International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear TerrorismSenate Consideration of Treaty Document 110-4
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[Senate Treaty Document 110-4] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] 110th Congress 1st Session SENATE Treaty Doc. 110-4 _______________________________________________________________________ INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM __________ MESSAGE from THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES transmitting INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM (THE ``CONVENTION''), ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON APRIL 13, 2005, AND SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON SEPTEMBER 14, 2005 July 12, 2007.--Treaty was read the first time, and together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ---------- The White House, July 12, 2007. To the Senate of the United States: I transmit herewith for Senate advice and consent to ratification the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (the ``Convention''), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on April 13, 2005, and signed on behalf of the United States of America on September 14, 2005. As of July 3, 2007, 115 countries have signed the Convention and 23 have submitted their instruments of ratification or accession. The Convention entered into force on July 7, 2007. I also transmit for the information of the Senate a report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention. The Convention imposes binding legal obligations upon States Parties either to submit for prosecution or to extradite any person within their jurisdiction who commits terrorist acts involving radioactive material or a nuclear device as set forth in Article 2 of the Convention, threatens or attempts to commit such an act, participates as an accomplice, organizes or directs others to commit such an offense, or in any other way contributes to the commission of such an offense by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, regardless of where the alleged act took place. States Parties to the Convention will also be obligated to provide one another legal assistance in investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offenses set forth in Article 2, in conformity with any treaties or other arrangements that may exist between them or in accordance with their national law. The recommended legislation necessary to implement the Convention will be submitted to the Congress separately. This Convention is important in the campaign against international terrorism. I recommend, therefore, that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this Convention, subject to the understandings and reservation that are described in the accompanying State Department report. George W. Bush. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL ---------- Department of State, Washington, April 4, 2007. The President, The White House. The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to its transmittal to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, subject to the understandings and reservation set forth in the enclosed Overview, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (``the Convention'') adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on April 13, 2005. You and President Putin of Russia signed the Convention on September 14, 2005, the first day it was opened for signature. As of March 22, 2007, 115 countries have signed the Convention and 18 have submitted their instruments of ratification. The Convention will enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. A detailed Overview of the provisions is enclosed with this Report. Recommended legislation necessary to implement the Convention is being prepared for separate submission to the Congress. The Department of Justice joins in recommending that this Convention be transmitted to the Senate at an early date for its advice and consent to ratification, subject to the understandings to Article 4, 10, and 12, and to the reservation to Article 23. Respectfully submitted. Condoleezza Rice. Enclosure: As stated. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism overview The following is an overview and detailed analysis of the provisions of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (``the Convention''), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (``UNGA'') on April 13, 2005 and signed on behalf of the United States of America on September 14, 2005. On December 17, 1996, the UNGA adopted resolution 51/210, establishing an Ad Hoc Committee tasked with creating, among other instruments, a convention on nuclear terrorism. Culminating in its ninth session, from March 28 to April 1, 2005, the Ad Hoc Committee recommended a draft of the Convention to the General Assembly for adoption. The Convention was adopted, by consensus, by resolution 59/290 on April 13, 2005. The President of the United States and President Putin of Russia signed the Convention on the first day that it was opened for signature at the September 2005 UNGA summit. As of March 22, 2007, 115 countries have signed the Convention and 18 have submitted their instruments of ratification. The Convention will enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. For each country that ratifies, accepts, approves, or accedes to the treaty after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument, the Convention will enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of that country's instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. The Convention is the first multilateral counterterrorism treaty adopted by the UNGA since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Convention provides a legal basis for international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of those who commit offenses involving radioactive material or a nuclear device, or any device that may emit radiation or disperse radioactive material. In creating such a legal framework, the Convention follows the precedents set by numerous counterterrorism conventions to which the United States is already a party, such as the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (``Terrorist Bombings Convention'') and the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (``Terrorism Financing Convention''). Like those earlier conventions, this new Convention requires Parties to criminalize under their domestic laws certain types of offenses, and also requires Parties to extradite or submit for prosecution persons accused of committing, attempting to commit, or aiding in the commission of such offenses. The Convention also provides for the safekeeping and return to one of several appropriate States Parties of radioactive material, devices, and nuclear facilities. Articles 1 and 2 together serve to define the offenses covered by the Convention, with Article 1 incorporating several definitions of phrases used in Article 2. A ``device'' includes any nuclear explosive device, as well as any device that may emit radiation or disperse radioactive material that may, owing to its radiological properties, cause death, serious bodily injury, or substantial damage to property or the environment. A ``nuclear facility'' includes nuclear reactors as well as facilities for the production, storage, processing, or transport of radioactive material. Paragraph 1 of Article 2 describes two categories of principal offenses. First, any person commits an offense under the Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device, as defined in Article 1 above, with the intent either to cause death or serious bodily injury, or to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment. Second, any person commits an offense under the Convention if he or she unlawfully and intentionally uses radioactive material or a device or uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner that releases or risks the release of radioactive material, with the intent either to cause death or serious bodily injury, or to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment, or to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization, or a State to do or refrain from doing an act. The Convention also provides for a range of ancillary offenses. Paragraph 2 of Article 2 provides that any person also commits an offense if that person credibly threatens to commit an offense as set forth in Paragraph 1 or demands by credible threat radioactive material, a device, or nuclear facility. The inclusion of ``threats'' as an ancillary offense is new with this Convention, and is fully warranted by the grave nature of the harm threatened. The threat provision is formulated in a manner that is compatible with threat offenses in U.S. law. There are additional ancillary offenses that are present in the prior counterterrorism conventions. Paragraph 3 provides that any person commits an offense if he or she attempts an offense as set forth in Paragraph 1. Paragraph 4 further provides that any person commits an offense if that person participates as an accomplice in an offense under Paragraphs 1, 2, or 3, organizes or directs others to commit such an offense, or in any other way contributes to the commission of one or more offenses under Paragraphs 1, 2, or 3 by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. These ancillary offenses will strengthen the ability of the international community to investigate, prosecute, and extradite those who conspire or otherwise contribute to the commission of offenses defined in the Convention. There is no separate offense for dumping of radioactive waste, if done without the relevant criminal intent specified in Article 2( 1) of the Convention. Although a few delegations tried to broaden the offense provisions to include dumping, the United States and other nuclear powers succeeded in resisting this expansion on the grounds that it was better addressed in environmental conventions and that such a provision would be outside the focus on the terrorist acts that form the basis of the Convention. Article 3 makes most of the Convention's provisions inapplicable to offenses that lack an international aspect. In generally limiting its scope of application to those cases involving elements from more than one State, the Convention follows the precedent set by prior counterterrorism conventions, such as the Terrorist Bombings Convention, the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, and the 1979 Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. Article 4(1) provides that nothing in the Convention shall affect other rights, obligations, and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law and follows corresponding provisions in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention. Paragraph 2 of Article 4 contains two important exceptions from the scope of the Convention relating to activities of armed forces and military forces of a State. Under the first exception, the Convention does not apply to the activities of ``armed forces during an armed conflict,'' where such activities are governed by international humanitarian law. This exception is identical to the one found in the Terrorist Bombings Convention, and is meant to exclude from the Convention's scope the activities of armed forces, so long as those activities are in the course of an ``armed conflict'' and are governed by international humanitarian law, also known as the ``law of war.'' Given that suspected offenders may claim the benefit of this ``armed conflict'' exception to avoid extradition or prosecution under the Convention, it would be useful for the United States to articulate an understanding similar to the one issued with respect to the Terrorist Bombings Convention regarding the scope of this exception. In this respect, an appropriate source of authority would be the widely accepted provision in Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (``Additional Protocol II''), concluded at Geneva on June 8, 1977, which President Reagan transmitted to the Senate on January 29, 1987, for advice and consent to ratification. Specifically, Additional Protocol II, which applies to non-international armed conflicts, treats situations of ``internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature'' as not being armed conflicts. Through an understanding, the United States would make clear that isolated acts of violence that include the elements of the offenses in Article 2 would be encompassed in the scope of the Convention, and would not fall within the first exception discussed above. As a separate matter, the term ``international humanitarian law'' is not used by the United States armed forces and could be subject to varied interpretations. It therefore would be useful for the United States to articulate in an understanding that, for the purposes of this Convention, this phrase has the same substantive meaning as the phrase ``law of war.'' I therefore recommend that the following understandings to Article 4 be included in the United States instrument of ratification: (1) The United States of America understands that the term ``armed conflict'' in Article 4 of the Convention does not include situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature; (2) The United States of America understands that the term ``international humanitarian law'' in Article 4 of the Convention has the same substantive meaning as the law of war. The second exception in Paragraph 2 of Article 4 also is identical to one found in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and exempts from the Convention's scope of application the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties. The official activities of State military forces are already comprehensively governed by other bodies of international law, such as the international instruments relating to the law of war and the international law of state responsibility. The comprehensive exclusion of official activities of State military forces from the Convention's scope was an important U.S. objective in negotiating the text of this Convention. While such an exclusion might be thought to be implicit in the context of the Convention, the Convention's negotiators thought it best to articulate the exclusion expressly in light of the relatively broad nature of the conduct described in Article 2 and the fact that this conduct overlaps with activities of State military forces. The conduct of certain civilians who act in support of official activities of State military forces are also exempted from the Convention's scope of application. The phrase ``military forces of a State'' is defined broadly in Paragraph 6 of Article I as meaning ``the armed forces of a State which are organized, trained, and equipped under its internal law for the primary purpose of national defense or security and persons acting in support of those armed forces who are under their formal command, control, and responsibility.'' In addition, because the Convention does not reach the official activities of State military forces, it similarly does not reach persons, including non-military policy-making officials of States, who might direct or organize the activities of State military forces or who might otherwise have been subject to the ancillary offenses in Article 2 if State military forces had not been excluded from the Convention's scope of application. Because of the importance of this provision, I recommend that the following understanding to Article 4, which builds on an understanding made with respect to the corresponding provision in the Terrorist Bombings Convention, be included in the United States instrument of ratification: The United States of America understands that, pursuant to Article 4 and Article 1(6), the Convention does not apply to: (a) the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties; (b) civilians who direct or organize the official activities of military forces of a State; or (c) civilians acting in support of the official activities of the military forces of a State, if the civilians are under the formal command, control, and responsibility of those forces. Paragraph 3 of Article 4 clarifies that nothing in the prior provisions is intended to condone or to make lawful otherwise unlawful acts or to preclude otherwise lawful prosecution. Finally, in a provision that confirms the view of the United States, Paragraph 4 provides that the Convention does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way, the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States. Article 5 requires States Parties to make the offenses enumerated in Article 2 criminal offenses punishable under their domestic laws by appropriate penalties that take into account their grave nature. It follows precedents in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention. Article 6 requires States Parties to adopt any measures that may be necessary to ensure the criminal offenses under the Convention, in particular where they are intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other similar nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature. It follows a corresponding provision in the Terrorist Bombings Convention. Article 7 establishes the basis for cooperation between States in the prevention of offenses under the Convention. States Parties must take all practicable measures to prevent and counter-preparations in their own territories for an offense under the Convention, including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups, and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance, or knowingly provide technical assistance or information or engage in the perpetration of offenses. Article 7 also adds significantly to prior counterterrorism conventions in the realm of information sharing. States Parties undertake to exchange accurate and verified information in accordance with their national law, in particular when information is available concerning the commission and preparation of offenses set forth under Article 2, unless doing so would violate national law or jeopardize the security of the concerned State or the physical protection of nuclear material. Paragraph 2 requires States Parties to take steps consistent with their national law to ensure the confidentiality of information received in confidence from another State Party or during an activity carried out to implement the Convention. Each State Party is to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of its competent authorities and liaison points responsible for sending and receiving the information referred to in Article 7(4). For the United States, these roles will be performed by the Operations Center of the Department of State. Article 8 encourages States Parties to make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material, taking into account relevant recommendations and functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under Article 9, each State Party must establish its jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Article 2 when the offense is committed in its territory; on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an aircraft registered under its laws at the time the offense is committed; or where the offense was committed by a national of that State. Each State Party has discretion to establish jurisdiction over offenses set forth in Article 2 where the offense is committed against a national of that State; against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises of that State; by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that State; in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or on board an aircraft that is operated by the Government of that State. Upon becoming a party to the Convention, a State must notify the United Nations Secretary- General of the jurisdiction it has established under its domestic law. Moreover, any changes to this jurisdiction must be immediately notified to the Secretary-General. In addition, a State must take measures, including establishing appropriate jurisdiction, to prosecute offenders present in its territory if the State does not extradite them. None of the jurisdictional provisions of the Convention excludes the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its own national law. Under the terms of Article 9, States Parties may enact a broad array of jurisdictional bases over the offenses enumerated in Article 2. Of significant interest and value to the United States, which has many government facilities outside of U.S. territory, is the Convention's recognition of jurisdiction over attacks against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises. This would give the United States internationally recognized jurisdiction based on this Convention to prosecute in U.S. courts the perpetrators and organizers of such attacks on all U.S. Government facilities abroad, as well as military installations. In addition to the foregoing jurisdictional bases, which correspond to those in the Terrorist Bombings Convention, is the provision in Article 9 allowing States Parties to establish jurisdiction over offenses committed in an attempt to compel a State to do or abstain from doing any act. This provision, which is also of significant interest and value to the United States, provides jurisdiction over offenses under this Convention where terrorists seek to coerce State action even where a national or facility of that State is not the target of the attack. Upon becoming a party to the Convention, a State must notify the United Nations Secretary-General of the jurisdiction it has established under its domestic law. As in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and Terrorism Finance Convention, Article 10 includes provisions relating to alleged offenders arrested or detained for the purpose of extradition or prosecution. Paragraph 1 of Article 10 requires States Parties to take necessary measures under their national law to investigate any information received that an offense has been committed or is being committed in the territory of a State Party or that the offender or alleged offender may be present in its territory. Paragraph 2 requires the State Party to ensure an alleged offender's presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. Paragraph 3 ensures that alleged offenders who are arrested or detained are able to communicate without delay with the appropriate representative of the State of which they are a national, or of a State otherwise entitled to protect them (e.g., a protecting power), or, if they are stateless, the State of habitual residence. The rights set forth in Paragraph 3 must be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the State in the territory of which the offender or alleged offender is present, subject to the provision that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under Paragraph 3 are intended. Upon ratification and entry into force, this Convention would supplement other treaties on the same subject, such as the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights or any applicable bilateral agreement on consular relations. These obligations are essentially coterminous except in the case of stateless persons, which the consular treaties do not address. Article 10, like the Convention as a whole, as well as other similar counterterrorism conventions, is not intended to create judicially enforceable rights. To avoid any unnecessary disputes with our treaty partners, I recommend that an understanding on this point, with respect to both Articles 10 and 12, be included in the United States instrument of ratification. The suggested text of the understanding is set forth following the discussion of Article 12. In a provision of crucial importance for the Convention and the United States, which is consistent with corresponding provisions in prior counterterrorism conventions, Paragraph 1 of Article 11 declares that a State Party that does not extradite an alleged offender found in its territory shall, ``without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offense was committed in its territory,'' submit the case to its competent authorities for purposes of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities are obligated to take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offense of a grave nature under the law of that State. Consistent with prior counterterrorism conventions, Paragraph 2 of Article 11 declares that the obligation in Paragraph 1 to extradite or submit for prosecution can be discharged by the temporary transfer of nationals for trial in another country by those States Parties that cannot otherwise extradite their nationals, provided both the Requesting and Requested States agree. Any sentence imposed would be served in the surrendering State. This provision on temporary transfer of nationals for trial is a useful recognition of this practice by the international community in a binding multilateral legal instrument. Consistent with prior counterterrorism conventions, Article 12 requires States Parties to guarantee to persons taken into custody for the offenses set forth in Article 2 fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international human rights law. Like Article 10 above, this Article is not intended to create judicially enforceable rights. I therefore recommend that the following understanding with respect to Articles 10 and 12 be included in the United States instrument of ratification: The United States of America understands that Articles 10 and 12 impose no obligation on the United States to provide any individual remedy within its judicial system for any person who alleges a violation of those articles or any other terms of this Convention. Consistent with prior counterterrorism conventions, paragraph 1 of Article 13 amends existing extradition treaties between States Parties to include the offenses defined in Article 2 as extraditable offenses and provides that States Parties shall undertake, in subsequent extradition treaties, to include the offenses set forth in Article 2 as extraditable offenses. Paragraph 2 allows States Parties that make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty providing for extradition between the Parties to utilize the Convention to serve as an independent legal basis for extradition between States Parties without an independent extradition treaty. It is a longstanding United States policy to extradite fugitives only to States with which the United States has a bilateral extradition treaty. Thus, we do not expect that the Convention will serve as an independent legal basis for extradition from the United States. Consistent with prior counterterrorism conventions, Article 14 establishes general mutual legal assistance obligations between States Parties in connection with investigation or criminal or extradition proceedings brought in respect of the offenses in Article 2. Article 15 provides that none of the offenses set forth in Article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political offense or an offense connected with a political offense or as an offense inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or mutual legal assistance may not be refused solely on such grounds. This Article applies to extradition and mutual legal assistance requests involving the offenses in Article 2, and provides a useful narrowing of the political offense exception in such cases. Many modern U.S. bilateral extradition treaties already contain provisions that bar application of the political offense exception to extradition with respect to offenses under multilateral conventions to which ``prosecute or extradite'' obligations apply. This provision builds on this trend by making the restriction on the invocation of the political offense exception for requests based on offenses under Article 2 a matter of general application rather than dependent on the terms of individual bilateral law enforcement treaties between the Parties. Corresponding provisions are found in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention. Article 16 provides that nothing in the Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for offenses set forth in Article 2 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to such offenses has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion, or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons. This Article is similar to provisions already included in many bilateral extradition treaties and corresponds to provisions in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention. Article 17 provides and establishes various conditions for the temporary transfer to one State Party, for purposes of assistance under the Convention, of a person in custody in another State Party, provided that the person in question consents and the competent authorities of both States Parties agree. This provision is included in prior counterterrorism treaties and is similar to provisions found in virtually all of the bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties to which the United States is a party. Article 18 provides for the safekeeping and return of radioactive material, devices, and nuclear facilities. Upon seizing or otherwise taking control of any radioactive material, devices, or nuclear facility, following the commission of an offense, a State Party must take steps to render it harmless, ensure that any nuclear material is held in accordance with applicable IAEA safeguards, and have regard to physical protection recommendations and health and safety standards published by the IAEA. Following the completion of any proceedings connected with an offense set forth in Article 2, any radioactive material, device, or nuclear facility must be returned to the State Party to which it belongs, the State Party of which the person owning such radioactive material, device, or nuclear facility is a national or resident, or to the State Party from whose territory it was stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained. Article 18 also establishes procedures for the handling of such material when no originating State exists or when a particular State cannot lawfully return, possess, or accept the material. Article 19 requires the State Party in which the alleged offender is prosecuted to notify the United Nations Secretary- General of the final outcome of criminal proceedings relating to offenses under the Convention. Article 20 requires States Parties to conduct consultations with one another directly or through the United Nations Secretary-General to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention. Article 21 provides that States Parties shall carry out their obligations under the Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. Articles 19 and 21 follow corresponding provisions in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention. Consistent with provisions in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention, Article 22 provides that nothing in the Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other State Party by its domestic law. Paragraph 1 of Article 23 provides that disputes between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention that cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall be submitted at the request of one of them to arbitration, or, failing agreement on the organization of such arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. Paragraph 2 provides that a State may make a declaration excluding this dispute-resolution obligation at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. In October 1985, the United States withdrew its declaration under Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Consistent with that action, I recommend that the following reservation to Paragraph 1 of Article 23 be included in the United States instrument of ratification: (a) Pursuant to Article 23(2) of the Convention, the United States of America declares that it does not consider itself bound by Article 23(1) of the Convention; and (b) The United States of America reserves the right specifically to agree in a particular case to follow the arbitration procedure set forth in Article 23(1) of the Convention or any other procedure for arbitration. This reservation would allow the United States to agree to adjudication by a Chamber of the Court in a particular case, if that were deemed desirable. The United States filed similar reservations with respect to the dispute settlement provisions in the Terrorist Bombings Convention and the Terrorism Financing Convention. As detailed in Article 25, the Convention will enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the United Nations Secretary-General. Pursuant to Article 27, a State Party to the Convention may denounce it by written notice to the United Nations Secretary- General. Denunciation will take effect one year from the date of receipt of the notification by the United Nations Secretary- General.