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[Senate Treaty Document 105-5]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]



105th Congress                                              Treaty Doc.

                                SENATE
 1st Session                                                      105-5
_______________________________________________________________________



 
              FLANK DOCUMENT AGREEMENT TO THE CFE TREATY

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

     THE DOCUMENT AGREED AMONG THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) OF NOVEMBER 19, 1990, ADOPTED 
AT VIENNA ON MAY 31, 1996 (``THE FLANK DOCUMENT''). THE FLANK DOCUMENT 
  IS ANNEX A OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE FIRST CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE




 April 7, 1997.--Agreement was read the first time and, together with 
the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
          and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate


                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                    The White House, April 7, 1997.
To the Senate of the United States:
    I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the 
Senate, the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 
19, 1990, which was adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996 (``the 
Flank Document''). The Flank Document is Annex A of the Final 
Document of the first CFE Review Conference.
    I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the 
report of the Department of State on the Flank Document, 
together with a section-by-section analysis of the Flank 
Document and three documents associated with it that are 
relevant to the Senate's consideration: the Understanding on 
Details of the Flank Document of 31 May 1996 in Order to 
Facilitate its Implementation; the Exchange of Letters between 
the U.S. Chief Delegate to the CFE Joint Consultative Group and 
the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the 
Joint Consultative Group, dated 25 July 1996; and, the 
Extension of Provisional Application of the Document until May 
15, 1997. I take this step as a matter of accommodation to the 
desires of the Senate and without prejudice to the allocation 
of rights and duties under the Constitution.
    In transmitting the original CFE Treaty to the Senate in 
1991, President Bush said that the CFE Treaty was ``the most 
ambitious arms control agreement ever concluded.'' This 
landmark treaty has been a source of stability, predictability, 
and confidence during a period of historic change in Europe. In 
the years since the CFE Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union has 
dissolved, the Warsaw Pact has disappeared, and the North 
Atlantic Alliance has been transformed. The Treaty has not been 
unaffected by these changes--for example, there are 30 CFE 
States Parties now, not 22--but the dedication of all Treaty 
partners to achieving its full promise is undiminished.
    The CFE Treaty has resulted in the verified reduction of 
more than 50,000 pieces of heavy military equipment, including 
tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat 
aircraft, and attack helicopters. By the end of 1996, CFE 
states had accepted and conducted more than 2,700 intrusive, 
on-site inspections. Contacts between the military 
organizations charged with implementing CFE are cooperative and 
extensive. The CFE Treaty has helped to transform a world of 
two armed camps into a Europe where dividing lines no longer 
hold.
    The Flank document is part of that process. It is the 
culmination of over 2 years of negotiations and months of 
intensive discussions with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, our 
NATO Allies, and our other CFE Treaty partners. The Flank 
Document resolves in a cooperative way the most difficult 
problem that arose during the Treaty's first 5 years of 
implementation: Russian and Ukrainian concerns about the impact 
of the Treaty's equipment limits in the flank zone on their 
security and military flexibility. The other Treaty states--
including NATO Allies--agreed that some of those concerns were 
reasonable and ought to be addressed.
    The Flank Document is the result of a painstaking 
multilateral diplomatic effort that had as its main goal the 
preservation of the integrity of the CFE Treaty and achievement 
of the goals of its mandate. It is a crucial step in adaptation 
of the CFE Treaty to the dramatic political changes that have 
occurred in Europe since the Treaty was signed. The Flank 
Document confirms the importance of subregional constraints on 
heavy military equipment. More specifically, it revalidates the 
idea, unique to CFE, of limits on the amount of equipment 
particular nations in the Treaty area can locate on certain 
portions of their own national territory. Timely entry into 
force of the Flank document will ensure that these key 
principles are not a matter of debate in the negotiations we 
have just begun in Vienna to adapt the CFE treaty to new 
political realities, including the prospect of an enlarged 
NATO.
    I believe that entry into force of the CFE Flank Document 
is in the best interests of the United States and will 
contribute to our broader efforts to establish a new European 
security order based on cooperation and shared goals. By 
maintaining the integrity of the CFE flank regime, we take a 
key step toward our goal of ensuring that the CFE Treaty 
continues to play a key role in enhancing military stability 
into the 21st century. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give 
early and favorable consideration to the Flank document and to 
give advice and consent prior to May 15, 1997.

                                                William J. Clinton.


                          LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                       Department of State,
                                         Washington, April 3, 1997.
The President,
The White House.
    The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with a 
view to transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent, 
the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, 
adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996 (``the Flank Document'').
    The Flank Document, which is Annex A of the Final Document 
of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty 
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and The Concluding Act 
of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, was adopted at Vienna 
on May 31, 1996 by the United States of America and the 
Republic Armenia, the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of 
Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, 
Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French 
Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of 
Georgia, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of 
Kazakstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of 
Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, 
the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the 
Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, 
the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the ``States Parties'').
    Also enclosed for the information of the Senate, are the 
following three documents associated with the Flank Document: 
the Understanding on Details of the Flank Document of 31 May 
1996 in Order to Facilitate its Implementation; the Exchange of 
Letters between the United States Chief Delegate to the CFE 
Joint Consultative Group and the Head of Delegation of the 
Russian Federation to the Joint Consultative Group, dated 25 
July 1996; and, the Extension of Provisional Application of the 
Document until May 15, 1997.
    Although not submitted for the advice and consent of the 
Senate, these three documents are relevant to consideration of 
the Flank Document by the Senate.


                              introduction


    On May 31, 1996, the 30 States Parties to the CFE Treaty 
concluded the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 
1990, a legally binding agreement, to resolve the CFE flank 
issue. The Flank Document was annexed to the Final Document 
issued at the conclusion of the two-week CFE Treaty Review 
Conference in Vienna. The Review Conference addressed a variety 
of important issues,including implementation of the Treaty and 
future adaptation of the Treaty to respond to Europe's changing 
political environment. This agreement on the flank issue was the 
culmination of months of intensive discussions and negotiations with 
the Russian Federation, NATO Allies and other CFE Treaty partners. It 
is an important step in ensuring the Treaty's continued viability and 
integrity.
    The CFE Treaty imposes limits on the number of certain 
kinds of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) each of two groups of 
states (corresponding to the membership of NATO and the former 
Warsaw Pact) may have in the Treaty's ``area of application.'' 
Article V of the Treaty imposes further limits on the amount of 
TLE that may be deployed within the portion of the area of 
application commonly known as the flank zone. From early 1993, 
Russia argued that the CFE Treaty, which had been negotiated 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, did not adequately reflect 
Russia's security needs in the post-Cold War world. 
Specifically, Russia claimed that the regional equipment limits 
in the Treaty's flank zone were too restrictive to permit it to 
deploy forces to that area adequate to meet its security 
concerns for the region, which includes the North Caucasus. 
Ukraine also claimed that the Treaty's flank limits were unduly 
restrictive and would cause it to incur unreasonable 
implementation costs.
    NATO Allies did not accept all of Russia's claims 
concerning its security problems in the flank zone or the 
amount of equipment Moscow said it needed there. The Alliance 
did recognize, however, that the significant changes to 
political borders in the flank region since the Treaty's 
signature in 1990, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact, and Russia's low armored combat vehicle 
(ACV) limit in the flank zone, raised legitimate questions that 
needed to be addressed.
    For over two years, CFE states worked to find a way 
acceptable to all Parties to address these concerns about the 
flank limits. The resulting Flank Document is based on an 
approach that was endorsed by all 30 CFE States Parties in 
November 1995 at the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna, 
which in turn was based on a September 1995 NATO proposal.

                   key elements of the flank document

    The Flank Document has three basic elements: (1) removal of 
certain territory from the original flank zone, which reduces 
the size of the flank zone (the ``map realignment''); (2) 
additional constraints on equipment in the areas removed from 
the flank zone through the realignment; and (3) additional 
transparency measures for the flank zone and those areas 
removed from the flank zone. Under the Flank Document, Russia 
must lower its force levels in the region so that its equipment 
holdings in the old and new flank zone meet all CFE obligations 
by 31 May 1999.
    The territorial realignment contained in Section III, 
paragraph 1 of the Flank Document removes certain areas in 
Russia and Ukraine from the flank zone. Once the Flank Document 
enters into force, these areas will be considered to be part of 
a different CFE zone and, in addition to the constraints and 
enhanced transparency measures outlined above, will be subject 
to the limitations on equipment for that zone, rather than the 
more restrictive limits of the flank zone.
    With regard to Russia, the Flank Document does not permit 
any increase in overall holdings of treaty-limited equipment 
(TLE) in the total area of application of the Treaty, nor does 
it change the equipment limits for the flank zone as specified 
in the CFE Treaty. However, after the Flank Document enters 
into force, the Treaty's flank limits will apply to a smaller 
geographic area than previously, and Russia will have until 31 
May 1999 to bring its deployments in the realigned flank zone 
into full compliance with the Treaty's flank limits.
    The Flank Document contains a commitment, provisionally 
applied even before entry into force as of 31 May 1996 through 
31 May 1999, by which Russia agrees not to increase its total 
equipment holdings in the original flank above levels specified 
in the Flank Document, which were those present in the areas as 
reported in Russia's January 1, 1996 CFE data submission. 
Provisional application of the ``no-increase'' commitment until 
May 15, 1997 is based upon the understanding that Russia has 
not by virtue of the Flank Document been relieved of its 
existing CFE obligations, including its obligations with 
respect to its TLE holdings in the flank zone. In particular, 
this means that as a legal matter, the U.S. takes the view that 
Russia continues to exceed its maximum levels for holdings of 
TLE in the flank zone, notwithstanding the Document's provision 
that limits Russian flank deployments at January 1996 levels. 
Provisional application also benefits the U.S. and NATO Allies 
by making the enhanced transparency provisions of the Document 
effective immediately and by providing protection against any 
increase in Russian deployments in the flank zone prior to 
entry into force of the Flank Document. The map realignment has 
not been provisionally applied and will not become effective 
unless and until approved by all States Parties. In addition to 
the Treaty's limits on deployments in the realigned flank zone, 
the Document provides for sub-caps on Russian ACVs in specific 
regions removed from the flank, as an assurance against 
excessive concentrations of ACVs in any one area removed from 
the flank zone. The Document also contains provisions that will 
provide greater transparency to other CFE states, including 
additional inspections, and more frequent data submissions by 
Russia and Ukraine.

                            entry into force

    The Flank Document will enter into force when all CFE 
States Parties have deposited confirmation of their approval of 
the Document with the Government of theKingdom of the 
Netherlands. If the Flank Document is not approved by all States 
Parties by May 15, 1997, it will be subject to ``review'' by all CFE 
States Parties.

                               Conclusion

    Accompanying this Report is a Section-by-Section Analysis 
of the Document.
    The Flank Document will achieve a basic U.S. objective: to 
reaffirm the integrity and effectiveness of the CFE Treaty 
amidst Europe's dramatically changing circumstances. It 
resolves concerns that had been raised by Russia and Ukraine 
regarding the impact of the Treaty's flank zone equipment 
limits on their security, particularly in the Caucasus and 
Black Sea region, but in a manner other CFE parties can accept 
and that reinforces the importance and legitimacy of one of the 
Treaty's basic features: regional ceilings. It reaffirms 
Russia's commitment to the basic obligations of the Treaty at a 
time when there have been some voices in Russia and Ukraine 
arguing that the Treaty, negotiated when the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact still existed, was outdated in this respect. I 
believe that the Flank Document reflects an important step in 
preserving European security and will advance the overall 
interests of the United States. For this Document to enter into 
force, all 30 States Parties to it must notify the Depositary 
of their formal approval by May 15, 1997.
    I therefore recommend that the Document be transmitted to 
the Senate for its advice and consent at the earliest possible 
date prior to May 15, 1997.
    Respectfully submitted,
                                                Madeleine Albright.
    Enclosures: As stated.