EXTRADITION TREATY WITH CYPRUSSenate Consideration of Treaty Document 105-16
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[Senate Treaty Document 105-16] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] 105th Congress Treaty Doc. SENATE 1st Session 105-16 _______________________________________________________________________ EXTRADITION TREATY WITH CYPRUS __________ MESSAGE from THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES transmitting EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON JUNE 17, 1996 July 28, 1997.--Treaty was read the first time and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ---------- The White House, July 28, 1997. To the Senate of the United States: With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (``the Treaty''), signed at Washington on June 17, 1996. In addition, I transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty. As the report explains, the Treaty will not require implementing legislation. This Treaty will, upon entry into force, enhance cooperation between the law enforcement communities of both countries. It will thereby make a significant contribution to international law enforcement efforts. The provisions in this Treaty follow generally the form and content of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification. William J. Clinton. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL ---------- Department of State, Washington, June 13, 1997. The President, The White House. The President: I have the honor to submit to you the Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (``the Treaty''), signed at Washington on June 17, 1996. I recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The Treaty follows closely the form and content of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States. The treaty represents part of a concerted effort by the Department of State and the Department of Justice to develop modern extradition relationships to enhance the United States ability to prosecute serious offenders including, especially, narcotics traffickers and terrorists. The Treaty marks a significant step in bilateral cooperation between the United States and Cyprus. Upon entry into force, it will replace the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Great Britain signed at London on December 22, 1931, which was made applicable to Cyprus upon entry into force on June 24, 1935 and which the United States and Cyprus have continued to apply following Cypriot independence. That treaty has become outmoded, and the new Treaty will provide significant improvements. The Treaty does not require implementing legislation. Article 1 obligates each Contracting State to extradite to the other, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, persons sought for prosecution for or convicted of an extraditable offense. Article 2(1) defines an extraditable offense as one punishable under the laws of both Contracting States by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year, or by a more severe penalty. Use of such a ``dual criminality'' clause rather than a list of offenses covered by the Treaty obviates the need to renegotiate or supplement the Treaty as additional offenses become punishable under the laws of both Contracting States. Article 2(2) defines an extraditable offense to include also an attempt or a conspiracy to commit, aiding or abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of or being an accessory before or after the fact to an extraditable offense. Additional flexibility is provided by Article 2(3), which provides that an offense shall be considered an extraditable offense: (1) whether or not the laws in the Contracting States place the offense within the same category of offenses or describe the offense by the same terminology; or (2) whether or not the offense is one for which United States federal law requires the proof of such matters as interstate transportation or use of the mails or of other facilities affecting interstate or foreign commerce, such matters being merely for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction in a United States federal court. With regard to offenses committed outside the territory of the Requesting State, Article 2(4) provides the parties with the discretion to grant or deny extradition if the offense for which extradition is sought would not be punishable under the laws of the Requested State in similar circumstance. The United States recognizes the extraterritorial application of many of its criminal statutes and frequently makes requests for fugitives whose criminal activity occurred in foreign countries with the intent, actual or implied, of affecting the United States. Cyprus did not indicate any anticipated difficulty with this provision. When extradition has been granted for an extraditable offense, Article 2(5) also requires extradition for any other offense specified in the request, even if punishableby deprivation of liberty of less than one year, provided that all other requirements for extradition are met. Article 3(1) provides that neither Contracting State is obligated to extradite its nationals, but a Requested State may do so unless otherwise provided by its laws and Constitution. Article 3(2) requires the Requested State, if it denies extradition solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, to submit the case to its authorities for prosecution. As is customary in extradition treaties, Article 4 incorporates a political and military offenses exception to the obligation to extradite. Article 4(1) states generally that extradition shall not be granted for an offense of a political character. Article 4(2) specifies three categories of offenses that shall not be considered to be political offenses: (a) a murder or other willful crime against the person of a Head of State of one of the Contracting States, or of a member of the Head of State's family; (b) an offense for which both Contracting States are obliged pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit the case to their competent authorities for a decision as to prosecution; and (c) a conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the offenses described above, or aiding and abetting a person who commits or attempts to commit such offenses. The Treaty's political offense exception is substantially identical to that contained in several other modern extradition treaties, including the treaty with Jordan, which recently received Senate advice and consent. Offenses covered by Article 4(2)(b) include: --aircraft hijacking covered by The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague December 16, 1970, and entered into force October 14, 1971 (22 U.S.T. 1641; TIAS No. 7192); and, --aircraft sabotage covered by the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal September 23, 1971, and entered into force January 26, 1973, (24 U.S.T. 564; TIAS No. 7570). Article 4(3) provides that extradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request was politically motivated. Article 4(4) permits the executive authority of the Requested State to deny extradition for military offenses that are not offenses under ordinary criminal law (for example, desertion). Article 5 bars extradition when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted in the Requested State for the same offense, but does not bar extradition if the competent authorities in the Requested State have declined to prosecute or have decided to discontinue criminal proceedings against the person sought. Article 6(1) permits refusal of extradition in cases where an offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the Requesting State but not in the Requested State, unless the Requesting State (if so requested) provides assurances that the death penalty, if imposed, will not be carried out. Article 6(2) states that, in cases where an assurance under Article 6(1) is provided, the death penalty will not be carried out, if imposed by the courts of the Requesting State. Article 7 enables extradition requests to be granted irrespective of statutes of limitations in either the Requesting or Requested State. Article 8 establishes the procedures and describes the documents that are required to support an extradition request. Article 8(1) requires that all requests be submitted through the diplomatic channel. Article 8(3)(c) provides that a request for the extradition of a person sought for prosecution be supported by a statement of the facts of the case disclosing reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed and that the person sought committed it. Article 9 establishes the procedures under which documents submitted pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty shall be received and admitted into evidence. Article 10 declares that all documents submitted by the Requesting State shall be either in the language of the Requesting State or in the language of the Requested State, but gives the Requested State the right to require a translation into its language. Article 11 sets forth procedures for the provisional arrest and detention of a person sought pending presentation of the formal request for extradition. Article 11(4) provides that if the Requested State's executive authority has not received the formal request for extradition and supporting documentation within sixty days after the provisional arrest, the person may be discharged from custody. Article 11(5) provides explicitly that discharge from custody pursuant to Article 11(4) does not prejudice subsequent rearrest and extradition of that person upon later delivery of the extradition request and supporting documents. Article 12 specifies the procedures governing surrender and return of persons sought. It requires the Requested State to provide prompt notice to the Requesting State through the diplomatic channel regarding its extradition decision. If the request is denied in whole or in part, Article 12 requires the Requested State to provide information regarding the reasons therefor. If extradition is granted, the authorities of the Contracting States shall agree on the time and place for surrender of the person sought. If the person sought is not removed from the territory of the Requested State within the time prescribed by its law, the person may be released, and the Requested State may subsequently refuse extradition for the same offense. Article 13 concerns temporary and deferred surrender. If a person whose extradition is sought is being prosecuted or is serving a sentence in the Requested State, that State may temporarily surrender the person sought to the Requesting State solely for the purpose of prosecution. Alternatively, the Requested State may postpone the extradition proceedings against a person who is being prosecuted or who is serving a sentence in that State until its prosecution has been concluded and the sentence has been served. Article 14 sets forth a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered by the Requested State is determining to which State to surrender a person sought by more than one State. Article 15 provides for the seizure and surrender to the Requesting State of property connected with the offense for which extradition is granted, to the extent permitted under the law of the Requested State. Such property may be surrendered even when extradition cannot be effected due to the death, disappearance, or escape of the person sought. Surrender of property may be deferred if it is needed as evidence in the Requested State and may be conditioned upon satisfactory assurances from the Requesting State that it will be returned. Article 15(3) imposes an obligation to respect the rights of third parties in affected property. Article 16 sets forth the rule of speciality. It provides, subject to specific exceptions, that a person extradited under the Treaty may not be detained, tried, or punished for an offense committed prior to extradition other than that for which extradition has been granted, unless the executive authority of the Requested State consents. Similarly, the requesting State may not extradite such person to a third state for an offense committed prior to the original surrender unless the executive authority of the Requested State consents. These restrictions do not apply if the extradited person leaves the Requesting State after extradition and voluntarily returns to it or fails to leave the Requesting State within ten days of being free to do so. Article 17 permits surrender to the Requesting State without further proceedings if the person sought formally consents by way of affidavit or otherwise. Article 18 governs the transit through the territory of one Contracting State of a person being surrendered to the other State by a third State. Article 19 contains provisions on representation and expenses that are similar to those found in other modern extradition treaties. Specifically, the Requested State isrequired to represent the interests of the Requesting State in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Requesting State is required to bear the expenses related to the translation of documents and the transportation of the person surrendered. Article 19(3) clarifies that neither State shall make any pecuniary claim against the other State arising out of the arrest, detention, examination, or surrender of persons sought under the Treaty. Article 20 states that the United States Department of Justice and the Ministry of Justice and Public Order in Cyprus may consult with each other directly or through the facilities of INTERPOL in connection with the processing of individual cases and in furtherance of maintaining and improving Treaty implementation procedures. Article 21, like the parallel provision in almost all recent United States extradition treaties, states that the Treaty shall apply to offenses committed before as well as after the date the Treaty enters into force. Ratification and entry into force are addressed in Article 22. That Article provides that the Parties shall exchange instruments of ratification, whereupon the Treaty shall enter into force. Upon entry into force, the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Great Britain, signed at London December 22, 1931, shall cease to have effect between the United States and Cyprus, except for pending extradition proceeding in which the documents have already been submitted to the courts of the Requested State at the time the Treaty enters into force (with Articles 16 and 17 of the new Treaty applicable to such proceedings). Under Article 23, either Contracting State may terminate the Treaty at any time upon written notice to the other Party through the diplomatic channel with termination to become effective six months after the date of such notice. A Technical Analysis explaining in detail the provisions of the Treaty has been prepared by the United States negotiating delegation and will be submitted separately to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Department of Justice joins the Department of State in favoring approval of this Treaty by the Senate at an early date. Respectively submitted, Madeleine Albright.