellectual property and removes
our competitive edge. The margins of victory are razor thin, and we
cannot afford to lose a step.
U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet approach to overarching
cyber defense is consistent with U.S. Fleet Forces Command's Fleet
Design and the Chief of Naval Operation's plan for a Future Navy, with
more innovation across the Fleet. The networks upon which the Navy
depends to conduct its missions and fight effectively are presently
under continuous probing, if not outright attack by determined
adversaries. Simply put, any system with embedded information
technology or networking capability is a target for an adversary.
Technology is increasingly moving in the direction of everything
defaulting to being networked so this environment will continue to
increase in complexity and pose challenges to our operations.
U.S. Fleet Cyber Command directs operations to secure, operate, and
defend Navy networks, which currently consists of more than 500,000 end
user devices; an estimated 75,000 network devices (e.g., routers,
servers); and approximately 45,000 applications and systems across
multiple security enclaves. These systems are comprised of information
technology, combat and operational technology and control systems. I
can most succinctly capture our approach to cybersecurity by stating
the Navy operates all of its networks as warfighting platforms. As a
warfighting platform it must be aggressively defended from intrusion,
exploitation and attack. As a warfighting platform, the network must be
agile, resilient, and responsive to the C2, intelligence, logistics,
and combat support functions that depend upon it. As a warfighting
platform, its configuration must also be precisely maintained. It must
be resilient to attack and allow us to ``fight through the hurt.''
Finally, as a warfighting platform, it must be capable of and available
to deliver warfighting effects in support of Combatant Commander
Reflective of the larger culture, the demand for seamless
connectivity continues to grow, and solutions to visualize and protect
this operational key terrain must keep pace. The Fleet must have trust
and confidence in its networks, systems and data, and the information
and knowledge they present. Failure to adequately protect and assure
our Fleet networks would be detrimental to our maritime operational
capability and warfighting effectiveness. Therefore, the importance of
a secure architecture for Navy networks cannot be overemphasized. Our
Systems Commands, Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and government
research centers play a pivotal role in design and acquisition of our
systems. Their focused R&D efforts of secure, resilient architectures
and systems, reinforced by industry and academia best practices, are
needed to ensure we are investing in the right systems, technologies
and methodologies to provide a resilient information environment that
can be operated and maintained by our personnel. Effective systems
engineering also highlights the importance of ensuring our
cybersecurity processes are intertwined with our network capabilities
so we can maintain proper cybersecurity controls. Designing,
developing, testing and fielding systems resilient to cyber
exploitation is a key step in this. As the Navy Authorizing Official
(NAO), we serve as a the oversight authority through utilization of the
DOD Risk Management Framework to ensure new systems include the proper
cybersecurity controls and identification of risk on our networks from
design through fielding, and most importantly throughout their
Additionally, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command is operationally focused on
continuously improving the Navy's cyber security posture through an
emphasis on the combination of people, process and technology. This
allows us to reduce the network intrusion attack surface, implement and
operate layered defense in depth capabilities, and expand the Navy's
cyberspace situational awareness as outlined below.
Reducing the network intrusion attack surface
Opportunities for malicious actors to gain access to our networks
come from a variety of sources such as known and zero-day cyber
security vulnerabilities, poor user behavior, and supply chain
vulnerabilities. Operationally, we think of these opportunities in
terms of the network intrusion attack surface presented to malicious
cyber actors. The greater the size of the attack surface, the greater
the risk to the Navy mission. The attack surface grows larger with
aging operating systems and when security patches to known
vulnerabilities cannot be rapidly deployed across our networks,
systems, and applications.
The Navy is taking positive steps in each of these areas to reduce
the network intrusion attack surface including enhanced cyber awareness
training for all hands, enhancements to how we monitor our networks for
compliance and vulnerabilities, reducing the time to field patches and
fixes, and improving the process on how we inspect the cyber readiness
of our networks.
An example of an innovative approach to reducing our attack surface
is our Continuous Hardening and Monitoring Program (CHaMP) initiative.
CHaMP brings together current and historical information from all
sources, Navy attack surfaces and network operations to focus our
network and operational system hardening and remediation efforts. The
program aims to include continuous machine-assisted assessments of Navy
commands' vulnerability management compliance, Information Assurance
accreditation status, and network owner responsiveness in securing
their networks. Based on threat indicators and command performance
relative to Navy and DOD cybersecurity standards, the CHaMP program
will be used to prioritize the assignment and deployment of our Navy
Blue Team and other cybersecurity response activities.
Furthermore, we are bolstering our ability to manage cyber security
risks in our networks by closely integrating our access and authorized
activities with operations and risk-based inspections. This allows us
greater understanding of IT challenges and configuration management
processes. Through our work with industry partners and academia we are
exploring ways to utilize data analytics, machine learning, and other
automation technologies to do some of the cybersecurity heavy lifting
that will bring our defensive posture to the next level.
Additionally, the Navy is reducing the attack surface with
significant investments and consolidation of our ashore and afloat
networks with modernization upgrades.
The Navy's Next Generation Enterprise Network-Recompete (NGEN-R) is
an evolution building on the successes of the current ashore enterprise
contracts (Navy Marine Corps Intranet and OCONUS Network (ONENET)). By
incorporating lessons-learned from Operation Rolling Tide in 2013, a
large-scale network maneuver and operation to eradicate an adversary
from the Navy's unclassified network, and combining our overseas and
CONUS shore enterprise networks under NGEN-R we can improve situational
awareness, and our ability to C2, and operate and defend Navy networks.
The enhanced situational awareness capability of NGEN-R will enable our
headquarters and network defense forces to make better informed network
operational decisions, and improve speed and agility to maneuver our
networks for maximum effectiveness.
Often times, people are viewed as the largest vulnerability in this
equation--by that same logic, our people, each and every person
touching a keyboard, can make the network stronger. We believe a Navy
cyber defense is an all hands effort like damage control on a ship. Our
entire Navy needs cyber training but not everyone requires the same
level of instruction. So we have developed tailored cyber training for
our cyberspace workforce, leaders, average users and those who require
escalated privileges. All Navy personnel are required to complete
online cybersecurity awareness training upon hiring or accession, with
an annual refresher. For the cyberspace workforce, the Navy is
providing training that enables them to effectively conduct cyber
offensive and defensive operations. Like other warfighting lines of
operation? cyberspace operations training is also being delivered to an
increasing number of officers via their professional military
education, as well as in undergraduate and graduate school curriculum.
The Navy addressed the need to integrate cyber training in other
leadership development courses as well throughout the ranks. Finally,
systems and operational commands identified enhanced users who require
specialized cybersecurity training based on the roles they perform. For
example, certain engineers at the systems commands will receive
cybersecurity training so they are able to build better defend their
unique networks and systems. Some of this training is already underway.
An example of an operational enhanced user would be select shipboard
technicians trained to recognize cyber threats to their operational
technology/industrial control systems and recover them from attacks
against those systems.
Enhance our Defense in Depth Operations
The Navy is working closely with U.S. Cyber Command, NSA/CSS, our
Cyber Service counterparts, DISA, Inter-Agency partners, and commercial
cyber security providers to enhance our cyber defensive capabilities on
all of our networks through layered sensors and countermeasures
including the interface with the public internet on our unclassified
networks down to the individual computers that make up our Navy
networked environments. Key to this is our ability to detect and react
to adversary activity and restore capability quickly. These defensive
measures are informed by all source intelligence and industry cyber
security products combined with knowledge gained from analysis of our
own network sensor data. As information sharing improves, so does the
shared responsibility for mutual defense.
From the long-haul communications that form our wide area network
backbones to software and infrastructure purchased as a service such as
commercial cloud, we are dependent upon commercial industry and share
our cybersecurity responsibilities in partnership with them. While the
rise of dual-use technology has created vulnerabilities, it has also
created opportunities for us. Many of our challenges are not unique to
the .mil domain and are shared by commercial industry. We fend off the
same cast of adversaries, who are using the same tactics, techniques
and procedures within .edu, .gov and .com domains. We work similarly to
reduce the attack surface by applying countermeasures and patching
known vulnerabilities on the same types of network infrastructure.
Industry is and will remain a critical mission partner through
technology development, sharing lessons learned, sharing risks, and
responsible intelligence sharing.
As industry evolves capabilities we can employ, we include those in
our overall architecture, and we are currently piloting and deploying
new sensor capabilities to improve our ability to detect and respond to
adversary activity as early as possible. In the future, we see industry
advances in the fields of Artificial Intelligence (Al) and machine
learning will allow us to continually improve the tools we employ on
our networks to enable a more predictive and automated cyber defensive
environment. It's a fast paced fight. We need to respond faster than
the adversary and envision automation as the means to outpace the
threat. This includes increasing the diversity of sensors on our
networks, moving beyond strictly signature-based capabilities to
behavioral sensing, and improving our ability to proactively detect new
and unknown malware. We need these tools to help us sense what is
``normal'' and detect what activity on the network is just outside
that, so we can act quickly. Capable adversaries will operate at or
below the ``noise level'' so using the advanced analytics enabled by Al
and machine learning will give us a tactical advantage in identifying
malicious activity early. We are working with partners to investigate
the best way to use these data science technologies for mission
At the tactical edge, 17 of our 20 Cyber Protection Teams are
deployed around the globe today as well as five afloat Defensive
Cyberspace Operations (DCO) teams deployed within our Carrier Strike
Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups. We are leveraging big data
analytics, as well as machine learning to improve our ability to
protect that data in our networks. We also work closely with our Navy
systems commands (SYSCOM) , such as Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA),
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command (SPAWAR), for example, in order to protect our weapon systems
and platforms from cyber-attacks. Each of the Navy systems commands
provides full life-cycle support for a specific category of military
hardware or software, including research and development, design,
procurement, testing, repair, and in-service engineering and logistics
support. Our partnerships with the SYSCOMS help to expand our
cyberspace situational awareness and protecting our assets effectively.
The Navy continues to support the spirit and intent of the Joint
Information Environment (JIE), including the implementation of a Single
Security Architecture (SSA) that begins with the Joint Regional
Security Stacks (JRSS). The Navy and Marine Corps Intranet is our
primary onramp into JIE, including incorporating JIE technical
standards into the acquisition of the Navy Enterprise Networks as those
standards are defined. In parallel, the Navy is setting internal
technical standards for implementation of a Defense in Depth functional
architecture across all our systems commands and networks, afloat and
ashore--from standard desktop services to combat systems and industrial
control systems. Additionally, the Navy is well into the transition
along with the rest of DOD to the Risk Management Framework, which is
drawn from a solid basis using National Institute of Standards and
Technology practices. This is significant as it moves us from an
antiquated compliance focus perspective to one of risk focus informed
by intelligence, providing improved cybersecurity, a concept we are
applying to all of our networks IT, industrial controls and Combat
Systems. Most importantly, we are integrating ways to better understand
operational cybersecurity risk and defensive posture throughout an
information system's life cycle. Operations in cyberspace are highly
dynamic; we can only achieve a truly defensible architecture by
investing in automation of the collection, integration, and
presentation of data built in from the beginning as an integral part of
each system. These actions will help us to truly build cybersecurity
and resilience in initial system design and development and avoid the
pitfalls associated with trying to bolt them on at the end. Continuous
monitoring is critical to our understanding of how consistently our
systems are properly configured in accordance with standards. Only then
can operational commanders make cyber maneuver decisions with
confidence that they will deliver the intended results.
JRSS will become part of our future defense in depth capabilities.
As described above, the Navy has already consolidated our networks
behind defensive sensors and countermeasures. We expect that JRSS v2.0
will be the first increment connected to the Navy Enterprise Networks.
Accordingly, the Department of Navy is planning to consolidate under
JRSS 2.0 as part of the technical refresh cycle for NMCI when JRSS
meets or exceeds existing Navy capabilities. Integrating the Navy
Enterprise Network with the JRSS will allow shared visibility into the
boundary capabilities for Navy and DOD.
As we make improvements in our monitoring of Navy networks, we will
continue to feed that operational picture into the JIE joint
environment to ensure shared situational awareness across DOD of the
Navy's portion of the Department of Defense Information Networks as a
risk to one is shared by all.
For our part, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command is operationally focused on
continuously improving the Navy's cyber security posture by reducing
the network intrusion attack surface, implementing and operating
layered defense in depth capabilities, and expanding the Navy's
cyberspace situational awareness.
Create Cyber Situational Awareness
Just like any other domain, success in cyberspace requires
awareness of both ourselves and our enemies. It requires that we
constantly monitor and analyze Navy platforms within both the classic
maritime system and global information system. The Navy continues down
the acquisition path to expand our Navy Cyber Situational Awareness
(NCSA) capabilities with a more robust, globally populated and mission-
tailorable Cyber Common Operating Picture (COP). A new capability under
development called SHARKCAGE will provide us significantly improved
analytics and speed of response by leveraging the power of machine
learning. In parallel, we are establishing the organizational linkages
required giving context to that pictureand our data strategy focuses on
seamless integration with all DOD network operations, industrial
controls, and maritime operations data. For example, we are
collaborating with Navy Facilities Command (NAVFAC) to include sensor
feeds from industrial control systems into our NCSA, informing
operators of the cyber defensive status of critical infrastructure
systems for a more holistic view for mission assurance.
u.s. fleet cyber command operational forces
Status of the Cyber Mission Force
The CMF has three primary missions: Defend the nation against
national level threats, support combatant commander missions, and
defend Department of Defense information networks.
Navy teams are organized across existing U.S. Fleet Cyber Command
operational commands at cryptologic centers, fleet concentration areas,
and Fort Meade, depending upon their specific mission. Navy is
responsible for sourcing four National Mission Teams, eight Combat
Mission Teams, and 20 Cyber Protection Teams, and for their supporting
teams consisting of three National Support Teams and five Combat
Given the dynamic nature of the cyber environment, our Navy CMF
teams have achieved and must sustain a high degree of readiness. All 40
of the Navy-sourced CMF teams achieved Full Operational Capability
(FOC) as of October 6th, 2017, one year ahead of the designated U.S.
Cyber Command target. Navy CMF teams are currently actively engaged in
cyber offensive and defensive operations globally as part of the joint
FOC is an externally validated evaluation indicating the unit has
met all its capability requirements and can perform its mission as
designed. However, it is not a measure of combat readiness. Achieving
FOC was only a waypoint as the Navy's operational need for a well-
trained and motivated cyber workforce will continue to grow in the
coming years. Although reaching this milestone is a great
accomplishment, the true challenge is in sustaining that high degree of
readiness and the ability to promptly 'answer all bells' when directed
by U.S. Cyber Command. We are meeting that readiness challenge through
continuous execution of current operations, a robust training program
and in ensuring our forces have the tools and infrastructure they need
Additionally, we have focused on the integration of our Fleet's
efforts, capacity and capabilities across the Navy and Joint force. In
my role as the Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber commander aligned to U.S.
Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command, this is an area where
organizationally we have made significant progress last year.
Our planning with U.S. Pacific Command must be robust enough to
create cyber support plans that are integrated into their operational
plans in the more traditional warfighting areas. This requires a staff
that is fully embedded into the supported combatant commander processes
while being synchronized with my main staff at the Headquarters at Fort
Meade. As a JFHQ-C Commander, I directed an extension of my staff in
February 2017 to integrate at U.S. Pacific Command and provide
cyberspace planning and force employment into operations alongside
forces from the other warfighting domains. We organized our CMF teams,
which included three U.S. Air Force CMF teams and two U.S. Army CMF
teams, as well as my Navy CMF teams, in Hawaii to form an interim Cyber
Forward Element as a one-stop-shop for full spectrum cyberspace
operations in support of U.S. Pacific Command. This extension of my
staff provides Offensive and Defensive Cyberspace planning to PACOM
until a permanent Cyber Operations Integrated Planning Element, or CO-
IPE, is in place. A CO-IPE, serves as the forward extensions of Joint
Force Headquarters--DODIN and Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber. We are in
the process of standing up three permanent CO-IPE at PACOM, SOUTHCOM
and United States Forces Korea, working with our combatant commanders
to project power in, from and through cyberspace. These Elements will
also fully integrate cyberspace into battle plans, ensuring timing and
tempo are set by the commanders for use of cyberspace effects in the
field based on their operational scheme of maneuver.
Reserve Cyber Mission Forces
Through ongoing mission analysis of the Navy Total Force
Integration Strategy, we developed a Reserve CMF Integration Strategy
that takes advantage of our 298 Reserve sailors' skill sets and
expertise to maximize the Reservist support for full spectrum cyber
operations. These Reservists are being brought into service through
fiscal year 2018, and will be individually aligned to Active Duty CMF
teams and the Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber. In this way, we can
employ the unique skillsets our Reserve sailors bring to the fight,
while building a cadre of highly trained personnel that can be ready
for surge efforts now and in the future.
As our Reserve cyber billets are fully manned and these personnel
trained over the next few years, we will continue to assess our Reserve
CMF Integration Strategy and adapt as necessary to develop and maintain
an indispensably viable and sustainable Navy Reserve Force contribution
to the CMF.
We are also exploring relationships with academia by establishing
reserve detachments with high-performing academic research
institutions. For example, this past year, we have directed and
resourced the creation of a reserve detachment (FCC/C 1 OF Det
Pittsburgh), attached to Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group (NCWDG),
whose mission is to better leverage the research and technology rising
out of Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) and Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) in Pittsburgh, PA. This was initiated to better connect
with advances in the academic world in order to enhance our cyber
mission force training and cyber tool development.
Recruit and Retain
In fiscal years 2016 and 2017, the Navy met officer and enlisted
cyber accession goals, and is on track to meet accession fiscal year
2018 goals in May of 2018. Currently authorized special and incentive
pays, such as the Enlistment Bonus, should provide adequate stimulus to
continue achieving enlisted accession mission, but the Navy will
continue to evaluate their effectiveness as the cyber mission grows.
Today, Navy Cyber Mission Force (CMF) enlisted ratings (CTI, CTN,
CTR, IS, IT) are meeting retention goals. Sailors in the most critical
skill sets are eligible for Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). SR-B
contributes significantly to retaining our most talented sailors, but
we must closely monitor its effectiveness as the civilian job market
continues to improve and the demand for cyber professionals increases.
Additionally, Navy is reviewing whether additional incentives for our
most critical skill sets, such as Interactive On-Net Operators (IONs),
Cyber-related officer communities are also meeting retention goals.
While both Cryptologic Warfare (CW) and Information Professional (IP)
communities experienced growth associated with increased cyber
missions, we are retaining Officers in these communities at 93 percent
overall. Both CW and IP are effectively-managing growth through direct
accessions and through the lateral transfer process, thereby ensuring
cyber-talented officers enter and continue to serve. Additionally,
since 2011, the Navy has 40 Cyber Warfare Engineers (CWE) in the ranks,
the Navy's direct commission program for experienced and highly
talented cyber professionals.
Fortunately, the Navy has had seen a sufficient quantity and
quality of individuals via our established accession means (USNA, ROTC,
OCS, direct commissions, etc.) for CW, IP, CWE and Cyber Warrant
Officers (CWO) communities. Leveraging special authorities granted by
Congress as the time is not necessary (10 U.S. Code 533(g). However, as
the ``War for Talent'' continues due to the combination of an upward
trending economy and an ever increasing competition for cyber
skillsets, this authority will allow the Navy to remain competitive in
the future as necessary.
With respect to the civilian workforce, we currently have 91
civilian positions within the Cyber Mission Force. Forty-seven of these
positions are filling various work-roles throughout the CMF and the
remaining 44 are our Computer Scientists/Tool Developers. Currently we
have 27 of the 47 positions filled throughout CMF; we continue to
recruit for our 44 Tool Developers and have made 17 selections to date,
and have 12 personnel onboard. We are aggressively hiring to our
civilian authorizations consistent with our operational needs. Our
primary challenges in recruiting are the current compensation allowable
and competition with industry and other DOD entities. With this in
mind, we are currently offering various incentives to potential
candidates which includes higher step (step 7) on the GS pay scale, 10
percent of salary as a one-time recruitment incentive, 10 percent of
salary for relocation expenses, and several years of assistance in
student loan payback (5K per year). Even with these incentives, we are
not competitive with industry or the National Security Agency (NSA),
and we intend to increase these incentives in the near future.
Additionally, we are optimistic that the Cyber Excepted Service
implementation (Phase II) will help in our recruitment efforts. We plan
to use all of the authorities available to us and hire to our Cyber
positions, to include our JFHQ-C and CO-IPE, as expeditiously as
As the economy continues to improve, we expect to see more
challenges in recruiting and retaining our cyber workforce.
Educate, Train, Maintain
The Navy currently manages, under the Executive Agent appointment
of the Cryptologic Training System, the Joint Cyber Analysis Course,
which provides basic initial accession (1000-level training) skillsets
for Cyber operations used by all services, including acting as the
accession school for the Navy's Cryptologic Technician Networks rate.
Further, Cyber and Information Security knowledge in accession are
maintained in training for the Information Systems Technology rate and
recently added basics for the Intelligence Specialist accession path.
Officers in Cryptologic Warfare and Information Professional
designators receive Cyber and Information Security requirements.
As directed in the NDAA of fiscal year 2016 and in close
consultation with U.S. Cyber Command, the Navy is on tracking towards
to begin resourcing training for sailors assigned to its CMF in fiscal
year 2019. As also outlined in the January 2017 Cyber Force Model
Training Transition Plan for foundational (2000-level) training, the
Navy is prepared to execute administrative oversight of designated
cyber training curriculum in fiscal year 2019. Two-thousand-level
training for Navy organic Information Systems Technicians providing
Information Assurance and Network Security functions are in place
through Navy channels. Similar training for Navy organic operational
Network Defense personal is conducted on an individual basis with
future plans to transition to a systematic approach.
U.S. Cyber Command mandates Joint Cyberspace Training and
Certification Standards for the CMF, which encompass procedures,
guidelines, and qualifications for individual and collective training.
Most of the training today is delivered by U.S. Cyber Command and the
National Security Agency (NSA) in a federated but integrated approach
that utilizes existing schoolhouses and sharing of resources while
sailors are in an operational status. Through the CFMTT plan with
resourcing, the Services will transition to providing sailors that have
already received foundational training. CMF training specifically
involves 54 role-specific, intermediate through advanced training
pipelines using a mix of nearly 100 Joint, NSA National Cryptologic
School (NCS), and multi-Service courses to prepare officers, enlisted
and civilians for their CMF work roles. These training events are not
only aimed at the individual sailors, but also provide operational team
certifications and sustainment training. Once certified, our team
training is maintained throughout the year via several key unit level
exercise events which allow individuals and the collective team to
demonstrate required skills against simulated adversaries. U.S. Fleet
Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet augments the required U.S. Cyber Command
training pipeline in two ways--online skills development and the
provision of supplemental academics.
Using the DOD's Enterprise Cyber Range Environment (DECRE)
resources, provided by the Joint Staff, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command
utilizes Joint Information Operation Range nodes (JIOR) to connect CMF
teams with ranges which are representative of shipboard networks. These
networks are used as offensive and defensive mission rehearsal
platforms and to augment individual training for various team work-
roles. U.S. Fleet Cyber Command has also invested in a web-based
individual and collective training platform, using a commercial virtual
environment, to augment the academic portions of the U.S. Cyber Command
training pipeline with hands-on skills development. The Persistent
Cyber Training Environment (PCTE), managed by the Department of the
Army, is expected to incorporate similar distributed training
methodologies in module-based systems. When necessary, teams seek out
and receive additional training based on work roles or specific mission
From a formal educational perspective, to develop officers to
succeed in the increasingly complex cyberspace environment, the Navy
offers the following opportunities for cyber development:
USNA: The U.S. Naval Academy offers introductory cyber
courses for all freshman and juniors to baseline knowledge.
Additionally, U.S. Naval Academy began a Cyber Operations major in the
Fall of 2013. Furthermore, the Center for Cyber Security Studies
harmonizes cyber efforts across the U.S. Naval Academy.
NROTC: Our Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps' program
maintains affiliations at 51 of the 180 NSA Centers of Academic
Excellence at colleges around the country. Qualified and selected
graduates can commission as Information Warfare Officers, Information
Professional Officers, or Intelligence Officers within the Information
NPS: For graduate-level education, the Naval Postgraduate
School offers several outstanding graduate degree programs that
directly underpin cyberspace operations and greatly contribute to the
development of officers and select enlisted personnel who have already
earned a Bachelor's Degree. These degree programs include Electrical
and Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Cyber Systems Operations,
Network Warfare Operations and Technology, and a masters of Applied
NWC: The Naval War College (NWC) is also incorporating
cyber into its strategic and operational level war courses, at both
intermediate and senior graduate-course levels. NWC also integrates
strategic cyber research into focused Information Operations 10/
Cybersecurity courses, hosts a Center for Cyber Conflict Studies (C3S)
to support wider cyber integration across the College, and has placed
special emphasis on Cyber in its war gaming role.
Together with U.S. Naval Information Forces, we will be realigning
several of our operational commands to stand-up an Information Warfare
Training Group (IWTG) later this month. This new command will advance
IW readiness and warfighting capabilities, including Cyberspace
Operations (CO), through training, assessments and certification
assistance for Type Commanders in order to prepare afloat and shore
activities to face the challenges of a dynamic threat environment.
Future Cyber Workforce Needs
The Navy's operational need for a well-trained and motivated cyber
workforce (Active, Reserve and civilian) will continue to grow in the
coming years. We continue to analyze the readiness of our Cyber Mission
Force and will adjust recruiting tools, as required.
U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet is partnered with
University of Maryland's ``Center for the Advanced Study of Language''
(CASL) in researching aptitude assessments for our cyber workforce.
Cyber workforce screening and recruitment may be aided by the
refinement and implementation of the Cyber Aptitude and Talent
Assessment (CATA). The CATA will enhance screening and selection of the
individuals best suited for specific work roles and assist with
vectoring personnel into the work roles where they have the best
probability of success, potentially reducing the training pipeline,
minimizing attrition and delivering the most capable workforce.
Assuming success with ongoing developmental efforts, we will work with
stakeholders to identify logical injection points. (Recruiting,
Universities, Service Academies, etc.).
The Navy's 2019 budget continues to prioritize readiness alongside
the investments necessary to sustain an advantage in advanced
technologies and weapons systems. Ensuring the cyber resiliency of
networks is part of maintaining the readiness of warfighting platforms.
The budget continues funding to train and equip the CMF, provides
investments in Science and Technology and information assurance
activities to strengthen our ability to defend the network. To maintain
our advantage in advanced technologies and weapons, funding is provided
for engineering to improve control points and boundary defense across
Hull, Machinery & Electrical, Navigation and Combat Control Systems and
for Cyber Situational Awareness.
The Navy requested accelerated funding for procurement of Cyber
Protection Teams (CPT) field deployable computing and analysis
capability called Deployable Mission Support Systems (DMSS) in PB18.
The procurement and sustainment of 40 DMSS kits is required by Navy
Cyber Protection Teams (CPT) to conduct intensive, computationally-
heavy analysis when reach back capability is unavailable or bandwidth
is limited. Without accelerated funding, this will reduce the number of
full-capability DMSS kits available to Navy CPTs and delay the program
schedule by over one year. Operationally, this will drive the need to
share a limited number of DMSS kits for missions that may occur across
the globe. The PB19 request builds upon this effort and will
significantly improve operational defensive cyber capability and
readiness. Our total inventory objective of sustained DMSS kits is 40,
which is projected to occur by 2021.
The Navy is requesting increased investment in Defensive Cyber
Operations forces' ability to detect adversary activities and analyze
cyber-attacks against Maritime Cyber Key Terrain (CKT) and to integrate
all-source intelligence and Navy data to assess adversary capabilities.
The goal of these investments is to improve the Navy's capacity to
deliver to Operational Commanders, cyber situational awareness at all
layers of the IT infrastructure and provide a cyber COP at our Fleet
Maritime Operations Centers.
Continued funding for training is necessary to ensure operator
proficiency as Fleet systems are modernized and become more complex. I
believe the Navy's ability to appropriately fund training of our
operators in these new technologies will improve operational readiness.
The proliferation of cyber capabilities, coupled with new
warfighting technologies, will increase the incidence of ``gray zone''
operations against our Nation and our Navy. Over the past year and a
half, we have seen information become a weapon of choice amongst our
competitors. We view the information environment to include the domains
of space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, all merged
together as key in our ability to get in front of our adversaries to
deny them operational advantages. That invisible battle space is an
area that we must optimize to win in the future.
The opening rounds of the next conflict will likely be in
cyberspace--the Navy must be ready to prevent wars as well as win them.
Therefore, we will conduct operations in and through cyberspace, the
electromagnetic spectrum and space to ensure Navy and Joint/Coalition
freedom of action and decision superiority while denying the same to
our adversaries. The Navy is closely aligned with U.S. Cyber Command,
Combatant Commands, joint and interagency partners, and other Services
to support a whole-of-government response to cyber threats. We will
continue to succeed by leveraging our strengths and shrinking our
vulnerabilities. We will win in these domains through commitment to
excellence and by strengthening our alliances across the U.S.
Government, Department of Defense, academia, industry, and with foreign
Thank you again for this opportunity to update you on the great
work being done by the men and women of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, U.S.
Tenth Fleet and the U.S. Navy. I look forward to working closely with
members of the subcommittee on cybersecurity and appreciate your
support of the cyber investments included in the Navy's 2019 budget
request. I'm happy to take your questions.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Vice Admiral Gilday.
Major General Reynolds.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL LORETTA E. REYNOLDS, USMC,
COMMANDER, MARINE FORCES CYBERSPACE COMMAND
Major General Reynolds. Good afternoon, Chairman Rounds,
Ranking Member Nelson, Senator Sasse, and other members of the
committee. On behalf of the marines, the civilians marines, and
the families of the United States Marine Corps Forces
Cyberspace Command, I want to thank you for your continued
support, and I appreciate this opportunity to update you on the
tremendous progress that we've made since I was last before you
I'd like to highlight what our marines are doing in the
cyberspace domain, and how we've shifted our focus from
building the command to operationalizing, sustaining, and
expanding capabilities in this new domain.
Chairman, at MARFORCYBER, I have organized operations along
three lines of effort, and I will briefly highlight those for
you today. I use this framework to organize my activities and
to measure our progress.
So, my first priority is to secure, operate, and defend the
Marine Corps Enterprise Network, the Marine Corps portion of
the DOD [Department of Defense] Information Network. We have
continued to expand our definition this year of the MCEN
[Marine Corps Enterprise Network] by including all elements of
the Marine Corps IP [Intellectual Property] space, which
includes our many disparate networks that are owned and managed
by different commands across the Marine Corps. To be more
defensible, we've collapsed domains this year, we've expanded
our enterprise view of the network through a common service
desk, an endpoint, discovery, and we are now--as General
Nakasone mentioned--we are also nearing completion of upgrade
to WIN 10 across the Marine Corps. We've also experimented with
additional acquisition methods and models like DIUx [Defense
Innovation Unit-Experimental] that are more responsive to the
changing threat. We're looking forward to employing Cyber
Command acquisition authority, when it makes sense.
Moving forward and in response to the National Defense
Strategy, we know we must be prepared to fight tonight, and we
will build the objective network capable of fighting and
winning against a peer adversary in a contested information
environment. So, recognizing that our ability to command and
control is our center of gravity, we are participating in
efforts with the United States Marine Corps Service
Headquarters to design and build a more defensible network
My second priority is fulfilling our responsibility to
provide warfighting capabilities through the development of
ready, capable cyberforces to United States Cyber Command. I am
happy to report that, as of January of this year, ahead of
schedule, all of our 13 teams have reached full operational
capability and are employed against priority missions. Many of
our marines have participated in planning or executing
offensive and defensive missions against today's adversaries,
and are informing tactics and procedures on a daily basis. We
are increasing our proficiency every day.
Now, to increase readiness and retention, and to increase
skills progression, sir, as you mentioned, the Marine Corps,
just last week, announced the creation of our cyberspace
occupational field. The creation of the MOS [Military
Occupational Specialty] will allow us to deliberately provide
targeted incentives for recruiting and retention. For our
civilian marines, we are leaning into hire and transition our
workforce to the Cyber Excepted Service. As part of our
integrated planning element build in support of Special
Operations Command, we have hired civilians across the SOCOM
enterprise who are providing cyber intelligence and planning
support for joint cyber fires.
My third priority is to provide support to the Marine Corps
as it works to operationalize the information environment. As
you are aware, the Commandant has modified marine formations to
build greater capability in the information environment under
the Marine Corps operating concept, and we are building
additional DCO [Deployable Cyber Force] forces inside the MAGTF
[Marine Air-Ground Task Force], experimenting with tactical
cyber, and sharing lessons on the integration of cyber with
other fires and other information capabilities. As we continue
to increase our capability and our capacity, we look forward to
occupying our new operational headquarters on NSA's [National
Security Agency] campus next month.
I want to again take the opportunity to thank Congress for
the military construction funding that enabled the development
of our new building. This building is much more than just
administrative spaces. It will serve as a platform for
training, command and control, planning, and execution.
I am incredibly proud of the strides that we have made in
operationalizing cyberspace in support of the MAGTF and the
joint warfighter since I was last before you in May.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for
inviting me to testify before you today, and for the support
that you and this committee have provided our marines and their
families. I look forward to continuing the dialogue and to
answer your questions today.
[The prepared statement of General Reynolds follows:]
Prepared Statement by Major General Loretta E. Reynolds
Major General Reynolds was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in May
1986 upon graduating from the United States Naval Academy. Throughout
her career she has served in a variety of command and staff billets in
the operating forces. As a Lieutenant, she served as a Communications
Watch Officer at the Base Communication Center, and later returned to
the Division Communications Company where she served as a Communication
Center Platoon Commander, Multichannel Platoon Commander, Operations
Officer, and Radio Officer. As a Captain and Major, she served with
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 18, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Okinawa, Japan as a Detachment Alpha Executive Officer and Commanding
Officer. She served with the Ninth Communication Battalion, 1st
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group as the Assistant
Operations Officer and Commanding Officer, Bravo Company. As a
Lieutenant Colonel, she commanded Ninth Communication Battalion, I MEF
and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II in Fallujah,
Iraq. As a Colonel, she commanded I MEF Headquarters Group and deployed
the Group to Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan in support of I MEF FWD/
Regional Command Southwest in Helmand Province during Operation
Enduring Freedom. She recently served as the Commanding General, Marine
Corps Recruit Depot/Eastern Recruiting Region, Parris Island, SC.
In the Supporting Establishment, she has served as an Acquisition
Project Officer at the Marine Corps Systems Command, Candidate Platoon
Commander for Charlie Company, Officer Candidate School, Commanding
Officer of Recruiting Station Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, an Action
Officer and Deputy Division Head for Strategic Plans Division, Command,
Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Department, Headquarters
Marine Corps and as Division Chief (J6) at the Joint Staff in the
Pentagon. Her most recent assignment was as the Principal Director
(Asia & Pacific), Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Asia
Her professional military education includes the United States
Naval Academy, The Basic School, the Basic Communication Officer's
Course, Command and Control Systems Course, the Navy War College and
the Army War College. She has earned Masters Degrees from both the
Naval War College and the Army War College.
Her personal decorations include the Defense Superior Service
Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (with
gold star), the Navy, and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (with gold
Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members
of this Committee, I thank you for inviting me here today to represent
the Marines and civilian Marines of Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace
Command (MARFORCYBER). I appreciate this opportunity to update you on
the tremendous progress we have made since I was last before this
committee in May, to highlight what your marines are doing in the
cyberspace domain and how we have shifted our focus from building the
command to operationalizing, sustaining, and expanding capabilities in
this warfighting domain.
Our Commandant, General Neller, made clear in his Message to the
Force 2018 that the Marine Corps must be prepared to fight in order to
make it to the next conflict. This includes our ability to fight--and
win--in the domain of cyberspace. Our adversaries will test our
superiority across the domains of air, land, sea, and space, in the
next conflict. They are testing us in cyberspace today. Understanding
this, and consistent with our Commandant's guidance, we are developing
the Marine Corps' cyber capacity at the tactical level of war, so that
in the future the Marine Corps will more effectively preserve the
ability to fight and win in a contested environment and deliver effects
It gives me great pride to share with you today the many
accomplishments of the Marines and civilian Marines of MARFORCYBER, and
the work they are doing to defend our nation from a growing and
mission and organization
As the Marine Corps Service component to U.S. Cyber Command,
MARFORCYBER conducts full spectrum cyberspace operations. This includes
securing, operating and defending the Marine Corps Enterprise Network
(MCEN), executing DOD Information Networks (DODIN) operations,
conducting Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) within the MCEN and
Joint Force networks, and when directed, conducting Offensive
Cyberspace Operations (OCO) in support of Joint and Coalition Forces.
We do this to enable freedom of action in cyberspace and across all
warfighting domains, and to deny the same to our adversaries.
As the Commander, MARFORCYBER, I wear two hats. I am Commander,
MARFORCYBER, and I am the Commander of Joint Force Headquarters--Cyber
(JFHQ-C) Marines. In these roles, I command about 1700 Marines,
civilian Marines, and contractors across our headquarters and
subordinate units. MARFORCYBER is comprised of a headquarters
organization, a JFHQ-C, and two colonel led subordinate commands:
Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group (MCCYWG) and Marine Corps
Cyberspace Operations Group (MCCOG). Through the JFHQ-C construct, we
provide direct cyber operations support to U.S. Special Operations
In order to accomplish our mission, I organize operations along
three lines of effort that I will highlight for you today. I use this
framework to organize activities, allocate resources, grow capability,
and measure our progress.
secure, operate, and defend the mcen
My first priority is to secure, operate, and defend the Marine
Corps' portion of the DODIN, the MCEN. We have continued to expand our
definition of the MCEN by including all elements of the Commandant of
the Marine Corps' IP space, which includes our many disparate networks
that are owned and managed by different commands across the Marine
We accomplish this mainly through one of the two subordinate
commands mentioned previously--the MCCOG. The MCCOG is responsible for
directing global network operations and computer network defense of the
MCEN. It executes DODIN Operations and DCO in order to assure freedom
of action in cyberspace and across warfighting domains, while denying
the efforts of adversaries to degrade or disrupt our command and
With the increasing pace of operations in the cyberspace domain,
the MCCOG, our primary DODIN and Cyber Security Services Provider
(CSSP), was designated an operational Command in December 2016.
Internally, the MCCOG is re-organizing to more effectively fight in a
high tempo environment and to better align to its operational command
designation. Their reorganization will be complete this April.
Simultaneous with its designation, in August 2017, the MCCOG stood
a Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) mandated Command Cyber
Readiness Inspection (CCRI) and a pilot Command Cyber Operational
Readiness Inspection (CCORI), successfully passing both inspections and
maintaining its certification as the Marine Corps' only CSSP.
Additionally, during this same timeframe, MCCOG's Marine Corps
Information Assurance Red Team (MCIART), the team responsible for
assuming an adversarial role and testing our layered defenses across
the Marine Corps, was recertified by the National Security Agency
The Marine Corps views the MCEN as a warfighting platform, which we
must aggressively defend from intrusion, exploitation, and attack.
Recent real-world defensive cyberspace operations have informed and
sharpened our ability to detect and eliminate threats on the MCEN. The
operational posture to address vulnerabilities is critical as exploits
are identified by USCYBERCOM or through adversary action. Recent
operational successes include the replacement of more than 200 Virtual
Private Network (VPN) Devices across more than 120 distinct sites in
less than a 90 day period. In addition, recent real-world operations,
such as responding to destructive and malicious global ransomware
(WannaCry) and wiperware (Petya/NotPetya) events, have improved our
ability to aggressively and successfully compress patching timelines
and enhance our defenses in order to avoid exploitation.
While the MCCOG maintains a persistent capability to defend the
Marine Corps' cyber battlespace, MARFORCYBER is continuously seeking
methods to enhance the Service's defenses. Beginning in December,
MARFORCYBER began augmenting the MCCOG's capability with other rapid
and persistent defensive cyber resources that can quickly identify a
threat, defend an area, eject adversaries, and recover from malicious
activity. Though actively engaging an adversary in our battlespace is
critical, securing the battlespace from attack is our first line of
defense. Understanding this, we have adopted a philosophy of ruthless
compliance with security measures across all elements of the MCEN. We
are using every security action to increase our partnerships with other
MARFORs and major subordinate commands to exercise command and control,
and increase their understanding of the constant threat our adversaries
pose in cyberspace. Cybersecurity is a team effort and it requires
everyone to be engaged. We rely on the buy-in from our partners to
ensure that the MCEN is properly protected.
We have improved network visibility and security by consolidating
our legacy systems into a single homogeneous network. Consolidating
domains reduces attack surfaces and improves our ability to identify
and respond to threats. We are aggressively consolidating legacy
domains, transitioning to the WIN 10--operating system, and collapsing
regional service desks to a single enterprise service desk. Our updates
to each of these priorities are described briefly below.
Enterprise Service Desk. Since May, MARFORCYBER has been replacing
regional service desks with a centralized, standardized Enterprise
Service Desk (ESD) in Kansas City, Missouri to manage and monitor the
MCEN, provide valuable insight regarding network trends, and rapidly
respond to warfighter needs. The ESD is under the operational control
of MARFORCYBER. While consolidation is not yet complete, the ESD has
provided the anticipated benefits of improved service and network
visibility, complementing other defensive actions on the MCEN. Our next
step is to establish the Alternate ESD in New Orleans, and procure the
equipment for both ESD locations. The fiscal year 2019 President's
Budget requests the funding to continue to stand up the ESD.
Domain Consolidation and Elimination (DC&E). We are continue
efforts to collapse legacy networks into a single, homogenous and
secure network. Legacy networks increase the Marine Corps' cyber
footprint and unnecessarily increase attack surfaces for adversaries.
Eliminating these networks and consolidating them within the MCEN will
provide much needed standardization, increase network visibility, and
decrease the attack surface available to our adversaries. Out of 52
legacy domains, only 18 remain to be decommissioned. The largest
program of record requiring migration is the Marine Corps Enterprise
Information Technology Services (MCEITS), a system that provides
collaboration, data exchange, and information access. Planning is
underway to migrate MCIETS onto MCEN-N. We anticipate completing our
DC&E efforts by September of 2019 however, additional actions are
required to consolidate legacy networks onto the MCEN such as migrating
public-facing webservers into demilitarized zones, consolidating data
centers, and conducting Enterprise Infrastructure Modernization (EIM).
We are also participating in joint efforts to secure our networks,
most notably by integrating into the Join Information Environment
(JIE). Through JIE, the Marine Corps will install Multiprotocol Label
Switching as part of the Joint Regional Security Stack (JRSS) project
and will standardize transport while improving security. In addition,
the Marine Corps continues working with Joint Force Headquarters----DOD
Information Networks (JFHQ-DODIN) to modernize infrastructure and
comply with standards that protect our public-facing systems to reduce
unnecessary and outdated public facing system, and harden and PKI-
enable the remaining. Upgrades to the equipment and standards that
safeguard our public-facing websites are underway to ensure we remain
connected to the general public and industry while maintaining the
latest in cybersecurity protections.
Windows 10. The Marine Corps continues its efforts to transition
its Microsoft Windows end user devices to the Windows 10 (WIN 10)
operating system (OS), effecting well over 100,000 devices on the
unclassified network alone. In order to accomplish this task,
MARFORCYBER exercised command and control relationships with Tier III
Commanders and MARFORs to synchronize effort and resources, engage
commanders across the force, and track progress. The Service leadership
has supported our efforts; and we have been providing periodic updates
on progress and compliance to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps. Our WIN 10 transition is currently on plan to meet 31 March
deadline established by DOD.
Cyber is a dynamic, competitive environment, and we are continually
responding to the increasing capability and capacity of our
adversaries. We are improving our ability to understand system data and
identify vulnerabilities. Through participation in various joint
exercises, we continuously affirm that treating cyberspace as a
contested warfighting domain is essential to our ability to rapidly
identify and defeat an adversary. During Exercise Pacific Sentry, a
bilateral exercise led by U.S. Pacific Command and linked to U.S.
Strategic Command and USCYBERCOM headquarters' exercises, we identified
several key stakeholders and owners of Marine Corps information
repositories who must aggressively defend themselves in cyberspace in
order to provide essential, service level activities. Our experience
during real-world operations and training exercises has demonstrated
that many commands and processes within the Service that have
historically been considered administrative in nature must
operationalize in order to function in a contested cyberspace domain.
For example, our partners in cybersecurity inside the Service include
acquisition commands and data owners. In cyberspace, the Supporting
Establishment must respond with the same readiness and agility as the
Moving forward, and in response to the National Defense Strategy,
we must build the objective network capable of fighting and winning
against a peer adversary. We are participating in efforts to shape our
battlespace within the Service by designing a more defensible
architecture. The Objective Network is a service-level capability that
spans all war-fighting functions and enables operations across all
domains. The Objective Network must be deployable and resilient to
support command and control functions throughout the Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) in a contested, disconnected, intermittent, and low
bandwidth environment. To operate in this environment, the network must
adapt to conditions and optimize performance, while reducing detection
The objective network is essential to ``make sense'' of the
cognitive domain, where enterprise and local resources feed critical
thinking to drive commander's decision-making and enable information
operations. Artificial Intelligence (Al) is the core element in
accomplishing this in near-real time. An interconnected family of MAGTF
Al systems share priorities, monitor the network, learn patterns, and
inform human decision making. This enables Al to manage hardware and
software components, route network traffic, and reduce the
electromagnetic footprint. The result is a resilient command and
control network that supports the warfighter even in the most austere
provide a cyberspace warfighting capability
My second priority supports our responsibility to provide ready,
capable cyber forces to USCYBERCOM's cyber Mission Force.
The Marine Corps is responsible for 13 of USCYBERCOM's 133 Cyber
Mission Force (CMF) teams: one National Mission Team (NMT), eight Cyber
Protection Teams (CPTs), three Combat Mission Teams (CMT), and one
Cyber Support Team (CST). These 13 teams are aligned against USCYBERCOM
(Cyber National Mission Force), USSOCOM, and Marine corps missions.
Three of the eight CPTs are service retained and oriented to
service missions, (23 percent of the total Marine corps CMF).
I am happy to report that, as of January 2018 and ahead of
schedule, all of our 13 teams have reached FOC. All teams are fully
engaged in supporting the mission. Although we have met FOC criteria,
our work is not done. We have shifted our focus toward sustaining and
improving our team readiness.
To increase readiness, improve effectiveness, and address retention
of cyberspace operators, the Marine Corps recently established a
Cyberspace Occupational Field. We have learned a great deal in the past
several years about the training, clearance, and experience
requirements across the cyber mission force. We know that in order to
be effective, we must retain a professional cadre of cyberspace
warriors who are skilled in critical work roles, and we know that many
of our marines desired to remain part of the cyber work force. We
intend to begin assigning marines to the cyberspace MOS on 1 October
2018. This will significantly improve both readiness and retention of
the cyber force, and allow us to develop their skills throughout their
I would like to thank Congress for authorizing the Marine Corps to
grow its structure by 1,000 earlier this year to 185,000. Our growth in
cyber is consistent with the Commandant of the Marine Corps' request to
expand our ability to operate in the Information Environment and build
capabilities that allow the Marine Corps' to increase its emphasis on
maneuver in a cognitive sense, expanding our employment of combined
arms to the domains of cyberspace.
The MCCYWG is our colonel led command that is responsible for
identifying capability requirements, training, certifying, and
sustaining readiness for our CMF teams. While they are currently
minimally staffed, my vision for this command is to develop it into the
centerpiece for advanced cyber warfare training, tactics, and
certifications to support Marine Corps cyber forces. The Commandant of
the Marine Corps recently approved growth for the MCCYWG to enable this
vision in support ofjoint CMF and Marine Corps cyber units.
While building the CMF, members of the MARFORCYBER staff were dual-
hatted as the Joint Force Headquarters staff. This year, the increasing
pace of cyberspace operations demanded that we resource a separate,
standing JFHQ-C. This JFHQ-C provides planning, targeting, and
intelligence support to supported commanders, synchronizes execution of
cyberspace operations, and provides command and control for CMTs and
In May I updated you regarding the development of the Joint Force
Headquarters--Forward, which was intended to integrate cyberspace
operations with USSOCOM's global operations. Since then, the Secretary
of Defense, through USCYBERCOM, instructed all Service Cyber Components
to rename this organization the Cyberspace Operations--Integrated
Planning Element (CO-IPE) and to complete an implementation plan no
later than March of this year. We have been working through both
USCYBERCOM and USSOCOM to identify and satisfy requirements in the most
efficient manner possible.
In addition to the five marines already at USSOCOM headquarters, we
begun to build the COIPE across USSOCOM organizations worldwide and
look to complete the civilian hiring for a total 26 civilians by
October of this year. We have also been working within the Service to
increase our uniformed CO-IPE staff, with an increase of 13 marines
required to meet our staffing goal by the end of fiscal year 2020.
As with all other domains, the marines continue to be ``First to
Fight'' in cyberspace. Our CMTs working in support of Joint Task Force
Ares have conducted multiple, large-scale operations to support U.S.
Central Command (USCENTCOM) and Combined Joint Task Force--Operation
Inherent Resolve. We have also expanded our support beyond the CMTs to
include cyberspace operations planners working at multiple locations
both overseas and here at home with partner organizations. I currently
have numerous marines deployed to locations in both USCENTCOM and
USAFRICOM, planning and integrating cyberspace operations into ongoing
activities. We are also working within the Service to integrate
cyberspace effects and planning into other domains. We recently
deployed a Marine cyberspace planner to Afghanistan to assist the
marines in Helmand Province as Task Force South West executes their
advise and assist mission with our Afghan partners. Through my deployed
personnel, we are bringing cyberspace operations to the tactical edge
of battle, while at the same time generating cyberspace experience and
expertise within operational units outside of USCYBERCOM. These
experiences will allow operational planners to adapt the emerging
cyberspace capabilities in such a way that we can incorporate
cyberspace operations at all levels of conflict across the full range
of military operations.
We continue to improve on the Marine Corps' investment in
specialized tools for defensive cyberspace operations. The Deployable
Mission Support System (DMSS) hardware and software tools comprise the
weapons system CPTs use to meet any mission they may be assigned, from
readiness and compliance visits to incident response or Quick Reaction
Force missions. The DMSS toolkit evolves with the threat and is
continually revised and upgraded to ensure CPTs have the most up-to-
date toolkit available for a dynamic cyberspace operations mission set.
MARFORCYBER is also working to develop a DMSS-like toolkit for
employment by the Service's Defensive Cyber Operations--Internal
Defensive Maneuver (DCO-IDM) Companies, which will provide an organic
defensive cyberspace capability to Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
Commanders within the newly established MEF Information Groups (MIG).
MARFORCYBER is currently finalizing the engineering and procurement of
third generation DMSS 3.0 kits, the first of which is scheduled to be
delivered in late fiscal year 2018. Revisions in version 3.0 include:
reduction in overall size of the system to allow for increased
transportability on commercial flights, updated suite configuration to
allow for split-based operations, leveraging reach-back capability to
shared resources at a central location. We are working within the
budget to address associated sustainment and operational support
We have established relevant operational capability in support of
the warfighter and continue to experience consistent growth in
operational capability and ability to deliver cyberspace effects.
operationalize the information environment
My third priority is to add cyberspace warfighting expertise to the
MAGTF and to enable operations in the Information Environment. Since
our establishment in 2009, our marines and civilians have implicitly
understood the need to provide a high return on the Marine Corps'
investment in cyber.
The Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) describes a future
operating environment where marines will fight with and for
information, engage in a battle of signatures and be required to
maneuver throughout networks even as we design networks that are
maneuverable themselves. Last year, the Marine Corps developed a new
force design to meet the needs of the MOC. This effort, called Force
2025, includes a DCO-IDM company and electronic warfare company for
each MEF within the MIG. The DCO companies will provide MAGTF
commanders with a trained and organized capability to conduct
activities as maneuver elements for deployed networks, data stores and
weapons system. As an element of the aforementioned MEF Information
Group (MIG), the DCO-IDM Companies will support the defense of MAGTF
key terrain in cyberspace and maintain a commander's ability to command
and control. Their primary function will be mission assurance actions
such, as actively hunting for advanced internal threats that evade
routine security measures, performing incident response actions, and
performing digital forensics.
MARFORCYBER continues to lead the DCO-IDM Training Pilot Program,
which will inform the DCO-IDM Company concept of employment. We
recently hosted DCO-IDM Training at MARFORCYBER, which included command
leadership from all three MIGs as well as members of the DCO-IDM
Companies. The pilot training included hands on training for the
marines of the DCO-IDM Companies provided by MCCWYG as well as training
for MIG leadership on employment, authorities, capabilities, and
command and control. In addition, our Service retained CPTs remain
engaged with the DCO-IDM Companies and continue to provide training
opportunities. Members of DCO-IDM Companies have accompanied our
Service CPTs during real-world operations and this partnership
To increase cyber readiness across the Service, we continue to
emphasize the role of the Commander in the security and defense of the
MCEN, and are conducting Cyber Readiness Visits at commands throughout
the Marine Corps to identify cyber key terrain, assess readiness and
culture, and bolster our defenses. As the Marine Corps' cyber career
field comes online, we will aggressively build cyber operators to
ensure the MAGTFs, bases and stations have the expertise and capacity
to enhance cyber readiness not only at MARFORCYBER, but across the
We have accomplished much in a short period working within the
construct of these lines of effort, but still much work to do.
cyber workforce management
Since my last testimony in May, Headquarters, Marine Corps has
approved my request to grow MARFORCYBER capability and capacity. We are
now working on implementation as we nearly double the size of the
command, adding more than 500 additional personnel, both uniformed and
civilian. This growth includes increased capacity at the MARFORCYBER
Headquarters staff, increasing the size of MCCWYG to focus on improving
our readiness through improved training and application of lessons
learned across the Marine Corps, and creating a fully staffed JFHQ-C.
This growth is programmed to occur over the next 5 years, starting this
year and ending in fiscal year 2022. Our growth is in-line with the
Commandant's vision and Future Force 2025.
At MARFORCYBER we have more than 60 reservists integrated into the
command, both as mobilized marines who are working 365 days a year to
support our mission, along with part time drilling marines who come in
periodically over the course of the year for both individual training
periods and two week Active Duty training periods. Both groups of
reservists provide one of the three functions; MARFORCYBER staff
augmentation, support to MCCYWG, and support to joint, academic, and
experimental activities. Over the last year our Marine reservist have
made numerous contributions, including filling key roles in the
MARFORCYBER staff, as well as augmenting USCYBERCOM in support of
operational requirements. The Marines providing Reserve support to the
MCCYWG leverage skills they have acquired both in Service and from
their civilian work environments. They support and augment CPT
activities based on identified skill gaps. Recently, one of our CPTs
had a scheduled mission and a last minute personnel gap was identified,
and with 48 hours, a Reservist with the requisite skills volunteered to
support the mission. This is just one example of how our Reserve
marines are a force multiplier in the defense of the MCEN.
Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), in conjunction with the current
effort to increase Active Component (AC) DCO capability and capacity,
is developing a Reserve component capability to augment, reinforce, and
sustain AC MEF DCO requirements. The primary capability will be the
activation and phased build of two Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR)
DCO-IDM Companies. These companies will be structurally similar to
their AC counter-part companies and will most often be deployed and
employed at the team level. MARFORRES' vision is to create meaningful
opportunities for the population of marines who leave Active service,
and to capitalize on their success and credentialing as civilians in
the IT sector.
On the civilian side, the Office of Personnel and Management
approved an increase in MARFORCYBER's recruitment and retention
incentives from 25 percent to 50 percent. These additional incentives
have assisted in hiring and maintaining critical cybersecurity civilian
billets within MARFORCYBER. This increase provides us the ability to
negotiate with the workforce, gaining ground against the private
sector's ability to offer more money and incentives. In addition, we
are participating in the DOD's Cyber Excepted Service (CES) Personnel
System. The CES is a personnel system aligned to both Title 10 and
Title 5 provisions that support the human capital lifecycle for
civilian employees engaged in or in support of cyber-related missions.
The implementation of this new personnel system will occur over three
phases, with Phase II beginning in January of this year for the Service
Cyber Components and, extending over a two year implementation process.
Policy that limits the recruitment of recently retired or separated
service members that are cleared and fully trained has become
substantially more difficult after the expiration of the policy
suspending the 180-day cooling off period required before taking a
government position. While there is a waiver process for uniquely
qualified candidates, we have found that the waiver process itself is
cumbersome and not timely, approaching 180 days in many cases. We are
working with key stakeholders to help streamline the waiver process,
which would help decrease the wait time in getting qualified personnel
on board. To ensure that we are not unnecessarily losing our homegrown
talent, the cyber workforce should be waived from this requirement.
As we continue to increase our capability and capacity, we look
forward to occupying our new headquarters building on NSA's campus. I
want to again take the opportunity to thank you for the Military
Construction funding that enabled the development of our new
headquarters. When I was last before you in May, I updated you on the
development of this new operational headquarters facility, designed to
meet the demands of our increased mission. Previously referred to as
the East Campus Building--Marine Corps, I am pleased to inform you that
we have received approval from within the Service and USCYBERCOM to
name our new facility after an American hero, Colonel Alva B. Lasswell.
Colonel Lasswell was a World War II cryptologist credited with
translating an intercepted message that revealed Japan's planned attack
on Midway Island. Colonel Lasswell's work enabled Admiral Nimitz to
appropriately plan history's first great carrier battle at Midway, a
turning point of the war in the Pacific Theater. This building is much
more than just new administrative offices--it will serve as the Marine
Corps' premier cyber warfighting platform, and will provide full
spectrum cyberspace operation capabilities. We are on schedule to
complete our move in to the Lasswell Building by 4th quarter of fiscal
year 2018, and we anticipate a dedication and ribbon-cutting ceremony
to be held sometime this spring.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for
inviting me to testify before you today, and for the support that you
and this Committee have provided our marines and their families.
I am incredibly proud of the strides we have made in
operationalizing cyberspace in support of the MAGTF and joint
warfighter since I was last before you in May, but we have not
succeeded alone. Our successes have come from a growing network of
partnerships across the Service, the Operating Forces, government,
industry, and academia. Cyberspace is a team effort and we are quickly
gaining momentum and buy-in to build a more capable, ready force that
is prepared to fight--and win-tonight in the cyberspace domain.
I look forward to continuing this dialogue and working with members
of this subcommittee in the future.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Major General Reynolds.
Major General Weggeman, you are last because you are the
youngest of the branches.
Senator Rounds. You may begin.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL CHRISTOPHER P. WEGGEMAN, USAF,
COMMANDER, TWENTY-FOURTH AIR FORCE, AND COMMANDER, AIR FORCES
Major General Weggeman. I think that's an honor.
Thank you, Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Nelson,
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today along with my esteemed
cyber colleagues. I look forward to discussing the Air Force's
significant progress in advancing full-spectrum cyberspace
operations and our contributions to joint operations.
I have the distinct honor to lead more than 15,000 total-
force airmen and civilians operating globally as a maneuver-
and-effects force in a contested domain delivering cyber
superiority for our service and in support of our joint
In this domain, threats are growing rapidly and evolving.
Our adversaries are acting with precision and boldness,
utilizing cyberspace to continuously challenge the United
States below the threshold of armed conflict, imposing great
costs on our economy, national unity, and military advantage.
In this ever shifting and competitive terrain, we must remain
vigilant with cyber hygiene, cybersecurity, and threat-specific
defensive operations in order to compete, deter, and win.
The Air Force has invested in the creation, fielding, and
sustainment of an ever increasing portfolio of cyber defensive
and offensive capabilities. Specifically, seven cyber weapon
systems designed to provide a tiered global defense of the Air
Force information network; second, defensive cyber maneuver
forces to actively defend key cyber terrain; and, last,
offensive capabilities to provide all-domain integrated
operational effects to combatant commanders.
The Air Force's Cyber Mission Force Teams are on track to
achieve full operational capability by the end of fiscal year
2018. As of today, 35 of 39 Cyber Mission Force Teams have
declared full operational capability. By comparison,
highlighting our extensive progress, at this time, at this same
hearing 10 months ago, we only had nine teams at FOC [Full
Operational Capability]. Our four remaining teams are expected
to declare FOC by June of 2018, concluding our build phase 3
months ahead of deadline.
Air Force Cyber trains and fights as a total-force team,
harnessing the unique attributes and talents of all
components--regular Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air
Force Reserve. Across 24th Air Force, we employ more than
11,000 full-time and part-time Reserve and Guard personnel
providing support for training, intelligence, full-spectrum
operations, command and control, and capability development.
For our Cyber Mission Force Teams, the Air Force has employed a
built-in total-force strategy with 15 Air National Guard
squadrons and a classic Reserve associates squadron providing
additional trained and ready surge capacity in times of crisis.
Cyberspace operations are powered through partnerships, and
24th Air Force is wholly committed to strengthening our
relationships with other Air Force partners, our sister
Services, interagency counterparts, combatant commanders,
coalition allies, as well as civilian industry partners.
Congressional support continues to be essential to our
significant operational progress, and will only increase in
importance as we move forward.
I will keep my opening remarks brief, as I have provided a
comprehensive update for the committee in my written statement
outlining in detail our significant operational improvements,
specific initiatives, successes, and challenges, of course.
I am honored and humbled to command this magnanimous
organization, and I am inspired every day by the innovative
spirit, the patriotism, the sacrifice, and audacity of our Air
Force cyber warriors. They are, by far, our Nation's most
powerful cyber weapon system.
I look forward to your questions and the ensuing dialogue.
[The prepared statement of General Weggeman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Major General Chris P. Weggeman
Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today, along with Assistant Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rapuano and my
fellow Service Cyber Component Commanders. I look forward to discussing
the Air Force's significant progress in advancing full-spectrum
cyberspace operations and our contributions to joint operations
globally. I have the distinct honor to lead the audacious men and women
of the 24th Air Force, Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER), and Joint Forces
Headquarters Cyber (JFHQC) Air Force. Our headquarters is located at
Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas and we have over fifteen
thousand Total Force airmen and civilians on-mission around the world,
diligently increasing our capability to deliver full spectrum cyber
capabilities and effects in support of the Air Force, the Joint Force,
and our Nation.
AFCYBER warriors are operating globally as a maneuver and effects
force in a contested domain, delivering cyber superiority for our
Service and in support of our joint partners. Our forces exist to
preserve our freedom of maneuver in, from, and through cyberspace while
denying our adversaries the same. Our Command places significant
emphasis on operationalizing cyberspace as a warfighting domain across
the range of military operations and continues to evolve our tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to provide ready cyber forces to
Combatant and Air Force Commanders across the globe.
As Commander, 24th Air Force, I report directly to the Commander of
Air Force Space Command and am responsible within the Air Force for
classic Title 10 organize, train, and equip functions. Twentyfourth Air
Force also serves as the Cyber Security Service Provider (CSSP) for our
Air Force networks and other designated key cyber terrain. Under the
AFCYBER hat, I am the Air Force's Cyber Component Commander who
presents and employs Air Force cyber forces to United States Cyber
Command. These ready forces plan and execute all-domain integrated,
full-spectrum, cyberspace operations in support of assigned Service and
Combatant Command missions. Finally, under my third hat, as Commander,
JFHQC Air Force, I lead a United States Cyber Command subordinate
headquarters with delegated Operational Control of assigned cyber
Combat Mission Forces employed in a general support role to both United
States Strategic Command and United States European Command. At 24th
AF/AFCYBER, we execute our assigned cyberspace operations missions
through six distinct but inter-related lines of effort--Build, Operate,
Secure, Defend, Extend, and Engage, or what we refer to as ``BOSDEE''.
defense is our #1 mission
In our 24th Air Force and AFCYBER roles, we build, operate, secure,
and defend the Air Force networks every day to ensure these networks
remain available and secure for assigned missions, functions, and
tasks. The broader mission includes base infrastructure, business, and
logistics systems, as well as mission and weapon systems; in total,
providing on-demand capabilities to approximately one million users
worldwide. In 2012, the Air Force CIO designated 24th Air Force as the
CSSP for all systems within the Air Force enterprise. In this capacity,
we are responsible for protecting, monitoring, analyzing, detecting,
and responding to malicious cyber activity across the Air Force
network. Our reliance on cyberspace continues to grow and we are still
scaling capacity to execute this expansive mission requirement. We are
working closely with Headquarters Air Force and Army Research
Laboratories to ensure our threat- and risk-driven defensive operations
preserve our freedom of maneuver in, from, and through cyberspace while
denying our adversaries the same. In 2016, we instituted the Air Force
Information Network Defense Campaign Plan and have since made great
strides in improving our cybersecurity posture and compliance with both
USCYBERCOM orders and industry-recognized cyber hygiene best practices.
A major cyberspace security and defense success over the last year
has been the employment of the Automated Remediation and Asset
Discovery (ARAD) capability suite across the AF enterprise. ARAD is an
instantiation of the commercial Tanium product, enabling operators to
perform vulnerability management, incident response, system health
diagnostics, as well as asset identification and optimization across
our AF network in a matter of seconds to minutes vice days to weeks
using previous capabilities. In May 2017, at first onset of the
WannaCry Ransomware attack, our cyber crews employed ARAD capabilities
to quickly identify, prioritize and secure all vulnerable systems
across our enterprise terrain within hours; resulting in zero
infections on Air Force networks. By contrast, the 2013 Heartbleed
virus remediation effort took 8 months to achieve the same results. The
demonstrated operational power and potential of ARAD is truly
revolutionary, and we are diligently experimenting, evolving, and
developing operational employment concepts, use cases, and applications
to close key mission-capability gaps in close partnership with the
cybersecurity in the 21st century
In the contested cyberspace domain, threats are growing rapidly and
evolving. Our adversaries are acting with precision and boldness;
utilizing cyberspace to attack the United States below the threshold of
armed conflict; imposing great costs on our economy, national unity,
and military advantage. In this ever-shifting and competitive terrain,
we must remain vigilant with cyber hygiene, cyber security, and threat-
specific defensive operations in order to compete, deter, and win.
The Air Force has invested in the creation, fielding and
sustainment of seven cyber weapon systems designed to provide a tiered
global defense of the Air Force Information Network. We have also
fielded defensive cyber maneuver forces and capabilities to engage
threats able to bypass defenses, and offensive cyber forces and
capabilities to provide all-domain integrated operational effects to
Last year, I discussed three transformational efforts that 24th Air
Force, in collaboration with our Service staff and Major Commands,
developed and implemented in order to transition our force and
Information Technology posture towards a 21st century, Commander and
cyberspace operator driven, threat and risk-based mission assurance
cyber-ecosystem. These three major efforts include; 1) evolving towards
Enterprise Information Technology as a Service (EITaaS), 2) maturing
and resourcing our Air Force CIO Cyber Squadron Initiative and inherent
Mission Defense Teams, and finally 3) the development and fielding of
Air Force Material Command's Cyber Resiliency of Weapons Systems
(CROWS) Office capabilities. These three major endeavors, deliver a
coherent approach to cyber security, cyber defense, weapon system
resiliency, and the ever critical ``every airmen a sentry'' cyber
hygiene culture across our Air Force.
Over the past year the EITaaS concept has evolved. EITaaS is a
network reference architecture designed to smartly divest the costly
and manpower intensive network operations, maintenance, and customer-
service support demands of our Service's dated, Information Technology
infrastructure via outsourcing basic services to commercial and
industry partners. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force has approved
this plan of action and requested an accelerated implementation
starting in fiscal year 2018. The Air Force has identified the first
seven bases to implement EITaaS to determine the service planning
necessary to capture further requirements, learn appropriate command
and control and security provisions and transition airmen from NetOps
missions and functions to cyber-based system defense and mission
assurance. A companion effort within EITaaS is our on-going Cloud
Hosted Enterprise Services (CHES).
Cloud Hosted Enterprise Services (CHES), started in 2016, provides
collaboration (email, Skype for business, SharePoint) as Software-as-a-
Service. It is currently securely hosting over 187,000 user accounts
across ten bases. This service delivery model has been praised for
improved network performance, reliability and scalability. EITaaS will
integrate into on-going Joint Information Environment (JIE).
Joint Regional Security Stack (JRSS) migrations and fielding
continues in close partnership with the United States Army and the
Defense Information Services Agency (DISA). All DOD components will
ultimately utilize JRRS. To date, we have successfully migrated four
regions, to include roughly four hundred thousand users across 105
locations. While JRSS still requires TTP development and a more mature
operational employment framework, this joint, shared security standard
provides state of the art cyber security capabilities at our Service
(Tier-2) AFNET gateway boundaries, continuing to add strength to our
The CMF Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) and Air Force Mission Defense
Teams (MDTs) continue to provide Active cyber defense at all echelons
of Air Force organizations; delivering enterprise mission assurance in
a contested domain even in the presence of a maneuvering enemy. Mission
Defense Teams (an on-going ``pilot'' program across all Major Commands)
are small 4 to 6 person teams; trained, equipped and task-organized to
survey, secure, and protect key cyber terrain at wing and below in
order to deliver cyber-based mission assurance for unit's assigned
missions and weapon systems. This initiative employs a Commander and
mission-driven force employment model. Mission Defense Teams employ
cyber security and defense tactics, techniques, and procedures in
addition to their own suite of tailored cyber defense sensors and tools
to provide Active defense at the base level. Since 2016, the Air Force
has executed 45 Mission Defense Team ``Pathfinder'' initiatives across
a diverse set of Air Force missions and organizations to test and
validate the operational concept and cyber defensive tool-set
requirements. These ``Pathfinder'' units focused on functional mission
analysis to identify key-cyber terrain, mission-planning, and network
characterization. Leveraging the ``Pathfinder'' lessons learned, the
Air Force is now working to optimize the MDT force construct, training
needs, intelligence support requirements, and tool-set. MDT efforts
will continue to be synchronized with our CSSP, CPT, and CROWS missions
to provide an integrated, layered security and defensive posture for
Air Force weapon systems.
The third transformational effort is Air Force Materiel Command's
Cyber Resiliency of Weapons Systems, or CROWS office (in response to
the 2016 NDAA section 1647 requirement). Their on-going mission is to
increase cyber resiliency of Air Force weapon systems across our
acquisition and life cycle management processes to maintain mission
effective capability under adverse conditions. CROWS has two primary
objectives; first, to ``bake-in'' cybersecurity into developmental and
future mission and weapons systems, and second; to employ a prioritized
threat- and risk-based, cyber vulnerability assessment of existing
systems to best mitigate risk to missions and forces. Based on the NDAA
language, the Joint Staff required the Air Force to evaluate 50 legacy
weapon systems. To date, the Air Force has begun 23 weapon system
evaluations and is on track to complete all 50 by the end of 2019
(deadline set by NDAA.) Their roadmap to cyber resiliency advances from
systems assurance to the institutionalization of cyber security, cyber
hygiene, and resiliency across all Air Force weapons systems. Their
comprehensive strategy includes sustainable and programmable tools,
infrastructure, and a skilled cyber workforce of operators, system
engineers, and acquisition professionals to deliver end-to-end mission
and weapon system cyber security. While still relatively new, the CROWS
Cyber Incident Coordination cell has proved invaluable throughout this
past year, working in coordination with 24th Air Force, as
vulnerabilities have been found in cyber key terrain of mission
systems. The office will continue to mature and enhance the cyber
security posture of new and existing weapon systems.
The combined effects and capabilities of these three major Air
Force transformational efforts, plus our ongoing AFCYBER cyber security
campaign plan leveraging signals intelligence (SIGINT) and all-source
intelligence, industry, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
and DISA best practices, provides the Air Force with a full-spectrum,
coherent framework for generating threat- and risk-based mission
assurance for our networks, infrastructure and mission/weapon systems.
This mission assurance strategy is reinforced by an acquisition and
life-cycle sustainment enterprise empowered, innovating, and resourced
to deliver cyber security and resilience for our Air Force.
af data office
Data is the digital currency that underpins multi-domain
operations, decision-making and command and control. For a Service to
be a leader in the application of artificial intelligence to increase
warfighting resilience and lethality, it must first be a leader in
data. To this end, the Air Force has stood up the Air Force Data
Office, and appointed a Chief Data Officer, Maj Gen Kim Crider USAFR.
The Air Force is the first Service to create an enterprise level Data
Office reporting directly to the Service Secretary.
The Air Force Data Office has developed a ``VAULT'' strategy,
centered on ensuring relevant data is--Visible, Accessible,
Understandable, Linked, and Trustworthy. They are diligently working on
data science application use-cases across a cross-section of Air Force
missions and functions to generate both visible quick-wins and a
greater understanding of the required enterprise-data architecture and
operational employment concepts required to deliver desired outcomes.
Data driven multi-domain Command and Control is the path to integrated
Joint operations whose operational timing/tempo lives inside our
adversaries ``OODA'' loop, overwhelming their decision cycles,
delivering the operational advantage and initiative to our Joint
cyber mission force: transitioning from build to readiness
The Air Force is on track to achieve Full Operational Capability
(FOC) for all Service CMF teams by the end of fiscal year 2018. As of 1
March 2018, 35 of 39 Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams have declared FOC,
and the four remaining teams are expected to declare FOC by June 2018,
3 months ahead of the deadline. AFCYBER has developed a team-by-team,
name-byname plan that ensures all teams will achieve FOC on time. This
significant milestone is due to the years of hard work by the Service
and USCYBERCOM, with the support of Congress.
While we remain laser-focused on building and delivering our
Service teams to FOC, we continue, in earnest, to generate and review
team readiness leveraging well-established institutional standards and
metrics (Personnel, Training, Equipment and Supply.) We are working
with our Service and USCYBERCOM to institutionalize formal CMF Defense
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) definitions, metrics and integration.
This will normalize CMF force presentation and force management while
generating critical mission capability and capacity gap analysis needed
for Commanders to drive force readiness. As Admiral Roger's stated,
``Commissioning a warship--while an important event--does not make that
ship mission ready.'' Readiness and lethality are paramount. The Air
Force continues to work to recruit and retain top talent, develop
modularized and agile training, build our own military operations
infrastructure, as well as deliver organic combat capabilities to the
Joint war fight (these initiatives are discussed below). We have made
great strides, but a lot of work still needs to be done to ensure our
CMF crew members are proficient at their duties and the whole team is
ready and able to perform assigned missions and tasks.
The Air Force has taken a conscientious and deliberate approach to
building our Service cyber workforce. While CMF remains the #1
priority, the Air Force is actively developing cyber airmen and
civilians that have the proper balance of technical and tactical/
operational competence needed to fully integrate cyberspace into joint
military operations. The Air Force is still building the cyber bench,
employing a deliberate approach to human-capital professional force
At 24th Air Force we know the most critical element in cyberspace
operations is not copper or silicon, its carbon. Our innovative and
audacious airmen are the centerpiece to our AFCYBER capabilities, our
most powerful weapon system by far; they have demonstrated time and
again their agility and dedication towards generating mission outcomes
for our Service, the Joint Force and our Nation. We have thrust them
directly from build to battle throughout the CMF build evolutions.
Therefore, we remain committed to recruiting, training, developing, and
retaining the right cyber talent. I must thank Congress for increasing
our agility in shaping our workforce; the new Cyber Excepted Service
authorities will help us recruit, manage, and retain cyber expertise in
a highly competitive talent market. With support from the NDAA, the Air
Force now has the ability to directly commission cyberspace operations
officers, the first two of whom will be entering the force early this
year, one as a Second Lieutenant, and one as a First Lieutenant. We
have also instituted retention bonuses for officers and enlisted within
the cyber career field in order to preserve the experience of our
trained and ready airmen. We owe it to the incredible men and women
that make-up these teams to see they are properly trained, equipped,
and prepared for all assigned missions. There must be an evolving
dialogue centered on resourcing and procuring the capabilities and
capacity required for our CMF to be properly postured for success
beyond the build.
``one force'' in afcyber
Air Force Cyber trains and fights as one Total Force team with all
components; Regular Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force
Reserve. Across 24th Air Force, we employ more than eleven thousand
full-time and part time reservists, providing support for training,
intelligence, operations, and command and control, incorporating units
in 31 states.
We are delivering cyber forces in support of the Department's CMF
framework fully integrated with our Total Force partners in the Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserves. These ``One-Force'' teams are
providing United States Cyber Command with capabilities to defend the
nation, support Combatant Commanders, and defend the DODIN. For CMF,
the Air Force has 15 Air National Guard squadrons supporting two Cyber
Protection Teams and one National Mission Team. At the conclusion of
our CMF build-phase, the Air Force's Cyber Protection Force will have a
50 percent surge capacity built-in with 10 Cyber Protection Teams in
ready-reserve status and available during times of crisis. By the end
of Calendar Year 2018, all 15 Air National Guard squadrons will have
been mobilized and have ``on-mission'' experience under their belts.
Similarly, the Air Force Reserves provide the equivalent of a full
Cyber Protection Team and are currently integrated with Active Duty
forces. This represents a significant portion of the Air Force's
overall contributions and will draw on more than 1,100 Reserve
component members. These Total Force professionals bring a powerful
pedigree of experience and expertise across the spectrum of cyberspace
missions. Many have years if not decades of experience working in
prominent civilian IT, Infrastructure and Industry positions, which
bolsters our cyber mission-effectiveness on many levels.
The Air National Guard has already completed five extremely
successful Cyber Protection Team six-month mobilizations (254 cyber
operators) in support of United States Northern Command's air defense
missions and associated key-cyber terrain security and defense.
The Reserve's 854th Cyber Operations Squadron in conjunction with
the Tennessee Air National Guard provide over 300 personnel to augment
and provide continuity of operations for the Air Force's Cyber
The Total Force also plays a crucial role in our Engineering and
Installation (E&I) and Combat Communications capabilities; consisting
of over 75 percent of the Air Force's available E&I and Combat
Communications personnel. Twentyfourth Air Force E&I Citizen Airmen
have been on site executing USSTRATCOM's new HQ cabling and IT-network/
systems fit-out for over 3 years, delivering an estimated DOD cost
avoidance of over $400 million over original contract bids. Our 5th
Combat Communications Group continues to deliver and extend combat
capabilities at the tactical edge. In 2017, our 5th Combat
Communications Group deployed more than 131 personnel to over 25 sites
in 14 countries. In February 2017, the 5th Combat Communications Group
deployed airmen to stand up the initial communications at a bare base
in Syria. The team provided communications support to the site's Senior
Airfield Authority who managed the ramp and airspace for the only U.S.
military logistics hub in country and home to units from the Army,
Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Department of State. In fiscal
year 2017, the Air Force garnered $42.7 million to modernize the
capabilities for 23 combat communications units. These new capabilities
empower our combat communications forces to be better prepared and more
efficiently support Combatant Commanders' worldwide.
In June 2018, 24th Air Force will host the second-annual state
Adjutants General, Assistant Adjutants General, and Wing Commanders
Cyber Symposium. Improving operational awareness focused on the
mission, Commanders' priorities, and resources are key to forging a
lasting partnership with our Total Force brethren. This gathering will
continue to enable critical collaboration and information flow
regarding personnel, equipment, requirements, and authorities and
generate insights into optimizing force presentation and harnessing our
citizen airmen's industry expertise to solve tough cyber operations
Cyberspace operations are a ``team sport'' and 24th Air Force/
AFCYBER is wholly committed to strengthening our relationships with
other Air Force partners, our sister Services, interagency
counterparts, Combatant Commanders, coalition allies, as well as
civilian industry partners. Given the proximity of our headquarters and
close mission alignment, 25th Air Force continues to be a critical
strategic partner across all of our missions. The 25th Air Force
Commander, Major General Mary O'Brien, has been a vital CMF force
provider and steadfast ``Wingman'' as we partner to generate enduring
force readiness and operationalization of the cyber domain.
support to combatant commands
Cyberspace is an inherently global domain that impacts every
function of our Joint Force. This force is increasingly dependent upon
cyber capabilities to conduct modern military operations. JFHQ-C AF
supports assigned Combatant and subordinate Joint Force Commanders by
providing full-spectrum, all domain integrated cyberspace maneuver and
effects in support of their assigned missions. JFHQ-C AF delivers
``Cyber IN War'' for our Combatant Commanders. As Commander, I retain
Operational Control of assigned Service and joint Cyber Mission Forces
providing general support to both United States European Command and
United States Strategic Command.
We continue to operationalize and mature cyber operations into
Tier-1 Combatant Command Exercises, concluding our third exercise in
January. Our continued involvement in major exercises enables fully
integrated joint planning, maneuver, targeting and fires coordination
for cyberspace maneuver and effects operations. It also drives
Combatant Command awareness and trust of cyberspace capabilities. Our
team effectively integrated within existing, institutional planning,
targeting and fires processes to provide cyber effects across the full
range of military operations within the exercise. Our capabilities and
effects were fully synchronized with the timing and tempo dictated by
the supported Commander. Cyberspace domain operations were employed
using extant processes, fully integrated with all other classic
warfighting domains propagating force awareness, comprehension and
intrinsic value across all participants, agnostic of professional
pedigree or experience.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff furthered this goal by
updating the cyberspace operations command and control framework last
fall, directing USCYBERCOM establish Cyber Operations--Integrated
Planning Elements (CO-IPEs) at each Combatant Command. JFHQC AF has
administrative control of the CO-IPEs at USEUCOM, USSTRATCOM, and
USTRANSCOM to plan, synchronize, integrate, and de-conflict cyber
operations with Combatant Command plans and operations. We are
partnering closely with our Service to build and operationalize these
new units to full operational capability within the next three to five
The 24th Air Force understands the cyberspace domain is primarily
provisioned by private industry and our ability to collaborate with our
industry partners benefits the nation's cybersecurity posture. We have
developed Cooperative Research and Development Agreements with 20
industry leaders in Information Technology, Defense, and Banking to
share and collaborate on innovative technologies and concepts. These
collaborative efforts allow us to advance science and technology in
support of cyberspace operations, as well as share best practices with
industry partners. We continue to leverage this program and are
currently in the process of enhancing our partnerships with academia.
We employ private sector technology and expertise to build,
operate, secure, and defend the Air Force Network. Right now, within my
headquarters and operations center, we have experts from leading
technology companies (Microsoft, Cisco, Symantec, AT&T) working hand in
hand to develop solutions to both current problems and future concepts.
In cyberspace, innovation is crucial. Over the past two years, we
have synchronized with cyber innovation centers of excellence across
the Service, Department, and Nation, including the Air Force Academy
CyberWorx, Defense Digital Service (DDS), Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental (DIUx), the Cyber Proving Ground, Air Force and National
Research Labs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA.)
In December 2017, in cooperation with Air Force Defense Digital
Service, we launched the second instantiation of our Hack the Air Force
program. A bug bounty program, Hack the Air Force continues to showcase
how a diverse, crowdsourced pool of private sector, ethical hackers can
help quickly identify critical security vulnerabilities across public
facing Air Force assets. This event included 24 top hackers working
alongside 24th Air Force cyber operators to both hack and remediate
vulnerabilities in real-time. Hackers hailed from 32 international
partner nations, including members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, Five Eyes nations, and Sweden. This event was a major
success; discovering over 106 valid vulnerabilities and allowing our
cyber operators to gain from the expertise of the hackers as well as
garner real time remediation experience.
We are also fortunate to have a long-standing close relationship
with San Antonio, Texas, also referred to as ``Cyber City USA.'' The
local community has committed significant resources to support the
growth of cybersecurity both locally and nationally. Our leadership
team participates in a variety of civic leader engagements to share
lessons related to cybersecurity. By partnering together, 24th Air
Force supports a broad array of programs designed to reach young
students, essential to our nation's success in this arena. A good
example is the Air Force Association's ``Cyber Patriot'' STEM
initiative in which our airmen mentor cyber teams as part of a
nationwide competition involving nearly 10,000 high school and middle
challenges and opportunities
As a new and rapidly maturing warfighting domain, cyberspace
operations continue to make huge advancements in the operationalization
of missions and forces. However, there are many challenges in our
critical path towards delivering required capability and capacity for
assigned missions. At the macro-level, these challenges fall into four
broad categories; (1) manpower and training, (2) cybersecurity of
weapons systems, (3) key enablers to cyberspace operations, and (4)
professionalization of the cyberspace domain workforce. These broad
categories closely mirror Admiral Rogers' focus areas for United States
Cyber Command and the Service Cyber Components. His charges direct us
to secure and defend weapons and mission systems and the data that
resides on them, as well as increase speed, agility, precision,
readiness and lethality of an effectively manned and trained cyber
workforce in coordination with Guard and Reserve forces to deliver all
domain integrated effects across all phases of operations that support
DOD strategy and priorities. While the primary challenges remain the
same, and acknowledging there is much more to do, the Air Force has
made and continues to make great progress along these lines of effort.
Manpower and Training
Success in our missions depends on a trained and ready force. As
stated above, congressional support has been instrumental in increasing
our agility in scaling and shaping our workforce. A dedicated Civilian
Cyber Recruiting cell was established at the Air Force Personnel Center
in January 2017 to focus on cyber recruiting. In 2017, the cell
completed 30 recruiting events including cyber collegiate competitions
and technology events. The Air Force has expedited civilian cyber
hiring through the use of Direct Hire and Expedited Hire appointments,
reducing the hiring time by about 35 percent. For our military members,
we are creating aptitude assessments to find the right personnel and
modifying our cyber personnel paths including monetary incentives to
retain them. Monetary incentives range from $300 per month for our new
enlisted cyber operators to $60,000 over the period of four years for
some of our officers.
We continue to make great strides, but challenges still remain. As
discussed last year, manpower deficiencies in our units that operate,
secure, and defend our networks still force a constant high-pressure
deployed-in-place operating environment of competing priorities and
risk decisions with insufficient force structure to meet critical
operational demands. The EITaaS effort will help alleviate some of this
burden, but should not be viewed as a complete panacea.
In fiscal year 2019, USCYBERCOM transitions the CMF training
mission to the Services. In preparation for the receipt of this
mission, we continue to make our training pipeline more adaptive and
responsive to operational needs. We have enhanced our training
capacity, increasing the annual training throughput of our enlisted
cyber initial skills training schoolhouse by 54 percent (211 to 324
students per year) beginning in CY17. The Air Force also stood up a
local San Antonio detachment to our advanced cyber formal training unit
effectively doubling capacity there. This effort has allowed the Air
Force to execute the CMF TFI Strategy and keep pace with the ever-
increasing cyberspace operator requirements outside of CMF.
Additionally, the Air Force is developing specialized courses to
deliver the right training at the right time to our cyber operators. We
have created a new Cyber Intelligence Initial Qualification Training
and a provisional offensive cyber operations formal training unit. In
June 2018, 24th Air Force will host our first interactive operator
course utilizing our organic military cyber operations platform.
Looking toward the future, we are building a $14.2 million, 36,000
square foot schoolhouse facility at our main cyber formal training unit
at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Groundbreaking was on 10 August 2017 for a
scheduled completion in late fiscal year 2019.
The Service Staff in conjunction with Air Education and Training
Command are currently developing custom Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)
training tracks based on a ``modular syllabus'' that utilizes the
latest training assessment innovations and provides placement
flexibility through the training pipeline. The concept allows airmen
with intrinsic cyber competency to ``test-out'' of portions or modules
of the curriculum. This methodology provides incentives and
opportunities to our airmen who possess an advanced cyber aptitude,
whether via formal or informal training or education, to advance
through the pipeline and arrive on station at an operational unit in a
significantly shorter time frame ready to contribute to our mission. In
order for this concept to be effective, resourcing is required to
design and validate aptitude assessment tools and develop an agile and
responsive curriculum development framework that keeps pace with the
advancement of technology, tradecraft, and our adversaries.
Cybersecurity of Weapon Systems
We must continue to increase investment towards system cyber
security and defense. The majority of all sustainment dollars today
goes toward functional capability upgrades in any mission or weapons
system program. Our current process of ``bolting on'' weapons system
cyber security after the fact adversely impacts all three critical
systems-acquisition and sustainment attributes: cost, schedule, and
performance. It is more complex and expensive to defend mission systems
where there is no inherent or ``baked in'' cybersecurity framework. As
previously mentioned, the CROWS office is getting after this today as
directed by the NDAA, but much more needs to be done from a resource
and execution perspective to generate the tempo and scale of action
necessary to secure our expansive weapon system portfolio.
Key Cyber Enablers
The Department has begun planning for and resourcing a multiple
phenomenology approach to generating ``access'' to required cyber-
space. Each Service is exploring multiple pathways to get to the target
and deliver effects against our adversaries in cyberspace. The Air
Force has planned and is provisioning its own organic military cyber
operations platform, for Joint CMF use, separate and distinct from NSA.
The Air Force's organic cyber military operations platform completed
its proof of concept mission in September 2017 and is now being
utilized by our CMF forces. Its continued development, along with agile
and responsive tool development capabilities, will ensure assigned AF
and Joint CMF mission priorities and requirements are being met.
Professional Development of our Workforce
The Air Force established a Cyber Project Task Force (PROTAF) to
monitor progress, identify challenges, and collaborate on manpower and
personnel efforts to ``get after'' building the Air Force portion of
the CMF. The Air Force also instituted a Service-wide policy to enforce
back-to-back CMF tours for our CMF-trained personnel, thereby ensuring
proper return on investment, and is reviewing the current Active Duty
Service Commitment model for certain cyber operations work roles to
ensure proper return on investment. Furthermore, the Air Force
recognized the positive value of spreading cyber-mindedness and
experience across our AF enterprise, just like air and space
operations, to ensure cyber competency across all mission areas and
In order to become the challenger in the cyber domain and operate
effectively across the range of military operations, we must address
our current risk posture. The natural evolution and progression of
cyberspace operations (maneuver and effects forces) from NSA's long-
standing SIGINT and CNE missions (intelligence forces) and operations
brings with it a well-established intrinsic risk posture to gird
foreign intelligence collection operations in an extremely congested
and contested operational Domain.
In this light, today's cyberspace operations are overly risk-driven
vice being mission-driven and risk-informed more in line with the other
classic domains of warfare. USCYBERCOM and the Service Cyber Components
require a more responsive and agile mission-oriented risk framework
which delivers the speed, agility and operational fighting tempo needed
to seize the initiative and advantage in our battle space.
We must challenge the Domain's outmoded concepts of sovereignty,
attribution, and intelligence gain/loss calculus which overly constrain
our ability to achieve cyberspace superiority across assigned missions
and functions. Our risk framework needs to drive operational outcomes
and be properly informed by both the war-winning and risk mitigation
imperatives. We are in constant contact in cyberspace with multiple
adversaries daily. We must persist, at times we must fallback and cede
terrain, and we must accept some level of calculated capability
attrition (access, platform, tools), all while harnessing our innate
National capability and capacity to out think, out maneuver and out
punch our adversaries. This is the recipe for eroding their confidence
in cyberspace, imposing costs, and challenging their belief system for
achieving benefit thru malicious cyber actions. In parallel, we need to
effectively and transparently communicate the legitimacy of our actions
in/from/thru cyberspace so our Nation and our Allies fully understand
and support the actions we take to secure and defend our combined
National Security interests, our freedoms and our unmatched quality of
I am proud of the tremendous strides we are making to
operationalize cyber capabilities in support of joint warfighters and
defense of the nation. Despite the challenges of growing and operating
across a contested and diverse mission-set with a rapidly maturing work
force, it is clear Air Force networks are better defended, Combatant
Commanders are receiving more of the critical cyber capabilities and
effects they require, and our departments' critical infrastructure is
more secure due to our cyber warriors' tireless efforts. They are true
professionals in every sense of the word.
Congressional support was essential to the substantial operational
progress made and will only increase in importance as we move forward.
Without question, resource stability in the years ahead will best
enable our continued success in developing airmen while growing our
capability and capacity to operate in, through and from the cyberspace
domain. Resource stability will also foster the innovation and
creativity required to face the emerging threats ahead while
maintaining a capable cyber force ready to act if our nation calls upon
I am honored and humbled to command this magnanimous organization
and look forward to a thorough and continuing dialogue.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Major General Weggeman.
Senator Sasse has been a regular attendee at these, and yet
he always seems to have to leave before he can ask any
questions, and so, I'm going to defer my questions.
Senator Sasse, you may begin.
Senator Sasse. Being 101st in seniority has some downsides,
it turns out.
Senator Sasse. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you all for your service. Thanks for being here.
I'd like to talk about the Presidential Policy Directive
20. Does it work? If not, what's the conversation like between
you all and DOD and the NSC [National Security Council] about
that? Could you talk us through, a little bit, about how long
it takes in the process, from beginning to end? All of you,
but, General Nakasone, if you want to start.
Lieutenant General Nakasone. So, PPD-20, or Presidential
Policy Directive 20, the methodology upon which we get approval
for offensive cyberspace operations, is a work in progress, in
terms of the way that we've approached getting approvals. I
would say we have had a tremendous amount of success with
ongoing operations with regards to JTF [Joint Task Force] Ares
and our fight against ISIS. That has been, certainly, something
that has allowed us to make a case for the things that we need
to have done. Is the process perfect? No, it's not. But, this
is a constant dialogue that goes on between ourselves,
certainly Cyber Command, and the Department of Defense, and
then the National Security Council, Senator.
Senator Sasse. Admiral.
Vice Admiral Gilday.Sir, thanks for the opportunity to
comment on this subject.
So, as General Nakasone mentioned, really we have not--PPD-
20 hasn't kept us from delivering effects when we have been
required to deliver them. It is intended, or was intended, to
be a very deliberate process in determining when and how we
would deliver cyber effects against--whether it's a sovereign
nation or whether it's a rogue actor. I think that--as an
overarching policy, I think that it's a good framework. There
are built-in mechanisms within that framework to accelerate
authorities if we need them. If the Nation needs to get
authorities quicker, it exists.
But, as General Nakasone said, we have learned a lot in the
last two and a half years. The world has changed a lot in the
last two and a half years, in terms of how people act in this
space. I do think that we're learning from that, and I do think
it's informing policymakers. I think people are marching
together to make improvements.
Senator Sasse. So, you can cite specific examples of times
when the process has worked, but I assume, if we were in a
classified space, there would also be specific operations that
you'd tell us about that you were never able to carry out
because of how slow it is. I've heard other cyber warriors
refer to PPD-20 as molasses. Is it the case? What can we talk
about, in a nonclassified setting, about specific operations--I
guess not talking about specific operations, but what general
takeaways do we have about times when it's been too slow to
enable you to act in cases when you had targets that you would
have liked to have pursued?
Major General Reynolds. Well, I can't speak to any of the
operational specifics, but I'll give you a perspective, to your
original question. Again, you know, policy is not my realm, as
the senior military operational commander, but I'll give you
some observations of PPD-20.
Now, when I first came into the domain in 2012, that's when
we were writing PPD-20. So, think about the maturation and the
pace of change since then. So, 6 years later, we still have the
same PPD-20. It started out as kind of an authorities-driven
policy directive. I think what we're going to now is, we're
learning now that we have capability, capacity to actually do
more, we need more of a mission- and risk-informed policy that
allows us a broader spectrum of authorities and risks that
would allow us the pace, the timing and tempo of operations, I
think, to match our adversaries in cyberspace. So, I think
that's where we're going now, that we're showing that we have
capability, capacity, we're proving ourselves that we can be
responsible and credible actors in this space. I think we
should be looking at: How do we broader--how do we create a
broader spectrum of threat- and risk-based authorities and
delegation so that we can respond with greater tempo.
Senator Sasse. I want to follow up on the standardized
delegation question, but generally I think you were trying to
Major General Reynolds. Senator, I would--I mean, I think
what you've heard from the other Commanders is exactly that, in
that everything that we are learning--I think, every day, we
are learning more and more about the delivery of effects in
this domain. To General Weggeman's point, it's really a matter
of: Where's the risk, and who should accept that risk and--from
a decisionmaking perspective? I certainly think there's some
room to have more discussion on this, on this PPD, sir.
Senator Sasse. If you were, sort of, briefing the
Armed Services Committee on what standardized delegations
might look like for all of our allies, could you give examples
of cases where our allies might have some delegated authorities
that have been routinized that you'd like us to look at?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. I'd--I
would welcome--probably do that in a different session.
Senator Sasse. I think there are a number of us who'd like
to follow up on that and be tutored by you. Again, with all
respect to your operational responsibilities, not your
policymaking responsibilities, but those of us who are in a
policymaking role know well that we need the tutorials of
people who are actually living this, day in and day out. So,
I'm over time, here, but we'll follow up on that, and invite
you back in a classified space.
Senator Rounds. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, we're here in the family, so
you go ahead.
Senator Rounds. All right, thank you. I appreciate it.
I'm going to follow up kind of along the same lines that
Senator Sasse has begun. I think it's a good line to begin
I'd kind of like to know what limitations and current
policy most immediately challenge your ability to operate
effectively in cyberspace, if I could. I'll just open this up.
We're all in the family here. I recognize that we're in an open
session, but we're talking about policy and the difference--and
let me perhaps preface this a little bit.
We've got thousands of years of knowing how armies have
learned how to interact with one another on a battlefield.
There are norms that have been established. The same with the
law of the sea. There are norms that have been established, in
terms of how we treat one another, military to military,
military to civilian, and so forth. Even in the air, we have
norms about how one aircraft treats another aircraft when there
are incidents. Space is perhaps a little bit newer. Most
certainly, the norms there have not been completely
When it comes to cyber, the norms are still being
established. Our expectation, in many cases, is based upon what
norms in other domains of war have already been established. It
would seem that our adversaries have not taken the same
approach and are not bound by the same respect for norms as
perhaps we are.
So, let me bring this back. Again, what are the
limitations, in terms of how we look at and how we view the
norms, when it comes to our offensive capabilities? What are
the limitations that we respect that perhaps you would see in--
Senator Sasse has indicated our allies perhaps have other
alternatives or other policies established. We have peer
competitors that most certainly do some things that we would
not consider to be appropriate at this point, or we are
restricted from doing. Do you have any examples of that or
things that you have seen that have been frustrating to you
with regard to their offensive movements that we simply do not
Lieutenant General Nakasone. So, Senator, normally we're a
very talkative bunch. I would offer that we can provide the
perspective of our operational lessons learned. Let me take it
from that aspect, because I think that's an important piece.
So, when we look at the domain, there are really three
things that I think all of us are very interested to have a
discussion on. First of all is the discussion of risk. Who
accepts the risk? What is the risk? How you describe the risk?
What are the mitigations for that risk? They're elements that I
think that we talk a lot about when we're--when we are in
discussions and planning for cyberspace operations.
Second thing is: What's the operational gain/loss? If we do
this mission, or we don't do this mission, what is the
opportunity cost for those actions?
The third element, I would say, is: What's the intel gain/
loss? That is obviously a question that is offered by many of
us and also those in the interagency. I think that that is
perhaps the area that all of us, based upon our operational
experiences, have spent some time with.
Major General Reynolds. Yes, Senator. I guess I--I think I
need to offer a thought, based upon Senator Nelson quoting my
written statement, because I think this gets right to it.
So, you know, to me, the cornerstone document is our new
National Defense Strategy, right? So, compete, deter, and win.
So, if I was looking at, you know, a broad set of policies, you
know, I don't want to act like the irresponsible actors. I
think our--we're a nation of laws. I think we, as military
operational commanders, operate under the Law of Armed
Conflict, rules of engagement, and special instructions so that
we're credible and responsible in the disposition of our
duties. But, I do think, if we want to compete, deter, and win
in cyberspace, that we have to get, to General Nakasone's
point, more oriented on mission outcomes and risk models and
threat-driven operations that allow us to become the challenger
instead of the challenged in this domain.
So, all the things you mentioned, all the things I talk
about, I do think we have to look at new approaches within the
confines of our Government and what we seek to do from a
national perspective on things like sovereignty. To your point,
right? There is no international airspace or water in
cyberspace. Every piece of the domain is some manmade space
that someone says is his or hers. We have to rethink that. I
think we have to look at--becoming the challenger is going to
require us to be more of a 21st-century information operation;
information warfare-cogent organization or group of interagency
partners that wants to then, you know, do the things that are
happening to us--to impose costs, to deny benefit, to
demonstrate stake, and to convey the legitimacy of those
actions to our citizenry, as well.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. General Nakasone, you're going to be the
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, and it is now being upgraded
to a combatant command. Have you thought about the possible
unique role that you're going to be, that you may be one of the
U.S. military establishment commanders that is actually in
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Senator, if confirmed,
certainly I will be thinking every single day about that, and I
have been a bit over the past couple of weeks, as I've
testified. I would offer, as I think to this future, it's
informed by much of what I've learned over the past couple of
years in command of Joint Task Force Ares. If I might----
Senator Nelson. Okay. Let me stop you there. Let me ask
about that. Because, as the commander of Task Force Ares
responsible for the operations to disrupt ISIS, and
specifically to disrupt ISIS on the Internet for their
propaganda, recruiting, and command and control, the Task
Force's performance in its first year was rated as poor. But,
you have testified, ``Performance has gotten a lot better.''
So, have you conducted operations in Task Force Ares designed
to manipulate the thinking of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Senator, yes, we have. We have
conducted information operations. I would offer that that's
perhaps the piece of Ares that I've learned the most about,
being able to provide a message, to amplify a message to impact
Senator Nelson. So, not just disrupting their networks, but
also conducting cognitive information operations?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Yes, Senator. In fairness, as
you pointed in your opening comment, probably more at the
tactical and perhaps operational level. But, I think that
that's where it begins, understanding how you provide that
message, the infrastructure that you need, the capabilities
that are going to underpin your messaging.
Senator Nelson. So, are you using the Army's first
Information Operations Brigade?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Senator, yes, we are.
Certainly that's one of the elements. Other elements for our
joint force, to include our marines, our Navy and our Air
Force, as well, Senator.
Senator Nelson. So, now you're moving to the strategic
level overall, not just the Army's perspective. Are there
lessons from this task forward--the task force that can be
elevated to the strategic level and applied to the information
warfare threat from Russia?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Senator, I think there
probably are, in terms of the lessons that we've learned in
Ares. While I'm a bit hesitant to apply a broad brush, let me
offer three that do come to mind.
First of all, you have to start early. You indicated the
first year was a difficult one for us. It was a difficult one
for us, because we were trying to build an infrastructure,
build capabilities, build talent.
The second thing I would offer is: there's nothing more
powerful than having your own infrastructure, your own
capabilities. One of the things that the Army has provided us
is an infrastructure that we use.
The third thing is: it comes down to talent. Eighteen
months ago, in a room of, you know, cyberspace operators across
our entire force, if I would have asked the question, ``Raise
your hand if you've conducted an offensive cyberspace
operation,'' out of 100 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines,
maybe two or three would have done it. Today, nearly the entire
room has got their hand up, Senator.
Senator Nelson. So, as you go on to be the four-star
commander of a combatant command, Russia has at least some
military units that combine technical cyberoperations and
information capabilities. The DNI has testified that their
operations are having strategic effects on us. That's from Dan
Coats, the DNI [Director of National Intelligence]. Do your
information operations units have cyber skills?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Our information operations
units do have cyber skills, Senator.
Senator Nelson. So, if all these functions are integrated
at the service level, why do we separate them at the unified
command level and in the Office of Secretary of Defense?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Well, Senator, I take your
point. I think that's where section 1637 of NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act] Fiscal Year 2018 is looking at: How
do you bring that together? How do you have one look? I believe
that OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] is working that
piece of it right now, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Okay. As you work that, then you've got to
have an answer to the question: Who is responsible for
strategic information operations, the kind of operation that
Russia has conducted against us in our elections? Anything you
can comment on that in this setting at this time, even though
you don't have the fourth star?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. So, Senator, I will wait until
the OSD has completed that study there. I think that that's
important as we take look and move forward over.
Senator Nelson. Okay.
I'll just close out, Mr. Chairman, by saying that it was so
telling when Admiral Rogers, our four-star commander, whom
General Nakasone will relieve when Admiral Rogers retires--it
was so telling that he said he's ready to do the attacks, but
he has not been given the authorities. I fear for American
democratic institutions if we don't attack.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Well, I would just like to speak briefly to you about a
couple of issues. One is recruitment and retention of the
personnel that we need in terms of the cyber fight. You know,
there are many things about the Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act that I think enhances the strength of our
military, but there's also some things about it that don't seem
to make much sense in certain contexts. I really would love to
get your all's input as to how the up-or-out issue relates to
the expertise we need in cyber. You know, I know that pilots in
the Army can typically be warrant officers who can progress in
rank but still continue to fly. Have we made the adjustments
for cyber warriors to be able to adjust in rank and still be
able to work in the cyber sector? Or are we defaulting to the
norm, which is moving them out of that MSO [Military Service
Obligation] into something different so that they can get
experience throughout the various parts of our excellent
So, I'd like each of you to address briefly the
recruitment-and-retention issues and what issues that DOPMA
[Defense Office Personnel Management Act] may be causing for
our retention of the very best in this really challenging
field? We have enough trouble competing with the private sector
without adding in some of the challenges that are inherent in
the current way that we develop leadership in our military.
Vice Admiral Gilday.Senator, good afternoon. Thanks for
So, if I could say real briefly, in terms of constraints, I
think we have direct commission programs now, where we're
trying to attract the best and the brightest from society to
join us. So, their entry level is at an ensign or a second
lieutenant. That pay is about $37,000 a year base pay. So, we
are not competitive with the private sector, in terms of
competing for that kind of talent. We want to go after it.
Senator McCaskill. I get--I mean, you know, we can't--I
mean, that's what we pay somebody to answer the phones in--
around here. We're asking them to have incredible expertise.
That seems to me totally unrealistic.
Vice Admiral Gilday.Yes, ma'am. There have been other
hearings on the Hill recently where this has been addressed by
the personnel chiefs, in terms of requesting additional relief
so that we can give people credit for their years of service in
the outside sector and pay them what they deserve, in terms of
being competitive with the private sector.
In terms of up-or-out, we have not made any modifications
yet, although we know we're going to have to take a look at
that and do so in the future. Because, to your point, we're
just going to hemorrhage talent at that--at those upper ranks,
when we really don't need to. We could retain those people
If I could talk about the civilian force for a moment,
that's where we do have some challenges, in terms of some
fairly rigid guidelines that we have to follow, in terms of the
amount of incentives that we can offer people coming in. Maybe
a 10-percent hiring raise, maybe a 10-percent relocation bonus;
perhaps, in some cases, accelerated promotion--but, not broadly
enough to make us a very attractive employer for those in the
I think that the Cyber Excepted Service is a step in the
right direction, in terms of providing us more latitude. But, I
still think the--I still think that we will likely need more
authorities to remain competitive, or to be competitive, with
the private sector.
Senator McCaskill. Is there any other input that anyone
would like to give on this subject?
Major General Reynolds. Senator, I would just say that I
agree with everything that Admiral Gilday said. I think cyber
is going to be the game-changer for us. We, in the Marine
Corps, just established the new MOS so that we could target
incentives. Already, I think, we're going to maximize the bonus
structure that we have inside the Marine Corps to kind of get
after and retain some of this special talent. The Commandant
makes the point all the time, you know, ``We may end up with a
platoon of warrant officers, and that's got to be okay with
us.'' So, I know, at the highest level of our service, he's
willing to challenge status quo. The key for us is to figure
out what exactly is that incentive? In some cases, ma'am, it's
not pay. Sometimes it's education, sometimes it's certificates,
sometimes it's--you know, so, for us, it's being able to target
those incentives and have the freedom of action to do that to
retain the best talent, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. Anybody else?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. I would add to General
Reynolds' point. For the Army, what we have taken a look at is
our career fields. So, Senator, as you discussed the challenge
with DOPMA right now, you know, up or out, what we have looked
at is: Is there a career field out there for a tool developer
that all he's going to do for 20 years is develop these
exquisite tools? We think there is. One of the things that I
have seen, across all the Services, the senior leadership to,
you know, try new flexibility on these things. Are we going to
send enlisted soldiers to get a graduate degree? Are we going
to send them to training with industry? Are we going to do
different type of activities that will be attractive to them?
Not all of them will work. Some of them will. But, unless we
try some of these things, I think that, you know, we're going
to have a challenge in the future.
Senator McCaskill. Well, if you have the flexibility with
MOS descriptions and MOS incentives, then that's one thing, but
I would really appreciate--if there are things that we could
add to the NDAA this year to give you more tools to recruit and
retain--there is no question that, if there is one area that I
pretty much believe, on a bipartisan basis, everyone realizes
that we have got to up our game, it is in cyber warfare,
because clearly, right now, I would not say that we're winning.
I don't like it when we're not winning. Some of that is
complicated by policy decisions, but some of it is us getting
the very best and the very brightest.
If there are specific things we could do to give you
additional flexibility or tools, I'd really appreciate it if
you would share them with us before we begin our consideration
of the NDAA this year.
Senator Rounds. I recognize that you are over on time, but
I know that General Weggeman had tried to make a comment, as
well, and I would allow General Weggeman to respond, as well,
if he'd like to at this time.
Major General Reynolds. Yeah, I think my compatriots
provided most of the responses. For me, I personally believe
the Services recruit, first, based upon values, and then,
second, based upon talent or skillset. I think the cornerstone
we have as cyberspace operations professionals is our mission.
As you all know, we're the only organization that has the
mission to do what we do, when directed and authorized,
legally. I look at that as the biggest retention tool we have.
Is like--it's like young Captain Weggeman on the F-16 line.
When I flew four times a week, I was as happy as they get. Give
me any mission, send me anywhere. I'm up for it. It's the same
for our cyber operations professionals. You know, reps and
sets. So, we have to make sure we're giving them the tools, the
infrastructures, and the environments so that they can sharpen
and hone their tradecraft, so they get those sorties. That
helps with retention, for sure.
But, you know, the second thing that would help us all is,
we're all working together. I think we're working with industry
on cutting-edge assessment tools to assess a cyber aptitude of
an individual when they come in front of us. What--you know,
the interesting I--thing I learned from the people--again, I'm
not a technologist, ma'am, I'm a fighter pilot by training, but
what I've learned is, the biggest thing we ask them, to assess
them, is: What do you do in your home time? Are you scripting
on Python? Are you on a Metasploit? Are you coding? Are you
taking Raspberry Pis and putting them together? Are you--that's
actually one of the best, most powerful assessment tools, so
that's one of the things that we ask them, in terms of that.
I think you've given us a lot of the powerful arrows in our
quiver, which is to direct assess and direct commission. The
Air Force has--our--in 15 days from now, our first two pilot
direct commissionees go to OTS [Officer Training School]. One
will be a second lieutenant, one will be a first lieutenant.
So, we appreciate that.
We'll certainly get back to you on what we could ask of you
in the next NDAA. But, I just wanted to offer the mission
perspective as being the cornerstone for retention, from my
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to say, I agree with Senator McCaskill,
strongly, that, please give us a request for authorities on any
of the issues where you need support, resources, flexibility,
whatever it is, any ideas.
[The information referred to follows:]
ARCYBER could use additional assistance from Congress in recruiting
and retaining technically skilled talent from the civilian sector.
While we appreciate being given statutory authority to offer
constructive credit to potential cyber officers, that authority is
currently limited with respect to offering military rank commensurate
with civilian sector abilities, experience and education. The
Department of Defense submitted a legislative proposal for inclusion in
the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which
expands constructive credit up to the rank of colonel, in both the
Active and Reserve components. This would afford us greater discretion
in determining the rank of the appointed officer, providing the Army a
more robust means by which to recruit and retain soldiers with skills
critical to the Army's cyber mission. As of the date of submission of
this IFR Insert, LTG Stephen G. Fogarty is the commander of ARCYBER.
Senator Gillibrand. I talked to Lieutenant General about
this before. So, anything you need, we will provide, because we
feel so passionately about this.
For Generals Nakasone and Weggeman, you're both building
out Reserve components for cyber capability right now. The
Guard has now built a new--out--Task Force Echo, which has been
deployed to Fort Meade. General Nakasone, what do you see as
the long-term mission of the Army Guard cyber component?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Senator, you referenced our
Guard component, we'll build 11 teams over the next 4 years.
They will be doing both State missions, when not activated, and
they will also be doing such things as Task Force Echo, which
is a mobilized mission to protect our infrastructure.
What we have found, working with the Guard, are several
elements. First of all, incredible base of talent. Secondly is
the ability to provide them the same training standard that our
Active component gets. The third thing is to equip them with
the same tools that we use on the Active side and the Reserve
side. That's powerful for us, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. I think you agree with this, but could
the Guard help address some of the existing gaps in our whole-
of-nation approach to cyber? Could it serve as a conduit
between State, local, and Federal Government, as well as the
private sector, because of the unique relationships on the
ground and authorities?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. I do agree, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. General Weggeman?
Major General Reynolds. Thank you, ma'am. Yes, I'll go
first--last question first.
So, absolutely. I think the Air National Guard of the 262
Cyber Operations Squadron in Washington State is a great
exemplar of how you can partner with State utilities, and now
they're working through the legal dimension of even a private-
sector utility, for how we would provide support from a--an
industrial base SCADA [Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition] system support and electrical power SCADA system
support. So, that's the Guard, the citizen airmen in that
State, helping both their State and private-sector utilities.
That's actually ongoing. They have three dedicated ten-person
UTCs--think of them as deployable teams--that are specialized
in EP, electrical power, SCADA systems, as one example to this.
So, we're already--I think that they're a great exemplar to go
In terms of, you know, the Air Force, we've built in, in
our CMF [Cyber Mission Force] build, Guard and Reserve
capabilities already. So, right now we have 15 Guard cyber
squadrons that have contributed to build three of the Active
Duty CMF teams--two cyber protection teams and one national
mission team. They're currently--actually, the Guard forces
from New York, New Jersey, and Texas are the three----
Senator Gillibrand. Great.
General Reynolds.--States currently manning those teams.
They've gone through ten full mobilization rotations. So, in
dwell right now, the Air Force already has ten cyber protection
teams in the Guard in dwell for surge capacity, if required.
Senator Gillibrand. I'd like to ask you, for the record,
both of you, for a--recommendations in terms of how we could
use the National Guard to support next year's election from
cyberattack as a critical infrastructure. I understand, from
earlier hearings, that you don't feel you have that authority
from the President. But, what I would like from this committee
is recommendations to this committee that, if you were given
that authority, what you would like to implement and what
resources or support you would need to implement that specific
mission. I will then use that. Because this is something that
both Senator Rounds and Nelson have been very focused on,
because we do see the election as critical infrastructure. We
do see an attack on our election infrastructure as a
declaration of war. I want to know, if we ever were able to
give you the authority to protect the next election, how you
would use the National Guard, specifically, to do that, and
what additional either resources or authorities you would need
if you were tasked with that duty. Because that's something
this committee has been very focused on for a long time, and
we'd like your input, specifically, if we were to do that in
[The information referred to follows:]
Normally, unless called into Federal service, National Guard
support to elections is within the purview, and subject to the
direction, of each state governor. Governors can choose to activate
National Guard personnel in a State Active Duty status at any time they
deem necessary and appropriate. U.S. Army Cyber Command executes its
Title 10 training and readiness oversight of Army National Guard (ARNG)
cyber forces by managing personnel in approved cyber training courses
and ensuring that cyber protection teams (CPTs) meet USCYBERCOM
established joint standards directed for all Army components. Any
additional specialty training concerning election systems would be at
the discretion of the relevant state governor. The Army is resourced to
build a total of 11 ARNG CPTs, one of which will reach initial
operational capability in September 2018, with all reaching full
operational capability by 2022. Once at full operational capacity, the
ARNG teams will have the training and equipment to support a range of
missions defending critical infrastructure. Currently, our cyber forces
execute both the Federal and state level missions. As we fully
establish these forces, our ability to support directed operations will
only improve. As of the date of submission of this IFR Insert, LTG
Stephen G. Fogarty is the commander of ARCYBER.
Major General Reynolds. Okay. So, I appreciate, ma'am,
giving the latitude that--if the policy was given and the
authorities were given, I think there's two specific things
that I think are essential, and it kind of goes to the fire
forces we've learned that can fight fires, and it goes to pre-
scripted knowledge and missions. Unless you want us to be what
I would call a ``wet cleanup on aisle five force,'' if you want
us to be there and preventatively build security----
Senator Gillibrand. Correct.
General Reynolds.--and defense to thwart malicious
cyberactivities, we would need the authorities and the tools
and the infrastructure--some of our defensive kits--that are
purposely tailored to the networks and systems that you would
want us to support the State and local SCADA--or, sorry,
infrastructure CICR systems with. So, you know, we need to know
the networked topology, we need to know the hardware, firmware,
software that it operates so that we could be responsive, we
could sensor, we could share information, and we could be
proactive in defense.
Senator Gillibrand. So, that is the guidance I'd like you
to write to this committee by letter to say, ``If we were ever
given this responsibility, if we were ever given this
authority, these are the ten things we would need.'' That's
item number one. ``We would need access to all the information
and systems that are used, State by State. We would need access
to the resources to be able to develop expertise in each of
these systems. We would need X, Y, and Z.''
So, just tactically, what do you need? Then, we can at
least, as a committee, decide: Do we want to put that in the
NDAA as authorities for you to then go ahead and do? Obviously,
the President would have to sign off on that. But, as our work
from the committee, we've had so many hearings on cyber,
specifically, and I feel like your hands have been tied every
time we talk about one critical infrastructure, which is our
electoral system. We already know we have foreign adversaries
who are hammering it daily. We also know that you--that we now
have the technology, because we had a hack-a-thon and actually
effectively hacked vote totals. Our own cyber experts could do
that within, I think, a 24-hour period. So, we know what the
vulnerabilities are. I just want to proactively know from you
guys, with your expertise, what you would need if I was--if you
were told you need to prevent this and you need to start a new
Major General Reynolds. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. So, just guidance, so we know what it
looks like. We also have several private-sector think tanks
working on this, as well, what would be their recommendations
to go to every one of the 50 Secretaries of State. We'll have
that information soon enough. We have a bill with--Senator
Graham and I--to create a 9/11-style deep dive to assess what
are the vulnerabilities and what are the ten things, as a
secondary effort, too. But, in the meantime, I'd like your
guidance, because if we can put it in the NDAA in April--or,
when is the--it's soon. It'll be soon.
Senator Rounds. We're in the middle of it now.
Senator Gillibrand. Yeah, right now. So, it'll be soon when
we get to vote on it.
Senator Rounds. Senator Nelson, I know that you're time-
constrained, but if you'd like to make some comments or
questions here, we'll do that before we start to finish up here
a little bit.
Senator Nelson. Thanks.
General Nakasone, on the issue of direct commissioning,
what are the legal limits that you cite? Should we alter them
so that this program can be successful?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Senator, what we are facing
right now is an inability to grant constructive credit. As
Admiral Gilday spoke to, constructive credit is the recognition
of someone's abilities or experience in the civilian sector
transformed and measured against what rank they may come in
within the military. Right now, I believe that we are limited
to first lieutenant--bringing them in as a first lieutenant.
So, we would like greater flexibility on that, based upon
I think that's important when you think about some of the
capabilities and some of the talent we're looking for--people
in big data, artificial intelligence, machine learning,
forensics malware analysis. Those are all things that are not
necessarily attractive to come in as a young first lieutenant.
Senator Nelson. Do you think that's hampering us getting
people to join?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. I do, Senator.
Senator Nelson. So, how do you fix that? Put them at a
Lieutenant General Nakasone. So, one of the things we've
been working with your staffers is to look at how we better
measure constructive credit to allow them to come in at a
Senator Nelson. General Reynolds, tell me, if a--if you get
a direct commission into the Marine Corps, does that mean that
they still have to be able to do 15 pull-ups?
Major General Reynolds. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Good.
Senator Nelson. I'm glad, General.
Why should cyberspace be any different from other domains?
Do we need the legislation to establish, without a doubt, that
traditional military activities include cyber operations?
Well, General Nakasone, you're going to be the big chief--
Senator Nelson.--so why don't you try to answer that?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. So, I don't think it should be
any different than the other domains, Senator. I think that
this has been a product of, you know, a very, very young and
maturing force that we have, you know, some unique capabilities
and characteristics of how we operate. Not having borders is
something that, you know, really isn't applicable in the other
domains, minus space. So, one of the things that we, again,
have come to is, you know, being able to define traditional
military activities has sometimes been hard. It's much harder
if you're not operating in this space. Now that we are
continually operating in this space, I think we have a much
greater way of being able to determine what traditional
military activities are.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Rounds. Admiral Gilday.
Senator Nelson. Sure.
Vice Admiral Gilday.Briefly. Sir, I'm--I respect your time,
as you want to depart. The comment that I'd make with respect
to cyber and traditional military activities is that the longer
that it takes to integrate cyber into the other warfighting
domains, the longer it takes to normalize it, the less--the
longer it takes for people to get comfortable with it, and the
more it's treated as a special kind of action that it's
difficult to get authorities for.
To the point that you made in your opening comments about
the Russians--and it's related to this--we're at a point right
now where we've allowed the Russians to establish those
boundaries. We have allowed them--in any other space--the
maritime, the air, the land--you want to gain access so that
you can dominate. You want to put the enemy--you want to be in
a position to dominate, whether it's physically or, in this
case, virtually. The Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans,
when you talk about authorities, they have different rule sets,
they have a lower threshold for aggression. So, they are
gaining the initiative. So, it becomes more difficult for us to
gain a position of advantage and to do the things that you want
us to do.
Changing policy is one thing. The will to act is a
completely different problem set that is just as important as
changing PPD-20 or changing any policies that underlie how we
act in this space.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
I'm going to follow up on this, because I think this really
gets to the root of a lot of the questions that you've heard
today, and comments that you've heard today. I know that
Senator Gillibrand has discussed the issue of the electoral
process and how critical that is. But, I think you can look at
almost any of our critical infrastructure right now and you can
just simply ask the same question, and that is, If this was act
of war or if this was an act of aggression using kinetic
forces, whether by air, land, or sea, there would be an
expectation by the American public that our defense forces
would be in a position to respond, to defend? But, then also
there would be an expectation that the deterrent forces would
come to bear. Seems that with regard to cyber, we have yet to
establish what those incidents are and at what point they reach
the point to where there has to be a deterrent reaction on our
The Defense Science Board made it very clear that with--for
the next 10 years, our defensive capabilities will not be equal
to the offensive capabilities of our peer competitors. It's
become very clear--and I think the discussion--and, Admiral
Gilday, I think you made mention to it--Russia has a different
norm, in terms of what they see as the opportunities within the
cyber domain. I think we've seen that with a number of the peer
competitors and also some rogues, as well. That is, is that
they have used cyber as a way to impact our Nation's--our
assets--in some cases, critical infrastructure and, in some
cases, an electoral process. But, most certainly, they do it
right now without a sense that we're prepared to offer that
Can we talk a little bit about what it would take and about
the challenges--not so much--and I recognize that this is an
open session, but I think it's really important to lay out, you
know, as I said, that--when we talk about NATO issues and so
forth, and we talk about international norms, there is Tallinn
1 and there is Tallinn 2.0, both of which try to establish what
rises to an act of war in cyberspace and also what the
incidents are that have to be responded to. Isn't it really
true that, here, we have huge defensive capabilities, and that
we have huge capabilities with regard to being able to
infiltrate silently and gather a huge amount of data, as good
as anybody in the world, and yet, at the same time, because we
want to make sure that we follow the norms and that we are a
respected neighbor, that we are very, very careful about how we
respond in the domain of cyber? If it was air, land, or sea,
there could be hell to pay, but in cyber we're not quite
prepared to identify and to state publicly what those norms
What are the policy discussions--and if I had a group of
enlisted men and women sitting in front of me right now who are
on the front lines doing this, and it was in a classified
setting, they would spill their guts about how frustrated they
can be at times and what they would really love to be able to
do, but they recognize their responsibility to adhere to clear
I know this is more of a statement than it is a question,
but it's your turn now. You've thought about this a lot. Can
you, in this open space, talk a little bit about the challenges
that you see, and perhaps some of the frustrations that you
have, in terms of protecting our critical infrastructure,
civilian resources, and so forth, that perhaps the public
simply doesn't recognize and that we should be talking about
Lieutenant General Nakasone. Senator, I'll begin on this.
This is a very important question.
So, I think it begins with: What is the strategy for the
defense of the Nation in cyberspace? That is an overall
question that I think has to be asked, has to be debated, has
to be discussed amongst policymakers, the American people, and
Senator Rounds. Would you--let me just stop you right
there. Fair to say that we really don't have a true cyber
policy established yet?
Lieutenant General Nakasone. So, I've learned, from my
testimony over the past couple of weeks, Senator, that this
committee has asked many times for a policy, and that one still
has not been delivered. That's correct.
Senator Rounds. Okay.
Lieutenant General Nakasone. I would offer that, when we
think about other defense of the Nation in cyberspace--roles,
responsibilities, functions, missions--what are the elements
that make it up? What are the parts of the government, what's
the responsibility of the private sector that owns 90 percent
of the networks that are necessary to protect?
The next thing I think about a lot is: What are the
thresholds of support? So, when we think about this, how much
of this responsibility should reside with the private sector,
and at what point, when a nation-state actor has taken after
our critical infrastructure, does it become the responsibility
of the Department of Defense to defend the Nation? That is
still a discussion point that I think is, you know, one to be
So, those are just a couple, Senator, that I would offer as
I've thought about this question over the past several months.
Senator Rounds. General Reynolds.
Major General Reynolds. Yes, sir. I'd like to just add one
or two thoughts on this.
One of them is that--I guess in my time in command at
MARFORCYBER, going back to the Defense Science Board and what
they learned about, you know, deterrence, one of the key
findings was that we need to be able to deny the adversary. I
don't want to speak for all of my peers here, sir, but we have
spent an enormous amount of time even inside the service on
this denial piece: How we make sure that what I own is
defensible? There was a lot of work to do. So, moving forward,
will we have additional capacity? Yes, sir, I think we would.
But, the other thing that I would like to make sure that we
make a point here, in that--and it goes back to the JTF Ares
lessons learned. What Ares did, I think, for U.S. Cyber Command
was provide a--number one, a joint capability inside U.S. Cyber
Command, so you have all the Services represented there, but it
also gave an opportunity for the combatant commands to reach
into Cyber Command. In one single entry point, it gave the
interagency one place, it gave our allies and partners one
place to come in the counter-ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant] fight. That was enormously important.
So, I think, organizationally, moving forward: Who are the
other combatant commanders that are involved in the plan
against Russia? How are we organizing ourselves? It's really
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Vice Admiral Gilday.Sure. Thanks for your question.
The main point that I want to make is that the force is not
big enough, not based on the discussion that we had in this
room this afternoon. If there's expectations to protect
critical infrastructure, to hold significant adversaries at
risk, adversaries that we are in contact with every day, then
more needs to be done, in terms of the buildout and the
development of a cyberforce that is comparable to the Nation's
reliance on cyberspace for our economy, for our quality of
life. It touches everything that we do. It's gigantic. And you
take a look at the force, and you take a look at the number of
trigger-pullers we have, 6,200--6,200. Take a look at the
United States Navy, take a look at the United States Army, take
a look at the Marine Corps, the smallest of the Services, and
the Air Force, and make a comparison there. Based on what we
talked about this afternoon in this room, the importance of
cyberspace to the American people, to our quality of life, I
think that that has to, at some point, be reassessed. I think
that the things that we have learned over the last 2 years need
to play into that assessment. I think we need to be honest with
ourselves. I think we need to act more boldly.
Senator Rounds. General Weggeman.
Major General Reynolds. There's a benefit of going last. I
think a lot of the key points I would make--to Admiral Gilday's
last point, I agree. The scope and scale of CICR is extremely
vast. And I agree, our force is too small. So, we will have to
think deliberately and calculated, in terms of what would be
DOD's role in--to support that, and how do we best use a high-
demand, low-density force, if a policy is written to where we
would provide that, above and beyond the National Guard or the
You know, so, as the former J5 at Cyber Command, I've been
thinking about, you know, the cyber deterrence question for a
long time, and I'll give you, simplistically, my frame.
The first thing is, the phrase is flawed. I believe the
proper way to say it is ``cyber indeterrence.'' Cyber--it's--
what is cyberspace operations' role, offense and defense, in a
national strategic deterrence campaign? Admiral Rogers
testified that, you know, sometimes you don't want to use cyber
when you come back. So, it's got to be a whole-of-government,
if not whole-of-nation, campaign.
The second thing about any indeterrence is: Deter what? I
think what we constantly come back to in this forum is, we want
to say we want to deter malicious cyber activity. So, if we
want to deter or erode an enemy's confidence in their ability
to pitch malicious cyber activity at us, again, we need to use
every arrow in our quiver as a nation to deter that activity.
We are but one. We may be the least--have the least amount of
capability or capacity. So, we have to go to other things. But,
I do think it's all about ``cyber indeterrence,'' and that's
I go back to the classic principles of, you know, within
cyber we have to be able to impose cost, we have to be able to
deny benefit, and maybe we do one in the cyberspace domain and
other in another domain, whether it's land, sea, maritime,
information, leveraging State Department or FBI [Federal Bureau
of Investigation] or other agency partners.
The last is the concept of--in the Defense Science Board
study, everything is about taking that first hit. It's a
constant thing. For those of us who have been around, this is
an offense-dominant domain. Our adversaries have exquisite
capabilities. If you want to be that second-strike force, you
may not have that luxury. It's hard to recover. So, I think we
have to do a hard look at a nation, given the exquisite
insights that our intelligence community can generate, the
exquisite insights that our cyber forces and operators can
generate. What is the--what is our realm of strategic
preemption? When would we have thresholds or triggers where we
would strategically preempt a large release of malware that
would take us down and set us back on our feet for a year?
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Now, let me just finish with this. General Nakasone, the
Ares project, they pointed out earlier that there were some
challenges there, and that some of the conditions weren't the
best. And yet, unless we clearly look at and we--we're critical
in the way that we analyze our successes and where we need to
improve, we're not really doing our job. So, the fact that we
could have a frank discussion about improvements and so forth,
that's a positive thing. Showing how far we've come in a very
short period of time with regard to this particular domain, I
think, is critical in creating more successful opportunities in
the future. If we ever get to the point where we can't look at
those criticisms and say, ``These are learning experiences, and
we can do better, and we will learn from them,'' then we're in
So, I--first of all, I don't take offense from someone
suggesting that there were challenges with a program and that
we're going to have to do better in the future. I think that's
the way that it was perceived by the panel that's before us
today. I appreciate that.
Second of all, I think what we've talked about here today,
while we're talking about the positioning, the capabilities of
our forces today from your perspective, I think what you've
given us, in terms of an insight as far as what the policy
issues are and the understanding of the American public with
regard to your mission right now and the role that you have
been asked to play, versus what I think in many cases is the
expectation of an American public that says, to begin with,
``If someone attacks us in cyberspace, we should hit them hard
in cyberspace'' versus--the appropriate role is--just because
someone attacks us by sea doesn't mean we necessarily have to
attack only by sea. We can attack in a whole lot of different
domains. But, it does require this, that unless we are dominant
in air, land, sea, space, and cyber, our adversaries will take
advantage of any opening they see.
And so, with that, I want to say thank you to Senator
Gillibrand for being able to attend with us again today. I want
to thank all of our witnesses here today for your testimony.
This is not the last that we will see you all in front of our
And, General Nakasone, we look forward to visiting with you
in a new role, as well, when the opportunity comes.
And unless any one of our witnesses has anything further to
add, we will call an adjournment to this meeting at this time.
[Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]